1 


LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY   OF  CALIFORNIA. 


Receh-ed 


,       288  J'. 


Accessions  No.  -^  %•$  #3         S/itlf  No. 


• 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS: 


BY 


GENERAL  G.  H.  DUFOUR, 

LATELY   AN   OFFICER   OF  TIIK   FRENCH    ENGINEER    CORPS,     GRADUATE   OF    THE    POLY- 
TECHNIC SCHOOL,    AND   COMMANDER   OF  THE    LEGION   OF  HONOR J 
CHIEF  OF  STAFF  OF  THE  SWISS  ARMY. 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  LATEST  FRENCH  EDITION, 


BY 


WM.  P.  CRATGHILL, 


OAPT.    IT.    8.    KNGINEKR8,    LATELY   A88T.    PROF.    OF  CIVIL   AND   MILITARY  ENfllNKEKlXQ 
AND   SCIENCE   OF   WAB   AT  THE  U.    8.   MILITARY    ACADEMY. 


NEW  YORK: 
D.   VAN  NOSTRAND,   192   BROADWAY. 

1864 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1SC3, 
BY  D.  YAN   NOSTRAND, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
Southern  District  of  New  York. 


0.  A.   ALVORD,   STEREOTYPES  AND   PRINTEB, 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 


GENERAL  DUFOUR,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
of  the  Army  of  Switzerland,  is  a  graduate  of  the 
Polytechnic  School  of  France, — the  institution  styled 
by  the  great  Napoleon,  "  The  lien  which  lays  me 
golden  eggs"  General  Dufour  is  a  distinguished 
Civil  and  Military  Engineer,  besides  being  a  prac- 
tical soldier.  In  all  military  matters  he  is  recog- 
nized as  one  of  the  first  authorities  in  Europe. 

The  work  on  Strategy,  Guard  Tactics,  &c.,  of 
which  a  translation  is  now  offered  to  the  public, 
was  prepared  for  the  instruction  of  the  officers  of 
the  Swiss  army.  It  is  written  in  a  plain  and  sim- 
ple style.  The  author  does  not  deal  in  vague  gener- 
alities, but  gives  simple,  practical  directions,  which 
are  illustrated  by  actual  examples  left  by  Napoleon 
and  other  great  generals  of  ancient  and  modern 
times.  It  will  be  observed  that  the  work  contains 
numerous  excellent  plates  embodying  principles  in 
themselves. 


IV  PREFACE. 

That  portion  of  the  original  which  had  a  special 
application  to  the  Swiss  army  has  been  omitted  in 
the  translation.  Some  modifications  and  slight  ad- 
ditions have  been  ventured  upon,  with  a  view  of 
making  the  book  more  acceptable  to  American 
readers. 

U.  S.  MILITARY  ACADEMY, 
West  Point,  N.  T. 


PISTES. 

PAGE. 

FIG.  1.  Relation  of  distances  and  times  of  two  armies  from  a 

common  point 9 

1  2.  Advantage  of  oblique  base  of  operations 13 

"  3.  Concave  base  of  operations 14 

"  4.  Double  lines  of  operations 18 

"  5.  Line  of  operations  towards  flank  of  enemy's  front 24 

"  6.  Advanced  guard,  flankers,  Ac Ill 

"  7.  Preparatory  order  for  battle  of  a  division 140 

"  8.  A  flank  march 142 

"  9.  A  flank  march  of  a  large  body  of  troops 145 

"  10.  Method  of  marching  of  Frederick  the  Great 147 

"  11.  March  of  an  army  containing  five  corps 157 

"  12.  March  of  Russian  army  to  Austerlitz 161 

*'  13.  Napoleon's  march  upon  Ulm  in  1805 163 

"  14.  Echelon  order 181 

"  15.  Order  of  battle,  with  artillery  in  front  of  the  infantry  . .  .  189 
"  16.  Example,  showing  relative  influence  of  strategical  and 

tactical  considerations  in  choosing  point  of  attack. . . .  195 

"  17.  Second  example 197 

"  18.  Point  of  attack,  when  a  wing  of  each  army  is  on  the 

same  range  of  high  ground 199 

"  19.  Case  in  which  an  extensive  turning  movement  ig  proper  .  202 
"  20.  A  method  of  making  an  unexpected  attack  upon  a 

flank 203 

"  21.  An  attack  upon  the  centre 205 

"  22.  Attack  by  a  corps  of  four  divisions 212 

"  23.  Defence  by  a  corps  of  four  divisions 228 

"  24.  Defensive  position  on  high  ground 235 

"25.  Dispositions  of  an  army  in  line,  surprised  on  the  left 

flank 2  40 

"  26.  Defence  of  a  position  in  a  mountainous  country 271 

"  27.  Topographical  sketch 348 

"  28.  Itinerary 3GO 

"  29.  Profile  of  field-work  for  defence  of  a  camp  guard 385 


PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY. 


CHAPTEE  I. 

Art.  I.— Definitions. 

IF  by  the  aid  of  the  histories,  often  very  incomplete, 
of  the  armies  of  ancient  times,  we  examine  their 
operations,  we  shall  find  some  of  them  more  or  less 
similar  to  those  of  modern  armies,  and  others  essen- 
tially different.  The  first  class,  which  relate  to 
grand  movements,  are  within  the  domain  of  Strategy. 
The  second  class  belong  to  Tactics:  such  are  the 
dispositions  for  marches,  for  battles,  of  camps,  &c. 
For  example,  the  famous  expeditions  of  Hannibal 
and  Napoleon  across  the  Alps  presented  more  than 
one  point  of  resemblance  in  their  general  outline, 
but  the  subsequent  combats  and  battles  were  entirely 
dissimilar.  The  general  arrangements  of  campaigns 
depend  upon  the  topography  of  the  theatre  of  the 
war,  which  is  almost  unchanging;  but  special  arrange- 
ments, evolutions,  or,  in  a  word,  Tactics,  vary  with 
the  arms  in  use  at  different  periods.  Much  valuable 


8  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

instruction  in  strategy  may  therefore  be  derived  from 
the  study  of  history :  but  very  grave  errors  would 
result  if  we  attempt  to  apply  in  the  armies  of  the 
present  day  the  tactics  of  the  ancients.  This  fault 
has  been  committed  by  more  than  one  man  of  merit, 
for  want  of  reflection  upon  the  great  differences  be- 
tween our  missile- weapons  and  those  of  the  ancients, 
and  upon  the  resulting  differences  in  the  arrangement 
of  troops  for  combat. 

It  is  evident  from  the  preceding  remarks,  that  strat- 
egy is  in  a  special  manner  the  science  of  generals;  but 
in  tactics  in  its  various  ramifications,  from  the  school 
of  the  platoon  to  the  orders  of  battle,  from  the  bivouac 
of  an  outpost  to  the  camping  of  an  army,  officers  of 
all  grades  are  concerned.  It  would,  however,  be  ped- 
antry to  desire  to  fix  invariable  limits  for  these  two 
branches  of  the  military  art,  for  there  are  many  cases 
where  these  separating  limits  disappear. 

Tactics,  if  we  designate  by  that  term  simply  the 
evolutions  of  the  battle-field,  may,  so  to  speak,  be 
taught  by  mathematical  figures,  because  for  each  of 
these  movements  there  is  a  rule ;  and  this  remark  is 
the  more  applicable  as  we  descend  the  scale  of  mili- 
tary knowledge.  But  the  case  is  not  the  same  with 
strategy,  because  in  its  calculations  account  must  be 
taken  of  time,  of  the  nature  of  roads,  of  obstacles  of 
every  kind,  of  the  quality  of  troops,  of  the  mobility  of 
the  enemy,  and  many  other  things  which  cannot  bo 
measured  by  mathematical  instruments.  For  example, 


DEFINITIONS.  9 

any  one  would  be  greatly  deceived  who  should  be- 
lieve the  point  A  (fig.  1)  sufficiently  protected  by  the 
army  M  against  an  en- 
emy placed  at  N,  a  lit-  A^ ?- 

tie  outside  the  circle  de- 
scribed with  A  as  a  cen- 
tre and  A  M  as  a  radius. 
Athough,  upon  the  sup- 
position that  the  ground 
is  perfectly  level,  the  ar-  Fi&-  *• 

my  M  may  reach  A  before  the  army  N,  which  is  at  a 
greater  distance  ;  still  the  point  A  is  insecure,  because 
the  enemy,  taking  the  initiative  before  the  army  M  is 
informed  of  its  movement,  may  have  so  much  the 
start  as  to  reach  some  point,  as  P,  before  M  is  ready 
to  march ;  the  distance  P  A  being  then  less  than  M  A, 
IS"  could  arrive  at  A  before  M.  It  is  quite  evident 
from  this  illustration,  that  other  things  besides  dis- 
tances are  to  be  taken  into  account  in  calculating  the 
relative  advantages  of  the  positions  of  two  armies 
having  a  common  object  in  view :  the  time  must  be 
considered  which  is  necessary  for  one  army  to  be  in- 
formed of  the  movement  of  the  other ;  and  this  ele- 
ment of  time-  is  the  one  which  in  war  gives  so  many 
advantages  to  the  general  who  takes  the  initiative, 
and  moves  with  activity.  If,  moreover,  the  quality 
of  the  roads  is  variable;  if  rivers  are  to  be  crossed  and 
defiles  to  be  passed — as  the  two  armies  will  seldom  be 
upon  equal  terms  in  these  particulars — the  problem 
1* 


10  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

of  the  relative  advantages  of  positions  becomes  still 
more  complicated,  and  less  capable  of  solution  by  the 
use  of  geometrical  figures ;  genius  alone  can  grasp 
and  solve  it. 

Having  now  explained  what  is  to  be  understood  by 
the  terms  strategy  and  tactics,  to  the  definition  of 
which  too  much  importance  has  perhaps  been  lately 
given,  we  shall  proceed  with  our  subject. 

In  every  operation  in  war  there  are  three  principal 
things  to  be  considered :  the  point  of  departure,  the 
point  to  be  attained,  and  the  direction  to  be  followed 
in  reaching  it.  The  line  upon  which  an  army  rests, 
and  from  which  it  proceeds  to  act  against  the  enemy, 
is  called  the  ~base  of  operations.  Thus,  the  Rhine, 
with  its  fortified  cities,  is  the  base  of  operations  for 
the  French  in  waging  a  war  in  Germany.  The  Alps 
and  Pyrenees,  with  their  forts  and  defiles,  are  the 
bases  for  operations  in  Italy  and  Spain. 

If  the  army  remains  «upon  its  base  of  operations, 
and  limits  itself  to  disputing  its  possession  with  the 
enemy,  it  takes  the  name  of  line  of  defence.  In  fol- 
lowing the  course  of  the  Danube,  we  find  in  succes- 
sion the  lines  of  defence  of  the  Black  Forest ;  of  the 
Iller,  which  has  Ulm  on  the  right ;  of  the  Lech,  pass- 
ing by  Augsburg ;  of  the  Iser,  having  Munich  and 
Landshut  near  it ;  of  the  Inn,  which  empties  into  the 
Danube  at  Passau,  &c.  A  hundred  combats  have 
taken  place  on  these  different  lines. 

The  points  which  it  is  desirable  to  attain,  whose 


BASES  OF  OPERATIONS.  H 

capture  is  important  for  the  success  of  a  campaign, 
are  called  objective  points,  or  objectives  of  operations. 

The  route  pursued  by  an  army  in  reaching  an  ob- 
jective is  the  line  of  operations,  which  takes  the  name 
of  line  of  retreat  when  passed  over  by  an  army  reti- 
ring before  a  victorious  enemy,  in  order  to  gain  some 
line  of  defence  where  a  stand  may  be  made. 

Art.  II.— Bases  of  Operations. 

The  base  of  operations  should  be  formed  of  secure 
points,  where  every  thing  is  collected  that  is  necessary 
for  the  wants  of  the  army,  and  from  which  proceed 
roads  suitable  for  purposes  of  transportation.  If  these 
points  are  joined  by  a  natural  obstacle,  such  as  a  river, 
a  chain  of  mountains,  a  great  marsh,  extensive  forests, 
the  line  is  so  much  the  better,  on  account  of  the  diffi- 
culties presented  to  an  enemy  who  attempts  to  break 
through  it. 

A  base  of  operations  which  has  some  extent  is  bet- 
ter than  a  contracted  one,  because  there  is  more  room 
for  manoeuvres,  and  there  is  less  danger  of  being  cut 
off  from  it.  If,  for  example,  a  single  city  forms  the 
base,  and  an  enemy  gets  possession  of  the  principal 
road  leading  to  it,  the  army  may  be  greatly  embar- 
rassed, as  it  will  be  cut  off  from  all  supplies  and  re- 
enforcements. 

The  form  of  the  base  is  not  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence :  if  it  is  concave  to  the  front,  or  has  its  extremi- 
ties resting  upon  the  sea,  a  great  lake,  or  some  other 


12  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

prominent  obstacle,  the  army  lias  its  wings  much 
more  secure  than  if  the  base  be  convex,  or  presents  a 
point  towards  the  enemy. 

"When  an  army  moves  forward  a  long  distance,  it  i8 
obliged  to  assume  a  new  base  in  advance  of  the  first, 
in  order  to  have  depots  at  hand  from  which  its  sup- 
plies may  be  drawn.  This  new  line  is  called  the 
secondary  base  of  operations  /  it  is  usually  a  river 
crossing  the  line  of  operations,  and  the  towns  upon  it 
are  fortified,  if  they  are  not  already  so,  in  order  to  the 
security  of  the  military  supplies,  &c.,  collected  in  them. 

If  it  is  prudent  to  occupy  successive  bases  of  opera- 
tions as  the  army  advances  into  an  enemy's  country, 
still,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  to  be  necessary  for  it  to 
halt  in  the  midst  of  a  series  of  successes  for  the  pur- 
pose of  making  these  establishments.  Troops  are  left 
behind,  or  others  are  brought  up,  to  occupy  and  fortify 
the  points  to  be  held,  and  establish  depots  of  supplies, 
while  the  army  continues  to  advance  and  profit  by 
the  successes  already  gained. 

When  the  secondary  base  is  not  parallel  to  the 
original  base,  the  more  distant  extremity  must  be 
specially  strengthened  by  art,  because  it  is  more  ex- 
posed to  the  attacks  of  the  enemy.  The  other  ex- 
tremity, from  its  retired  position,  is  more  secure,  but 
affords  less  protection  to  the  army. 

An  oblique  base  gives  an  army  the  opportunity  of 
threatening  the  enemy's  communications  and  base, 
without  exposing  its  own.  Thus  the  army  M  (fig.  2), 


BASES    OF    OPERATIONS. 


13 


00 


Fig.  2. 


whose  original  base  was 
K  S,  parallel  to  P  Q,  the 
base  of  the  enemy,  and 
which  has  as  its  natural 
line  of  operations  A  B, 
perpendicular  to  these 
two  lines,  could  not  make 
an  attempt  upon  the  left 
flank  of  the  army  N  with- 
out running  the  risk  of 
having  its  own  communi-  R 
cations  intercepted,  unless  it  had  taken  a  secondary 
base,  X  Y,  oblique  to  A  B  ;  for  the  positions  would  be 
reciprocal.  If  you  cut  the  line  of  communications  of 
the  enemy,  he  may  take  possession  of  yours,  which  is 
left  open  to  him.  But  with  the  new  base,  the  lateral 
movement  is  not  imprudent,  because  M  always  has  a 
direct  and  safe  retreat  upon  the  point  Y,  which  is 
near  enough  to  give  support.* 

Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  advantages 
of  a  base  of  operations  which  is  concave  towards  the 
enemy,  and  embraces  with  its  wings  the  theatre  of  the 
war.  When  it  is  decidedly  of  this  form,  it  gives 
an  opportunity  of  changing  the  line  of  operations,  if 
necessary,  without  the  loss  of  the  support  of  a  secure 
base.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  the  base  of  opera- 
tions has  the  form  E  S  T  (fig.  3) ;  the  army  M,  basing 


*  Points  like  the  one  in  question,  which  are  marked  in  the  figures 
by  sm;tll  circles,  are  fortified  cities  or  posts. 


14:  PEINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

itself  on  R  S,  may  at 
first  adopt  the  line  A  B 
in  its  operations  against 
the  army  N,  whose  base 
is  P  Q,  and  afterwards, 
if  circumstances  render 
it  necessary  or  advanta- 
geous, the  line  B  C  may 
be  taken  up,  which  has 
S  T  for  a  base.  In  this 
rig.  s.  s  way  the  King  of  Prussia, 

before  the  battle  of  Prague,  passed  from  the  left  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Moldau.  The  passage  having  taken 
place,  he  had  a  new  base  upon  the  frontier  of  Silesia, 
and  abandoned  the  one  he  had  at  first  in  the  defiles 
separating  Bohemia  from  Saxony.  His  first  line  of 
operations  was  from  Dresden  to  Prague  by  the  left 
bank  of  the  Moldau ;  the  second  was  directed  towards 
Neiss,  a  strong  position  in  Silesia ;  the  two  bases 
made  an  angle  with  its  opening  towards  the  enemy. 
In  the  same  way,  in  1809,  Napoleon  had  the  Danube 
for  his  base,  and  a  line  of  operations  directed  towards 
Ingolstadt,  but  found  it  prudent  to  change  both,  pre- 
vious to  the  combat  of  Landshut  and  the  celebrated 
battle  of  Eckmuhl :  he  wrote  to  his  generals  that  he 
was  no  longer  concerned  about  the  Danube;  that  he  had 
chosen  a  new  base  on  the  Lech,  and  that  they  should 
fall  back  to  Augsburg  in  the  event  of  a  failure.  (See 
fig.  12,  p.  161.) 


LINES   OF   OPERATIONS.  15 

When  the  change  in  the  line  of  operations  is  made 
just  before  a  battle,  great  advantages  may  be  gained, 
because  it  deranges  all  the  plans  of  the  enemy.  None 
but  great  generals,  however,  know  when  to  make  such 
a  change. 

The  army  !N"  (fig.  3),  which  has  but  a  single  base, 
P  Q,  must  remain  upon  the  line  B  D,  as  it  otherwise 
runs  the  risk  of  having  its  retreat  cut  off,  in  the  event 
of  a  reverse.  It  is  laid  down  as  a  principle,  that  in 
such  a  case,  even  if  the  forces  were  superior,  the 
abandonment  of  the  line  B  D,  which  is  virtually  the 
abandonment  of  the  base  P  Q,  would  be  wrong. 

When  one  party  controls  the  sea,  a  portion  of  the 
coast,  where  a*  good  harbor  may  be  held  and  furnished 
with  supplies,  is  a  sufficient  base  for  an  invasion. 
The  English  on  different  occasions  have  taken  Co- 
runna,  Lisbon,  and  Dunkirk,  as  bases  of  operations ; 
they  used  every  possible  exertion  to  retain  the  last- 
named  place  as  a  foothold  upon  the  coast  of  France ; 
they  still  hold  Gibraltar,  whence  they  are  ready  to 
penetrate  into  Spain  whenever  it  is  necessary  or 
politic.* 

Art.  III. — L.ine§  of  Operations. 

All  routes  are  not  equally  good  for  moving  against 
an  enemy.  Some  lead  more  directly  and  safely  than 
others  to  the  object  aimed  at ;  some  are  more  or  less 

*  Yera  Cruz  was  the  base  for  the  operation  of  General  Scott's 
campaign  in  Mexico,  in  1847,  as  also  for  that  of  the  French,  in 
1862-'63. 


16  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 


favorable,  according  to  the  relative  inferiority  in  cav- 
alry or  infantry ;  some  abound  more  in  resources,  are 
more  convenient  for  turning  the  enemy's  positions ; 
some  are  more  completely  protected  by  the  base  of 
operations,  &c.  One  of  the  most  valuable  talents  of 
a  general  is  that  which  enables  him  to  estimate  pro- 
perly the  relative  advantages  of  lines  of  operations, 
and  to  choose  the  best. 

The  line  of  operations  is  simple  when  the  army  pro- 
ceeds in  a  single  direction  and  remains  united ;  or,  at 
any  rate,  the  corps  composing  it  are  not  so  distant 
from  each  other  that  they  cannot  afford  mutual  sup- 
port. It  is,  therefore,  the  case  of  roads  being  used 
nearly  parallel,  not  distant  from  each  other,  and 
separated  by  no  great  obstacles. 

The  line  of  operations  is  doiible  when  the  army  is 
divided,  and,  although  proceeding  from  a  single  base, 
the  different  corps  move  along  lines  so  distant  from 
each  other  that  they  could  not  be  concentrated  the 
same  day  upon  a  common  field  of  battle.  "When 
.Marshal  Wurmser,  issuing  from  the  passes  of  the 
Tyrol  to  succor  Mantua,  which  was  besieged  by 
Bonaparte,  divided  his  army  into  two  parts,  with  a 
view  of  advancing  simultaneously  along  the  valleys 
of  the  Adige  and  Chiese,  on  both  sides  of  Lake  Garda, 
he  had  a  double  line  of  operations.  In  the  same  year 
1796,  Jourdan  and  Moreau,  basing  themselves  on  the 
Rhine,  between  Basle  and  Mayence,  manoeuvred  upon 
the  Main  and  Danube  separately :  they  had  a  double 


LINES    OF    OPERATIC 

line  of  operations ;  or,  what  is  nearly  the 
each  had  his  own  line. 

Except  in  the  case  of  being  as  strong  as  the  enemy, 
both  morally  and  physically,  or  stronger  upon  each 
line,  it  is  disadvantageous  to  use  a  double  line  of 
operations,  especially  if  it  is  divergent ;  because  the 
enemy  may  take  a  position  between  the  fractions  of 
the  army,  beat  each  separately,  and  find  himself 
favorably  situated  for  cutting  their  communications. 

The  greater  the  progress  made  upon  divergent  lines 
of  operations,  the  greater  does  the  disadvantage  be- 
come ;  because  the  two  armies  are  constantly  increas- 
ing their  distance  from  each  other,  as  well  as  the  dif- 
ficulty of  affording  mutual  assistance.  The  enemy 
between  them  may  suddenly  move  against  one  of  the 
two  corps  and  beat  it  before  the  other  can  come  up ; 
he  may  then  return  to  the  latter,  with  a  fair  prospect 
of  overwhelming  it  in  the  same  way.  In  the  first  of 
the  two  examples  cited  above,  Marshal  Wurmser  was 
beaten  by  his  young  opponent,  who  took  a  position 
between  his  two  corps  and  destroyed  them  in  succes- 
sion. In  the  second  example,  the  French  generals 
were  forced  to  retreat  by  the  Archduke  Charles,  who 
manoeuvred  upon  a  single  interior  line,  and  had  the 
skill  to  profit  by  his  position.  It  is  evident  from  this 
explanation,  that  although  there  is  danger  of  being 
enveloped  on  a  battle-field,  the  case  changes  when 
the  distances  increase,  and  the  enveloping  corps  are 
too  far  separated  to  be  able  to  combine  their  attacks. 


18  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

Then  the  central  position  is  the  best,  provided  there 
is  a  display  of  the  energy  requisite  in  such  circum- 
stances. Thus,  the  rules  of  strategy  may  differ  essen- 
tially from  those  of  tactics ;  they  may  even  be  di- 
rectly in  opposition  ;  and  this  is  one  of  the  causes 
which  often  render  the  application  of  these  rules  so 
difficult. 

The  only  case  in  which,  even  with  forces  nearly 
equal,  and  when  powerful  motives  urge  to  such  a 
course,  it  is  proper  to  take  a  double  line  in  presence 
of  a  respectable  enemy,  is  that  where  he  moves  upon 
two  diverging  or  widely  separated  lines.  But  then 
the  lines  should  be  interior,  in  order  that  the  two 

J> •%  corps  M  and  M'  (fig.  4) 

/  \  may,  if  necessary,  keep 

/  \  up   an    inter-communi- 

/  \         cation,  give  mutual  as- 

sistance in  case  of  at- 
tack, or  concentrate  sud- 
denly against  one  of  the 
\  hostile  corps  N  N',  which 

A£ \  are  manoeuvring   upon 

Fig.  4.  exterior  lines,  and  can- 

not possibly  take  part  in  the  same  action.  The  prin- 
ciple of  interior  lines,  especially  when  they  are  con- 
verging, is  really  nothing  but  a  modification  of  that 
of  the  simple  line  of  operations.  This  principle  con- 
sists in  always  keeping  your  corps  between  those  of 
the  enemy,  more  nearly  together  than  his,  and  better 


LINES    OF    OPERATIONS.  19 

prepared  to  afford  mutual  support.  It  is,  however,  al- 
ways safer  to  manoeuvre  upon  a  single  line  than  upon 
two,  even  if  they  are  interior ;  especially  so  when 
the  country  is  entirely  open,  and  there  is  no  obstacle 
between  you  and  the  enemy  which  would  permit  him 
to  attack  one  of  your  corps  by  surprise,  before  the 
other  could  rejoin  it. 

We  must  not  confound  with  double  or  multiple  lines 
of  operations  the  different  roads  taken  by  the  corps 
composing  a  single  army,  for  the  purpose  of  reaching 
a  common  place  of  concentration  ;  in  this  case  there 
is  a  common  object  to  be  attained,  and  the  corps  are 
separated  only  temporarily,  to  enable  them  to  move 
more  rapidly,  to  gain  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country,  and  to  subsist  more  easily.  This  separation 
is,  indeed,  the  perfection  of  art,  when  it  is  arranged  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  cease  at  the  moment  the  decisive 
struggle  begins.  It  is  one  of  the  best  means  of  keep- 
ing the  enemy  a  long  time  uncertain  as  to  the  point 
where  he  will  be  attacked.  To  know  how  alternately 
to  separate  the  corps,  in  order  to  embrace  a  great  ex- 
tent of  country  when  circumstances  permit  or  require 
it,  and  to  concentrate  them  rapidly  to  strike  decisive 
blows,  is  one  of  the  most  evident  marks  of  mili- 
tary genius.  ISTo  general  of  modern  times  has  given 
stronger  proofs  of  possessing  this  faculty  than  Na- 
poleon. 

When  a  commander  is  forced  by  the  events  of  the 
war  to  change  the  original  line  of  operations,  and  to 


20  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

take  a  new  one,  the  latter  is  called  an  accidental  line 
of  operations.  But  it  would  be  improper  to  apply 
this  term  to  a  line  taken  voluntarily,  for  the  purpose 
of  marching  upon  a  point  that  the  enemy  may  have 
left  unprotected,  because  he  imagines  himself  threat- 
ened in  another  direction.  The  change  of  the  line, 
far  from  being  an  accident  in  this  case,  is  the  result 
of  a  wise  combination,  and  the  probable  cause  of  im- 
portant successes.  The  primitive  line  would  then  be, 
to  some  extent,  a  pretended  one,  and  the  secondary 
line,  the  real  one  ;  it  should  not,  therefore,  be  called 
accidental :  it  would  be  simply  a  new  line  of  opera- 
tions.* 

It  is  sometimes  proper,  in  a  retrograde  movement, 
to  abandon  the  natural  line  of  retreat  and  adopt  a  new 
one,  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  the  enemy  into  a  part 
of  the  country  where  his  superiority  may  be  diminished 
and  himself  removed  from  his  principal  object.  The 
retreat  is  then  made  parallel  to  the  frontier  instead  of 
along  the  original  line,  which  is  usually  perpendicular 
to  it.  This  line  of  retreat  cannot  be  styled  accidental, 
because  it  is  made  through  choice  and  has  an  advan- 
tage over  the  natural  line.  It  has  received  the  name 
of  parallel  retreat,  which  is  very  appropriate.  Fred- 
erick of  Prussia,  having  been  obliged,  by  the  loss  of 

*  "Washington  made  a  change  in  his  line  of  operations  after  the  ac- 
tion of  Princeton,  in  New  Jersey,  which  is  one  of  the  finest  in  military 
history.  Napoleon  had  projected  a  change  in  his  line  of  operations,  in 
case  he  lost  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  but  victory  rendered  its  execution 
unnecessary. — Hcdkctis  Military  Art  and  Science. 


LINES   OF    OPERATIONS.  21 

a  large  convoy,  to  raise  the  siege  of  Olmutz,  adopted 
a  line  of  retreat  through  Bohemia  in  preference  to 
re-entering  Silesia  by  his  natural  line,  from  Olmutz 
to  Neiss:  by  pursuing  this  course  he  continued, 
though  retreating,  to  wage  the  war  on  his  enemy's 
soil,  and  to  relieve  his  own  provinces  from  its  burdens. 
The  line  was  really  accidental  only  for  his  adversary. 
Success,  in  such  a  case,  requires,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  force  be  not  too  much  interior  to  that  of  the 
pursuing  enemy ;  and,  secondly,  that  the  retiring  army 
be  not  so  far  from  its  owii  territory  as  to  run  the  risk 
of  being  entirely  cut  off.  The  nature  of  the  surround- 
ing country  must  be  considered  in  coming  to  a  con- 
clusion in  this  matter;  if  it  is  difficult,  the  movement 
will  be  the  less  dangerous ;  if  the  country  is,  on  the 
contrary,  free  from  obstacles,  the  safest  road  will 
usually  be  the  shortest. 

If  the  retreat  is  effected  behind  a  line  of  defence 
which  the  enemy  has  forced,  it  may  still  be  parallel 
rather  than  perpendicular  to  that  line,  because  he  is 
thus  withdrawn  from  his  object  of  penetrating  into 
the  interior  and  marching  on  the  capital ;  there  is 
thus  a  gain  of  time,  and  although  the  country  is  not 
relieved  by  it  of  the  burdens  of  the  war,  it  has  all  the 
other  advantages  of  the  parallel  retreat.  The  retreat 
of  Marshal  Soult,  in  1814,  before  the  English  army, 
may  be  classed  under  this  head.  Wellington's  main 
object  was  to  cross  the  Garonne  and  march  upon  Paris; 
Soult  moved  along  the  Pyrenees,  forcing  Wellington 


22  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

to  follow  him  as  far  as  Toulouse,  where  he  detained 
the  English  general  several  days. 

When  a  choice  is  to  be  made  between  several  lines 
of  operations,  that  should  be  preferred  which  offers 
the  greatest  facilities  for  subsistence — where  the  army 
will  be  safest  and  have  the  greatest  advantages.  If 
it  is  superior  in  cavalry,  the  level  country  will  be 
better  for  its  operations ;  in  the  contrary  case,  broken 
or  mountainous  country  will  probably  be  more  suitable. 
A  line  of  operations  parallel  and  near  to  a  water- 
course is  very  favorable,  because  the  army  has  at  once 
a  support  for  one  of  its  wings,  and  great  additional 
facilities  for  transportation.  The  position  of  the  ene- 
my has  also  a  great  influence  upon  the  choice  of  a  line 
of  operations.  If  he  is  spread  out  in  cantonments 
over  a  large  extent  of  country,  that  route  will  be  the 
best  which  leads  into  the  midst  of  his  isolated  corps, 
and  gives  an  assailant  the  opportunity  of  separating 
them  still  more.  If,  in  these  circumstances,  the  line 
of  operations  were  directed  towards  one  of  the  extremi- 
ties of  the  hostile  army,  its  corps  would  be  pressed 
back  towards  each  other,  and  their  concentration 
would  be  rather  expedited  than  hindered.  If,  how- 
ever, the  enemy  is  concentrated,  a  direction  should  be 
chosen  by  which  one  of  his  flanks  may  be  threatened, 
provided  your  own  line  runs  no  risk  of  being  cut ; 
the  first  principle  is  never  to  uncover  the  base  or  the 
line  of  operations.  The  plan  to  be  adopted  depends 
also  upon  the  character  and  capacity  of  the  opposing 


LINES   OF   OPERATIONS.  23 

generals,  the  quality  of  the  troops,  their  state  of  dis- 
cipline, &c.  Turenne,  when  he  had  to  contend 
against  the  great  Conde,  by  no  means  undertook  what 
would  have  been  simple  and  easy  in  presence  of  infe- 
rior men.  Upon  one  occasion,  in  the  campaign  of 
1654,  he  lost  several  men  by  passing  before  the  Span- 
ish lines  within  range,  which  gave  rise  to  some  re- 
marks from  several  officers  who  were  with  him ;  he 
replied  :  u  It  is  true,  this  movement  would  be  impru- 
dent if  made  in  presence  of  Conde  ;  but  I  desire  to 
examine  this  position  closely,  and  I  know  the  customs 
of  the  Spanish  service  are  such,  that  before  the  arch- 
duke is  informed  of  our  proceedings,  has  given  notice 
of  them  to  Prince  de  Conde  and  received  his  advice, 
I  shall  be  back  to  my  camp."  There  spoke  a  man 
who  was  capable  of  judging  in  those  matters  which 
belong  to  the  divine  part  of  the  art.  It  is  in  these 
delicate  distinctions  that  is  manifested  a  true  genius 
fur  war. 

It  has  been  stated  that  the  line  of  operations  should 
be  directed  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy  when  he 
keeps  united,  if  it  can  be  done  without  exposing  your 
own.  It  almost  always  happens  that  the  turner  is 
turned ;  and  this  is  strictly  true  in  a  country  free 
from  obstacles,  when  the  bases  of  the  two  armies  are 
nearly  parallel  and  equal.  In  fact,  the  army  M 
(fig.  5)  cannot  make  an  attempt  upon  the  commu- 
nications of  the  army  N,  except  by  following  a  line 
of  operations,  S  B,  which  is  oblique  to  the  base,  R  S, 


PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 


?-  5- 


and  supported  by  it  at 
its  extremity  ;  but  then 
the  central  line  A  B 
and  the  communication 
on  the  left  are  uncovered, 
and  the  advantages  of 
the  extended  base  are  lost, 
since  the  only  line  of  re- 
\  treat  left  is  upon  the 
\  point  S.  It  is  then  only 
"f  in  the  case  where  natural 
obstacles  enable  a  few 
troops  to  defend  the  communications,  B  R  and  B  A, 
against  attack  from  the  enemy,  that  the  principal  line 
of  operations  may  probably  be  directed  towards  the 
flank  of  the  enemy,  because  by  throwing  forward  the 
small  corps,  m  and  m\  upon  the  other  lines,  the  base,  R  S, 
is  covered,  while  at  the  same  time  the  enemy  is  threat- 
ened upon  several  points.  It  may  be  stated  generally, 
that  it  is  only  when  favored  by  natural  obstacles  in 
this  manner,  movements  may,  without  very  great  risk, 
be  made  against  the  flanks  of  an  enemy.  The  influence 
of  the  features  of  ground  is  always  manifested  in  the 
resolutions  arrived  at  in  war ;  the  study  of  topography 
is,  therefore,  of  the  highest  importance  for  officers  of 
all  grades,  but  especially  for  those  who  are  intrusted 
with  important  commands. 

A  line  of  operations  which  is  too  extended,  rela* 
tively  to  its  base,  loses  a  portion  of  the  advantages  it 


STRATEGIC   POINTS.  25 

may  possess,  on  account  of  the  opportunity  afforded 
an  enemy  of  cutting  it.  It  is  this  consideration  which 
induces  a  general,  as  he  advances  from  his  primitive 
base,  to  adopt  secondary  ones.  To  desire  to  establish 
a  fixed  relation  between  the  length  of  a  line  of  opera- 
tions and  the  extent  of  a  base  would  be  ridiculous 
pedantry.  The  triangle  formed  by  connecting  the  po- 
sition of  the  army  with  the  extremities  of  the  base  may 
vary  infinitely.  Its  form  and  dimensions  generally 
do  not  depend  upon  our  will.  It  is  sufficient  to  say, 
that  the  greater  the  extent  of  the  base,  the  more  dis- 
tant may  be  the  operations  of  the  army  without  having 
its  communications  endangered ;  nearly  in  the  same 
way  that  a  pyramid  may,  with  equal  stability,  have 
a  greater  height  as  its  base  is  broader. 

Art.  IV.— Strategic  Points. 

Objective  points  are  also  called  strategic  points ;  and 
we  include  under  this  denomination  not  only  those 
which  may  be  considered  as  the  principal  objects  to 
be  attained,  but  also  those  whose  occupation  is  of 
manifest  advantage  to  the  army. 

A  capital  city  is  a  strategic  point  of  great  impor- 
tance, because  it  regulates  or  greatly  influences  the 
public  opinion  of  the  nation,  contains  abundant  re- 
sources of  every  kind,  the  loss  of  which  may  greatly 
paralyze  the  enemy  ;  and  to  the  minds  of  a  large  por- 
tion of  the  people  all  hope  of  successful  defence  is 


26  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

lost  when  an  invading  army  has  reached  the  heart  of 
the  state.  If  by  seizing  the  capital  no  other  than  the 
moral  eifect  is  produced  of  discouraging  the  people, 
it  is  still  a  worthy  object  of  the  efforts  of  an  invading 
army.* 

A  point  is  strategic  when  it  is  the  key  of  several 
important  communications,  when  it  controls  the  navi- 
gation of  a  river  or  defends  some  important  passage. 
For  instance,  Ratisbon,  on  the  Danube,  wThich  is  the 
centre  of  important  communications  on  both  banks 
of  the  river,  has  always  been  shown,  in  the  wars  in 
Germany,  to  be  a  strategic  point  for  the  possession 
of  which  the  belligerents  have  made  great  efforts. 
Smolensk  on  the  Borysthenes  is  another ;  this  city  is 
in  the  interval  between  the  Borysthenes  and  the  Meja, 
the  key  of  the  Russian  empire  on  the  side  of  Moscow. 
Hence,  in  1812,  the  Russians  were  as  anxious  to  hold 
this  point  as  the  French  to  seize  it.  The  city  of  Lan- 
gres,  situated  near  the  sources  of  several  of  the 

*  The  possession  of  Genoa,  Turin,  Alexandria,  Milan,  &c.,  in  1796, 
both  from  their  political  and  military  importance,  had  a  decided  influ- 
ence upon  the  results  of  the  war  in  these  several  states.  In  the  same 
•way  Venice,  Rome,  and  Naples,  in  179Y;  Vienna,  in  1805  and  1809. 
Berlin,  in  1806;  Madrid,  in  1808;  andParis,  in  1814  and  1815.  IfHanni- 
bal  had  captured  the  capital  immediately  after  the  battle  of  Cannte,  the 
Roman  power  would  have  been  destroyed.  The  taking  of  Washing- 
ton, in  1814,  had  little  or  no  influence  on  the  war,  for  the  place  was 
then  of  no  importance  in  itself  and  was  a  merely  nominal  capital.  It, 
however,  greatly  influenced  our  reputation  abroad,  and  required  many 
brilliant  successes  to  wash  the  blot  from  our  national  escutcheon. 
The  possession  of  the  capital  is  of  prime  importance  in  a  civil  war,  as 
recent  evonts  in  America  have  proved. — HALLEOK. 


STRATEGIC    POINTS.  27 

streams  which  water  France,  is  another  strategic  point. 
Alexandria,  in  Piedmont,  as  a  fortress  beyond  the  Alps, 
is  equally  so ;  its  possession  is  indispensable  for  holding 
the  plains  of  the  Po.  Soria,  upon  the  plateau  of  Old 
Castile,  is  a,lso  a  strategic  point,  although  that  city 
has  nothing  in  itself  to  make  its  conquest  desirable ; 
it  is  rather  the  position  which  is  important,  because, 
like  Langres,  it  is  near  the  source  of  several  rivers.* 
In  level  countries  there  are  few  points  that  are  strate- 
gic from  their  positions ;  they  become  so  on  account 
of  the  fortifications  which  surround  them,  as  well  as 
the  supplies  and  resources  they  furnish.  Many  of 
these  points  are  found  in  wooded,  undulating  coun- 
tries, cut  up  by  rivers  and  lakes.  Such  countries  are 
usually  thickly  settled. 

In  mountainous  regions,  like  the  Alps  and  the 
Pyrenees,  the  number  of  strategic  points  is  some- 
what limited,  but  they  are  very  distinctly  marked: 
they  are  found  at  the  entrances  of  defiles,  at  the 
points  whence  several  valleys  branch  out,  at  the  junc- 
tions of  roads.  The  high  ground  at  the  point  where 
several  ridges  meet  is  also  strategic,  for  the  troops  oc- 
cupying it  may  select  the  route  by  which  to  descend : 
their  movements  are  from  a  central  point  outwards, 
while  those  of  the  enemy  can  only  be  accomplished 

*  Cairo,  at  the  junction  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi  Rivers,  is  a 
strategic  point  of  great  importance.  Paducah,  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Tennessee,  is  also  important.  New  York,  New  Orleans,  Fortress  Mon- 
roe, St.  Louis,  and  Chattanooga  are  strategic  points. 


28  PRINCIPLES   OF   STEATEGY. 

by  long  circuits  made  to  pass  around  the  mountains 
which  it  may  be  impossible  to  cross.  If  he  has  once 
fairly  started  in  a  valley,  he  is  in  a  measure  forced  to 
remain  in  it,  as  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  him  to 
pass  from  one  to  another ;  but  the  troops  stationed  at 
the  head  of  the  valleys  may  use  them  at  pleasure  and 
in  turn  if  necessary. 

Art.  V.— Plan  of  a  Campaign. 

Before  undertaking  a  war  or  any  operation,  a  cer- 
tain object  to  be  attained  must  be  decided  upon ;  the 
direction  of  the  necessary  movement  must  be  fixed 
in  advance  and  as  accurately  as  possible ;  there  must 
be  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  real  object  aimed 
at,  in  order  that  every  thing  may  be  prearranged  and 
nothing  left  to  chance.  This  is  called  making  the 
plan  of  the  campaign :  the  definition  itself  implies 
that  the  war  is  to  be  offensive. 

It  is  evident  that  this  plan  should  be  limited  to  the 
grand  strategic  operations  and  be  only  an  outline  of 
them,  leaving  as  much  latitude  as  possible  for  choice 
of  movements  of  detail  and  execution.  It  would  be 
absurd  to  pretend  to  dictate  to  a  general  what  he 
ought  to  do  from  day  to  day,  for,  after  the  first 
marches,  and  he  has  reached  the  theatre  of  the  ene- 
my's operations,  he  no  longer  does  what  he  likes  but 
what  he  can  :  marches,  manoeuvres,  combats  depend 
upon  imperious  circumstances  ;  the  determinations  to 
make  them  are  usually  sudden  and  result  from  the  posi- 


PLAN  OF  A  CAMPAIGN.  29 

tion,  resources,  forces,  and  condition  of  the  enemy.  The 
general  should  be  perfectly  untrammelled  in  carrying 
out  a  plan  of  campaign,  even  if  it  has  been  marked 
out  for  him  by  higher  authority ;  but  it  is  still  better, 
after  selecting  a  competent  man,  to  let  him  make  his 
own  plan  and  attend  also  to  its  execution,  as  he,  be- 
ing more  interested  in  its  success  than  any  one  else, 
will  strive  to  make  it  succeed. 

In  making  a  plan  of  campaign,  maps  are  necessary, 
and  for  this  purpose  those  upon  a  small  scale  are  the 
best,  as  they  show  a  whole  country  together.  It  is 
enough  for  them  to  indicate  exactly  the  position  of 
fortified  places,  water-courses,  the  main  roads,  moun- 
tain ranges,  frontiers.  Those  maps  are  best  which 
are  most  distinctly  marked,  because  they  are  more 
easily  consulted.  Maps  on  a  large  scale,  or  topo- 
graphical maps,  are  useful  in  determining  questions 
of  detail,  but  the  number  of  sheets  such  maps  usual- 
ly consist  of  renders  them  inconvenient  for  use  in 
making  the  general  arrangements  of  a  plan  of  a  cam- 
paign. The  topographical  maps  will  be  consulted 
when  a  camp  is  to  be  established,  a  position  taken 
up,  an  order  of  battle  agreed  upon. 

The  plan  of  the  campaign  indicates  the  places  of 
concentration  of  troops,  the  base  and  line  of  opera- 
tions, the  strategic  points  to  be  attained. 

The  choice  of  the  points  of  concentration  of  troops 
is  regulated  not  only  by  the  consideration  of  subsist- 
ence, although  this  is  always  very  important,  but  by 


30  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

the  desire  to  occupy  such  positions  as  will  keep  the 
enemy  uncertain  where  he  is  to  be  attacked,  and 
which  permit  the  initiative  to  be  taken  promptly  and 
in  strong  force.  The  distance  of  the  different  points 
of  assembly  should  be  so  calculated  that  all  the  corps 
may  arrive  at  the  same  time  at  the  general  rendez- 
vous in  order  to  pass  the  frontier  together.  Thus,  in 
1815,  Napoleon  having  determined  to  attack  the  al- 
lied armies,  directed  his  forces  towards  Belgium,  which 
was  occupied  by  the  English  and  Prussians.  They 
were  covering  all  the  space  between  Liege,  Mons, 
and  Brussels,  for  a  distance  of  sixty  or  seventy  miles 
along  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse,  being  "principally 
established  between  Mons  and  Namur.  Napoleon 
assembled  his  forces  at  Maubeuge,  Beaumont,  and 
Philippeville,  thus  threatening  Mons,  Brussels,  and 
Namur,  and  forcing  the  enemy  to  remain  separated. 
He  resolved  to  pass  the  frontier  at  Charleroi,  with  a 
view  of  assailing  the  centre  of  the  hostile  canton- 
ments. Calculating  the  distance,  he  caused  the  sev- 
eral corps  to  set  out  at  hours  which  enabled  them  to 
arrive  simultaneously  at  Charleroi.  The  place  was 
readily  taken.  They  passed  the  Sambre,  and  on  the 
same  day,  June  15th,  camped  in  the  enemy's  coun- 
try. This  is  an  interesting  example :  it  demonstrates 
the  influence  of  a  good  choice  of  places  of  assembly 
upon  the  first  successes,  the  moral  effect  of  which  is 
so  great.  The  saine  general,  two  years  previously, 
operating  upon  a  vastly  greater  scale,  obtained  the 


PLAN   OF   A   CAMPAIGN.  31 

same  precision  in  the  results  of  his  arrangements. 
He  had  assembled  his  corps  on  the  Niemen;  he  sent 
them  by  different  roads  and  at  different  times  to- 
wards Ostrowno,  where  they  arrived,  after  long  march- 
es, at  the  moment  when  the  two  armies  were  about  to 
come  to  blows.  General  Barclay,  with  Fabian  pru- 
dence, avoided  the  effect  of  this  formidable  concen- 
tration, by  abandoning  the  position  to  his  adversary. 
In  a  plan  of  campaign,  the  base  of  operations  can 
only  be  a  subject  of  discussion  when  there  is  a  choice 
between  two  frontiers,  and  there  is  a  hesitation  which  to 
take.  For  example,  if  a  war  were  impending  between 
France  and  Austria,  and  France,  as  she  usually  does, 
wished  to  take  the  offensive,  there  would  be  occasion 
for  discussing  the  relative  advantages  of  the  Rhine 
frontier  or  that  of  the  Alps.  This  is  the  time  when 
the  general  form  of  the  base  must  be  considered,  and 
its  influence  upon  the  object  in  view.  If  it  is  concave, 
the  army  after  advancing  will  have  a  secure  support 
for  its  wings  and  rear.  If  it  forms  a  salient  angle,  as 
does  Silesia  in  the  Austrian  States,  there  is  the  advan- 
tage of  being  enabled,  with  a  single  body  of  troops,  to 
keep  the  enemy  uncertain  as  to  the  quarter  to  be  at- 
tacked; and  he  is  thus  obliged  to  spread  his  forces 
along  the  whole  circuit  to  be  guarded,  which  is  very 
unfortunate  for  him.  But  even  if  he  remains  united, 
there  is  every  facility  for  attracting  his  attention  in 
one  direction,  suddenly  striking  a  blow  in  the  other  by 
the  shortest  route3  and  taking  him  unawares.  This 


32  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

salient  form  is  therefore  advantageous  for  opening  a 
campaign  ;  but  the  army  runs  the  risk,  in  case  of  a 
defeat,  of  being  separated  from  its  base.  The  case  is 
reversed  with  a  concave  base. 

The  importance  of  the  base  of  operations  increases 
with  its  extent,  its  defensive  properties,  its  resources 
of  every  kind,  its  vicinity  to  depots,  the  facilities  for 
reaching  it  from  the  interior,  &c.  If  it  is  perpendicu- 
lar to  the  proposed  line  of  operations,  and  extends  be- 
yond it  on  both  sides,  it  is  better  than  if  it  were  oblique, 
and  only  supported  the  line  on  one  side. 

When,  therefore,  in  a  plan  of  campaign,  there  is  an 
opportunity  to  compare  the  relative  advantages  of  two 
bases  of  operations,  not  only  should  the  character  of 
the  base  be  considered,  as  a  more  or  less  solid  support 
for  the  army,  a  greater  or  less  obstacle  to  the  enemy, 
but  also  its  form  and  relative  position. 

Of  two  frontiers,  one  necessarily  has  preponderating 
advantages ;  it  should  therefore  be  selected  as  the  base 
of  operations,  and  all  the  disposable  means  of  attack 
should  be  collected  upon  it.  A  fault  is  committed  in 
proceeding  from  two  bases  at  the  same  time.  It  is 
much  better  to  stand  on  the  defensive  on  one  frontier, 
in  order  to  collect  more  troops  on  the  other,  and  secure 
more  chances  of  success.  Success  seldom  follows  a 
division  of  forces  ;  and  the  same  reasons  which  make 
double  lines  of  operations  dangerous,  are  equally  power- 
ful against  attempts  to  act  offensively  from  two  distinct 
bases.  There  should,  on  the  contrary,  always  be  the 


PLAN    OF   A    CAMPAIGN.  33 

greatest  possible  concentration  of  effort,  in  order  that 
successes  which  are  gained  may  be  decisive;  and 
they  will  always  be  more  so  upon  the  important  fron- 
tier than  upon  the  other;  all  proper  means  of  strength- 
ening the  one,  without  too  much  weakening  the  power 
of  defence  of  the  other,  should  be  adopted ;  in  the 
same  manner  upon  a  battle-field,  troops  are  withdrawn 
from  the  wing  that  is  less  threatened,  in  order  to  re-en- 
force that  one  which  is  to  decide  the  fate  of  the  conflict. 
The  discussion  of  the  different  lines  of  operations 
that  may  be  followed,  is  an  essential  part  of  the  plan 
of  a  campaign.  In  fact,  it  is  not  with  these  lines  as 
with  the  base,  which  oftentimes  gives  no  ground  for 
discussion,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  determined  before- 
hand by  the  geographical  position  of  the  country  where 
the  war  is  to  be  waged.  Lines  of  operations,  on  the 
contrary,  may  be  very  different,  because  there  are  al- 
most always  several  routes  leading  to  the  same  object. 
There  are  so  many  things  to  be  considered,  that  the 
choice  of  the  best  line  is  always  a  very  delicate  matter. 
In  this,  the  general  shows  his  true  conception  of  the 
principles  of  the  art.  It  is  scarcely  possible  to  lay 
down  other  rules  on  this  subject  than  those  stated  in 
Article  III.  It  may  be  added  that,  in  discussing  these 
lines,  effective  distances  are  to  be  calculated,  that  is  to 
say,  the  times  actually  necessary  for  passing  over 
them,  and  not  the  distances  on  the  map ;  all  things 
else  being  equal,  the  shortest  route  should  be  adopted  ; 
the  best  road  will  be  used  when  there  are  no  strong 


34:  PKIXCIPLES    OF    STEATEGY. 

reasons  for  leaving  it,  for  troops  march  much  more 
rapidly  along  a  broad  and  convenient  road,  than 
through  narrow  and  difficult  paths.  The  character  of 
the  cities  to  be  passed,  defiles,  obstacles,  may  oblige 
the  use  of  indirect  and  bad  roads ;  for  the  mere  diffi- 
culties of  a  march  are  not  usually  so  great  as  those  of 
capturing  cities  and  forcing  denies.  When  the  army, 
in  advancing,  is  enabled  to  rest  one  of  its  wings  upon 
a  natural  obstacle,  the  best  line  of  operations  will  be 
the  one  which  is  nearest  to  that  obstacle,  because 
during  the  march  it  will  be  better  covered  by  the 
army,  whose  front  is  almost  always  several  miles  in 
extent ;  at  any  rate,  while  a  battle  is  not  imminent. 
When  the  two  wings  of  the  army  are  unsupported,  the 
line  of  operations  should  proceed  from  the  middle  of  the 
front,  in  order  to  be,  as  far  as  possible  in  this  unfavor- 
able case,  equally  covered  on  both  sides.  As  a  gene- 
ral rule,  in  a  march  as  in  a  battle,  the  line  of  opera- 
tions must  not  be  uncovered;  all  the  arrangements 
should,  on  the  contrary,  tend  to  cover  and  defend  it 
as  much  as  possible. 

The  choice  of  objective  points  also  requires  much 
sagacity,  as  the  possession  of  one  may  give  great  mili- 
tary advantages,  such  as  the  control  of  the  navigation 
of  a  river  or  the  passage  across  it,  or  the  control  of 
several  roads  or  valleys  having  a  common  point,  or  an 
essential  line  of  retreat,  &c.  ;  another  may  have  ad- 
vantages of  a  different  kind,  but  no  less  important,  such 
as  provisions,  munitions,  arms,  clothing,  equipments, 


PLAN    OF   DEFENCE.  35 

tools,  money, — all  indispensable  articles,  which  must  be 
carried  with  the  army,  if  they  cannot  be  obtained 
along  the  way.  The  capital,  large  cities  abounding 
in  resources  of  every  kind,  are  the  principal  points  to 
be  occupied,  and  are  those  which,  in  a  plan  of  cam- 
paign, should  figure  as  objective  points  of  the  first  im- 
portance. But  this  subject  has  been  already  treated 
to  some  extent  in  the  preceding  article. 

Art.  VI.— Plan  of  Defence. 

The  plan  of  a  defensive  campaign  may  be  better 
termed  plan  of  defence.  It  consists,  in  the  first  place, 
in  determining  the  character  of  the  war  to  be  under- 
taken, which  depends  on  national  character,  the  re- 
sources of  the  country,  its  topography,  and  climate. 
The  French  defend  themselves  by  attacking;  the  Ger- 
mans patiently  wage  a  methodical  war  behind  their 
frontiers  ;  the  Spaniards  strive  to  exterminate  their 
adversaries  in  detail ;  the  Russians,  in  1812,  were  seen 
to  devastate  their  country  and  burn  their  capital,  to 
deprive  the  invader  of  necessary  resources.  People 
who  are  courageous,  but  unaccustomed  to  privations, 
will  not  protract  a  war,  but  strive  to  end  it  by  bril- 
liant actions ;  they  will  strike  heavy  blows,  preferring 
a  single  great  battle,  where  defeat  even  will  be  glori- 
ous, to  a  series  of  partial  engagements,  which  exhaust 
the  country  and  lead  to  no  decisive  result. 

To  carry  the  war  into  the  territory  of  the  invader  or 
of  his  allies,  is  a  sure  means  of  throwing  part  of  the 


36  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

burden  upon  their  shoulders  and  thwarting  their 
plans.  The  morale  of  troops  is  raised  by  a  proceeding 
of  this  kind,  and  the  chances  of  success  are  increased. 
But  to  reap  success  from  such  a  plan,  the  forces  must 
not  be  too  inferior,  and  the  conformation  of  the  fron- 
tiers must  be  favorable.  The  army  must  not  go  too 
far  from  its  own  territory,  in  order  to  avoid  being  com- 
promised. The  zone  of  country  .between  the  army 
and  its  frontiers  will  supply  its  wants,  and  should  be 
defended  to  the  last  extremity,  by  bold  attacks,  with 
the  entire  disposable  force,  upon  that  corps  of  the 
enemy  which  is  most  conveniently  situated  for  the 
purpose.  If  the  stroke  is  successful,  the  army  may 
pass  to  the  offensive,  giving  an  entirely  new  phase  to 
the  war.  If  it  is  unsuccessful,  there  should  be  still 
greater  concentration,  strong  positions  for  camps 
should  be  selected,  or  the  army  should  retire  under 
shelter  of  some  fortified  city,  or  cover  itself  by  means 
of  a  river,  &c.  You  thus  oblige  the  enemy  to  follow 
you,  and  to  move  in  a  zone  of  which  the  devastation 
is  entirely  at  his  expense.  Montecuculi,  in  his  Me- 
moirs, strongly  recommends  this  kind  of  a  war  for  the 
defensive.  He  says :  "  On  the  territory  of  an  adver- 
sary, malcontents  are  enlisted  in  your  favor  ;  there  is 
no  need  for  concern  about  supplies  of  men,  money, 
and  other  necessaries,  as  these  only  become  exhausted 
in  the  theatre  of  war,  which  is  upon  your  adversary's 
soil." 

An  army  fighting  upon  its  own  territory  causes, 


PLAN   OF   DEFENCE.  37 

necessarily,  much  injury  to  the  people,  but  there  are 
less  risks  to  be  run  ;  the  population  is  favorable,  and 
gives  assistance  of  every  kind;  every  individual  is  a 
spy  upon  the  enemy,  and  gives  information  of  his 
operations  ;  the  battles  are  fought  on  positions  ex- 
amined, and  sometimes  prepared,  in  advance,  where 
the  enemy  is  obliged  to  come  after  the  army  ;  it  may 
move  in  any  direction,  because  every  space  not  occu- 
pied by  the  enemy  may  serve  for  a  base  of  operations ; 
there  is  every  facility  for  threatening  his  communica- 
tions ;  he  is  forced  to  make  detachments  for  the 
purpose  of  guarding  the  cities  he  has  taken,  and  to 
secure  his  subsequent  movements.  These  detachments 
are  fair  game — they  may  be  separately  attacked  and 
beaten,  or  surrounded.  When  fortune  crowns  with 
success  the  efforts  of  the  defenders,  their  victories  are 
much  more  decisive  if  obtained  within  their  own 
territories  than  beyond  them,  because  the  vanquished 
enemy  has  defiles  to  repass,  and  a  retreat  to  effect, 
in  the  midst  of  a  population  which  is  hostile  and  ready 
to  fall  upon  him.  But,  in  order  that  such  a  method 
of  acting  defensively  be  successful,  there  must  be 
unity  of  intention  and  effort  in  the  nation, — no  civil 
discords  to  divide  it  into  two  hostile  parties, — and  the 
dread  of  foreign  domination  must  exist  in  every  heart. 
What  can  a  divided  people  do  in  presence  of  an 
enterprising  enemy  ?  What  can  the  army  do,  even 
when  most  faithful  to  its  flag,  its  own  honor,  and 
organized  in  the  most  perfect  manner,  if  it  is  not 


38  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

seconded  by  the  population, — if  it  meets  nothing  but 
inertness  and  lukewarmness,  or  hostility,  where  it 
should  receive  assistance,  support,  co-operation  ?  This 
essential  condition,  without  which  defence  is  impos- 
sible, should,  therefore,  be  assumed  as  satisfied  in 
treating  a  question  of  this  kind. 

A  frontier  which  has  its  convexity  turned  to  the 
enemy  is  favorable  for  a  defence  made  within  its  limits 
at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  and  may  lead  to  the 
adoption  of  that  method.  In  fact,  from  a  central 
point  which  is  strongly  held,  the  wThole  circuit  of 
vulnerable  frontier  may  be  observed,  and  the  army 
may  stand  ready  to  move  by  the  shortest  route  to  the 
point  threatened.  Thus,  the  Piedrnontese,  by  occupy- 
ing a  position  near  Turin,  may  reply  to  any  attack 
made  upon  them  from  the  surrounding  Alps. 

The  character  of  the  war  being  decided  upon,  the 
details  are  next  to  be  considered,  and  these  properly 
compose  the  plan  of  defence.  The  determination  of 
the  places  where  a  suitable  resistance  may  be  made  ; 
of  those  to  which  the  forces  shall  retreat  in  case  of 
reverse,  and  the  routes  to  be  pursued ;  the  disposition 
of  the  troops  while  expecting  the  enemy's  approach  ; 
the  manner  of  anticipating  him,  wherever  he  may 
come ;  the  indication  of  points  for  concentration 
behind  the  frontier,  as  soon  as  his  projects  are 
developed  ;  the  method  of  supporting  the  advanced 
corps,  and  those  in  observation,  by  central  reserves ; 
finally,  the  designation  of  points  to  be  fortified  by  the 


PLAN    OF   DEFENCE.  39 

appliances  of  art,  bridges  to  be  destroyed,  roads  to  be 
mended,  &c. :  these  are  the  objects  to  be  attended  to 
in  making  a  plan  of  defence. 

The  local  topography  will  indicate  the  appropriate 
military  dispositions  to  be  adopted.  It  is  scarcely 
possible  to  lay  down  rules  on  this  point ;  all  that  can 
be  said  is,  that  a  too  great  scattering  of  the  troops 
is  always  dangerous  ;  consequently,  far  from  thinking 
of  guarding  all  the  passages,  some  must  be  abandoned, 
that  others,  the  most  important  and  the  most 
threatened,  may  be  better  defended.  If  the  enemy 
leaves  these  to  go  to  the  former,  his  projects  must  be 
counteracted  by  similar  means,  an  effort  being  always 
made  to  oppose  to  his  advance,  by  whatever  route  he 
may  come,  as  many  troops  as  possible.  Hence  we 
see  how  greatly  the  defence  of  a  State  is  influenced  by 
the  form  of  the  frontiers,  the  direction  and  character 
of  the  roads.  If  you  are  enabled  to  follow,  by  straight 
interior  lines,  the  movements  of  the  enemy  manoeu- 
vring on  the  circumference  of  the  circle,  you  have  all 
the  advantages  of  position,  and  may  always  anticipate 
him  at  any  threatened  point.  Even  in  the  contrary 
case,-  you  cannot  possibly  close  all  the  avenues  ;  that 
would  oblige  you  to  form  a  long  cordon  of  troops,  very 
weak  at  every  point,  through  which  an  enemy  may 
penetrate  wherever  he  pleases.  You  should  rather 
place  the  main  body  of  the  troops  behind  the  frontier, 
in  a  well-selected  position  for  the  promptest  movement 
upon  the  several  roads  open  to  the  enemy.  In  advance 


40  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

1 

of  this  corps,  and  upon  its  flanks,  you  should  send  out 
simple  detachments  to  occupy  the  passes  temporarily, 
and  give  notice  of  an  attack.  They  will  dispute  the 
ground  while  falling  back,  thus  retarding  the  march 
of  the  enemy,  and  giving  time  for  troops  to  approach 
and  meet  him.  In  this  way  all  the  surrounding 
country  will  be  efficiently  watched  to  avoid  surprises, 
and  the  troops  are,  also,  readily  concentrated  to  fight. 
Such  are  the  general  arrangements  to  be  adopted  in 
a  plan  of  defence ;  evidently  great  latitude  is  given 
them,  and  they  should  conform  to  the  requirements  of 
localities.  If,  however,  they  are  based  upon  the 
principle  of  concentration,  they  will  be  always  prefer- 
able to  an  insecure  cordon,  whose  detached  bodies 
afford  no  reciprocal  support,  are  withdrawn  from  the 
immediate  command  of  the  general,  who  cannot  be 
omnipresent,  and,  on  account  of  their  distance  apart, 
they  cannot  be  concentrated  when  the  line  is  broken 
anywhere.  Feuquieres  blames  Marshal  Catinat  for 
neglecting  these  principles  :  "  Catinat  being  intrusted 
with  the  defence  of  the  passes  of  the  Alps  against 
Monsieur  de  Savoy,  adopted  a  cordon  system, 
scattering  his  forces  along  the  whole  circuit  of  the 
mountains,  and  thus  gave  the  enemy  an  opportu- 
nity of  taking  the  offensive,  although  much  inferior 
in  infantry,  which  is  the  important  arm  for  moun- 
tain warfare.  De  Savoy,  by  concentrating  his 
forces,  was  superior  to  Catinat  wherever  he  chose 
to  attack,  especially  as  he  occupied  the  centre  of  the 


PLAN   OF   DEFENCE.  41 

circle  and  could  threaten  several  points  at  once, 
and  choose  for  the  real  attack  that  which  seemed 
best." 

To  give  prompt  notice  of  the  enemy's  movements 
a  system  of  signals  must  be  used,  or  the  magnetic 
telegraph. 

It  is  not  always  by  taking  position  in  the  direct 
path  of  an  enemy  that  his  advance  is  opposed,  but 
sometimes  points  may  be  occupied  on  the  flank  with 
much  advantage,  so  as  to  threaten  his  line  of  opera- 
tions if  he  ventures  to  pass.  If  these  flank  positions 
can  be  held  in  force,  the  enemy  must  leave  his  direct 
route  to  attack  them,  for,  unless  he  carries  them,  he 
runs  the  risk  of  being  cut  off  from  his  base.  He 
is  thus  compelled  to  fight  on  ground  selected  by  his 
adversary,  and  prepared  for  his  reception  by  fortifica- 
tion and  any  other  means  circumstances  may  permit. 
In  this  way  the  Turks,  by  concentrating  at  Shumla, 
completely  arrested  the  Russian  invasion  of  1810,  and 
by  pursuing  the  same  course  in  the  war  of  ISiJS,  they 
prolonged  their  defence  during  a  whole  campaign. 
If,  in  1812,  Kutosow,  instead  of  covering  Moscow 
and  taking  position  upon  the  plateau  of  Mojaisch,  had 
retired  towards  Kiow,  he  would,  as  Napoleon  himself 
admits,  have  drawn  the  French  army  in  that  direction, 
and  the  immense  sacrifice  of  Moscow  would  have  been 
avoided. 

Next  come  the  successive  lines  of  defence  presented 
by  a  country,  which  are  naturally  indicated  by  the 


4:2  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

water-courses  and  the  chains  of  mountains  or  hills. 
The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  these  are  to  be 
carefully  discussed.  The  best  lines  are  those  whose 
wings  are  supported  by  natural  obstacles,  such  as  the 
sea,  a  great  lake,  a  broad  and  rapid  river;  which 
have  a  controlling  influence  over  the  surrounding 
country ;  are  only  passable  by  a  small  number  of 
roads  easily  guarded ;  whose  general  form  is  convex 
to  the  front,  and  behind  are  good  roads  facilitating 
rapid  movements,  and  by  short  marches,  to  any  point 
attacked.  The  famous  lines  of  Torres  Yedras,  con- 
structed by  Wellington,  in  1809,  to  cover  Lisbon, 
satisfied  the  most  of  these  conditions ;  they  formed  a 
great  curve,  several  leagues  long,  one  of  its  extremi- 
ties resting  on  the  Tagus  and  the  other  on  the  sea ; 
there  was  a  chain  of  hills,  most  of  them  crowned  by 
fortifications,  behind  which  the  English  army  could 
manoeuvre  unseen,  and  move  to  diiferent  points  of 
the  curve  by  roads  which  had  been  put  in  good  con- 
dition, and  some  newly  constructed.  The  French 
co'Ld  not  force  these  lines,  although  they  were  not 
covered  by  a  river  in  front  of  them.  Continuous  arti- 
ficial lines,  erected  by  the  labor  of  men,  deserve  but 
little  confidence,  on  account  of  the  difficulty,  not  to  say 
impossibility,  of  defending  these  inert  masses  when 
unprotected,'  or  but  feebly  defended  by  natural  ob- 
stacles. The  lines  of  Wissembourg,  although  covered 
by  the  Lauter,  did  not  prevent  the  French  from  being 
driven  out  of  them  by  the  Austrians,  under  Marshal 


PLAN   OF   DEFENCE.  43 

"Wurmser.  Resting  at  the  left  upon  the  Yosges  moun- 
tains, and  at  the  right  upon  the  Rhine,  they  were  ten 
or  twelve  miles  long ;  it  was  impossible  for  an  army 
of  less  than  20,000  men  to  make  an  energetic  resist- 
ance in  them.  But  a  few  hours  were  necessary  to  see 
them  entered  at  several  points,  and  the  defenders 
driven  off.  The  most  celebrated  artificial  lines  are 
the  Chinese  walls,  and  these  never  arrested  the  inva- 
sions of  the  Tartars. 

The  advantages  to  be  drawn  from  fortified  cities 
should  be  considered,  either  for  protecting  against  the 
attempts  of  the  enemy  all  the  supplies  that  must  be 
collected  for  the  troops,  or  for  the  defence  of  certain 
points  which  should  be  held  as  long  as  possible.  A 
city  surrounded  by  a  simple  wall  and  ditch,  which 
secures  it  from  danger  of  being  taken  by  surprise  or 
open  assault,  may,  if  favorably  located,  be  of  the 
greatest  value.  A  city  which  will  withstand  attack 
but  twenty-four  hours,  may  be  very  useful,  as  in  this 
space  of  time  events  may  transpire  that  will  entirely 
change  the  appearance  of  affairs,  and  save  a  State 
from  the  greatest  of  all  misfortunes — the  loss  of  its 
independence.  If,  in  1814,  the  city  of  Soissons  had 
closed  its  gates  and  made  but  a  semblance  of  resist- 
ance, Blucher  could  not  have  escaped  Napoleon's  ac- 
tive pursuit,  and  perhaps  France  might  have  been 
saved.  In  1809,  the  Austrian  Government  rebuilt 
the  walls  of  Comorn,  which  had  been  destroyed  thirty 
years  before,  through  Joseph's  want  of  foresight. 


4A  PEINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

In  a  special  manner  cities  upon  rivers  may  be  very 
valuable  to  the  defence,  although  they  may  not  be  in 
a  condition  to  repel  an  attack  in  force,.  By  giving 
possession  of  the  bridges,  they  facilitate  manoeuvres 
from  one  bank  to  another,  enable  an  army  to  cover  it- 
self by  the  river  or  to  pass  it,  in  the  event  either  of  its 
being  too  weak  to  march  against  the  enemy,  or  of  a 
good  opportunity  being  presented  to  take  advantage 
of  some  false  movement  upon  his  part.  If  the  army 
passes  the  river,  these  cities  are  so  many  tetes-de-pont 
securing  its  retreat  and  covering  its  operations  after 
repassing  ;  they  are  so  many  points  by  which  the 
army  may  debouche  at  any  instant,  and  the  enemy  is 
thus  kept  on  the  watch  and  obliged  to  divide  his 
forces.  In  a  word,  fortified  cities  give  much  value  to 
the  lines  of  defence  formed  by  rivers  ;  they  may  even 
make  a  river,  which  is  perpendicular  to  the  frontier, 
a  dangerous  object  for  an  invading  army,  by  the 
facilities  afforded  the  defenders  for  occupying  the 
side  opposite  the  enemy  and  threatening  his  com- 
munications. He  must  then  halt  and  gain  possession 
of  the  cities  which  control  the  river.  But  this  is  a 
very  difficult  operation  in  presence  of  an  adversary 
who  is  determined  to  make  a  vigorous  defence.  If 
the  attacking  party  advance  along  both  banks,  his 
army  is  divided.  The  defensive  party,  holding  the 
bridges,  may  assemble  in  force  and  operate  against 
either  subdivision  of  the  hostile  army.  His  success 
is  altogether  probable.  The  invader  must  therefore 


PLAJS    OB    DEFENCE.  45 

remain  united  and  turn  his  attention  to  the  river  whose 
tetes-de-pont  are  so  threatening  to  him,  just  as  would 
be  necessary  for  any  flank  position  strongly  occupied, 
that  could  not  be  passed  by  without  great  danger.  If 
such  a  river  had  upon  it  no  fortified  places,  it  might, 
instead  of  being  an  obstacle,  form  a  support  for  one  of 
the  wings  of  the  invading  army,  and  facilitate  its 
transportation. 

It  is  therefore  true  that  cities  commanding  the 
water-courses  are  of  great  importance,  and  deserve 
careful  attention  upon  the  part  of  those  engaged  in 
preparing  a  plan  of  defence  ;  even  when  they  are 
imperfectly  fortified,  their  advantages  should  not  be 
neglected,  but,  on  the  contrary,  efforts  should  be  made 
to  increase  their  powers  of  defence. 

Positions,  properly  so  called,  that  is,  the  places 
where  an  army  may  advantageously  fight,  should  be 
indicated  in  a  plan  of  defence.  The  relative  advan- 
tages and  disadvantages  of  the  several  positions  should 
be  carefully  examined,  in  order  that  the  former  may 
be  profited  by,  and  the  latter  avoided  as  far  as  the 
circumstances  permit.  Calculation  should  be  made 
of  the  efforts  necessary  to  augment  the  defensive 
power  of  the  several  positions  by  the  means  presented 
by  the  engineer's  art,  and  to  remove  the  obstacles  of- 
fered to  the  free  movement  of  troops;  an  enumera- 
tion should  be  made  of  the  troops  of  each  arm  of  the 
service  necessary  or  useful  in  the  defence,  and  the 
places  for  them  to  be  camped  or  quartered  should  be 


46  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

indicated,  as  also  the  resources  in  the  neighborhood 
of  each.  As  a  measure  of  prudence,  in  anticipation 
of  a  reverse,  the  question  of  the  best  line  of  retreat 
for  the  army  should  be  discussed  ;  what  are  the  best 
places  for  rallying ;  what  parts  of  the  line  are  to  be 
disputed  foot  by  foot,  and  what  parts  are  to  be 
rapidly  passed  over,  &c.  The  conditions  of  a  good 
military  position  will  be  mentioned  under  the  subject 
of  battles. 

The  roads  are  to  be  designated  that  should  be 
broken  up  to  make  them  impassable  by  the  enemy ; 
also  those  to  be  improved,  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
defence.  Too  much  attention  cannot  be  bestowed 
upon  these  objects,  which  at  first  sight  seem  of  sec- 
ondary importance,  but  have  so  much  influence  upon 
the  rate  of  movement  of  the  two  parties,  and  conse- 
quently upon  the  execution  of  any  project.  A  well- 
organized  government  will  always  take  care,  in  the 
establishment  of  canals  and  roads,  that  the  advan- 
tages procured  by  them  to  commerce  are  not  very 
dearly  paid  for  in  war.  The  best  road  may  be  se- 
cured from  danger  by  constructing  a  work  for  its 
defence  at  the  most  suitable  point.  Roads  may 
undoubtedly,  and  especially  in  mountains,  be  cut  and 
rendered  temporarily  impassable,  by  the  destruction 
of  bridges,  &c. ;  but,  independently  of  the  greater  or 
less  facility  with  which  an  enemy  may  repair  these 
injuries,  there  is  always  a  feeling  of  repugnance  to 
taking  steps  for  the  destruction  of  the  communica- 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  47 

tions  of  the  country ;  it  is  delayed  to  the  last  mo- 
ment, and  often  until  too  late.  The  safest  plan  is  to 
build  the  forts,  of  which  mention  has  been  made,  and 
for  this  reason  a  plan  of  defence  should  indicate  the 
positions  for  them.  While  marking  the  points  where 
a  defence  may  be  made,  the  method  of  obstructing 
the  roads  in  front  should  be  indicated,  as  well  as  the 
means  of  improving  the  parts  to  the  rear,  with  the 
double  view  of  retarding  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
and  facilitating  the  arrival  of  succor. 

All  the  roads  connecting  two  positions,  or  which, 
being  behind  a  line  of  defence,  run  parallel  to  it, 
should  be  repaired ;  for  these  roads  are  the  routes  to 
be  passed  over  to  succor  threatened  points,  or  to  fall 
in  force  upon  detachments  of  the  enemy.  The  plan 
of  defence  should  treat  these  operations  in  detail. 

These  are  the  essential  objects  to  be  mentioned  in 
a  plan  of  defence.  There  are  others,  no  less  im- 
portant, which  relate  to  the  administrative  depart- 
ment, such  as  hospitals,  equipment,  accommodating 
troops  at  the  points  of  concentration,  their  subsist- 
ence, foraging,  the  postal  service  and  other  means  of 
correspondence,  &c.  These  objects  should  all  be  con- 
sidered in  a  plan  of  defence,  but  it  is  impossible  to  go 
into  all  their  details  here. 

Art.  Til. — Strategical  Operations. 

Preparatory  movements,  marches  skilfully  made, 
with  a  view  of  taking  position  upon  vulnerable  points 
of  the  enemy's  line ;  in  a  word,  strategical  operations, 


48  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

procure  those  immense  results  which  sometimes  fol- 
low a  single  victory.  A  battle  gained  is  an  excellent 
thing,  but  its  consequences  will  vary  according  as  the 
victor  is  so  situated  as  to  be  able  to  profit  by  it,  and 
cut  the  enemy's  communications,  separate  him  from 
his  base,  disperse  his  army,  &c.,  or  is  unable  to  inter- 
nipt  his  retreat.  In  the  first  case,  the  victory  is  deci- 
sive, if  the  pursuit  of  the  defeated  enemy  is  vigorous- 
ly prosecuted ;  in  the  second,  he  may  be  expected 
soon  to  make  another  stand,  and  fight  again.  When 
Napoleon  moved  his  army  from  Boulogne,  in  1805,  by 
forced  marches,  to  attack  the  Austrian  army,  that  had 
already  invaded  Bavaria,  and  was  advancing  between 
the  Danube  and  Lake  Constance,  he  directed  the  dif- 
ferent corps  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy, 
assuming  as  a  base  the  Rhine  below  Strasbourg  and 
the  Main,  of  which  he  was  master ;  he  turned  the 
mountains  of  the  Black  Forest,  in  whose  defiles  he 
showed  several  heads  of  columns,  to  cause  Mack  to 
think  he  was  going  to  meet  him  by  the  way  of  the 
valley  of  the  Danube.  When  Mack  perceived  his 
error,  it  was  too  late ;  the  blow  had  been  struck.  He 
was  cut  off  from  his  communications,  beaten  in  seve- 
ral encounters,  and  obliged  to  take  shelter  in  Ulm, 
where  he  capitulated  with  his  whole  army.  The  wise 
and  rapid  marches  which  preceded  the  combats  of 
Gunzbourg,  Elchingen,  &c.,  were  the  causes  of  the 
successes  of  Napoleon,  much  more  than  those  com- 
bats, brilliant  as  they  were.  The  Austrians  were 


STRATEGICAL    OPERATIONS.  49 

completely  cut  off  from  retreat ;  they  were  enveloped, 
and  forced  to  lay  down  their  arms  before  the  arrival 
of  the  succor  they  expected.*  Marshal  Saxe  was  con- 
vinced that  marches  contributed  to  the  successful 
issue  of  a  campaign  more  than  battles,  and  he  laid 
down  the  axiom,  that  "  success  in  war  is  due  to  the 
legs  of  the  soldiers."  History  justifies  his  assertion. 

We  shall  now  lay  down  the  principles  relating  to 
marches,  or  rather  to  strategic  movements. 

Forward  Movements. — A  numerous  army  is  always 
divided  into  several  corps,  which  move  along  different 
roads,  either  to  procure  subsistence  more  easily,  or  to 
facilitate  their  deployments  and  preparations  for  bat- 
tle. These  columns  should  be  the  nearer  to  each  other, 
as  the  enemy's  enterprises  are  the  more  to  be  ap- 
prehended. If  he  may  attack,  the  columns  should  be 
near  enough  to  afford  mutual  support ;  there  should 
be  no  obstacle  between  them,  which  will  prevent  their 
junction  and  concentration  on  the  field  of  battle.  But 
there  is  no  necessity  for  the  columns  to  move  exactly 
side  by  side,  and  along  parallel  roads  which  have 
been  opened  with  the  axe  and  the  pick.  Such  a 
course  would  make  rapid  movements  impossible,  and 
would  give  all  the  advantages  to  the  antagonist  who 
was  not  so  precise.  Since  the  time  of  Turenne,  Lux- 
embourg, and  Villars,  rapid  marches  had  been  forgot- 
ten ;  a  weak  army  was  divided  up  into  numerous 
columns,  which,  with  great  labor,  made  roads  through 

*  For  the  details  of  these  marches,  see  Chapter  III.,  Article  IIL 
3 


50  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

forests  and  across  ravines,  without  losing  sight  of  each 
other,  so  to  speak.  The  result  was  great  confusion, 
and  inconceivable  slowness.  The  French  Revolution 
put  an  end  to  that  folly,  and  a  return  was  made  to 
the  free,  rapid,  bold  marches  of  the  Romans.  So 
long  as  the  manoeuvre  is  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's 
cannon,  the  intervals  between  the  columns  executing 
preparatory  movements  may  be  greater  or  less,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances ;  the  only  limit  to  be  laid  down 
is  to  keep  the  intervals  such  that  the  .corps  may  be 
able  to  concentrate  the  same  day  upon  the  same  field 
of  battle. 

Each  column  should  take  proper  precautions  to 
prevent  being  surprised,  and  its  march  should  be  pre- 
ceded by  an  advanced  guard.  Negligence  in  this 
particular  may  lead  to  disaster,  as  history  proves  con- 
clusively. The  defeat  of  Flaminius  at  Thrasymene 
(now  Perugia),  is  a  celebrated  example  in  point. 
This  general  imprudently  ventured  into  the  defile 
between  the  lake  and  the  mountains  without  sending 
out  an  advanced  guard,  and  without  examination  of 
the  heights.  He  was  hurrying  to  attack  Hannibal, 
who  was  laying  the  country  under  contribution  ;  his 
haste  was  so  great  that  he  would  not  wait  for  his  col- 
league, who  was  coining  up  from  Rimini  with  an 
army.  In  the  midst  of  the  defile  the  wily  Carthagin- 
ian had  taken  a  stand  to  bar  the  way.  The  action 
begins,  and  the  Romans  see  descending  from  the  sur- 
rounding heights  numerous  troops,  to  take  them  in 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  51 

flank  ;  at  the  same  time  the  cavalry,  which  they  had 
passed  by  unseen,  attacks  them  in  the  rear.  The  Ko 
mans,  being  obliged  to  fight  on  all  sides,  are  obliged 
to  yield,  and  the  Carthaginians  made  terrible  slaugh- 
ter among  them. 

To  make  a  march  safe  against  the  attacks  of  the 
enemy,  it  should,  as  far  as  possible,  and  in  the  man- 
ner previously  explained,  be  along  a  river  which  will 
cover  the  flank  of  the  column  ;  but,  even  in  this  case, 
the  avenues  must  always  be  occupied  by  which  the 
enemy  might  approach.  For  this  purpose  troops  are 
detached  to  take  position  and  cover  the  march  until 
the  column  has  passed  so  far  that  there  is  no  longer 
danger.  The  detachment  will  then  rejoin  the  army 
as  soon  as  practicable. 

Those  marches  which  are  concealed  from  the  ene- 
my lead  to  the  most  important  results.  By  such 
marches  a  general  succeeds  in  placing  his  army  upon 
the  flank  of  his  adversary,  threatens  his  base,  or  sur- 
prises him  in  his  cantonments.  The  most  difficult 
countries  are  the  most  favorable  for  concealed 
marches,  as  there  are  greater  facilities  for  hiding 
them  ;  and  the  enemy,  trusting  to  the  natural  obsta- 
cles, neglects  ordinary  precautions,  and  omits  to  seek 
for  information.  With  patience,  labor,  and  preseve- 
rance,  material  obstacles  may  be  always  overcome  by 
an  arrny  that  is  not  disturbed  by  the  presence  of  an 
enemy.  It  may  be  stated  that  in  this  particular  noth- 
ing is  impossible.  As  an  example,  take  the  extraor- 


52  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

dinary  march  of  Hannibal  across  the  marsh  of  Clu- 
sium.  He  had  two  roads  by  which  to  advance  on 
Rome  ;  one  through  the  defiles  of  the  Apennines,  easy 
but  long,  and  held  by  the  Roman  army ;  the  other 
shorter,  but  across  vast  marshes,  supposed  to  be  im- 
passable. Having  ascertained  the  depth  of  the 
marshes,  and  being  convinced  that  the  difficulties 
they  presented,  though  great,  were  not  insurmounta- 
ble, Hannibal  chose  that  road.  Knowing  he  was  not 
expected  in  that  direction,  he  saw  that  he  would  have 
to  overcome  only  local  difficulties,  and  he  was  sure  of 
success  as  far  as  they  were  concerned.  By  taking 
that  road  he  avoided  the  defiles,  where  his  cavalry, 
which  was  superior  to  that  of  the  Romans,  would 
have  been  useless,  and  where  the  individual  valor  of 
the  Roman  soldiers  would  have  compensated  for 
the  incapacity  of  their  consul.  He  had,  moreover, 
good  grounds  for  hoping  that,  having  once  effected 
the  passage,  he  could  inveigle  the  imprudent  Flami- 
nius  into  a  battle  before  the  arrival  of  his  colleague, 
as  in  fact  happened.  The  success  of  that  bold  move- 
ment was  perfect,  because  it  was  so  secret  and  prompt 
that  the  Romans  had  no  time  to  offer  any  opposition. 
Rapidity  is  one  of  the  first  conditions  of  success  in 
marches,  of  strategical  movements,  as  of  simple  ma- 
noeuvres. By  celerity  of  movement  a  general  pre- 
serves the  advantages  gained  by  a  fortunate  initiative, 
and  he  follows  up  and  completes  the  success  a  vic- 
tory has  begun.  It  is  only  by  rapid  marching  that 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  53 

war  can  ~be  made  to  support  war.  By  remaining  but 
a  short  time  in  one  place,  an  army  does  not  exhaust 
the  provinces  through  which  it  passes  ;  their  resources, 
uncertain  as  they  may  be,  will  always  be  sufficient 
for  the  temporary  wants  of  armies.  By  adopting  such 
a  system,  there  is  no  longer  a  need  of  the  immense 
wagon-trains  used  to  transport  provisions  ;  nothing  is 
carried  but  what  is  indispensably  necessary  ;  the  sol- 
diers may  be  required  to  take  a  few  rations  of  bread, 
and  are  followed  by  droves  of  animals  to  furnish  meat. 
The  troops,  being  thus  unencumbered,  can  undertake 
and  execute  the  grandest  projects.  It  is  impossible 
to  gain  any  success  in  war  without  rapid  marches. 
Proceed  at  a  snail's  pace,  and  you  will  accomplish 
nothing  ;  misfortune  will  attend  you  continually,  and 
the  elements  will  seem  to  conspire  against  you. 

If  the  enemy  approaches,  spreading  out  his  corps 
over  a  large  space,  with  the  intention  of  enveloping 
you,  move  at  once  against  him,  and  strike  at  the  centre 
of  his  line.  Endeavor  to  attack  one  of  the  isolated 
parts  of  his  army,  and  defeat  it  before  the  others  can 
arrive  ;  move  rapidly  against  another,  and  treat  it  in 
the  same  way  :  you  will  thus  oblige  them  all  to  re- 
treat, to  take  divergent  roads,  and  to  encounter  a 
thousand  difficulties  in  effecting  a  junction,  if  indeed 
it  be  possible  for  them  to  do  so  at  all. 

In  this  way  ISTapoleon,  in  the  beginning  of  his 
career,  rushed  from  the  maritime  Alps,  and  fell  like  a 
mountain  torrent  upon  the  Austro-Sardinian  army, 


54:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

commanded  by  Beaulieu  and  Colli,  who  had  commit- 
ted the  fault  of  spreading  out  their  forces  in  a  long 
line,  with  the  expectation  of  enveloping  their  young 
adversary.  Colli  was  first  beaten  at  several  points ; 
Beaulieu's  turn  came  next,  and  from  that  time  the  two 
armies  were  so  entirely  separated,  that  one  of  the  gen- 
erals, desiring  to  cover  Turin,  retreated  towards  that 
city,  whilst  the  other  fell  back  upon  Milan  without 
attempting  to  rejoin  his  colleague.  Colli  was  forced 
to  accept  such  terms  as  the  victor  chose  to  give ;  Beau- 
lieu  could  only  stop  his  retrograde  movement  under 
the  walls  of  Mantua. 

But  if  the  hostile  army  is  concentrated,  an  attempt 
may  be  made  to  advance  upon  him  along  two  lines 
towards  his  flanks,  which  will  induce  him  to  divide 
his  forces  in  order  to  meet  this  double  attack.  Then 
the  two  corps,  which  have  been  separated  only  tem- 
porarily, with  a  view  of  immediately  effecting  a  re- 
union, will  move  towards  each  other,  and  make  a  com- 
bined attack  against  the  nearest  of  the  two  portions 
of  the  opposing  army.  It  readily  appears  that  such 
movements  may  be  attempted  only  when  the  topogra- 
phy of  the  country  favors,  and  to  some  extent  suggests 
them.  For  example:  a  general,  having  his  army 
covered  by  a  river,  need  have  no  alarm  at  seeing  his 
adversary  appear  opposite  in  the  interval  between  his 
two  corps,  when  he  can  make  a  rapid  flank  movement 
by  means  of  roads  along  the  river.  In  this  case  he 
may,  with  no  great  danger,  pass  to  the  right  and  left, 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  55 

in  order  to  cause  uneasiness  to  the  enemy  at  two  dis- 
tant points.  If  the  enemy  weakens  his  centre  to  re-en- 
force the  wings,  the  general  may  make  a  rapid  and 
concealed  night  march,  hurry  back  and  pass  the  river, 
using  temporary  bridges  for  the  purpose,  for  which 
the  materials  should  all  have  been  prepared  in  ad- 
vance, and  as  secretly  as  possible.  The  river  once 
crossed,  he  has  the  interior  position  ;  activity  and 
bravery  must  accomplish  what  remains  to  prevent  the 
separated  corps  of  the  enemy  from  effecting  a  junction, 
and  they  are  thus  forced  to  operate  on  exterior  lines. 
Here  we  see  the  importance  of  making  a  good  use  of 
time,  in  order  to  concentrate,  pass  the  river,  and  beat 
in  succession  the  fractions  of  the  army  between  which 
we  have  fortunately  succeeded  in  interposing  our  own. 
Time  is  all-important  in  war ;  often  an  hour  lost  can- 
not be  regained  ;  in  one  hour  we  may  be  anticipated 
upon  the  decisive  point;  in  one  hour  we  may  be  over- 
whelmed by  superior  forces  suddenly  assembled,  or  we 
may  let  slip  advantages  which  fortune  grants  only  to 
activity  and  boldness. 

The  preceding  remarks  prove  that  if  a  frontier  is 
attacked  on  several  points,  the  defensive  army  should 
not  be  divided  into  the  same  number  of  equal  corps, 
because  the  resistance  will  be  feeble  at  every  point ; 
but  the  different  attacks  should  be  met  by  small  corps, 
placed  in  observation  chiefly,  while  the  principal  mass 
is  kept  at  some  convenient  point,  in  order  to  fall  upon 
a  single  one  of  the  attacking  armies  when  separated 


56  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

from  the  others.  Suppose  we  take  the  case  of  80,000 
men  being  called  upon  to  resist  120,000,  divided  into 
three  equal  masses  of  40,000  each ;  if  the  defensive 
army  is  divided  into  three  equal  corps,  each  will  con- 
tain about  26,000  men,  and  consequently  there  will  be 
an  inferiority  of  force  at  every  point.  If,  instead  of 
that  arrangement,  each  of  the  advancing  armies  is  met 
by  a  simple  corps  of  observation  of  12,000  to  15,000 
men,  they  will  be  able  to  delay  the  enemy's  march, 
and  there  will  remain  a  central  mass  of  35,00.0  to  40,000 
men,  which,  b  eing  united  to  one  of  the  corps  of  observa- 
tion, will  form  an  army  of  about  50,000  men,  and  this 
may  defeat  the  enemy,  all  other  things  being  equal. 

When  the  disparity  of  force  is  still  greater,  every 
effort  must  be  exerted  to  be  superior  in  numbers  upon 
some  point ;  but  if  that  cannot  be  done,  and  it  is  some- 
times impracticable,  the  rule  must  still  be  followed  of 
concentrating  as  large  a  force  as  possible  to  meet  the 
enemy.  Then  the  struggle  is  to  be  prolonged  by  the 
development  of  the  greatest  attainable  vigor  and  ac- 
tivity, and  by  skilfully  using  all  the  topographical 
advantages  of  the  country.  Napoleon,  in  the  war  in 
France,  gave  a  striking  example  of  the  effectiveness 
of  central  manoeuvres  ;  he  fought  triple  his  forces  for 
four  months.  He  moved  his  reserves  from  point  to 
point  with  marvellous  rapidity.  One  day  he  fought  a 
battle  in  one  place,  and  the  next  he  was  twenty-five 
or  thirty  miles  distant,  marching  to  attack  another 
enemy,  whom  he  astonished  by  the  exhibition  of  so 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  57 

much  resolution  and  celerity  of  movement.  Csesar, 
when  surrounded  in  the  middle  of  Gaul  by  nations  in 
insurrection,  extricated  himself  from  his  critical  posi- 
tion by  similar  movements.  He  was  at  every  point 
where  danger  called  ;  he  gave  the  Gauls  neither  time 
nor  means  of  uniting ;  he  fought  them  successively, 
and  beat  them  in  detail.  A  few  weeks  sufficed  to 
finish  that  remarkable  campaign. 

The  study  of  the  Commentaries  of  this  great  cap- 
tain is  one  of  the  most  instructive  that  can  be  recom- 
mended to  young  officers.  Almost  every  page  exem- 
plifies the  application  of  strategical  principles,  which, 
as  has  been  remarked,  are  the  same  at  all  times  and 
in  all  places. 

Retreats. — In  retrograde,  as  in  forward  movements, 
the  simple  line  is  the  best,  as  by  using  it  the  mass  of 
the  force  is  always  in  hand  to  oppose  the  enemy. 
What  are  called  divergent  or  eccentric  retreats,  which 
are  effected  at  the  same  time  by  several  routes,  with 
the  view  of  misleading  the  victor,  and  making  him 
uncertain  as  to  the  course  to  pursue,  are  extremely 
dangerous.  A  force  which  is  divided  up  to  follow 
these  different  directions  is  weak  at  every  point ;  the 
isolated  corps,  affording  no  mutual  support,  are  ex- 
posed to  the  risk  of  being  enveloped,  thrust  upon  ob- 
stacles, dispersed,  destroyed,  as  was  the  case  with  the 
Prussians  after  the  battle  of  Jena.  The  victor,  not 
allowing  his  attention  to  be  diverted,  should  follow 
closely  one  of  these  corps  and  overwhelm  it ;  he  need 


58  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

give  himself  no  present  concern  about  the  others,  well 
knowing  that  he  will  have  no  difficulty  in  attending 
to  them  separately  at  a  convenient  time. 

An  army  should  never  be  divided  up  except  just 
after  a  brilliant  victory ;  it  is  then  in  presence  of  a 
disorganized  enemy,  who  has  lost  his  communications 
and  is  in  a  state  of  demoralization.  It  may  rush  into 
the  midst  of  the  scattered  corps ;  it  need  only  show 
itself  and  the  enemy  flies.  In  such  a  case  no  attempt 
is  too  rash ;  any  thing  is  good  except  what  is  too  slow 
and  methodical.  But  this  is  an  exceptional  case,  pro- 
duced by  the  circumstances  of  the  defeat  of  the  enemy. 

Remain  united,  therefore,  in  a  retreat,  still  more 
than  in  an  offensive  movement,  even  if  your  motions 
are  thereby  retarded,  for  the  first  consideration  is 
safety.  March  in  as  good  order  as  circumstances  per- 
mit, or  at  least  keep  together ;  still  present  an  impos- 
ing front  to  the  enemy,  and,  if  he  pursues  too  rashly, 
make  him  pay  the  penalty  for  so  doing ;  have  the 
boldness  to  turn  upon  him  if  he  gives  a  fair  opportu- 
nity or  marches  negligently.  More  honor  is  some- 
times derived  from  a  well-conducted  retreat  than  in  a 
battle  gained,  where  chance  often  enters  so  largely. 

Marshal  Massena's  retreat,  in  Portugal,  in  1809,  is 
an  excellent  model  for  imitation.  He  knew  how  to 
take  advantage  of  all  the  accidents  of  the  ground  to 
retard  the  pursuit  of  the  English.  He  never  gave  up 
a  position  until  it  was  just  about  being  turned,  and 
then  he  fell  back  to  another  at  some  distance  further 


STRATEGICAL  OPERATIONS.  59 

on.  His  columns  retired  slowly,  afforded  mutual  sup- 
port, and  kept  out  of  each  other's  way,  deploying  and 
righting  whenever  the  enemy  pressed  them  too  closely, 
or  where  the  ground  was  favorable  for  defence. 
Again  they  fell  back,  moving  towards  a  common 
point  in  the  rear,  keeping  always  near  enough  for  mu- 
tual assistance.  Nothing,  said  an  eye-witness,  could 
exceed  the  skill  there  displayed  by  Massena. 

It  is  very  advantageous  to  retreat  in  a  direction 
parallel  to  the  frontier,  if  possible,  because  then  an. 
enemy  gains  nothing  by  his  pursuit.  This  subject 
was  touched  upon  at  the  same  time  with  accidental 
lines  of  operations.  If  the  parallel  retreat  is  executed 
in  an  enemy's  country,  the  army  lives  at  his  expense ; 
the.  burdens  of  the  war  weigh  upon  him  ;  he  is  almost 
as  badly  off  as  if  he  were  the  beaten  party.  If  the 
retreat  is  made  behind  the  frontier,  the  victorious 
army  is  drawn  along  after  the  other ;  it  is  forced  to 
pass  over  much  ground  without  advancing  an  inch 
towards  the  interior  ;  only  the  borders  of  the  country 
are  given  up  to  the  pursuing  enemy,  which  is  also  in 
a  position  where  the  flank  is  exposed  to  forces  coming 
from  the  interior.  But  the  retiring  army  should 
take  care  not  to  expose  itself  by  undertaking  such  a 
movement  in  a  country  where  there  are  no  obstacles, 
for  the  enemy  would  then  be  able  to  cut  it  off  from 
its  base.  The  parallel  retreat  should  therefore  not  be 
undertaken  unless  some  respectable  obstacle,  as  a 
river  or  mountain  range,  favors  it. 


60  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

If  the  parallel  retreat  is  covered  by  a  river,  all  the 
bridges  should  be  broken,  for  security  against  attack 
on  the  flank.  For  the  same  reason,  if  it  is  made  under 
cover  of  a  chain  of  mountains,  the  lateral  passes  should 
be  occupied  until  the  army  has  gone  by,  and  such  dis- 
position should  be  adopted  as  will  permit  an  attack 
in  force  upon  those  hostile  bodies  which,  notwith- 
standing the  precaution  taken,  may  succeed  in  break- 
ing through  or  turning  the  passages,  and  may  attempt 
to  stop  the  progress  of  the  retreating  army.  A  weak 
corps  presenting  itself  in  this  way  should  occasion  no 
alarm,  for  the  danger  is  really  on  its  side. 

Evidently  a  parallel  retreat  can  only  be  effectively 
carried  out  on  a  frontier  of  considerable  extent.  If 
such  a  frontier  is  guarded  with  difficulty,  on  account 
of  its  length,  it  presents  the  advantage  which  has  just 
been  indicated,  and  this  is  not  the  only  one,  if  the 
general  knows  how  to  adopt  the  active  defensive  sys- 
tem. For  what  cannot  be  undertaken  in  the  defence 
of  a  narrow  frontier  without  risk  of  being  cut  off  from 
it,  or  being  thrown  back  upon  the  obstacles  which 
contract  it  while  giving  support  to  the  wings,  may  be 
attempted  with  success  upon  an  extensive  frontier 
that  presents  long  bases  of  operations.  Those  offen- 
sive returns  may  then  be  made  which  fortune  often 
crowns  with  success,  and  those  a  brilliant  enterprises 
undertaken  that  are  inspired  by  courage  and  daring. 

Diversions. — Combined  marches. — What  has  been 
thus  far  said  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  concen- 


STRATEGICAL  OPERATIONS.  61 

tration  of  forces  and  of  keeping  united,  proves  also 
that  diversions,  combined  movements,  detachments, 
are  operations  that  generally  cannot  be  approved. 

A  diversion  is  effected  when  a  corps  is  sent  to  a 
distance  to  operate  independently  of  the  army.  A 
combined  march  is  made  when  the  movements  of  this 
corps  and  of  the  army  have  a  mutual  relation,  and  the 
same  general  object  in  view.  In  each  case  the  sepa- 
rate corps  forms  a  detachment. 

Diversions  are  dangerous,  because  the  army  is  weak- 
ened by  just  so  many  men  as  are  employed  that  way  ; 
they  withdraw  the  attention  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  from  the  main  object ;  they  increase  the  chances 
of  accidents ;  they  complicate  events,  multiply  juris- 
dictions which  may  lead  to  clashing  of  orders,  and 
they  are  almost  always  a  source  of  disaster.  The 
army,  if  victorious,  can  only  gain  a  partial  success, 
and  can  with  difficulty  profit  by  it;  if,  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  defeated,  it  is  exposed  to  the  danger  of  total 
ruin,  since  it  can  receive  no  support  from  the  corps  so 
unfortunately  detached.  However,  there  is  nothing 
absolutely  fixed  in  the  difficult  science  of  war ;  there 
is  110  rule  without  numerous  exceptions.  Cases  arise, 
therefore,  in  which  diversions  are  not  only  justifiable, 
but  necessary.  For  example,  a  formidable  position  is 
to  be  carried  by  force,  and  it  can  only  be  done  by  at- 
tracting the  enemy's  attention  in  another  direction  ; 
it  then  becomes  necessary  to  detach  a  body  of  troops, 
more  or  less  numerous,  according  to  circumstances, 


62  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

who  may  make  a  circuit  for  the  purpose  of  occupying 
commanding  heights,  or  threatening  the  enemy's  line 
of  retreat.  These  cases  frequently  occur  in  moun- 
tainous countries ;  a  detachment  then  becomes  a  ne- 
cessity, the  only  alternative  being  the  failure  to  accom- 
plish the  object  in  view ;  but  it  should  be  so  regulated 
that  its  absence  should  be  as  short  as  possible,  and,  as 
soon  as  circumstances  permit,  there  must  be  a  return 
to  the  observance  of  the  principle  which  requires  unity 
of  action  and  concentration  of  forces.  Combined 
marches  and  diversions  are  much  less  dangerous  in 
mountainous  countries  than  elsewhere,  because  it  is 
difficult  for  the  enemy  to  interpose  himself  between 
the  columns.  The  separate  corps  find  in  every  valley 
contracted  spaces  where  their  wings  are  supported, 
and  they  are  in  no  danger  of  being  enveloped  ;  and 
sometimes  it  would  be  even  more  dangerous  than  use- 
ful for  large  bodies  to  be  held  together.  In  such  a 
case,  each  of  the  separate  corps  should  be  strong 
enough  to  defend  the  valley  in  which  it  is  operating, 
and  to  keep  open  its  communications  to  the  rear.  The 
rule  is  here  violated  only  in  form  and  not  in  reality, 
since  there  is  no  more  subdivision  than  the  ground 
requires;  the  different  corps  are  not  exposed  to  be 
forced  from  their  positions,  and  there  is  ample  oppor- 
tunity for  reunion  by  the  roads  in  rear.  General  Le- 
cointe  gave  a  fine  example  of  such  marches  when  he 
attacked  the  Saint  Gothard,  in  1799.  Upon  that  oc- 
casion, in  all  the  valleys  occupied  by  the  French,  they 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  63 

were  in  sufficient  force  to  defend  them  even  against 
a  sudden  attack  of  very  superior  numbers.  That  is 
the  whole  secret. 

A  diversion  is  allowable  when  the  forces  in  hand 
are  greatly  superior  to  the  enemy's,  and  there  is  diffi- 
culty experienced  in  subsisting  them  together.  Skill 
is  then  shown  in  making  such  a  division  of  the 
troops  as  will  permit  a  corps  to  be  moved  against  the 
flanks  or  the  communications  of  the  enemy  while  a 
force  equal  to  his  is  presented  in  front;  diversions 
may  then  be  made  in  the  provinces  which  are  poorly 
guarded,  or  lukewarm  in  their  allegiance,  or  where 
insurrection  may  be  excited ;  troops  may  be  unex- 
pectedly sent  to  the  capital  or  the  richest  cities,  to 
levy  contributions,  &c.  The  detached  corps  should 
then  act  vigorously,  make  forced  marches  in  order  to 
multiply  itself  in  the  eyes  of  the  enemy,  cause  him 
very  great  uneasiness  or  inflict  a  real  blow.  Indeci- 
sion or  vacillation  on  the  part  of  the  commander  of 
the  hostile  army  may  induce  a  diversion.  Except  in 
these  cases,  it  is  much  better  to  resist  the  temptation 
of  diversions  ;  it  is  always  safest. 

When  diversions  are  condemned,  it  is  to  be  under- 
stood that  those  are  not  referred  to  which  may  change 
the  whole  face  of  the  war,  or  consist  in  an  army's 
abandonment  of  its  own  country  to  the  enemy  in 
order  to  carry  the  war  into  his.  They  are  altogether 
different  from  other  diversions;  the  army  remains 
united,  and  moves  as  a  whole  to  the  attainment  of  a 


64  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

single  well-determined  object.  Such  resolutions  bear 
the  true  impress  of  genius,  and,  far  from  being  blama- 
ble,  are  worthy  of  praise,  no  matter  how  they  may 
result ;  for  a  man  of  spirit  can  attempt  nothing  more 
honorable  for  the  salvation  of  his  country  after  hav- 
ing tried  in  vain  all  ordinary  means.  Agathocles, 
king  of  Syracuse,  was  besieged  by  the  Carthagin- 
ians ;  after  exhausting  all  his  resources  in  the  defence 
of  the  place,  being  upon  the  point  of  surrendering, 
he  determines  boldly  to  pass  over  into  Africa.  He 
leaves  in  Syracuse  only  the  garrison  strictly  necessary 
for  its  defence,  takes  with  him  his  best  troops,  burns 
his  fleet  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  so  as  to  make  victory 
a  necessity,  and  advances  towards  Carthage.  He 
overwhelms  the  opposing  army,  succeeds  in  contract- 
ing certain  alliances,  and  brings  the  capital  to  the 
brink  of  ruin.  Syracuse  was  saved.  Certainly  this 
was  a  diversion  which  produced  a  very  great  result ; 
it  would  be  a  misuse  of  words  to  condemn  an  operation 
having  the  same  name,  though  differing  so  essentially 
in  character  from  those  already  referred  to. 

Diversions  of  this  kind,  although  on  a  small  scale, 
may  be  successful  when  they  are  well  conducted  and 
localities  favor.  It  is  always  advantageous  to  do 
what  the  enemy  is  not  prepared  to  expect,  because  in 
this  way  his  combinations  are  thwarted,  and  he  is 
obliged  to  stand  on  the  defensive  instead  of  taking 
the  offensive.  Turenne,  in  his  last  campaign,  gives  a 
fine  example  of  such  a  course.  He  was  not  intimi- 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  65 

dated  by  the  attack  of  his  adversary,  the  celebrated 
Montecuculi,  who  had  crossed  the  Rhine ;  but,  tak- 
ing no  notice  of  his  initiative,  he  crossed  the  river  at 
another  point,  and  obliged  his  opponent  to  leave  the 
French  territory  in  order  to  follow  him  and  defend 
his  own. 

We.  ordinarily  understand  combined  marches  to  be 
those  arranged  with  the  intention  of  arriving  from 
two  or  more  directions  upon  a  position  occupied  by 
the  enemy;  or  taking  in  front  and  rear  an  army 
which  is  to  be  attacked ;  or  placing  it,  to  use  the  ordi- 
nary expression,  between  two  iires.  But  there  is 
nothing  more  influenced  by  chance  than  these  eccen- 
tric movements ;  independently  of  the  temporary 
weakening  they  occasion,  the  smallest  accident  is  suf- 
ficient to  lead  to  their  failure,  and  upset  plans  appa- 
rently perfect :  a  body  of  troops  is  led  astray  by  the 
guide,  bad  roads  retard  the  march,  a  storm  arises,  a 
swollen  stream  stops  the  column,  the  enemy  is  en- 
countered where  he  was  not  expected ;  finally,  a 
thousand  accidents  happen  which  cause  the  operation 
to  be  unsuccessful.  On  the  other  hand,  the  army 
may  in  the  mean  time  have  been  attacked  or  forced  to 
retreat;  it  may  not  be  at  the  place  of  rendezvous; 
then  the  isolated  corps  is  very  much  compromised ;  it 
is  in  danger  of  being  enveloped  and  obliged  to  lay 
down  its  arms.  The  greater  the  extent  of  these 
eccentric  movements,  the  more  they  are  exposed  to 
chance,  and  consequently  the  more  care  is  to  be  taken 


66  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

to  avoid  them.  Thus,  on  a  field  of  battle,  it  is  a  fault 
to  send  a  corps  to  the  rear  of  an  enemy  to  attack  him 
there,  or  to  cut  his  communications,  because  the  army 
may  be  defeated  while  this  corps  is  making  its  de- 
tour ;  but  the  fault  is  still  greater  when  the  detached 
corps  is  to  make  a  march  of  several  days,  in  order  to 
reach  a  point  of  rendezvous  already  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  for  success  then  depends  on  circumstances 
that  cannot  be  controlled. 

Detachments  made  to  effect  a  diversion  or  a  com- 
bined march,  or  for  any  other  motive,  are  condemned 
by  all  writers  on  the  art  of  war.  Many  examples 
may  be  cited  to  prove  their  danger.  The  Great  Fred- 
eric, usually  so  wise  and  skilful,  had  to  repent  having 
made,  near  Dresden,  a  large  detachment  of  18,000 
men,  with  the  intention  of  cutting  the  communica- 
tions of  the  Austrian  army  with  Bohemia.  The  de- 
tachment was  surrounded,  and  fell  into  the  enemy's 
hands  after  having  fought  bravely  against  triple  its 
numbers,  constantly  ho  Ding  that  the  army  would  come 
up  to  its  delivery.  This  affair  took  place  at  Maxen, 
in  the  month  of  October,  1759  ;  it  shows  at  once  both 
the  danger  of  detachments  and  that  of  wishing  to 
cut  the  line  of  retreat  of  an  army,  which,  although 
beaten,  is  still  not  entirely  disorganized.  The  detach- 
ment, commanded  by  General  Fink,  succeeded,  it  is 
true,  in  taking  a  position  in  rear  of  the  Austrian  ar- 
my and  closing  the  way,  but  it  was  not  strong  enough 
to  hold  it.  This  general  was  certainly  deserving 


STRATEGICAL   OPERATIONS.  67 

blame  for  having  permitted  himself  to  be  enveloped, 
for  a  force  of  that  magnitude  ought  always  to  be  able 
to  penetrate  through  the  enveloping  circle  at  some 
point.  Fink  should  have  made  the  attempt,  and  he 
would  have  saved  a  part  or  the  whole  of  his  detach- 
ment. 

Nearly  upon  the  same  ground,  the  corps  of  Yan- 
damme,  debouching  from  Pirna  after  the  battle  of 
Dresden,  in  1813,  had  advanced  to  Toplitz  in  Bo- 
hemia, while  the  mass  of  the  French  army  was  still 
in  the  vicinity  of  Dresden.  This  detachment  experi- 
enced at  Culm  the  same  fate  as  that  of  Frederic. 
However,  Yandamme  attempted  to  break  th rough 
the  enemy's  line,  and  a  part  of  his  corps  escaped  in 
that  way.  Napoleon,  in  sending  out  this  detachment, 
deprived  himself  of  a  part  of  his  troops  for  the  bat- 
tle, or  at  least  for  the  operations  subsequent  to  the 
victory  and  having  the  object  of  completing  it ;  he  lost 
10,000  or  12,000  excellent  troops;  and, what  was  worse, 
the  morale  of  the  army  was  sensibly  affected  by  this 
check.  If  all  the  detachments  referred  to  in  history 
were  as  disastrous  as  these,  the  temptation  to  make 
them  in  presence  of  an  enemy,  unless  he  is  entirely 
defeated,  would  be  overcome;  but  others  which  are 
mentioned  were  entirely  successful,  and  hence  arises 
an  attraction  for  them  which  it  is  difficult  to  resist.  In 
fact,  there  is  no  more  brilliant  operation  than  cutting 
the  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy.  If,  however,  this  can 
only  be  done  by  a  division  of  force,  it  ought  to  bo 


68  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

enough  for  a  general  of  prudence  to  know  the  dan- 
ger to  which  he  exposes  himself,  to  cause  him  to  re- 
ject the  idea  of  a  diversion  or  of  any  separation  of 
the  different  parts  of  his  army. 

Pursuit. — After  a  victory,  the  beaten  corps,  which 
are  separated  and  disorganized  by  defeat,  should  be 
vigorously  followed  up ;  every  effort  should  be  put 
forth  to  prevent  their  rallying,  and  to  take  advantage 
of  their  temporary  weakness  and  discouragement. 
There  is  no  danger  in  dividing  the  army  in  order  to 
give  greater  mobility  to  the  columns  intrusted  with 
the  pursuit,  provided,  however,  they  keep  on  interior 
lines  and  push  the  enemy  on  diverging  lines.  Care 
must  be  taken  not  to  drive  towards  a  common  point 
corps  already  separated,  because  this  would  be  play- 
ing directly  into  their  hands  and  facilitating  their  ral- 
lying. A  fault  of  this  kind  lost  the  battle  of  Water- 
loo to  the  French.  Marshal  Grouchy,  who  had  been 
directed  to  pursue  the  Prussians  after  their  defeat  at 
Ligny,  should  have  gained  their  right,  in  order  to 
separate  them  from  the  bridges  of  the  Dyle,  which 
were  their  communications  with  the  English  army ; 
instead  of  that,  he  pushed  them  towards  Wavre, 
where  they  crossed  the  river,  and  came  up  at  the  de- 
cisive moment  to  the  aid  of  their  allies  on  the  field 
of  "Waterloo.  Grouchy,  who  should  at  all  hazards 
have  barred  the  way  to  them,  or  at  least  have  reached 
the  field  of  battle  simultaneously  with  them,  only 
followed  them  up,  and  did  not  make  his  appearance 


STRATEGICAL    OPERATIONS.  69 

until  the  battle  was  over.  Moreover,  the  terrible 
cannonade  said  in  tones  of  thunder  that  the  great 
question  at  issue  was  being  decided  at  Waterloo,  and 
that  he  should  hasten  there  with  his  whole  corps.  In 
this  memorable  instance  Grouchy  exhibited  a  want 
of  skill  or  of  resolution ;  he  did  not  know  how  to 
keep  the  Prussians  at  a  distance,  and,  after  permitting 
them  to  pass,  he  took  no  steps  to  neutralize  the  mate- 
rial and  moral  effect  necessarily  produced  by  their 
arrival  upon  the  French  army,  which  had  been  fight- 
ing since  noon  against  superior  forces. 

When  the  enemy  retires  in  tolerable  order,  his  corps 
remaining  united,  and  not  presenting  their  flanks  to 
partial  attacks,  the  pursuit  is  made  by  the  army  en 
masse.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  do  something 
more  than  simply  follow  him  along  the  same  road,  be- 
cause, as  soon  as  he  finds  a  defile  or  other  favorable 
position,  he  will  check  the  pursuer,  and  compel  the 
use  of  means  to  dislodge  him  ;  precious  time  will  thus 
be  consumed,  which  may  enable  his  re-enforcements  to 
arrive.  It  is,  therefore,  judicious  to  manoeuvre  to  gain 
the  flank  of  the  enemy,  while  a  part  of  the  army 
presses  closely  in  rear.  In  this  way  he  is  unable  to 
take  any  position  that  cannot  be  turned  at  once,  and 
he  will  be  forced  to  fall  back  immediately  after  estab- 
lishing himself.  The  march  of  the  pursuing  army  will 
thus  be  not  perceptibly  retarded,  and  the  beaten  party 
will  experience  the  greatest  difficulty  in  effecting  a 
reorganization  of  his  force.  General  Kutusof,  in  the 


70  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

disastrous  campaign  of  1812,  took  advantage  of  this 
method,  called  the  parallel  pursuit.     Instead  of  fol- 
lowing the  same  road  as  the  French  army,  where  he 
would  have  suffered  much  from  want  of  provisions, 
and  would  have  had  continued  combats  with  strong 
rearguards,  he  moved  alongside  the  long  column  of  the 
enemy,  attacking  whenever  he  could,  throwing  his  for- 
ces into  the  gaps  occasioned  by  the  length  of  the  road, 
by  the  cold,  and  by  the  sufferings  of  the  French.    This 
wise  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  general  greatly 
increased  the  losses  and  demoralization  of  his  enemy. 
When  the  pursuing  army  has  outstripped  the  en- 
emy, there  are  two  courses  which  may  be  taken  ;  either 
to  close  the  way,  if  it  is  sufficiently  strong  to  brave  his 
despair,  or  to  take  a  position  on  the  flank,  leaving 
the  road  open.     The  latter  is  the  better  course,  be- 
cause it  is  always  dangerous  to  impose  upon  any  body 
of  men,  weak  as  it  may  be,  the  necessity  of  conquer- 
ing or  dying.      Under  such  circumstances,  men  of 
spirit  surpass  themselves,  and  sell  their  lives  or  liber- 
ties very  dearly  ;  nothing  is  to  be  gained  by  placing 
them  in  such  a  situation.     It  is  then  better  to  attack 
such  a  body  of  troops  by  the  flank  than  to  bar  their 
retreat ;  for  they  will  seek  rather  to  escape  than  to 
fight ;  a  determination,  however,  which  will  cost  them 
dearly.     A  general,  expecting  to  occupy  with  impu- 
nity the  path  of  an  army  or  a  strong  detachment, 
must  have  forces  considerably  superior,  to  prevent  its 
breaking  through  ;  otherwise,  he  should  make  a  bridge 


STRATEGICAL    OPERATIONS.  71 

of  gold  rather  than  expose  himself  to  great  loss,  or 
even  to  entire  defeat,  as  was  the  lot  of  the  Bavarians 
at  Hanau,  when  in  1813  they  attempted  to  close  the 
way  to  France  to  Napoleon's  army,  which  was  retiring 
after  the  disaster  of  Leipsic. 

The  passage  of  a  river  is  always  a  delicate  operation 
for  an  army  which  is  retiring ;  the  general  engaged  in 
the  pursuit  should  know  how  to  profit  by  this  circum- 
stance, to  make  an  opportune  attack.  The  advantages 
are  evidently  on  his  side ;  he  attacks  with  his  united 
forces  an  army  divided  by  the  river  into  two  portions, 
which  cannot  assist  each  other  ;  he  surrounds  the  por- 
tion on  the  same  side  of  the  river  with  himself,  and 
presses  it  upon  an  obstacle  which  should  cause  its  de- 
struction. Now  or  never  he  should  act  with  the  great- 
est promptness  to  take  possession  of  the  bridge,  the 
only  means  of  escape.  Any  hesitation  under  such 
circumstances  would  be  a  fault. 

Guarding  a  conquered  country. — It  is  not  sufficient 
to  overcome  the  enemy  at  every  point,  but  arrange- 
ments should  be  made  for  holding  the  conquered 
country.  For  this  purpose,  detachments  are  made  of 
sufficient  strength  to  occupy  the  fortified  places  and 
other  military  posts,  to  collect  the  taxes  imposed,  and 
to  keep  the  people  in  subjection.  These  detachments 
weaken  the  army  in  proportion  as  it  penetrates  fur- 
ther into  the  country ;  whilst  the  defenders,  concen- 
trating in  the  interior,  are  getting  stronger.  A  point 
must  therefore  be  reached  where  an  equality  will  again 


72  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

exist,  and  there  the  struggle  will  recommence,  the  in- 
vaders having  against  them  all  the  chances  which  may 
result  from  a  defeat  at  a  distance  from  the  base  of  ope- 
rations, and  in  the  midst  of  a  population  ready  to  rise 
in  arms  at  the  reverse  of  their  enemies,  as  was  done  in 
the  Spanish  war  of  Napoleon. 

These  inconveniences  may  be  avoided  by  having  the 
active  army  followed  up  by  corps,  whose  only  duty  it  is 
to  guard  the  country.  They  will  form  an  army  of 
reserve,  which  will  remain  at  the  distance  of  several 
days'  march,  and  will  act  according  to  special  princi- 
ples. Instead  of  remaining  concentrated,  it  will  ex- 
tend itself  as  much  as  possible,  in  order  to  enlarge  the 
base  of  operations,  to  procure  abundant  supplies,  and 
to  keep  the  country  in  subjection.  The  army  of  re- 
serve, being  weaker  than  the  active  army,  and  formed 
chiefly  of  new  soldiers,  will  be  entirely  secondary  to 
the  latter,  and  will  receive  orders  from  the  same  chief; 
properly  speaking,  it  is  but  a  portion  of  the  main 
army,  which  will  be  added  to  it  when  circumstances 
require. 

The  army  of  reserve  will  follow  the  active  army  in 
all  its  movements,  keeping  at  a  certain  distance  from 
it ;  will  secure  its  rear,  will  guard  the  depots,  and  pre- 
serve free  communications  with  the  sources  of  supply ; 
will  besiege  or  blockade  the  fortified  places,  which  the 
active  army  may  thus  neglect  and  pass  by  ;  it  will 
guard  and  secure  the  line  of  retreat  in  case  of  disaster ; 
will  construct  necessary  works  of  fortification  to  im- 


STRATEGICAL    OPERATIONS.  T3 

prove  the  lines  of  defence,  to  cover  the  bridges  and 
secure  the  depots ;  in  a  word,  will  do  every  thing  the 
active  army  could  not  do,  without  scattering  too  much 
and  delaying  its  march. 

It  is  evident  that  such  arrangements  can  only  be 
made  when  there  is  great  superiority  on  the  part  of 
the  invaders  in  material  and  moral  force.  In  the  re- 
verse case,  far  from  thinking  of  forming  an  army  or 
corps  of  reserve  in  rear  of  the  active  army,  all  the 
available  forces  should  be  assembled  for  battles  ;  for 
the  essential  thing  is  to  have  decisive  victories.  When 
these  are  obtained,  the  country  is  held  in  subjection, 
either  by  re-enforcements  passing  through  it  to  the 
main  army,  or  by  detachments  of  the  strictly  minimum 
strength  consistent  with  safety,  which,  under  the  name 
of  movable  columns,  pass  through  the  country,  and 
multiply  themselves  in  the  eyes  of  the  inhabitants,  by 
continual  marches  and  counter- marches. 

When  an  army,  after  long  fatigues,  should  take 
some  rest,  it  should  be  spread  out  for  accommodation 
in  the  villages,  and  with  a  view  to  embrace  such  an 
extent  of  country  as  will  furnish  subsistence  for  men 
and  horses.  This  is  called  going  into  cantonments. 
Evidently  this  step  is  only  taken  when  the  enemy  is  so 
distant  that  there  is  no  danger  of  attack  from  him. 
However,  the  contingency  of  his  advancing  against 
the  cantonments  should  always  be  provided  for,  by 
making  arrangements  for  meeting  him  with  a  suffi- 
cient force.  A  point  of  assembly  is  designated  for  the 


74:  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

troops  in  the  event  of  an  attack,  and  care  is  taken  to 
have  it  so  far  to  the  rear,  that  the  enemy  may  not  be 
able  to  reach  it  before  them.  The  more  advanced 
corps  retires  on  this  point,  those  on  the  right  and  left 
move  towards  it  by  flank  inarches,  and  those  in  rear 
come  up  like  re-enforcements  by  forward  movements. 
Thus  the  concentration  is  effected  by  the  shortest 
routes.  To  facilitate  the  movements,  and  when  the 
cantonments  are  to  be  occupied  some  time,  the  roads 
are  repaired,  new  ones  even  are  made  through  forests 
and  marshes,  bridges  are  thrown  over  intervening 
streams,  dikes  are  formed  across  ravines,  &e. :  no 
trouble  or  labor  should  be  spared  which  contributes  to 
the  safety  of  the  army. 

The  cantonments  occupied  during  winter  are  called 
winter  quarters.  They  differ  from  those  just  referred 
to  only  in  being  of  greater  extent.  Natural  obstacles 
should  be  taken  advantage  of  to  cover  and  secure  them 
from  incursions  of  the  enemy.  They  are  ordinarily 
established  behind  a  river,  which  may  serve  as  a  line 
of  defence. 

We  here  conclude  what  we  have  to  say  on  the  sub- 
ject of  strategy  with  the  remark,  that  if  the  principles 
of  this  elevated  branch  of  the  art  of  war  are  so  simple 
that  any  one  may  not  only  understand,  but  discuss 
them,  their  application  in  practice  is  very  difficult, 
and  requires  much  sagacity  and  tact.  The  problem 
to  be  solved  is  an  indeterminate  one,  admitting  of 
many  solutions ;  a  thousand  circumstances  complicate 


STRATEGICAL  OPERATIONS.  75 

it ;  the  data  are  often,  indeed  always,  more  or  less 
uncertain  ;  and  in  many  cases  action  must  be  taken 
upon  no  other  basis  than  conjecture.  There  are  many 
exceptions  to  the  guiding  rules.  Events  succeeding 
each  other  rapidly ;  unforeseen  occurrences ;  difficulties 
in  procuring  information  ;  motives  unperceived  by  the 
mass  of  people,  but  imperiously  influencing  a  com- 
mander, oblige  him  to  modify  plans  perfectly  arranged. 
If  we  add  that  time,  a  most  essential  element,  almost 
always  fails,  it  will  be  understood  that  none  but 
superior  men  are  capable  of  putting  in  practice  this 
science,  whose  principles  are  contained  in  so  small  a 
compass.  Let  us,  therefore,  abstain  from  judging 
unfortunate  generals  with  too  much  severity.  Let  us 
recollect  that  at  the  moment  when  they  were  obliged 
to  act,  they  were  not  accurately  informed,  either  of 
the  force  or  the  position  of  the  enemy  ;  that,  having 
no  certain  information  on  this  subject,  they  were 
necessarily  reduced  to  a  weighing  of  probabilities; 
that  of  many  things  which  became  perfectly  well 
known  after  the  event,  they  were  entirely  and  neces- 
sarily ignorant ;  that,  if  they  had  known  them,  they 
would,  doubtless,  have  seen  as  well  as  we  what  was 
best  to  be  done ;  that,  perhaps,  again,  the  force  of 
circumstances,  which  is  irresistible  in  war,  has 
obliged  them  to  act  otherwise.  Let  us,  therefore,  be 
moderate  in  judging  others.  Let  us  be  indulgent,  or 
rather  just,  towards  those  who  are,  in  all  probability, 
competent  to  be  our  teachers ;  let  us  not  forget  that 


76 


PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 


circumstances  beyond  their  control  may  have  induced 
those  acts  which  seem  to  us  faults,  and  that  good 
fortune  is  often  at  the  bottom  of  the  most  glorious 
results. 


COMPOSITION    OF   A!*   AKMY.  77 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION,    ETC. 

Art.  I. — Composition  of  an  Army. 

To  form  an  army,  something  more  is  requisite  than 
a  mere  assemblage  of  men  with  arms  in  their  hands  ; 
those  men  must  be  obedient  to  the  orders  of  a  com- 
mander, who  directs  their  movements,  and  causes  them 
all  to  act  for  the  attainment  of  a  common  object. 
Without  this,  an  army  is  little  more  than  a  tumultuous 
mob,  where  confusion  and  disorder  reign  supreme. 
If  the  numerous  individuals  composing  it  do  not  obey 
a  single  will,  and  do  not  act  for  a  common  object,  no 
plan  can  be  certainly  undertaken  or  carried  out. 
Discipline  is,  therefore,  of  prime  importance  to  an 
army  ;  an  essential,  indispensable  condition  for  its 
existence.  Thus  those  troops  which  have  been  brought 
to  the  highest  state  of  discipline  have  at  all  periods, 
and  among  all  races,  had  the  undoubted  superiority. 
By  their  admirable  discipline,  the  Romans  triumphed 
over  all  nations,  and  gained  the  mastery  of  the  world. 

Honor  is  the  most  certain  promoter  of  discipline, 
especially  in  the  militia.  Punishments  which  are  too 
severe  irritate  the  soldier  without  reforming ;  they 
should  be  reserved  for  rare  cases,  where,  to  arrest 
mutinous  disorder,  it  becomes  necessary  to  use  the 


7S  PRINCIPLES   OF   STJKATEGY. 

most  powerful  repressive  measures.  It  is  by  using 
persuasive  means  with  soldiers  inclined  to  be  regard- 
less of  duty  ;  by  treating  them  humanely,  even  when 
punishing ;  by  carefully  avoiding  humiliating  them,  by 
contemptuous  and  offensive  language ;  by  seeking,  on 
the  contrary,  to  inspire  them  with  sentiments  of  patriot- 
ism and  honor,  that  a  chief  can  expect  to  form  cohorts 
which  will  be  magnanimous  in  victory  and  unshaken 
in  the  midst  of  reverses.  These  are  the  only  means 
which  can  be  relied  upon  to  produce  soldiers  who  may 
be  trusted  in  critical  moments.  If  they  are  insufficient 
to  make  heroes ;  if  enthusiasm  alone  is  the  mainspring 
of  prodigies  of  valor,  like  that  at  Thermopylae,  we 
may  be  at  least  sure  of  obtaining  every  thing  that 
can  be  expected  from  veteran  and  well-organized 
troops. 

A  commander  should,  therefore,  never  use  harsh 
and  contemptuous  language;  he  should  particularly 
avoid  violent  reproofs  of  those  subordinates  who  have 
failed  in  their  duties  ;  he  is  not  excusable  for  giving 
way  to  passionate  expressions  ;  he  will  always  congrat- 
ulate himself  for  restraining  his  tongue ;  the  soldiers, 
who  are  perfectly  able  to  appreciate  the  offence,  will 
give  him  credit  for  his  moderation,  and  will  pass 
their  own  judgment  on  the  guilty  parties,  and  will 
be  themselves  more  disposed  to  obedience. 

But  there  is  another  extreme  into  which  officers  of 
militia  easily  fall,  and  it  must  be  carefully  avoided. 
It  is  that  excessive  familiarity  which  lowers  and 


COMPOSITION   OF   AN    ARMY.  79 

throws  discredit  upon  the  individual  who  resorts  to  it, 
and  renders  him  contemptible  in  the  eyes  of  the  very 
persons  whose  favor  he  seeks  to  gain.  It  is  this 
culpable  weakness  which  is  the  means  of  filling  the 
ears  of  commanders  with  the  talk  of  bad  soldiers,  who 
are  always  indulging  in  grievances  and  complaints. 
It  is  destructive  of  all  discipline,  as  it  seals  the  eyes  of 
the  officers  to  the  faults  and  disorders  which  should 
be  rigidly  punished  or  repressed.  A  commander  who 
is  too  familiar  with  his  soldiers,  loses  all  control  over 
them  ;  he  is  exposed  to  vulgarities  and  want  of  respect 
from  those  whom  he  has  accustomed  to  regard  him  aa 
an  ordinary  companion,  and  to  speak  to  him  as  such. 

The  man  to  whom  the  charge  of  a  body  of  soldiers 
is  intrusted,  should  avoid  two  extremes  :  the  severity 
which  alienates,  and  the  excessive  familiarity  which 
breeds  contempt.  He  will  preserve  a  proper  mean, 
if  he  knows  how  to  be  just  while  not  severe,  and  to 
be  kind  to  individuals  while  requiring  rigid  perform- 
ance of  duty.  If  no  fault  goes  unpunished  ;  if  general 
good  conduct  and  gallant  deeds  receive  praise  and 
worthy  rewards,  the  chief  will  be  at  once  feared  and 
loved  by  his  subordinates  ;  his  order  will  be  punctually 
executed,  and  every  effort  will  be,  made  to  merit  his 
approbation.  Finally,  discipline  will  be  perfect. 

If  it  were  possible  to  select  the  men  of  whom  to 
make  up  an  army,  great  stature  should  not  be  the 
only  thing  to  be  sought  after.  The  Komans  were  not 
a  tall  race,  and  yet  what  nation  has  equalled  them  in 


80  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

military  exploits?  They  accomplished  such  great 
results  by  joining  to  military  qualities  the  civil  virtues. 
Strength  of  body,  great  height,  courage,  are  doubtless 
valuable  things  ;  but,  to  make  the  real  soldier,  these 
should  be  accompanied  by  other  qualities  no  less 
precious,  such  as  sobriety,  patience  under  privations, 
honor,  and,  above  all,  a  pure  and  ardent  spirit  of 
patriotism.  Those  virtues  alone  are  sufficient  to 
ennoble  the  military  profession,  which  is  too  often 
disgraced  by  excesses  of  every  kind,  as  hurtful  to  the 
nation  it  should  protect  as  to  the  enemy  who  is  the 
cause  or  the  pretext  of  them.  Therefore,  the  republics 
of  ancient  times  exercised  the  greatest  precautions  in 
the  selection  of  the  soldiers  to  whom  their  destinies 
were  committed.  No  one  was  admitted  to  the  honor 
of  bearing  arms  in  the  service  of  the  country  who  was 
not  directly  interested  in  its  defence.  Our  modern 
institutions  do  not  permit  us  to  hope  for  so  excellent 
a  composition  of  our  armies,  but  something  similar 
might  be  attempted  in  the  service  of  militia ;  and,  in 
the  regular  army,  the  custom  of  recruiting  its  ranks 
from  the  scum  of  cities  might  be  abandoned,  and 
replaced  by  a  military  conscription,  against  which,  it 
is  true,  there  has  always  been  a  great  outcry  ;  but 
still  it  presents  the  only  means  of  having  an  army 
filled  with  men  whose  interests  are  the  same  as  those 
of  other  classes  of  citizens. 

After   these    preliminary    remarks,    which,    it    is 
hoped,  may  not  be  useless,  I  enter  upon  my  subject. 


COMPOSITION    OF    AN    ARMY.  81 

A  great  army,  under  the  orders  of  a  general-in- 
chief,  is  composed  of  corps  commanded  by  subordi- 
nate generals,  each  corps  containing  all  arms  of  the 
service,  that  is  to  say,  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry, 
in  the  proportions  determined  by  experience.  It  will 
be  evident  that  the  division  of  a  large  army  into  seve- 
ral corps  is  absolutely  necessary,  in  order  to  render 
that  huge  machine  capable  of  obedience  to  the  various 
impulsions  it  is  to  receive,  and  of  assuming  the  various 
forms  circumstances  require. 

An  army  corps  rarely  contains  more  than  30,000 
men,  and  often  lower,  even  among  nations  who  have 
the  greatest  numbers  of  troops.  Such  a  command  is 
a  great  burden,  and  few  men  are  capable  of  managing 
it  creditably. 

An  army  corps  is  divided  into  a  certain  number  of 
divisions  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  each  of  which  is 
usually,  in  France,  commanded  by  a  general  of  divis- 
ion, the  army  corps  itself  being  under  the  orders  of 
a  marshal  of  the  empire.  In  the  United  States  army 
a  division  is  the  command  of  a  major-general.  The 
number  of  divisions  in  an  army  corps  is  variable,  de- 
pending on  the  strength  of  the  divisions  and  the  corps. 
The  other  arms,  engineers  and  artillery,  enter  usually 
by  companies  in  the  composition  of  an  army  corps. 
If,  however,  there  are  several  companies  of  the  same 
arms,  as  is  usually  the  case  for  artillery,  they  may  be 
joined  under  the  orders  of  one  commander. 

A  division  is  composed  of  several  brigades,  usually 
4* 


82  PRINCIPLES   OF   STEATEGY. 

from  two  to  four ;  in  the  United  States  service  each 
is  commanded  by  a  brigadier-general. 

Brigades  are  divided  into  regiments,  each  contain- 
ing two  or  more  ;  regiments  into  two  or  more  batta- 
lions or  squadrons,  according  as  they  are  composed 
of  infantry  or  cavalry.  We  hence  see  that  for  these 
two  arms  the  denominations  are  the  same,  except  the 
last  subdivision,  which  may  therefore  be  regarded  as 
the  unit  in  the  composition  of  armies,  and  is  often 
used  in  expressing  the  strength  of  a  corps,  the  num- 
ber of  battalions  and  squadrons  it  contains  being 
stated.  In  the  United  States  army  the  artillery  has 
a  nominal  regimental  organization. 

One  man  could  not  attend  to  all  the  duties  imposed 
by  the  command  of  an  army.  He  has,  as  assistants, 
a  certain  number  of  officers  who  compose  his  staff. 
They  transmit  his  orders  verbally  or  in  writing  ;  they 
arrange  marches  and  encampments  ;  they  make  ex- 
aminations of  ground,  and  collect  all  possible  infor- 
mation with  reference  to  the  position  and  movements 
of  the  enemy;  they  receive  and  communicate  with 
flags  of  truce,  and  attend  to  procuring  spies,  &c. ; 
they  make  condensed  reports  of  the  state  of  the  com- 
mand, from  the  reports  of  its  several  subdivisions  ; 
they  make  detailed  inspections  of  troops,  quarters, 
hospitals,  &c.,  to  be  certain  that  every  thing  is  in 
good  order ;  they  preserve  the  correspondence  and 
records;  they  give  descriptions  of  the  parts  of  the 
campaign,  make  maps  of  fields  of  battle,  supervise  the 


COMPOSITION    OF   AN    ARMY.  83 

different  services,  and  see  to  the  execution  of  regula- 
tions and  orders ;  in  a  word,  they  are  the  intermedia- 
ries the  general  makes  use  of  in  setting  in  motion  the 
huge  machine  called  an  army,  and  causing  its  various 
movements  to  be  made  in  an  orderly  and  suitable 
manner,  without  interference  between  the  several 
parts.  The  great  variety  of  details  composing  the 
duties  of  the  staff  makes  it  necessary  to  divide  them 
into  bureaus,  and  to  assign  special  duties  to  each 
bureau.  The  superior  officer  placed  at  their  head 
should  possess  the  confidence  of  the  commander ;  he 
must  be  made  acquainted  with  his  plans,  in  order  to 
co-operate  fully  in  carrying  them  out ;  it  is  his  duty 
to  give  his  opinions  freely  on  the  plans  proposed, 
even  to  offer  new  ones  if  he  thinks  fit  to  do  so  ;  but  it 
is  equally  incumbent  upon  him  to  throw  aside  his 
own  ideas  when  they  have  not  been  adopted,  in  order 
that  he  may  imbibe,  so  to  speak,  those  of  the  general, 
as  the  least  misunderstanding  between  these  two  men 
may  lead  to  the  gravest  mishaps.  Unity  of  ideas 
and  action  is  the  best  requisite  for  success. 

Each  army  corps,  division,  brigade,  and  regiment 
has  its  own  staff,  whose  duties  are  similar  to  those  of 
the  staff  of  an  army,  although,  of  course,  more  con- 
tracted, and  less  important,  proportionally  to  the  body 
of  troops  in  question.  The  artillery  and  engineers, 
when  found  in  sufficient  numbers,  are  assimilated  to 
the  divisions  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  They  have 
their  special  staffs  for  directing  their  troops,  and 


84r  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

every  thing  relating  to  their  special  and  appropriate 
duties. 

The  administrative  service  of  an  army  is  usually 
divided  into  several  distinct  departments,  as : 

Pay  department. 

Subsistence  department. 

Medical  «  [These   two    in   United  States 

Hospital  "  )      service  united. 

Recruiting 

Clothing  "  ") 

Barrack  "  I  Tnese  four  in  United   States 

V     army  combined  in  one,  called 

•^ ue*  I       quartermaster's  department. 

Transportation    "  j 

Military  justice. 

These  all  have  their  employes,  who  swell  the  num- 
bers of  an  army,  although  they  do  not  enter  the  line 
of  battle. 

Thus,  to  recapitulate,  a  grand  army  is  composed  of 
several  corps,  which  are  sometimes  designated  as  the 
wings,  the  centre,  the  general  advanced  guard,  the 
general  rear-guard,  reserve  corps,  &c.  Each  army 
corps  is  formed  of  several  divisions,  each  division  of 
several  brigades,  each  brigade  of  several  regiments5 
and  each  regiment  of  several  battalions  or  squadrons. 
The  artillery  attached  to  different  corps,  is  usually 
formed  into  companies  which  serve  batteries.  They 
are  kept  together  as  much  as  possible.  Sappers, 
miners,  and  pontoniers  serve  in  companies. 

An  army  is  accompanied  by  a  great  number  of  car- 


COMPOSITION   OF   AN    AEMY.  85 

riages,  for  the  transportation  of  munitions  and  war- 
like equipments,  provisions,  money,  hospital  stores, 
&c.,  tools,  pontoons,  &c.,  baggage,  and  a  variety  of 
other  things.  All  these  accompaniments  were  aptly 
styled  by  the  Romans  impedimenta,  for  m>thing  em- 
barrasses the  movements  of  an  army  so  much  as  the 
long  trains  of  wagons  it  is  forced  to  carry  with  it;  in 
order  to  supply  its  various  wants.  It  is  almost  super- 
fluous to  say  that  these  should  be  kept  down  to  the 
smallest  possible  number,  and  the  strictest  care  should 
be  taken  to  prevent  officers  and  employes  from  carry- 
ing with  them  carriages  unauthorized  by  regulations. 

The  three  arms,  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery, 
enter  in  different  proportions  in  armies,  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  country  where  the  war  is  to  be  car- 
ried on.  In  a  mountainous  country  less  cavalry  is 
necessary,  for  there  is  but  little  ground  suitable  for  its 
action ;  less  artillery  is  admissible,  especially  of  heavy 
calibres,  because  of  the  difficulty  of  transporting  it. 
In  countries  full  of  plains,  the  artillery  and  cavalry 
should  be  considerably  increased.  The  usual  propor- 
tion, in  the  great  armies  of  Europe,  is  for  the  cavalry 
to  be  one-fifth,  and  three  pieces  of  artillery  to  every 
1,000  men.  Thus,  an  army  of  100,000  men  would 
contain  20,000  horses  for  cavalry,  and  300  cannon. 

The  three  arms  are  still  usually  distinguished  as 
troops  of  the  line  and  light  troops  :  the  first  are 
specially  designed  to  fight  in  order,  with  closed  ranks • 
the  others  to  scour  the  country,  harass  the  enemy, 


86  PRINCIPLES    OF    STBATEGY. 

pursue  him  after  victory,  make  prisoners,  &c.  It 
would,  however,  be  an  error  to  suppose  that  these 
light  troops  are  never  drawn  up  in  any  kind  of  order, 
and  never  fight  except  as  skirmishers.  Such  troops 
would  be  a  great  embarrassment.  It  seems  still  ques- 
tionable whether  two  distinct  classes  of  infantry,  doing 
different  duties,  are  necessary ;  an  infantry  of  the  line 
to  fight  in  the  ranks,  and  light  infantry  to  act  indi- 
vidually. "Will  it  not  be  better  to  instruct  all  in- 
fantry soldiers  in  these  double  duties  ?  A  great  sim- 
plicity would  be  the  result  ;  every  body  of  troops 
would  then  be  able  to  do  its  own  scouting  and  sim- 
ilar duties ;  to  spread  out  in  broken  ground,  and  to  act 
in  mass  on  level  ground.  The  troops  of  the  line  would 
no  longer  be  heard  complaining  of  the  absence  of  the 
light  troops,  nor  the  latter  sometimes  giving  way  on 
account  of  their  separation  from  the  infantry  of  the 
line.  There  would  no  longer  be  a  pretext  for  the  dif- 
ferent corps  accusing  each  other  of  want  of  success. 
The  infantry  would  then,  under  all  circumstances,  be 
self-sustaining ;  being  composed  of  similar  elements, 
it  would  be  able  to  form  line  of  battle  at  pleasure,  or 
to  act  in  dispersed  order. 

"When  the  duties  are  divided,  one  class  of  infantry 
cannot  dispense  with  the  services  of  the  other ;  and  if 
by  accident  they  are  temporarily  separated,  there  is 
danger  of  loss  of  confidence ;  because  the  one  is  un- 
able to  disperse  among  woods  and  rocks,  or  the  other, 
being  in  a  level  position,  is  unaccustomed  to  fighting 


COMPOSITION   OF   AN   AEMY.  87 

in  line.  It  has,  moreover,  been  observed  that  troops 
of  the  line  deteriorate  in  a  long  campaign,  whilst  the 
contrary  is  the  case  with  light  troops  ;  all  the  infantry 
should  therefore  be  required  to  perform  in  turn  duties 
as  light  troops,  and  in  the  line  of  battle.  Detached 
troops  engage  in  what  is  called  "la petite  guerre" — an 
excellent  school  for  officers,  who,  in  such  expeditions, 
must  make  use  of  all  their  faculties.  Light  infantry, 
seeming  more  suited  to  these  duties,  are  preferred  for 
them  ;  so  that  the  officers  of  the  line,  perpetually  at- 
tached to  their  battalions,  can  learn  nothing  except 
the  less  elevating  part  of  their  profession.  This  is  a 
very  grave  inconvenience,  that  would  be  avoided  by 
giving  all  the  infantry  the  same  instruction.  And 
certainly  this  would  not  be  exacting  too  much  of 
soldiers,  who  commonly  pass  a  life  of  idleness  in 
garrison,  much  more  calculated  to  ruin  their  health 
than  excite  military  virtues. 

Certain  military  officers  of  great  merit  insist,  not- 
withstanding these  considerations,  upon  the  propriety 
of  having  two  kinds  of  infantry,  in  order  that  each 
may  perform  more  perfectly  the  duty  required  of  it, 
and  have  more  confidence  in  itself.  The  principal 
strength  of  soldiers  consisting  in  their  own  opinion  of 
themselves,  the  soldier  of  the  line  will  behave  better 
in  the  closed  ranks  of  a  battalion,  and  the  light  in- 
fantry man  in  an  open  order  which  allows  him  full 
freedom  of  movement,  where  he  can  profit  by  his 
skill,  and  take  advantage  of  the  least  obstacle  offering 


88  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

a  shelter.  In  fact,  this  question  cannot  be  treated 
in  a  rigorous  manner,  as  its  solution  depends  upon 
national  characteristics  and  varying  circumstances. 

As  to  the  cavalry,  it  is  best  to  have  several  kinds, 
in  order  to  use  profitably  horses  of  all  sizes,  and  to 
take  advantage  of  their  different  degrees  of  strength 
and  speed.  Cavalry  of  the  line,  or  heavy  cavalry,  are 
usually  mounted  on  the  strongest  horses ;  light  cav- 
alry, composed  of  hussars,  chasseurs,  and  lancers, 
make  use  of  the  smallest  and  most  active  horses  ;  the 
dragoons  are  a  kind  of  intermediate  cavalry,  ma- 
noeuvring in  line  with  the  first,  or  skirmishing  with 
the  second. 

The  artillery  of  the  line  is  served  by  men  on  foot, 
and  the  gait,  usually,  is  the  walk  or  the  trot  of  the 
horses,  in  order  that  the  men  may  follow.  But  the 
system  is  now  adopted  of  mounting  the  gunners 
upon  the  limbers  and  caissons,  which  permits  much 
more  rapid  movements.  Light  artillery  is  served  by 
mounted  gunners,  the  usual  gait  being  the  gallop ;  it 
manoeuvres  with  the  cavalry,  being  able  to  move 
with  equal  rapidity,  and  be  supported  by  it.  The 
artillery  of  the  line  regulates  its  movements  by  those 
of  the  infantry,  and  should  be  always  supported  by  it. 
Besides,  there  is  the  heavy  or  siege  artillery,  wrhich  is 
necessary  for  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortified 
places :  it  only  follows  the  armies  at  a  distance,  or 
remains  in  the  parks  ;  it  is  only  brought  on  the 
ground  when  needed. 


FORMATION   OF   TROOPS. 


Art.  II.— Formation  of  Troops. 

Since  the  introduction  of  the  musket,  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  rifle,  in  all  the  armies  of  the  civilized 
world,  infantry  is  formed  in  not  more  than  three 
ranks,  and  often  in  two.  With  this  formation,  all 
three  ranks  can  use  their  arms  at  once ;  with  four 
ranks  it  would  be  impracticable,  because  the  arm  is 
too  short.  The  men  of  the  fourth  rank  would  kill  or 
wound  those  of  the  first.  Even  in  the  three-rank  for- 
mation there  is  danger  of  this,  especially  with  new 
troops.  Opinion  in  Europe  is  divided  as  to  the  rela- 
tive advantage  of  the  formation  in  two  or  three  ranks, 
and  practice  in  European  armies  is  also  variable.  The 
English  and  Swiss  adopt  the  former.  Among  some  of 
the  people  who  use  the  three-rank  formation,  the 
third  is  specially  intended  for  duty  as  skirmishers,  so 
that  there  are  really  but  two  ranks  firing  in  line. 

The  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  two 
methods  balance  each  other ;  examples  of  success  at- 
tending the  use  of  both  may  be  cited.  The  English 
are  certainly  firm,  notwithstanding  their  shallow 
order ;  the  French  deemed  it  expedient  to  form  in 
two  ranks  at  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  where  they  were 
obliged  to  occupy  a  very  great  extent  of  ground  in 
order  to  fight  against  vastly  superior  numbers.  Na- 
poleon, in  his  Memoirs,  seems  to  favor  this  formation, 
but  proposes  to  increase  greatly  the  number  of  file- 


90  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

closers,  really  making  a  third  rank,  whose  duty  it  is 
not  to  use  their  arms,  but  to  preserve  order  in  the  ranks. 
To  use  the  third  rank  in  firing,  the  first  must  kneel, 
and  this  movement  requires  a  command  for  its  execu- 
tion. Firing  at  the  word  of  command  is  rarely  prac- 
ticable when  the  action  is  in  progress,  for  the  voices 
of  the  commanders  are  drowned  in  the  noise  of  can- 
non, drums,  cries  of  the  wounded,  &c. ;  the  excite- 
ment of  the  combat  makes  it  impossible  for  soldiers 
to  give  that  cool  and  continued  attention,  without 
which  a  large  number  cannot  discharge  and  reload 
their  pieces  together.  The  firing  necessarily  becomes 
"  by  file"  which  can  only  be  executed  by  the  first  two 
ranks.  The  third  rank  thus  becomes  useless  in  firing, 
while  one  more  man  in  each  file  is  exposed  to  each  bullet 
of  the  enemy.  An  attempt  has  been  made,  in  the 
French  service,  to  make  the  men  of  the  third  rank  load 
their  muskets  and  pass  them  to  those  in  the  second,  who 
may  thus  fire  twice  in  rapid  succession,  and  the  firing 
is  in  theory  more  actively  kept  up  than  in  the  two- 
rank  formation.  Experience  has  demonstrated  the 
fallacy  of  this  expectation,  as  confusion  is  produced  in 
exchanging  arms  between  the  second  and  third  ranks, 
loss  of  time  takes  place,  and  there  is,  moreover,  a  re- 
pugnance on  the  part  of  the  soldier  to  part  with  his  own 
and  to  use  the  musket  of  another.  This  repugnance  is 
praiseworthy,  for  the  soldier  should  cling  to  his  mus- 
ket, as  did  the  Spartan  to  his  shield.  He  should 
never  be  permitted  to  lose  it ;  and  if  he  cannot  bring 


FORMATION    OF   TROOPS.  91 

the  whole  of  it  from  the  field  of  battle,  he  should  be 
obliged  to  exhibit  pieces  of  it. 

The  losses  of  troops  drawn  up  in  two  ranks,  whether 
in  line  or  column,  are  less  when  exposed  to  artillery ; 
they  occupy  with  equal  numbers  a  greater  extent  of 
ground,  which  is  very  advantageous  for  outflanking 
the  wings  of  the  enemy,  or  for  resting  their  own  on 
obstacles  which  would  necessarily  be  beyond  the  line 
if  formed  in  three  ranks.  The  first  being  able  to  occu- 
py the  same  ground  with  fewer  men  than  the  second, 
stronger  reserves  may  be  held  in  hand,  in  order  to  act 
at  the  decisive  point  and  gain  the  victory.  Finally, 
troops  formed  in  two  ranks  march  with  greater  ease, 
and,  for  the  same  reason,  are  more  quickly  instructed 
and  formed. 

If  there  is  a  shock  to  be  received,  a  charge  of  cav- 
alry to  be  repelled,  the  formation  of  three  ranks  has 
undoubted  advantage,  because  the  third  rank  supports 
the  other  two  and  gives  them  confidence ;  its  fire  may 
be  very  effective  against  the  horsemen  in  the  later 
moments  of  the  charge,  when  the  men  of  the  first  two 
ranks,  having  come  to  the  position  of  "  charge  lay- 
onets"  are  bracing  themselves  to  receive  the  shock. 
At  this  movement  they  naturally  lower  the  head  and 
lean  forward  a  little,  which  diminishes  their  height 
somewhat,  so  that  those  who  are  behind  are  able  to 
discharge  their  pieces  without  injury  to  those  in  front, 
particularly  as  it  is  necessary  to  aim  high  in  order  to 
strike  men  on  horseback. 


92  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

Cavalry,  all  other  things  being  equal,  have  a  much 
better  chance  of  success  against  a  battalion  which  is 
very  shallow  and  extended  greatly,  than  against  one 
drawn  up  with  a  narrow  front  and  with  deep  files. 
For  this  reason  a  small  square  is  much  safer  than  a 
large  one :  a  little  body  of  a  few  infantry  often  re- 
sists all  the  efforts  of  a  numerous  cavalry,  because 
combined  attacks  are  impossible  against  so  small  an 
object,  which  can  be  only  assailed  by  a  few  horsemen 
at  once,  and  these  may  be  always  driven  off,  if  the 
infantry  are  cool  and  manage  their  lire  skilfully. 

When  an  action  is  prolonged  and  losses  occur,  gaps 
are  formed  in  the  line  of  battle,  which,  being  con- 
stantly increased,  may  eventually  compromise  the 
safety  of  the  troops,  unless  measures  are  taken  to  fill 
them ;  this  effect  is  specially  to  be  apprehended  in 
two-rank  squares,  on  account  of  the  diminution  of  fire. 
The  third  rank  may  be  very  usefully  employed  in 
closing  these  gaps.  It  is  really  the  first  reserve  of  the 
combatants,  and,  viewing  it  in  this  light,  a  commander 
would  be  wise  who,  when  the  fight  is  not  at  close 
quarters,  should  place  his  third  rank  behind  an  undu- 
lation of  ground,  either  standing,  or  sitting,  or  lying 
down,  to  prevent  useless  exposure.  The  third  rank 
may  be  used  in  carrying  off  the  wounded,  whose  suf- 
ferings and  cries  produce  a  demoralizing  effect,  which 
should  be  avoided  if  possible.  Finally,  if,  during  the 
contest,  it  is  necessary  to  re-enforce  the  skirmishers,  or 
to  send  suddenly  a  detachment  upon  the  flank  of  the 


FORMATION   OF   TROOPS.  93 

enemy,  or  to  some  point  important  to  be  occupied,  it 
may  be  done,  without  disarranging  the  plan  of  battle, 
by  employing  the  men  of  the  third  rank.  Marshal 
Saxe  condemned  battalions  too  much  extended,  on 
the  ground  that  they  were  not  firm,  and  were  good 
for  nothing  but  firing,  which,  he  said,  was  never  de- 
cisive. 

If  the  battalion  is  considered  by  itself,  it  is  evident 
that  where  it  exceeds  certain  limits  it  marches  and . 
manoeuvres  badly,  either  on  account  of  the  difficulty 
of  moving  its  parts  together,  or  of  the  impossibility  of 
hearing  the  voice  of  its  chief  from  one  end  to  the  other. 
A  long  line  always  wavers,  and  is  more  or  less  dis- 
jointed when  inarching  in  line  of  battle,  which,  of  all 
the  methods  of  gaining  ground  towards  the  enemy,  is 
the  most  natural  and  simple.  A  battalion  of  moderate 
extent  can  march  more  easily  and  for  a  longer  time 
in  good  order.  The  same  number  of  officers  is 
necessary  for  a  weak  battalion  as  a  strong  one,  and 
they  are  more  expensive  for  the  state  than  soldiers. 
Two  armies,  one  of  90,000  men,  formed  in  three  ranks, 
and  the  other  of  60,000  men,  in  two  ranks,  would  re- 
quire the  same  number  of  commissioned  and  non-com- 
missioned officers.  Grade  would  be  more  valuable, 
and  the  subordinate  officers  would  have  greater  im- 
portance, in  the  first  case  than  in  the  second,  because 
they  would  be  proportion  ably  less  numerous.  Any 
thing  depreciates  in  value  as  it  becomes  common. 

In  a  very  mountainous  country,  like  Switzerland, 


94:  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

for  example,  there  are  special  reasons  for  preferring 
the  formation  in  three  ranks,  which  are  drawn  from 
the  nature  of  the  country  itself.  This  country,  even 
in  the  most  open  portions,  is  cut  up  by  woods,  hills, 
rivulets ;  there  is  seldom  found  sufficient  space  for 
deploying  several  battalions ;  there  is  no  level  ground 
not  flanked  by  woods  or  other  natural  obstacles. 
Hence  it  is  better  for  the  battalions  to  have  less  extent 
and  more  solidity,  in  order  to  be  less  disordered  in  a 
broken  country,  and  to  close  the  open  spaces  better. 
These  are  in  fact  the  only  places  where  the  enemy 
can  penetrate — the  only  points  where  attacks  of 
cavalry  are  to  be  met.  The  w^oods  and  broken  ground 
may  always  be  sufficiently  defended  by  riflemen  and 
skirmishers.  Firing  should  not  be  the  only  depend- 
ence of  the  battalion ;  every  thing  else  should  not  be 
sacrificed  to  facility  of  firing;  care  should  also  be 
taken  to  have  the  lines  firm,  and  to  provide  means  of 
giving  the  men  that  self-reliance  without  which  they 
cannot  be  expected  to  offer  a  prolonged  resistance  to 
the  attacks  of  troops  that  may  be  better  disciplined 
and  more  numerous. 

It  has  been  proposed  to  retain  all  the  advantages 
of  the  battalion  formation  in  two  ranks,  for  firing  and 
executing  certain  movements  with  convenience,  and 
to  give  also,  in  part  at  least,  and  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances, the  advantages  of  three  ranks.  This  is 
to  be  effected  by  keeping  two  or  more  companies  of 
a  battalion  specially  for  skirmishers,  and  when  not 


FORMATION    OF   TEOOPS.  95 

thus  engaged  to  place  them  in  rear  of  the  flank  com- 
panies, in  order  to  strengthen  these  points  of  the  line, 
and  protect  them  from  attack  by  the  rear  or  flank. 
If  the  battalion  has  a  powerful  attack  to  resist,  these 
companies  may  form  a  third  rank.  In  a  simple  square, 
they  may  also  furnish  a  third  rank  to  the  four  fronts, 
or  form  a  reserve,  to  be  moved  to  any  point  the  enemy 
may  threaten.  In  moving  against  the  enemy  in 
columns  of  companies  or  divisions,  these  companies 
may  form  small  columns  on  the  flanks  of  the  main 
column,  keeping  abreast  with  the  last  division  or  a 
little  in  rear  of  it ;  they  will  thus  serve  to  enlarge  the 
breach  which  may  have  been  made.  These  auxiliary 
columns  may  then  turn  to  the  right  and  left,  taking 
in  flank  the  adjacent  parts  of  the  enemy's  line,  if  it 
still  remains  firm  next  the  breach  ;  finally,  they  may 
pursue  in  open  order. 

A  formation  in  an  even  number  of  divisions  is 
advantageous,  as  it  permits  a  battalion  to  be  divided 
into  two  equal  half  battalions,  and  each  part  to  be 
manoauvred  separately,  if  necessary.  The  proper 
extent  of  front  to  give  a  battalion  in  line  is  deter- 
mined by  the  condition  that  the  voice  of  its  chief 
at  one  end  may  be  easily  heard  at  the  other.  This 
will  fix  the  proper  number  of  men  for  a  battalion.  A 
suitable  front  is  found  to  be  about  one  hundred  and 
fifty  yards,  and,  if  in  two  ranks,  the  battalion  will 
contain  about  six  hundred  men.  It  is  an  excellent 
plan  to  have  each  division  formed  of  a  single  com- 


96  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

pany,  because,  in  actual  engagements,  the  battalion  is 
manoeuvred  in  column  of  divisions  much  oftener 
than  in  company,  and  at  such  times  it  is  very  advan- 
tageous to  have  the  men  under  the  immediate  orders 
of  their  own  captains.  When  a  division  is  formed  of 
two  companies,  one  captain  is  in  the  ranks,  and  a  whole 
company  under  the  orders  of  a  man  with  whose  voice 
the  men  are  not  familiar.  This  is  a  frequent  cause  of 
confusion  at  moments  when  it  is  most  to  be  avoided. 
Cavalry  is  drawn  up  in  two  ranks,  which  are  quite 
as  many  as  are  necessary,  and  even  then  the  men  of 
the  rear  rank  cannot  use  their  arms  effectively.  Con- 
sidering this  point  alone,  it  would  seem  that  cavalry 
should  be  drawn  up  in  but  one  rank  ;  but  the  men  of 
the  second  rank  are  by  no  means  useless ;  for  they 
support,  press  forward,  and  excite  to  greater  effort 
those  of  the  front  rank.  Gaps  in  a  line  of  cavalry  are 
even  more  dangerous  than  in  a  line  of  infantry,  and 
the  men  of  the  rear  rank  are  at  hand  to  fill  such  open- 
ings. If  we  could  expect  to  determine  the  effect  of 
the  shock  of  a  body  of  cavalry,  as  in  a  problem  of  me- 
chanics, by  multiplying  the  mass  by  the  velocity,  we 
would  conclude  that  the  formation  of  cavalry  ought 
to  be  deeper  than  it  is  actually,  since  the  mass  would 
be  increased  by  making  the  number  of  ranks  greater, 
the  front  remaining  unchanged.  But  such  a  hope 
would  not  be  realized  ;  for  no  cavalry,  however  well 
it  may  be  drilled,  will  form  a  compact  mass  at  the  end 
of  a  charge.  The  boldest  men  and  the  faster  horses 


FORMATION   OF   TROOPS.  97 

get  in  advance,  and  the  wounded,  timid,  and  badly 
mounted  men  fall  behind,  so  that  the  shock,  if  a  col- 
lision takes  place,  is  rather  that  of  successive  and  sepa- 
rate individuals  than  of  the  whole  body.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  two  ranks  are  enough.  The  squadron 
cannot  have  so  great  a  front  as  a  battalion,  because  it 
would  be  less  easily  managed,  and  the  voice  of  its 
commander  would  be  drowned  by  the  rattling  of  arms 
and  the  noise  of  horses.  Experience  has  shown  that 
it  should  have  about  half  the  length  of  the  battalion, 
or  about  seventy-five  yards.  Allowing,  as  is  usual,  a 
yard  to  a  man,  the  squadron  will  consist  of  one  hun- 
dred and  fifty  men  and  horses  ;  and  if  the  roll  contains 
more  men,  it  will  be  with  a  view  of  keeping  the  ranks 
filled  to  the  proper  number,  and  making  allowance 
for  absentees,  who  are  generally  numerous,  since  a 
horseman  is  a  compound  animal,  consisting  of  horse 
and  rider,  and  rendered  unserviceable  by  accident  to 
either  of  its  parts  ;  moreover,  horsemen  are  more  used 
for  duties  out  of  their  ranks  than  infantry. 

For  artillery  the  unit  is  the  battery,  consisting  usually 
of  four  or  six  pieces.  It  is  best  to  have  the  pieces  in 
each  battery  of  the  same  kind  and  calibre,  as  there  is 
always  liability  to  confusion  and  delay  from  mixing 
different  sorts  of  ammunition.  As  a  general  rule,  it  is 
best  to  have  the  corresponding  parts  alike  in  any  mili- 
tary body,  and  this  applies  to  the  personnel  as  well  as 
to  the  materiel.  Eeplacements  of  disabled  parts  is 
thus  facilitated.  In  line  of  battle  each  piece  of  artil- 
5 


98 


PKINCIILES    OF    STRATEGY. 


lery  of  large  calibre  should  be  allowed  about  fifteen 
yards,  and  twelve  for  smaller.  These  distances  are 
necessary  for  the  free  passage  of  limbers  and  caissons. 
Each  piece  should  have  its  own  caisson.  The  line  of 
caissons  is  about  fifty  yards  behind  the  pieces.  This 
distance  may  be  varied,  and  advantage  should  be  taken 
of  inequalities  of  the  ground  to  cover  the  caissons. 


ETJLES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  99 


CHAPTER  III. 

MARCHES   AND    MANCEUVRES. 

THE  business  of  an  army  is  to  march  and  to  fight. 
By  rapid  and  wisely  directed  marches  a  skilful  gene- 
ral prepares  the  way  for  a  successful  campaign,  reaps 
the  fruits  of  victory,  or  escapes  from  pursuing  and 
superior  forces.  The  subject  of  marches  forms,  there- 
fore, a  very  important  part  of  the  art  of  war. 

Article  I. — Rules  to  be  observed  in  Ufareliei. 

Marches  are  of  two  classes — those  made  near  an 
enemy,  and  those  made  at  a  distance  from  him.  In 
the  latter,  convenience  and  comfort  are  greatly  con- 
sidered ;  each  man  may  have  ample  room,  so  as  not  to 
be  crowded  by  his  neighbors  ;  the  road  may  be  given 
up  to  the  carriages  of  different  kinds,  so  as  to  allow 
free  passage ;  and  the  soldiers  may  march  on  the  sides. 
Care  should  be  taken  not  to  move  very  large  bodies 
together,  in  order  that  the  troops  arriving  in  a  town 
•  may  be  more  easily  lodged  and  fed.  When  too  many 
men  are  accumulated  in  a  town,  it  is  sometimes  very 
difficult  to  provide  promptly  for  their  wants  ;  those 
who. are  obliged  to  wait  have  just  cause  for  complaint, 


100  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

and  disturbances  may  take  place.  It  is  sometimes  irn 
possible  to  avoid  these  delays  and  discomforts,  and 
soldiers  should  therefore  learn  to  bear  them  patiently 
This  is  the  touchstone  which  proves  the  good  soldier. 
There  is  more  merit  in  patiently  enduring  the  incon- 
veniences necessarily  attending  the  painful  trade  of 
war  than  in  braving  death  in  battle. 

When  the  body  of  troops  to  be  moved  to  any  point 
is  very  large,  it  should  be  divided  up  into  detach- 
ments, and  these  started  successively  at  intervals  of  a 
day  or  more,  that  they  may  be  distributed  along  the 
road.  If  two  roads  lead  to  the  same  point,  part  of  the 
troops  will  be  sent  by  each,  the  time  being  so  regu- 
lated that  they  will  arrive  successively  at  the  point  of 
junction.  The  columns  should  never  cross  each  other, 
because  a  tiresome  delay  will  always  be  caused  to  that 
one  which  must  wait  for  the  other  to  pass.  Dangerous 
contests  may  even  result  from  such  meetings,  if  the 
staff  officers  who  regulate  the  march  are  not  very 
careful  to  arrange  the  manner  in  which  the  columns 
shall  pass  each  other.  Unless  specially  ordered  to  do 
so,  no  column  will  halt  to  allow  another  to  pass  it. 

Soldiers  cannot  make  an  entire  march  without  halt- 
ing, especially  when  the  distance  is  considerable.  A 
halt  at  mid-day  is  necessary,  and  should  be  long 
enough  to  give  men  time  to  rest  themselves  and  take 
some  food.  It  is,  moreover,  right  to  halt  a  few  min- 
utes in  each  hour,  and  to  allow  no  leaving  of  ranks  at 
other  times.  A  few  trusty  men  should  always  be  in 


RULES    TO   BE    OBSERVED 


rear,  to  gather  up  stragglers  and  prevent  marauding. 
An  early  hour  in  the  morning  should  be  taken  for 
starting,  especially  in  summer ;  but  men  should  not 
be  deprived  of  necessary  sleep  ;  that  between  midnight 
and  three  or  four  o'clock  is  found  to  be  best  and  most 
refreshing.  Night  marches  are  bad  for  the  health  of 
troops,  as  has  been  ascertained  by  direct  experiment ; 
they  are  very  fatiguing  to  mind  and  body,  and  there 
is  more  straggling  than  in  daylight. 

For  inarches  made  in  an  enemy's  country  other  ar- 
rangements are  necessary.  In  such  cases  comfort  and 
convenience  must  be  sacrificed  to  security  ;  necessary 
restrictions  and  labors  must  be  borne  in  order  to  avoid 
all  danger  of  surprise,  and  to  be  always  ready  to 
receive  an  attack.  Negligence  in  this  respect  is  inex- 
cusable ;  for  the  enemy  may  at  any  time  make  his 
appearance  when  least  expected. 

The  first  rule  is  to  march  in  column,  and  with  as 
wide  a  front  as  possible,  in  order  to  have  the  column 
as  short  as  possible,  so  that  in  case  of  attack  it  may 
be  most  speedily  concentrated.  If  the  object  of  the 
movement  is  a  simple  change  of  position,  to  effect  an 
assemblage  or  concentration  of  troops  before  coming 
to  blows  ;  if,  in  a  word,  the  march  is  not  within  the 
limits  of  the  enemy's  operations,  some  freedom  may 
be  allowed  in  the  ranks,  and  the  column  may  march 
at  full  distance.  It  should,  however,  be  closed  to 
half  distance  when  the  march  is  a  manoeuvre,  that  is 
to  say,  one  of  those  movements  which  precede  a  battle, 


102  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

and  are  intended  to  concentrate  the  troops  upon  the 
important  point,  to  secure  the  communications,  to 
cover  weak  points,  to  deceive  the  enemy,  to  distract 
his  attention,  to  divide  his  forces,  to  threaten  his  line 
of  retreat,  to  make  him  uneasy  about  his  depots,  &o. 
These  manoeuvre-marches  are  so  called  because  they 
are  manoeuvres  made  on  a  large  scale,  out  of  range  of 
cannon,  and  have  not  for  their  object  a  simple  gain 
of  ground,  as  is  the  case  with  an  ordinary  march,  but 
to  reach  a  suitable  position  on  the  field  where  a  battle 
may  follow.  They  are  executed  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  the  enemy,  and  really  under  his  ob- 
servation. They  should  therefore  be  characterized  by 
perfect  order  and  great  celerity. 

"When  the  battle  is  imminent,  the  troops  should  bo 
prepared  for  rapid  deployment,  and  formed  in  close 
column,  by  divisions,  on  the  road,  or  at  the  side  of  it. 
This  may  be  called  the  order  preparatory  to  battle. 
There  is  but  a  single  case  where  full  distances  should 
be  kept  in  a  manoeuvre-march,  and  this  is  when  the 
flank  is  exposed  to  the  enemy.  A  column  at  full 
distance  may  form  line  of  battle  by  a  simple  wheel  of 
its  subdivisions.  These  flank  movements  are  always 
dangerous,  and  should  be  avoided  as  much  as  possible. 
Generally,  the  head  of  the  column  reaches  the  battle- 
field first,  and  the  propriety  of  closing  it  up  is  mani- 
fest, with  a  view  of  facilitating  and  hastening  the 
deployments. 

A  column  on  the  march  will  always  be  preceded  by 


RULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  103 

an  advanced  guard,  which  searches  and  explores  the 
ground,  opens  or  repairs  the  roads,  if  necessary,  defeats 
the  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  surprise  the  column,  or 
draw  it  into  ambuscades,  &c.  It  gives  warning  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  receives  the  first  attack, 
and  thus  secures  the  main  body  time  to  prepare  for 
battle.  The  advanced  guard  is  preceded  by  small 
detachments.  Other  small  bodies,  called  flankers,  are 
sent  off  to  the  right  and  left,  to  pass  around  villages 
and  clumps  of  trees  where  the  enemy  might  be  con- 
cealed, around  hills  bordering  the  road,  behind  hedges, 
through  ravines,  fields  of  grain,  &c.  The  column  has, 
in  addition,  its  own  flankers,  especially  when  it  is 
isolated,  for  something  may  escape  the  advanced  party. 
It  is  far  better  to  take  too  many  precautions,  than  too 
few. 

The  Duke  of  Yendome  was  more  fortunate  than 
prudent,  when,  at  Luzara,  in  1702,  he  came  near 
pitching  his  camp  in  presence  of  Prince  Eugene's 
whole  army,  which  was  in  battle  array,  concealed 
behind  a  dike.  His  presence  was  not  at  all  suspected, 
BO  that  the  advanced  guard,  having  reached  the 
ground,  did  not  move  further  to  examine  the  neigh- 
borhood, and  the  pitching  of  the  tents,  with  its  at- 
tending confusion,  was  about  to  begin,  when  an 
accident  saved  Vendome's  army.  An  aide-de-camp, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  establish  the  camp-guard, 
thought  it  advisable  to  place  a  sentinel  on  the  dike, 
which  was  very  near.  Reaching  that  point,  he  dis- 


104:  •  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

covered  the  infantry  of  Eugene  lying  concealed  behind 
the  dike,  waiting  the  signal  for  the  attack ;  while  the 
cavalry  was  in  line  of  battle  at  a  greater  distance. 
He  immediately  gave  the  alarm,  and  the  troops, 
who  had  not  broken  their  ranks,  were  able  to  repulse 
the  attack.  Ten  minutes  later,  Yendome  would  have 
lost  his  army  and  his  reputation. 

In  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution,  an  inex- 
perienced republican  general  had  under  his  command 
a  long  column  of  infantry,  which  was  moving  on  a 
road  bordered  by  hedges.  There  were  no  advanced 
guard,  no  flankers,  and  much  negligence  in  the 
column,  which  was  much  elongated.  Suddenly  the 
Vendean  chief,  Charette,  fell  upon  the  flank  of  the 
column,  cut  it  through,  and  dispersed  it  in  a  moment. 
Bravery  was  of  no  avail  in  such  circumstances,  and 
there  was  nothing  to  be  done  but  to  escape  by  flight. 
Such  was  the  result  of  ignorance  or  imprudence  upon 
the  part  of  a  commanding  officer.  A  rear-guard  is 
also  necessary  to  close  the  march,  prevent  the  dis- 
orderly conduct  of  stragglers,  and  guard  against 
unexpected  attack  in  the  rear.  The  main  body  is  thus 
surrounded  by  detachments  which  look  to  its  security. 

Wagons  should  not  be  mixed  with  the  troops, 
because,  in  an  accidental  engagement,  they  would 
seriously  interfere  with  the  prompt  assembling  of  the 
different  corps ;  and,  in  all  cases,  they  make  the 
column  unnecessarily  long.  The  vehicles,  therefore, 
should  move  in  a  compact  and  orderly  manner,  behind 


RULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  105 

the  troops,  in  two  files,  if  the  roads  are  sufficiently 
wide,  in  order  to  reduce,  by  half,  the  space  they 
occupy,  which  is  always  considerable.  The  baggage 
should  have  an  escort,  to  protect  it  from  the  partisans 
who  may  slip  in  upon  the  rear  of  an  army. 

Working-men  should  be  distributed  at  the  head  of 
every  column,  to  level  obstacles,  fill  up  ditches  and 
ruts,  repair  bridges,  or  strengthen  them  when  they  are 
weak,  &c.  By  pursuing  this  course  the  march  of  a 
column  may  sometimes  be  made  less  rapid,  but  never 
entirely  stopped.  These  workmen  should  have  with 
them  several  wagons  loaded  with  tools,  timbers,  ropes, 
and  other  necessary  articles. 

Another  thing,  seemingly  of  little,  but  really  of 
great  importance,  which  demands  attention,  is  the 
regulation  of  the  pace  at  the  head  of  the  column,  to 
avoid  its  becoming  elongated  too  much.  The  poorest 
marchers,  or  the  heaviest  troops,  may  be  placed 
in  front,  and,  for  the  same  reason,  ox-teams  may  be 
put  before  the  other  vehicles.  When  the  enemy  is 
still  distant,  an  interval  may  be  left  between  the 
various  corps  of  which  the  column  is  composed  ;  by 
this  means  the  fluctuations  of  one  are  not  transmitted 
to  the  others,  and  each  moves  with  almost  as  much 
comfort  as  if  alone.  Otherwise,  every  man  in  rear  is 
obliged  to  halt  when,  for  any  cause,  those  in  front  of 
him  do  so,  and  then  he  must  quicken  his  pace  to  re- 
gain his  proper  distance.  This  irregularity  of  pace  is 
found  to  be  very  fatiguing.  It  may  be  greatly  avoided 


106  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

by  adopting  the  plan  indicated,  but  in  manoeuvre- 
marches,  and  whenever  there  is  danger  of  an  attack, 
distances  must  be  carefully  preserved. 

Ordinary  marches  are  from  fifteen  to  twenty  miles. 
The  latter  distance  is  a  long  inarch,  but  sometimes 
circumstances  require  a  column  to  get  over  twenty- 
five  miles,  and  even  more,  at  the  risk  of  leaving  many 
men  and  animals  behind. 

Several  days'  rest  should  always  follow  forced 
marches,  else  the  army  will  melt  away  in  a  little  while, 
for  the  human  body  is  not  made  of  iron.  At  a  deci- 
sive moment,  and  to  obtain  important  results,  a 
general  may,  and  should,  demand  of  his  troops  an 
extraordinary  effort ;  but  it  should  be  of  short  du- 
ration. Two  or  three  forced  marches  in  succession 
are  all  that  should  be  expected  from  troops  inured 
to  fatigue;  but  raw  troops  cannot  stand  even  so  much. 

Infantry  inarches  about  two  and  a  half  miles  an 
hour,  not  counting  halts ;  so  that,  taking  every  thing 
into  consideration,  ten  hours  are  necessary  for  passing 
over  twenty  miles,  the  march  being  in  column. 
Cavalry  makes  about  three  miles  an  hour  at  a  walk, 
and  five  miles  at  a  moderate  trot ;  as  this  gait 
may  be  held  for  several  hours,  it  may,  if  necessary, 
pass  over  the  space  of  an  ordinary  day's  march  in 
three  or  four  hours  ;  but  forced  marches  are  even 
more  hurtful  to  cavalry  than  to  infantry. 

In  marches  near  the  enemy,  the  halt  at  mid-day  is 
taken  advantage  of  to  cook.  When  men  and  horses 


KULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  107 

have  eaten  something,  they  can  with  more  ease  get 
over  the  remaining  part  of  the  march,  and  have  suffi- 
cient strength  to  fight,  if  an  engagement  occurs  in  the 
afternoon.  Unless  there  are  orders  to  the  contrary, 
or  special  circumstances  interfere,  this  halt  should  be 
long  enough  to  give  time  for  cooking. 

The  commissaries  should  be  careful  to  have  provi- 
sions ready  at  the  end  of  each  march,  and,  with  this 
end  in  view,  should  have  the  column  followed  by 
animals  and  wagons  loaded  with  provisions,  procured 
by  purchase,  and  by  requisitions  on  the  inhabitants,  if 
necessary.  These  resources  may  sometimes  fail,  and 
it  is  a  good  plan  to  require  each  soldier  to  carry  pro- 
visions sufficient  to  last  him  several  days,  prohibiting 
them,  as  far  as  possible,  from  eating  unless  when  it  is 
really  necessary.  In  the  Russian  campaign,  Marshal 
Davoust  had  arranged  the  knapsacks  of  his  men  so 
that  they  could  carry  in  them  four  biscuits  of  a  pound 
weight,  and  under  each  a  little  bag  of  flour  weighing 
ten  pounds,  besides  a  cloth  bag  suspended  from  the 
shoulder,  and  containing  two  loaves,  of  three  pounds 
weight.  The  entire  load  was  nearly  sixty  pounds — 
but  little  less  than  that  habitually  carried  by  the 
Bom  an  soldier.  Whether  the  troops  are  in  quarters 
or  bivouacs,  they  should  never  break  ranks  until  the 
detachments,  whose  duty  it  is,  have  examined  the 
neighborhood,  and  the  outposts  are  established  around 
the  quarters  or  bivouacs.  Security  is  the  fruit  of 
vigilance.  Every  body  of  troops,  however  numerous 


108  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

it  may  be,  should  take  these  precautionary  measures, 
not  only  at  night,  but  at  all  halts. 

Scouting  Parties. — No  march  should  be  made  in 
an  enemy's  country  without  a  careful  examination  of 
the  ground.  In  an  unobstructed  country  this  duty 
will  be  performed  generally  by  mounted  soldiers,  but 
in  a  broken  country  by  footmen.  The  scouting  par- 
ties move  in  front  and  on  the  flanks.  It  is  useless  to 
have  them  composed  of  many  persons,  as  their  duty 
is  not  to  fight,  but  to  learn  every  thing  they  can.  The 
duty  is,  moreover,  a  very  fatiguing  one,  and  should 
not  recur  too  frequently. 

The  scouting  parties  precede  the  advanced  guard. 
The  parties  on  the  flanks  are  called  flankers.  They 
move  at  two  or  three  hundred  paces  from  the  ad- 
vanced guard,  of  which  and  of  each  other  they  never 
lose  sight.  For  this  purpose  the  leading  detachment 
sends  out  three  small  groups,  one  in  front  on  the  road, 
and  two  others  on  the  right  and  left.  Each  group 
keeps  together,  or  at  least  the  members  of  it  should 
always  be  in  sight  and  hearing  of  each  other.  The 
flankers  are  sometimes  obliged  to  move  at  a  consider- 
able distance  from  the  road,  in  order  to  examine  the 
country  wrell.  Each  detachment  would,  in  such  a 
case,  surround  itself  with  small  groups,  one  in  front, 
and  the  others  towards  the  enemy.  When  the  coun- 
try is  much  covered  by  forests,  &c.,  the  number  of 
scouting  parties  must  be  increased. 

Three  men  are  enough  for  a  group,  the  senior  com- 


RULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  109 

manding  the  remaining  two.  They  do  not  use  their 
arms  unless  they  fall  into  an  ambuscade,  or  they  are 
on  the  point  of  being  taken,  and  then  they  must  give 
notice  of  the  enemy's  presence  in  the  only  way  which 
remains.  We  may  here  call  to  mind  the  noble  devo- 
tion of  the  Chevalier  d'Assas,  who,  having  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  a  hostile  patrol,  and  being  threatened 
with  death  if  he  uttered  a  sound,  cried  out  at  the  top 
of  his  voice,  "  This  way,  Auvergne ;  here  are  the  ene- 
my !"  He  fell,  covered  with  wounds,  but  he  gave 
the  alarm  arid  saved  his  comrades. 

The  scouting  parties  endeavor  to  cover  themselves 
under  hedges,  woods,  thickets,  or  heights  along  the 
road,  to  see  as  much  as  possible  without  being  seen. 
As  soon  as  they  discover  a  body  of  the  enemy,  they 
halt  and  conceal  themselves,  while  one  of  the  number 
gives  the  information  to  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  detachment  to  which  they  belong.  They  will 
keep  him  informed  of  every  thing  more  they  learn, 
and  all  without  noise. 

The  scouting  parties  explore  ravines  and  woods  with 
great  care,  and  will  never  pass  a  dike,  a  hedge,  a 
wall,  or  a  field  of  tall  grain,  without  seeing  whether 
there  is  any  thing  concealed.  They  should  visit 
houses  in  which  the  enemy  might  be  concealed,  one 
of  the  scouts  entering  alone,  while  the  others  remain 
outside  to  give  the  alarm,  if  necessary.  In  like  man- 
ner every  spot  should  be  examined  where  an  enemy 
might  be  hid. 


110  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

Before  entering  a  village  the  advanced  guard  halts, 
to  give  the  scouts  time  to  examine  it,  and  procure 
information  about  parties  of  the  enemy  that  may  be 
near.  The  scouts  pass  through  the  streets,  enter  yards 
and  gardens  enclosed  by  walls,  cause  several  houses 
to  be  opened  to  their  inspection,  and  visit  the  church- 
es and  other  public  buildings.  To  take  as  little  time 
as  possible,  the  business  of  examination  should  be 
divided  up,  and  ought  to  take  but  a  few  minutes.  If 
the  enemy  is  quite  near,  and  there  is  any  thing  suspi- 
cious about  the  village,  the  scouts  should  take  a 
longer  time,  and  make  a  more  thorough  inspection. 
Moreover,  however  small  the  number  of  the  advanced 
guard  may  be,  it  should  be  also  preceded  by  an  ad- 
vanced guard,  so  that  only  the  advanced  detachment 
shall  be  delayed ;  and  this  body  will  retake  its  place 
by  a  rapid  movement,  after  passing  the  village.  In 
this  case  the  advanced  guard  of  the  advanced  guard 
would  furnish  the  scouts,  and  the  flankers  would 
come  from  the  advanced  guard  itself. 

As  the  flankers  are  sometimes  out  of  sight,  connec- 
tion is  kept  up  with  them  by  patrols  or  small  detach- 
ments. The  leading  group  on  the  road  should  consist 
of  about  five  men,  of  whom  two  are  sent  in  front  of 
the  remaining  three. 

Figure  6  gives  the  idea  of  these  arrangements. 
A  represents  the  advanced  guard.  B,  the  detachment 
that  furnishes  the  three  groups  of  scouts  which  pre- 
cede it.  C  and  C,  the  detachments  which  move 


RULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  Ill 

parallel  to  the  road,  oo 

and  furnish  flankers,  0°a          &°°         0«>o 

who  are  supposed 
also  to  be  in  three 
groups,  the  one  in  S° 

front  of  the  detach- 
ment communicating 
with  the  scouts,  and 
the  other  two  groups 

on    the    outer   flank.    o<>   •          i  11 

D  and  D  are  patrols,          |] 
to  keep  up  communi- 
cation with  the  flank- 
ers,     and     affording 
them  prompt  aid  if  attacked. 

In  a  night  march  all  these  detachments  should  be 
drawn  in  much  nearer  to  the  advanced  guard,  and 
generally  the  flankers  must  be  dispensed  with.  Si- 
lence must  be  kept,  and  every  ear  ready  to  catch  the 
least  sound.  Xenophon  says  that  at  night  ears  must 
do  the  duty  of  eyes. 

Advanced  Guard. — If  the  only  duties  of  an  ad- 
vanced guard  were  those  of  examination  and  skirmish- 
ing, none  but  light  troops  should  be  employed  ;  but 
it  has  sometimes  to  seize  and  hold  important  points 
against  a  superior  force  until  the  main  body  can  come 
up.  It  has  to  force  defiles,  take  possession  of  villages, 
and  is  at  every  moment  exposed  to  serious  attacks. 
The  advanced  guard  of  a  corps  of  considerable  im- 


112  PKINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

portance  ought  therefore  to  have,  in  addition  to  the 
light  troops,  some  infantry  of  the  line,  heavy  cavalry, 
and  some  artillery,  in  such  proportions  that  the  differ- 
ent arms  may  afford  each  other  mutual  assistance. 

The  battalions  and  squadrons  of  the  army  should 
all  be  detailed  in  turn  for  advanced  guard  duty,  since 
this  is  the  best  school  for  soldiers  of  all  grades  to 
learn  their  trade,  and  all  should  receive  its  instruc- 
tions. To  form  the  advanced  guard  of  detachments 
taken  from  the  several  corps  is  a  bad  plan,  as  it  com- 
plicates the  details  of  that  service,  and  destroys  the 
spirit  of  honorable  rivalry  which  should  subsist  be- 
tween the  corps.  Discipline  suffers  also,  because  the 
men  do  not  serve  under  the  chief  to  wThom  they  are 
accustomed.  For  these  reasons  it  should  be  laid  down 
as  a  rule,  that  the  battalions  and  squadrons  should 
serve  in  succession  on  advanced  guard  duty.  If  the 
advanced  guard  does  not  contain  a  battalion  or  a 
squadron,  whole  companies  should  be  detailed,  and 
never  fractions. 

The  commander  of  the  advanced  guard  ought  to 
have  the  best  maps  that  can  be  obtained,  and  to  be 
attended  by  several  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country, 
to  serve  as  guides,  and  give  him  such  information  as 
he  may  need.  At  each  station  he  takes  new  guides, 
who  are  carried  along  under  a  strong  escort,  to  prevent 
their  escape.  Knowledge  of  the  language  of  the 
country  is  of  great  importance,  and,  if  the  commander 
himself  does  not  possess  it,  he  should  have  on  his  staff 


KULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MARCHES.  113 

some  officers  who  do,  preferring  those  who  have 
travelled  through  the  country  before. 

Travellers,  deserters,  and  prisoners,  should  be  sepa- 
rately questioned  as  to  the  position  and  forces  of  the 
enemy,  and  with  reference  to  what  is  known  or  pre- 
sumed about  his  plans,  the  morale  of  his  troops,  the 
character  of  the  commanders,  &c.  From  each  indi- 
vidual some  information  will  be  obtained,  often  indeed 
very  incomplete  and  unsatisfactory,  but  by  comparing 
all  their  statements  a  quite  accurate  idea  may  be 
formed  of  the  composition  of  the  hostile  forces,  their 
numbers,  positions,  prior  movements,  &c.  All  an- 
swers should  be  exactly  written  out  and  transmitted 
to  the  commanding  general,  whenever  they  furnish 
any  interesting  information  as  to  the  plans  of  the 
enemy. 

As  soon  as  the  commander  of  the  advanced  guard 
arrives  at  the  place  where  he  is  to  halt,  he  questions 
the  magistrates  and  other  intelligent  persons,  in  order 
to  obtain  all  the  information  they  possess  about  the 
roads,  bridges,  fords,  forests,  defiles,  marshes,  &c.  If 
they  know  any  thing  of  the  position  and  designs  of  the 
enemy,  they  can  generally  be  prevailed  upon,  by  polite 
management  rather  than  by  threats,  to  communi- 
cate it.  What  they  say  with  regard  to  the  resources 
of  the  country  is  to  be  received  with  caution,  for  it  is 
generally  their  interest  to  depreciate  them.  This, 
however,  is  a  point  about  which  reliable  information 
should  be  required.  While  the  commander  is  attend 


114  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

ing  to  these  details,  which  demand  much  activity  and 
tact,  he  sends  some  of  his  subordinates  to  examine  the 
neighborhood,  and  specially  in  the  direction  of  the 
road  to  be  passed  over  the  next  day.  The  country 
should  be  explored  to  a  considerable  distance  by 
patrols,  which  will  move  along  all  the  roads,  and 
inspect  every  spot  where  an  enemy  might  be  con- 
cealed. The  troops  should  not  lay  down  their  arms, 
nor  enter  quarters,  nor  bivouac,  until  the  patrols  re- 
turn and  the  guards  are  established,  and  there  is  no 
longer  any  thing  like  attack  to  be  apprehended. 

A  very  important  duty  of  the  commander  of  an 
advanced  guard  is  to  obtain  provisions,  in  order  to 
prevent  his  men  from  wandering  off  in  search  of 
them.  As  the  advanced  guard  is  generally  not  very 
strong  in  numbers,  and  may  have  to  engage  very  su- 
perior forces,  it  is  the  more  important  for  it  to  keep 
united.  As  provisions  are  needed  to-day,  so  they  will 
be  to-morrow,  and  they  should  be  loaded  into  some 
of  the  vehicles  of  the  country.  Such  foresight  is 
never  hurtful.  Montluc  says :  "  Always  have  a  good 
stock  of  provisions,  and  especially  bread  and  wine,  in 
order  to  afford  the  soldier  some  refreshment,  for  the 
human  body  is  not  made  of  iron." 

When  the  advanced  guard  comes  to  a  village  on 
the  road,  it  passes  round  it,  if  possible,  rather  than 
through  it,  especially  if  it  is  quite  long,  because  de- 
files, where  an  attack  may  be  made,  are  generally  to 
be  avoided.  Sometimes,  moreover,  it  may  happen 


KULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IN    MA.RCHES.  115 

that  the  scouts  have  not  made  a  sufficiently  close 
examination  of  a  village;  the  enemy  may  be  con- 
cealed in  the  houses,  and,  under  their  cover,  may  do 
much  mischief  before  they  can  be  dislodged.  Although 
this  event  is  not  very  probable,  yet  it  is  possible,  and 
the  precaution  is  therefore  justifiable  and  prudent. 

At  crossings  of  roads  the  advanced  guard  marks 
out  with  branches  of  trees  or  with  straw  the  one  it 
has  taken,  so  that  the  main  body,  which  is  at  some 
distance  in  rear,  and  generally  out  of  sight,  may  not 
mistake  the  road.  A  few  horsemen  may  be  left  at 
Biich  a  place  to  show  the  way,  but  that  will  depend 
upon  the  time  required  for  the  main  body  to  come  up. 
If  a  bridge  is  found  broken  or  unsafe,  or  ditches  dug 
across  the  road,  or  there  are  miry  places  or  other  obsta- 
cles which  might  stop  the  march  of  the  column,  the 
workmen  immediately  commence  the  necessary  repair 
with  all  possible  diligence,  and  rejoin  the  advanced 
guard  at  the  first  halt. 

When  the  country  is  much  covered  with  forests, 
the  advanced  guard  sends  out  some  scouts  who  keep 
up  communication  with  the  leading  detachment  and 
the  flankers.  This  is  to  provide  for  the  case  of  the  lead- 
ing scouts  having  left  some  portion  of  the  ground  with- 
out sufficient  exploration,  and  the  enemy,  not  having 
been  discovered,  might  unexpectedly  fall  upon  the 
advanced  guard.  The  second  set  of  scouts  will  see 
him  approach  and  give  warning  of  it.  The  same  pre- 
caution may  be  used  for  the  main  body,  especially 


116  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

when  it  is  considerably  distant  from  the  advanced 
guard.  We  repeat,  that  in  war  it  is  impossible  to 
take  too  many  precautions  to  prevent  surprise,  as 
well  on  the  march  as  in  quarters. 

In  passing  defiles  that  cannot  be  avoided,  the  lead- 
ing detachment  of  the  advanced  guard  should,  after 
passing  through,  examine  with  minute  care  the  neigh- 
boring ground,  because  it  is  in  such  positions  that  an 
enemy  would  secrete  himself,  with  a  view  of  attack- 
ing the  column  before  it  had  time  to  deploy.  The 
leading  detachment  should  therefore  halt  after  pass- 
ing the  defile,  form  line  of  battle,  and  send  flankers 
out  as  far  as  possible,  at  the  same  time  that  the  scouts 
examine  all  the  ground  in  the  front.  Its  march  will 
only  be  resumed  when  the  head  of  the  advanced 
guard  is  at  hand,  and  then  its  proper  distance  will  be 
regained  by  increasing  the  pace.  It  is  evident  that 
this  duty  is  very  fatiguing,  and  consequently  all  the 
light  troops  of  the  advanced  guard  should  take  their 
turns,  they  alone  being  employed  to  form  the  leading 
detachment  of  the  advanced  guard. 

There  is  no  good  reason  for  dispensing  with  any  of 
these  precautions  in  an  open  country,  for  however 
level  it  may  appear,  there  are  always  undulations 
under  whose  cover  troops  may  lie  hid  in  considerable 
numbers,  and  an  ambuscade  in  such  a  country  would 
probably  be  the  more  effectual  because  the  less  ex- 
pected. The  only  advantage  presented  by  a  level 
and  open  country  is,  that  a  few  horsemen  may  gallop 


RULES   TO   BE   OBSERVED   IN   MARCHES.  117" 

over  it  rapidly,  giving  it  a  sufficient  examination,  and 
thus  the  column  be  not  long  delayed. 

If  the  advanced  guard  meets  the  enemy,  it  forms 
line  of  battle  and  tries  to  hold  its  position ;  if  this 
cannot  be  done,  it  falls  back  upon  the  main  body, 
taking  advantage  of  all  favorable  points  for  delaying 
the  enemy,  and  giving  time  to  the  main  body  to  make 
such  preparations  as  may  suit  the  occasion.  The 
commander  should  lose  no  time  in  sending  an  express 
messenger  to  the  main  body.  If  it  is  night,  the  ad- 
vanced guard  should  charge  with  impetuosity,  what- 
ever may  be  its  force,  in  order  to  throw  the  enemy 
into  confusion  or  to  intimidate  him  ;  at  all  events,  to 
check  him.  In  such  a  case  the  darkness  is  favorable 
to  the  attacking  party,  because  the  enemy,  being 
unable  to  see  what  force  he  is  engaging,  must  be 
careful.  The  main  body  can  thus  have  time  to  come 
to  the  support  of  the  advanced  guard.  But,  as  has 
been  already  observed,  night  marches  are  to  be  avoid- 
ed, since  they  are  very  fatiguing,  give  rise  to  disor- 
derly conduct  which  the  officers  cannot  repress,  and 
during  the  darkness  most  unfortunate  mistakes  often 
occur.  One  example  will  be  given  of  the  many  that 
have  occurred  of  friendly  troops  firing  into  each  other 
at  night.  A  French  army  in  two  columns  was  march- 
ing at  night  towards  Landau,  when  a  partisan  chief 
with  fifty  men  slipped  between  the  two  columns, 
which  were  separated  by  a  ravine.  He  fired  from  his 
central  position  upon  both  columns  at  the  same  time. 


118  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

Each,  supposing  itself  suddenly  attacked,  returned  the 
fire,  and  so  they  continued  butchering  each  other 
until  daylight  revealed  the  fatal  error. 

The  advanced  guard  should  choose  some  favorable 
spot  for  the  principal  halt  of  the  march — one  con- 
cealed as  much  as  practicable  from  observation,  as, 
for  instance,  the  reverse  slope  of  a  hill.  Sentinels 
should  be  placed  at  the  top  to  have  an  extended  view, 
and  upon  the  roads  by  which  an  enemy  might  ap- 
proach. If  there  are  roads  near,  they  should  be  ex- 
amined by  scouting  parties  and  a  few  men  left  there, 
who  may  conceal  themselves  in  the  undergrowth,  and 
be  enabled  to  see  the  exterior  ground  without  being 
seen.  If  an  attack  is  imminent,  one-half  of  the 
troops  will  remain  in  line  of  battle,  ready  to  fight 
until  the  remaining  half  take  their  meal.  The  halves 
will  then  change  places. 

When  a  wood  of  considerable  extent  is  to  be  crossed, 
the  advanced  guard  should  be  halted  before  entering 
it,  and  the  leading  detachment  strengthened,  in  order 
that  the  number  of  scouts  may  be  increased. 

The  drums  of  the  advanced  guard  should  not  be  beat, 
as  they  give  warning  of  its  approach  ;  and  generally 
the  drum  should  be  little  used  on  the  march,  except 
in  passing  through  a  town,  in  coming  into  camp,  or 
entering  the  field  of  battle. 

"What  should  be  the  strength  of  the  advanced 
guard,  and  at  what  distance  should  it  march  from  the 
main  body?  These  questions  cannot  be  answered 


EULES    TO   BE    OBSERVED   IN   MAECHES.  119 

with  precision.  The  strength  of  the  advanced  guard 
and  its  composition  vary  with  circumstances,  and  de- 
pend upon  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  corn- 
mander-in-ehief.  The  advanced  guard  may  be  tem- 
porarily re-enforced  when  it  may  have  to  receive  an 
attack,  or  carry  and  hold  a  position ;  but  in  general 
its  strength  will  not  exceed  one-fifth  of  the  main 
body,  and  oftener  will  be  less.  The  advanced  guard 
will  contain,  in  the  majority  of  cases,  between  one- 
tenth  and  one-fifth  of  the  main  body.  To  make  it 
stronger  would  be  to  fatigue  the  men  by  a  severe 
duty  recurring  too  frequently ;  on  the  other  hand,  to 
make  it  too  weak  would  be  to  expose  it  to  capture  or 
destruction.  A  consciousness  of  weakness  might  pre- 
vent risking  a  vigorous  effort  when  imperatively  re- 
quired, and  such  a  failure  might  be  highly  disastrous 
to  the  army. 

The  distance  of  the  advanced  guard  from  the  main 
body  may  evidently  be  greater  for  a  large  than  a  small 
body  of  troops,  and  it  depends  also  very  much  on  the 
length  of  the  column.  As  it  is  the  duty  of  the  ad- 
vanced guard  to  give  notice  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy  and  to  delay  his  march,  it  should  be  at  such  a 
distance  that  the  main  body  may  have  time  enough  to 
prepare  for  an  attack.  For  example,  if  the  column  is 
three  miles  long,  more  than  an  hour  is  needed  for  the 
rear  to  come  up  to  a  line  with  the  head,  and  the  ad- 
vanced guard  should,  therefore,  be  at  least  the  same 
distance  in  front ;  for  if  it  is  true  that  it  delays  the 


120  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

enemy's  arrival,  it  is  equally  true  that  some  time  is 
consumed  in  ascertaining  the  real  state  of  affairs  and 
sending  a  messenger  to  the  rear.  It  would  seem  then 
a  good  rule,  that  the  advanced  guard  should  precede 
the  main  column  by  a  distance  at  least  equal  to  the 
length  of  the  latter.  Frequently  the  distance  is  much 
increased. 

The  rear-guard  is  arranged  nearly  in  the  same  way 
as  the  advanced  guard,  but  is  naturally  made  weaker, 
as  there  is  less  danger  of  attack  in  rear  than  in  front. 
It  is  the  escort  for  the  baggage  when  the  march  is 
in  advance.  The  rear-guard  proper  has  its  own  rear 
detachment  and  flankers.  These  detachments  send 
out  groups  of  two  or  three  men,  who  should  fre- 
quently turn  back  to  see  whether  the  enemy  is  fol- 
lowing the  column.  They  will  arrest  deserters  and 
marauders  and  drive  along  stragglers.  A  rear-guard 
should  have  a  detachment  of  cavalry  to  move  about 
rapidly  in  every  direction  when  necessary,  and  to 
keep  up  communication  with  the  main  body. 

In  a  retreat,  the  rear-guard  becomes  the  most  im- 
portant body,  and  should  be  composed  of  the  best 
troops,  or  those  which  have  suffered  least.  There  can 
be  but  little  rotation  in  such  duties.  Necessity  gen- 
erally requires  the  same  body  to  act  some  time  as  the 
rear-guard,  often  for  several  successive  weeks.  No 
other  service  can  give  more  fame  to  a  body  of  troops 
than  in  such  a  case  as  this,  where  it  exposes  itself 
to  danger,  privation,  and  toil,  less  for  itself  than  for 


BULES    TO    BE    OBSERVED    IX    MARCHES.  121 

the  remainder  of  the  army.     More  than  one  com- 
mander of  a  rear-guard  has  made  his  name  celebrated. 

In  a  retreat,  the  baggage  wagons  are  not  placed  be- 
tween the  main  body  and  the  rear-guard,  but  are 
moved  as  far  towards  the  head  of  the  column  as  pos- 
sible, to  secure  them  against  attack,  and  not  to  em- 
barrass the  defensive  arrangements. 

Strength  of  a  column  on  the  march. — It  has  been 
stated,  in  a  preceding  chapter,  that  an  army  of  con- 
siderable size  is  always  divided  up  into  several  corps, 
which,  on  a  march,  form  separate  columns,  and  move 
along  parallel  roads.  The  army  has  thus  not  only 
more  mobility,  but  also  threatens  the  enemy  sim- 
ultaneously in  several  directions,  keeps  him  in  a 
state  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  real  point  to  be  at- 
tacked, outflanks  him  if  he  makes  a  stand  at  any  par- 
ticular one,  and  can  be  subsisted  with  much  greater 
ease.  The  number  of  columns  will  depend  on  the 
magnitude  of  the  army  and  the  character  of  the  coun- 
try. Generally  the  number  will  be  increased  near 
the  battle-field,  to  facilitate  the  necessary  deploy- 
ments. There  is,  however,  a  limit,  below  which  it  is 
best  to  keep  the  strength  of  a  marching  column. 

Suppose,  for  example,  a  large  corps  marching  along 
a  single  road.  It  will  be  composed  of  troops  of  all 
arms,  in  the  proper  proportion.  There  will  be  an 
advanced  guard  from  seven  to  ten  miles,  or  a  half 
march,  in  front  of  the  main  body.  Couriers  will  take 
about  an  hour  to  pass  over  this  distance,  and  the 
6 


122  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

commander  of  the  main  body  will  hence  have  about 
two  hours  in  which  to  give  his  orders  and  to  deploy 
his  columns,  upon  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  is 
greatly  superior  to  the  advanced  guard,  and  drives  it 
back  upon  the  main  body.  Hence,  the  total  length 
of  the  column  should  not  be  more  than  six  or  seven 
miles,  in  order  that  the  rear  battalions  may  have  time 
to  arrive  at  the  head  of  the  column  to  participate  in 
the  engagement.  Experience  and  calculation  demon- 
strate that  an  army  of  30,000  men,  including  artillery 
and  cavalry,  and  with  infantry  in  three  ranks,  is  about 
as  large  as  can  be  properly  marched  along  a  single 
road.  This  fixes  the  magnitude  of  the  army  corps^  as 
it  is  termed.  If  the  infantry  is  in  two  ranks,  the 
corps  should  not  contain  more  than  20,000  men. 

Art.  II.— Forward  Movements,  and  the  Combats 
they  lead  to. 

Order  of  march  of  a  Division. — In  order  to  apply 
the  rules  laid  down,  and  to  have  definite  ideas  as  to 
the  details  of  a  forward  movement,  we  will  take  an 
example  of  a  division  of  four  brigades,  subdivided  as 
follows : — 

16  battalions  of  infantry  of  700  men  each 11,200  men. 

10  companies  of  sharpshooters 1,000     " 

2          "          "  cavalry 150     " 

24  pieces  of  artillery,  in  4  batteries TOO     " 

1  company  of  sappers 100     " 

1          "        "  pontoniers 100     " 

Total 13,25D     " 


ETC.  123 

This  total  does  not  comprise  the  division  and 
brigade  staffs,  or  persons  employed  in  the  medical, 
quartermaster,  and  commissary  departments.  These 
troops  in  line  of  battle  will  occupy  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  if  deployed  in  a  single  line,  and  the  in- 
fantry is  in  two  ranks.  The  column,  if  the  infantry 
march  by  sections,  and  each  piece  of  artillery  be  fol- 
lowed by  its  caisson,  will  be  also  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  in  length,  notwithstanding  the  absence  of 
the  advanced  guard  and  flankers.  The  advanced 
guard  will  be  two  and  a  half  or  three  miles  in  ad- 
vance of  the  column. 

The  rear-guard,  which  escorts  the  baggage,  will  be 
about  one  mile  and  a  half  to  the  rear.  If  the  division 
carries  four  days'  provisions  in  wagons,  as  is  usual 
when  concentrating  before  the  enemy,  400  wagons 
will  be  required,  and  the  train  will  be  more  than  a 
mile  long. 

The  infantry  is  divided  into  four  brigades,  each  of 
four  battalions  ;  and  as  the  marksmen  are  to  be  spread 
along  the  front  in  case  "of  an  engagement,  two  com- 
panies will  be  attached  to  each  brigade  and  two  to  the 
artillery.  The  infantry  brigades  will  march  in  turn 
at  the  head  of  the  column,  and  that  one  which  is  in 
front  will  furnish  the  battalions  and  sharpshooters  of 
the  advanced  guard.  In  like  manner,  each  battery 
marches  in  turn  with  the  advanced  guard,  unless 
there  are  special  reasons  to  the  contrary. 

The  advanced  guard  will  consist  of  the  company 


124  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

of  sappers,  one  company  of  cavalry,  two  of  sharp- 
shooters, one  battery,  and  two  "battalions  of  infantry. 
The  proportion  will  thus  be  one-eighth  for  the  in- 
fantry, one-fifth  for  the  sharpshooters,  one-fourth  for 
the  artillery,  and  one -half  for  the  cavalry.  It  is  too 
large  for  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  but  the  entire  ad- 
vanced guard  will  be  about  in  the  proper  proportion 
to  the  whole  command.  Some  cavalry  soldiers  are 
necessary  with  an  advanced  guard,  even  in  a  very 
broken  country,  to  serve  as  couriers  between  it  and 
the  main  body.  Not  less  than  one  company  should 
be  with  the  advanced  guard  in  this  case.  One  plat- 
oon will  pass  to  the  front,  and  furnish  scouts  for  the 
main  and  parallel  roads,  while  the  other  will  remain 
at  the  head  of  the  advanced  guard,  forming  the 
escort  of  its  commander.  The  sappers  will  follow 
the  cavalry,  having  with  them  wagons  of  tools,  and 
other  things  necessary  for  the  repair  of  roads  and 
bridges.  The  battalions  will  throw  out  flank  detach- 
ments, who  will  also  keep  up  a  communication  with 
the  cavalry  scouting  parties. 

The  remainder  of  the  troops  will  march  along  the 
road,  as  well  closed  up  as  possible,  and  in  such  order 
that  the  column  may  readily  form  line  of  battle  to 
the  front.  Generally  the  artillery  should  be  in  the 
centre,  so  as  to  be  better  protected  by  the  infantry, 
and  the  sharpshooters  will  be  on  the  flanks.  The 
order  of  march  of  the  advanced  guard  will  therefore 
be  the  following : — 


FOKWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETO.  125 

1st.  A  platoon  of  cavalry  in  front  of  the  advanced 
guard  proper,  and  furnishing  the  scouts  ; 

2d.  Another  platoon  of  cavalry  at  the  head  of  the 
advanced  guard ; 

3d.  The  company  of  sappers  with  their  wagons ; 

4th.  A  company  of  sharpshooters ; 

5th.  A  battalion  of  infantry,  sending  out  one  com- 
pany as  flankers  on  the  right ; 

6th.  A  battery  of  artillery ; 

Yth.  A  battalion  of  infantry,  sending  out  one  com- 
pany as  flankers  on  the  left ; 

8th.  A  company  of  sharpshooters. 

If  this  column  deploys  to  receive  the  enemy,  the 
two  platoons  of  cavalry  and  the  company  of  sappers 
will  fall  to  the  rear,  to  be  employed  as  may  be  neces- 
sary, and  the  flankers  will  gather  in  upon  the  wings 
to  support  the  sharpshooters. 

The  main  body  will  march  (two  or  three  miles  in 
rear)  in  the  following  order : — 

1st.  Two  remaining  battalions  of  the  brigade  which 
has  furnished  the  advanced  guard.  A  company  of  the 
leading  battalion  will  march  three  or  four  hundred 
paces  in  advance,  like  a  second  advanced  guard,  which 
will  throw  to  the  several  groups  front  and  flanks ; 

2d.  The  entire  second  brigade,  with  sharpshooters 
leading ; 

3d.  Three  batteries  of  artillery  together,  each  piece 
followed  immediately  by  its  caisson,  and  the  whole 
preceded  by  their  two  companies  of  sharpshooters ; 


126  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

4th.  The  third  brigade,  with  sharpshooters  lead- 
ing; 

5th.  The  fourth  brigade,  preceded  by  its  sharp- 
shooters, having  detached  one  battalion  to  the  rear  as 
rear-guard ; 

6th.  All  the  baggage,  reserve  ammunition,  forges, 
ambulances,  bridge  train ; 

7th.  The  battalion  which  forms  at  once  the  baggage 
escort  and  the  rear-guard,  the  company  of  pontoniers 
and  the  remaining  company  of  cavalry  closing  the 
column. 

It  wrould  seem  at  first  glance  that  the  pontoniers 
ought  to  be  in  front,  to  prepare  for  passing  rivers 
whose  bridges  may  be  broken  ;  but  their  train  would 
clog  the  advanced  guard,  whose  movements  should  be 
prompt  and  unembarrassed.  At  the  first  reverse  the 
train  would  be  lost,  and  the  army  deprived  of  a  most 
important  accessory  to  successful  operations.  The 
pontoniers  will  only  be  employed  in  passing  rivers  of 
some  importance,  and  in  such  cases  their  train  is 
easily  moved  to  the  front  while  the  army  is  halting, 
as  it  must  do.  The  sappers  of  the  advanced  guard  can 
make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  crossing  brooks 
and  small  streams. 

The  division  will  march  as  indicated,  in  advancing 
towards  the  enemy.  There  will  be  denies  to  pass, 
bridges  to  force,  rivers  to  cross,  and,  at  last,  prepara- 
tions made  for  battle,  when  the  enemy  takes  up  a 
position  to  hold  it.  These  cases  will  be  treated  in  a 


ETC.  127 

general  way,  without  particular  reference  to  the  divi- 
sion, whose  order  of  march  has  been  described. 

Passage  of  Defiles. — A  grave  disaster  may  result 
from  rashly  entering  a  long  defile  when  the  enemy  is 
near,  even  if  he  is  retreating  after  a  defeat.  It  is 
much  wiser  to  attempt  to  turn  a  defile  held  by  the 
enemy,  than  to  trust  to  the  chances  of  forcing  it  by 
direct  attack  at  the  expense  of  much  blood.  How- 
ever, there  are  cases  when  the  necessity  is  urgent,  and, 
cost  what  it  may,  the  passage  must  be  forced.  Under 
such  circumstances,  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  take 
possession  of  the  lateral  heights,  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary to  success.  The  heights  must  be  assailed  with 
infantry  columns,  whose  strength  will  be  proportional 
to  the  resistance  and  difficulties  to  be  met  and  over- 
come. The  enemy  will  be  driven  from  the  heights, 
and  his  position  in  the  defile  turned.  The  army  will 
not  attempt  to  penetrate  the  defile  until  the  columns 
on  the  flanks  have  taken  possession  of  the  heights.  If 
the  defile  is  very  narrow,  there  will  be  a  single 
column  in  it ;  and  in  such  a  case  there  should  be  con- 
siderable intervals  between  the  several  parts  of  the 
column,  in  order  that  if  the  leading  portion  is  driven 
back,  the  confusion  will  not  be  transmitted  to  those 
behind.  "When  the  valley  is  broad,  and  its  sides 
gently  sloping,  other  columns  may  move  parallel  to 
the  main  one,  at  levels  between  the  bottom  and  top. 
These  side  columns  should  keep  somewhat  in  advance 
of  the  main  column  on  the  lowest  ground.  This 


128  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

arrangement  is  based  upon  the  supposition  that  the 
stream  of  water  usually  found  in  such  locations  may 
be  readily  crossed,  so  that  the  communication  between 
the  several  columns  may  be  easily  kept  up.  It  is 
always  unsafe  to  separate  the  parts  of  an  army  by  im- 
passable obstacles,  in  presence  of  an  enemy,  who  may 
attack  and  crush  one  while  the  other  is  little  else 
than  an  idle  spectator.  If  the  stream  in  the  defile  is 
not  easily  crossed,  bridges  must  be  thrown  over  it  at 
several  points,  or  the  whole  force  must  remain  on  one 
side. 

If  the  defile  is  short  and  not  occupied  in  force,  the 
advanced  guard  should  take  possession  of  it,  the  light 
infantry  clearing  the  heights,  and  the  heavy  infantry 
passing  through  the  defile  with  the  artillery  and 
cavalry.  The  artillery  takes  the  lead,  that  it  may 
*not  be  masked  if  it  becomes  necessary  to  open  fire. 
The  cavalry  falls  to  the  rear,  as  it  can  be  of  little  use 
in  such  a  situation.  The  sharpshooters,  if  there  are 
any,  form  small  columns  on  the  flanks  of  the  artillery, 
or  they  may  be  replaced  by  companies  of  regular 
infantry. 

When  the  defile  is  quite  long,  and  strongly  held, 
the  advanced  guard  halts  at  the  entrance  and  waits 
for  the  main  body.  When  all  the  troops  have  come 
up,  arrangements  will  be  made  as  previously  indi- 
cated. 

The  rules  to  be  followed  are  the  same  for  a  large 
or  small  body  of  troops.  The  heights  must  first  be 


FORWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  129 

carried,  and  the  enemy  driven  from  them,  before  a 
movement  is  made  into  the  defile.  This  principle 
cannot  be  violated  with  impunity,  as  more  than  one 
example  has  demonstrated. 

In  high  mountains,  defiles  are  so  easily  defended 
against  direct  attack,  that  it  is  preferable  to  turn 
them,  which  is  generally  possible,  as  paths  more  or 
less  circuitous  almost  always  exist  by  which  a  force 
may  be  thrown  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  assailed. 
The  sense  of  security  on  account  of  the  strength  of  a 
position  sometimes  puts  vigilance  to  sleep,  and  the 
place  is  taken. 

Sometimes  the  enemy  occupies  but  one  side  of  the 
valley.  If  the  heights  cannot  be  carried  in  such  a 
case,  the  attempt  may  be  made  to  slip  along  the  other 
side  some  skirmishers,  and  even  artillery,  so  as  to  take 
the  enemy  in  flank,  while  the  remainder  of  the  troops 
attack  in  front.  It  was  thus  the  French  forced  the 
defile  of  Galliano. 

The  defence  is  not  always  made  in  the  defile  itself. 
Sometimes  an  attempt  is  made  to  envelope  and  over- 
whelm the  column  as  it  debouches.  The  commander- 
in-chief,  having  been  informed  of  such  a  state  of 
affairs,  hastens  to  join  the  advanced  guard,  and,  as- 
cending some  eminence  whence  he  can  see  the  ene- 
my's position,  he  makes  his  arrangements  and  sends 
his  orders  to  the  troops  in  rear. 

Generally,  the  only  course  is  to  scatter  the  troops 
just  in  front  of  the  defile  by  a  fire  of  artillery,  and 
6* 


130  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

immediately  to  throw  forward  and  deploy  a  portion 
of  the  troops  on  the  ground  thus  cleared.  These 
troops,  under  cover  of  the  artillery  crossing  its  fire  in 
front  of  them,  endeavor  to  gain  ground  to  the  front  to 
make  room  for  those  behind  them.  The  skirmishers, 
and  especially  the  sharpshooters,  push  forward  on  the 
right  and  left  along  the  heights,  with  a  view  of  an- 
noying the  batteries  of  the  enemy,  whose  converging 
fire  on  the  debouching  columns  may  be  very  destruc- 
tive. In  the  mean  time,  new  battalions,  closed  in 
mass  in  the  defile,  but  at  some  distance  from  each 
other,  debouch  and  deploy  rapidly  to  the  right  and 
left.  Several  squadrons  gallop  up  and  deploy  on  the 
wings.  When  troops  enough  are  on  the  ground,  they 
attack  with  the  bayonet  and  drive  the  enemy  off. 

In  the  deployments  subsequent  to  passing  defiles, 
and  in  other  cases  which  might  be  mentioned,  much 
time  is  often  gained  in  manoeuvring  by  inversion. 
Many  instances  have  occurred  of  troops  being  repulsed 
because  they  did  not  know  how  to  manoeuvre  in  this 
way. 

"Whatever  be  the  circumstances  of  the  passage  of  a 
defile,  and  whatever  plan  be  adopted,  the  baggage 
should  never  be  permitted  to  enter  until  the  outer  ex- 
tremity is  clear  of  the  enemy,  and  there  is  ample 
space  for  the  troops  to  manoeuvre.  It  is  not  difficult 
to  conceive  of  the  horrible  confusion  of  a  column 
driven  back  from  the  front,  harassed  in  flank,  and 
finding  the  defile  filled  with  wagons,  whose  drivers 


FORWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  131 

have  cut  their  harness  and  escaped  on  the  horses. 
The  baggage  should  therefore  never  be  permitted  to 
enter  the  defile  until  it  is  perfectly  safe. 

The  passage  of  a  defile  of  some  importance  requires, 
on  the  part  of  the  advanced  guard,  redoubled  vigi- 
lance and  precaution,  even  when  the  enemy  is  sup- 
posed to  be  absent,  for  he  may  return  by  a  cross-road 
and  attack  unexpectedly.  The  defile  should,  there- 
fore, be  examined  by  a  detachment  of  cavalry  some 
distance  in  front  of  the  advanced  guard,  and  the 
woods  on  the  right  and  left  carefully  explored  by 
flankers.  The  advanced  guard  should  pass  through 
by  detachments,  so  that  if  any  accident  happen  to  the 
leading  one,  the  remainder  may  escape  the  same  fate, 
and  may  render  it  assistance.  All  the  detachments 
should  unite  at  the  debouche,  and  remain  there  until 
scouting  parties  have  thoroughly  examined  the  neigh- 
boring ground,  so  that  they  may  feel  secure  against 
all  danger  of  attack.  . 

Passage,  of  Bridges. — Bridges  are  short  defiles,  but 
their  passage  requires  some  precautions  to  be  taken 
by  any  body  of  troops.  They  present  serious  difficul- 
ties when  they  are  defended,  and  the  passage  must  be 
forced.  When  there  is  no  enemy  visible,  the  same 
precautions  are  necessary  as  for  any  other  short  defile. 
The  leading  detachment  of  the  advanced  guard  stops 
at  the  river-bank,  taking  advantage  of  all  cover  afford- 
ed by  the  locality,  until  the  scouts  have  made  an 
examination  of  the  ground  on  the  other  side.  The 


132  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

horsemen,  who  perform  this  duty,  cross  the  bridge  at 
a  rapid  trot,  and  then  divide  into  three  groups ;  one 
of  which  moves  carefully  along  the  road,  making  the 
circuit  of  houses,  gardens,  and  clumps  of  trees,  while 
the  other  two  groups  go  to  the  right  and  left,  explor- 
ing as  they  go.  When,  after  a  few  minutes,  no  enemy 
is  discovered,  the  leading  detachment  crosses  the 
bridge,  and  rapidly  rejoins  the  groups  which  belong  to 
it.  In  the  mean  time,  the  advanced  guard  has  halted 
at  some  distance  from  the  bridge ;  the  flankers,  having 
reached  the  river-bank,  move  down  towards  the 
bridge,  examining  as  they  go.  They  cross  the  bridge 
and  move  to  the  right  and  left,  resuming  their  duties 
as  flankers.  The  advanced  guard  then  crosses  the 
bridge,  but  always  at  a  rapid  pace,  and  in  close  order. 
It  is  a  good  plan  to  leave  an  interval  between  the 
artillery  and  the  troops  before  and  after,  and  to  pass 
that  over  at  a  trot. 

As  soon  as  the  advanced  guard  is  safely  over,  the 
commander  makes  a  report  of  the  facts  of  the  case 
to  the  commander-in-chief.  When  the  main  body 
comes  up,  it  may  pass  without  delay,  only  giving  a 
little  time  for  its  flankers  and  scouts  to  pass  before, 
and  take  their  appropriate  places  on  the  other  side. 
If  the  communication  established  by  the  bridge  is 
an  important  one,  the  advanced  guard  should  not 
move  forward  until  the  main  body  has  come  up, 
because  the  enemy  might  permit  the  passage  by  the 
advanced  guard,  and  dispute  that  of  the  main  body. 


FORWARD    MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  133 

In  such  a  case,  it  should  prepare  to  resist  any  attack 
the  enemy  might  make  before  the  arrival  of  the  main 
body,  taking  advantage  of  the  features  of  the  ground 
to  strengthen  its  position. 

When  the  enemy  holds  the  bridge,  it  is  very  diffi- 
cult to  dislodge  them,  especially  if  the  bridge  is  long, 
and  the  opposite  bank  the  highest,  and  the  enemy 
provided  with  artillery.  The  famous  passage  of  the 
bridge  of  Lodi,  by  Napoleon,  in  the  presence  of 
10,000  Austrians,  is  well  known. 

Artillery  plays  an  important  part  in  the  attack  of  a 
bridge,  because  it  is  necessary  to  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  other  side  before  sending  troops  upon  the  bridge. 
If  the  direct  attack  fails,  the  enemy's  attention  must 
be  engaged  while  the  main  body  passes  at  another 
point. 

If  the  bridge  is  short,  and  is  held  by  a  small  force, 
the  advanced  guard  may  be  able  to  carry  it.  If 
not  it  will  halt,  the  staff  officers  will  examine  the 
ground,  look  for  fords,  &c.,  while  the  main  body  is 
coming  up. 

The  artillery  will  be  put  in  position  to  cross  their 
fire  on  the  ground  near  the  other  end  of  the  bridge, 
and  marksmen  may  do  excellent  service  also  in  killing 
the  men  and  horses,  if  the  river  is  not  too  wide. 
While  this  firing  is  in  progress,  the  infantry  who  are 
to  force  the  passage  are  making  the  necessary  pre- 
parations, covering  themselves  as  well  as  possible 
behind  inequalities  of  the  ground,  houses  woods, 


134  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

or  thickets  near  the  bank.  Each  battalion  will  form 
a  closed  column,  with  as  wide  a  front  as  the  bridge 
will  permit.  The  first  battalion  advances  past  the 
line  of  marksmen,  rushes  upon  the  bridge,  and 
crosses  it  at  a  run ;  drives  away  the  few  men  remain- 
ing at  the  other  end,  and  deploys  near  the  bridge. 
If  this  is  successful,  a  second  battalion  crosses  in  like 
manner,  deploys  alongside  the  first,  and  the  two  gain 
ground  to  the  front.  A  third  battalion  is  thrown 
over,  and  finally  the  whole  army  is  gotten  across. 
But  it  may  happen  that  the  first  battalion  is  repulsed. 
If  so,  the  officers  rally  it,  and  again  rush  upon  the 
enemy.  If  there  is  any  hesitation  in  the  movement, 
it  is  a  fit  time  for  a  personal  effort.  The  chief  seizes 
a  flag,  takes  his  place  in  front ;  the  men  are  inspired 
with  fresh  courage ;  the  bravest  rally  around  their 
leader ;  the  rest  follow,  and  the  passage  is  forced. 
Evidently  there  must  be  some  powerful  motive  to 
justify  so  dangerous  and  bloody  an  operation,  else  it 
would  be  preferable  to  take  more  time,  and  secure  an 
easier  passage  at  some  other  point. 

As  soon  as  the  infantry  has  taken  up  a  position  on  the 
opposite  side,  the  artillery  continues  its  fire  as  long  as 
it  can  without  endangering  the  infantry  which  has 
crossed.  It  then  ceases  fire,  forms  column,  passes  the 
bridge  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  takes  position  on 
the  other  side,  at  some  suitable  point  where  it  may 
continue  to  fire  upon  the  retiring  enemy.  The  cavalry 
will  have  crossed  as  soon  as  the  infantry  was  in  suffi- 


FORWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  135 

cient  force  to  give  it  support,  and  is  threatening  the 
flanks  of  the  enemy.  Or  else,  taking  advantage  of 
some  ford,  it  may  have  turned  the  position  while  the 
infantry  were  attacking  in  front.  The  remaining 
troops,  who,  during  the  engagement,  have  kept  out  of 
fire,  and  made  such  dispositions  as  would  be  advanta- 
geous in  case  of  a  repulse,  now  form  column  and  cross 
the  bridge. 

Passage  of  Woods. — When  a  column  is  to  pass 
through  a  large  forest,  the  attempt  should  not  be 
made  until  it  has  been  thoroughly  explored,  both  in 
front  and  on  the  sides,  to  such  a  distance  as  to  remove 
all  apprehension  of  unexpected  attack  by  a  large  force 
of  the  enemy.  In  this  case,  the  infantry  must  do  the 
scouting,  as  the  cavalry  can  make  but  little  progress 
in  a  dense  forest.  The  flankers  should  be  supported 
by  several  patrols,  which  will  keep  up  their  connec- 
tion with  the  column.  If  the  wood  is  of  small  extent, 
the  advanced  guard  does  not  pass  through  until  the 
scouts  have  reached  the  other  side  ;  but  if  of  consider- 
able extent,  the  delay  would  be  too  great,  and,  in  this 
case,  a  halt  of  half  or  quarter  of  an  hour  is  made, 
while  detachments  follow  each  other  to  the  front,  and 
serve  as  successive  re-enforcements  to  the  leading 
detachment,  if  it  is  obliged  to  fall  back. 

If  the  wood  is  occupied  by  the  enemy,  skirmishers 
are  sent  forward,  who  gradually  creep  up  on  the 
flanks,  under  such  cover  as  they  can  find,  to  the  out- 
skirts. The  artillery  follows  at  a  suitable  distance, 


136  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

takes  a  central  position,  fires  obliquely,  and  forces  the 
defenders  to  take  refuge  in  the  denser  parts.  Thus, 
the  skirmishers  are  enabled  to  get  cover  behind  the 
outer  fringe  of  trees.  When  this  is  accomplished,  and 
the  advanced  guard  is  in  possession  of  the  skirts  of 
the  wood,  the  enemy  can  not  hold  his  position  long, 
unless  abatis  have  been  made.  This  species  of 
obstacle  cannot  be  of  very  great  extent,  and  may  be 
the  more  easily  turned,  as  the  wood  itself  conceals  the 
movement.  The  enemy,  once  set  in  motion,  should  be 
vigorously  pressed  by  the  skirmishers,  supported,  if 
practicable,  by  small  columns.  If  the  entire  wood 
can  be  turned,  the  cavalry,  which  can  be  of  no  use  in 
the  interior,  may  make  a  circuit  to  threaten  the  com- 
munications of  the  enemy,  and  hasten  his  retreat. 
When  the  forest  has  been  well  swept  by  the  fire, 
several  squadrons  may  be  sent  along  the  road  at  a 
gallop,  to  dash  upon  the  retiring  enemy  as  he  debouches 
into  the  open  ground,  and  thus  change  his  retreat 
into  a  rout. 

Passage  of  Rivers. — The  most  serious  obstacle  that 
can  be  encountered  on  marches  is  an  unfordable 
river,  with  its  bridges  broken  down,  and  the  enemy  in, 
possession  of  the  opposite  bank.  To  pass  such  an 
obstacle  always  occasions  loss  of  time,  which  will  be 
proportional  to  the  difficulties  attending  the  attempt. 
If  the  column  has  a  bridge  train,  it  will  answer  for 
the  passage  of  streams  of  moderate  size  ;  but  when  the 
river  is  very  broad,  it  may  become  necessary  to  collect 


FORWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  137 

the  boats  of  the  country  and  other  materials  for  build- 
ing the  bridge. 

A  passage  is  made  either  by  a  stratagem  or  by 
force,  or  often er  still  by  both  together.  The  attempt 
should  not  be  made  until  the  staff  officers  have  made 
an  examination  of  the  river,  to  discover  the  most 
favorable  point.  This  point  will  usually  be  one  where 
the  bank  is  higher  than  on  the  other  side,  and  at  the 
same  time  envelopes  it,  on  account  of  a  bend  in  the 
river.  The  neighborhood  of  an  affluent  is  convenient, 
as  it  offers  facilities  for  collecting  in  safety  and  float- 
ing down  the  bridge  materials.  A  thickly  wooded 
bank  and  a  wooded  island  enable  the  preparations  for 
passage  to  be  made  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy. 

Efforts  are  made  to  keep  the  plans  secret,  and  to 
deceive  the  enemy.  Preparations  are  sometimes  made 
at  a  place  where  no  passage  is  intended,  and,  when 
every  thing  is  ready,  a  sudden  move  is  made  to  the 
real  point.  At  dawn,  batteries,  advantageously  posted 
upon  commanding  points,  on  the  right  and  left,  cross 
their  fire  on  the  opposite  shore,  and  drive  off  or  under 
cover  all  who  may  be  there.  Marksmen  may  also  be 
very  useful  in  assisting  the  artillery,  if  the  stream  is 
not  too  wide.  At  the  same  time,  the  boats  descend 
the  affluent  where  they  have  been  concealed.  They 
are  filled  with  soldiers,  and  rapidly  moved  across  the 
river,  where  the  men  disembark  as  fast  as  possible, 
and  secure  the  best  cover  they  can,  to  enable  them  to 
hold  their  ground.  The  artillery  gives  all  the  aid  it 


138  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

can  render  while  the  boats  are  carrying  over  other 
loads  of  infantry.  There  is  a  double  advantage  in 
these  successive  trips  of  the  boats,  the  first  soldiers 
thrown  over  being  incited  to  strenuous  efforts  by 
having  their  retreat  temporarily  cut  off,  and  still 
having  the  hope  of  speedy  re-enforcement.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  attacking  force  gets  constantly  better  until 
they  feel  strong  enough  to  charge  upon  the  enemy, 
and  drive  him  from  the  river. 

The  artillery  is  silenced  as  soon  as  its  fire  might  be 
dangerous  to  the  troops  on  the  other  side,  and  will 
shift  its  position  to  another,  where  it  may  still  be 
effective. 

"When  things  are  in  this  condition  the  bridge  may 
be  commenced,  but  troops  should  continue  to  cross  in 
the  boats.  Field-works  are  at  once  begun,  to  cover 
the  bridge  and  secure  its  possession  in  case  a  retreat 
becomes  necessary  subsequently.  This  is  a  pruden- 
tial measure  which  should  never  be  omitted. 

The  bridge  should  be  built  above  the  affluent,  so  as 
not  to  be  exposed  to  dangerous  shocks  from  boats 
which  might  get  loose  and  float  down  the  current. 
"When  the  bridge  is  finished,  the  artillery,  the  cavalry, 
and  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  pass  over. 

Arrival  of  the  column  in  presence  of  the  enemy. — 
As  soon  as  the  general  receives  notice  of  the  presence 
of  the  enemy,  he  hastens  to  join  the  advanced  guard, 
in  order  to  examine  his  forces  and  position,  as  well  as 
the  ground  upon  which  he  must  himself  manoeuvre 


FORWARD   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  139 

and  fight.  He  takes  with  him  the  chief  of  artillery, 
and  at  least  one  of  the  higher  officers  of  each  of  the 
corps  in  the  column,  so  that,  after  the  reconnoissance, 
when  his  plans  are  arranged  he  may  give  to  these 
officers,  in  person,  instructions  for  their  respective 
corps. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  troops  composing  the  column 
halt  in  the  road,  after  sending  forward  several  battal- 
ions to  re-enforce  the  advanced  guard,  if  necessary  ; 
and,  while  waiting  orders,  they  close  in  mass,  to  oc- 
cupy as  little  depth  of  ground  as  possible.  The  bag- 
gage, under  guard  of  a  few  men,  remains  in  rear,  and 
the-  cavalry,  which  had  formed  its  escort,  files  past 
along  the  road  and  takes  position  behind  the  infantry. 
The  field  artillery  is  in  the  centre  of  the  column,  and 
the  reserve  caissons  draw  near,  to  be  at  hand  in  case 
of  need. 

In  this  order  the  column  will  advance,  either  along 
the  road,  or  moving  off  obliquely,  if  required.  If  the 
engagement  is  not  to  take  place  the  same  day,  the 
army,  upon  reaching  the  position  selected,  will  deploy, 
light  its  fires,  and  wait  for  the  next  day.  When  the 
general  sends  word  to  prepare  at  once  for  battle,  the 
column  will  halt  and  break  up  into  several  smaller 
columns,  which  will  move  to  the  right  and  left  at  dis- 
tances suitable  for  deployment,  opening  roads,  if  ne- 
cessary, with  the  aid  of  the  axe  and  shovel. 

To  have  definite  ideas  on  this  matter,  let  us  recur 
to  the  example  of  the  division  on  the  march,  men- 


140 


PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 


tioned  above  in  this  chapter.  The  two  remaining  bat- 
talions of  the  leading  brigade  of  the  column  will  be 
rapidly  moved  forward  to  support  the  advanced  guard. 
There  will  remain  three  brigades  on  the  road  in  close 
column,  the  sharpshooters  and  eighteen  pieces  of  ar- 
tillery being  between  the  second  and  third  brigades. 
The  order  assumed  preparatory  for  battle  will  be  that 


<ti 


Fig.  T. 

shown  in  Fig.  7,  where  A,  B,  and  C  are  the  brigades, 
D  the  artillery,  and  C  the  cavalry,  and  the  division 
will  move  forward  in  this  order.  When  it  has  arrived 
on  the  field,  the  necessary  deployments  can  be  made 
in  twenty  minutes.  The  subject  of  battles  will  be 
treated  in  another  chapter. 


FLA^E.    MARCHES.  14.1 


Art.  III.— Flank  Marches. 

As  a  rule,  a  flank  should  not  be  exposed  to  tho 
enemy ;  but  there  are  cases  where  a  flank  march  can- 
not be  avoided,  or  where  it  is  the  best  thing  to  be 
done,  and  the  risk  should  be  run  for  a  short,  time,  in 
order  to  gain  some  great  advantage.  Take  the  case, 
for  example,  of  a  corps  which  could  effect  a  junction 
with  the  main  body,  by  executing  a  flank  march  along 
the  position  of  the  enemy,  or  by  making  a  wide  detour 
at  a  distance  from  him.  If  it  was  essential  that  the 
junction  should  be  effected  in  the  least  possible  time, 
the  risk  should  be  taken,  and  the  flank  inarch  made. 
In  war  there  is  no  rule  without  exceptions.  These  flank 
marches  are  exceptional  cases,  which  sometimes  occur, 
and  it  is  proper  to  mention  the  precautionary  measures 
to  be  adopted  to  avoid  disaster  on  such  occasions. 

As  the  greatest  danger  to  which  the  column  is  ex- 
posed is  that  of  being  attacked  in  flank  during  the 
march,  a  strong  detachment  should  be  thrown  out  on 
the  side  next  the  enemy,  to  move  along  in  a  direction 
parallel  with  the  column,  and  sufficiently  near  to  keep 
up  a  constant  communication  with  it,  and  avoid  being 
itself  compromised.  A  mile  would  be  about  a  proper 
distance  between  the  column  and  the  flank  detach- 
ment, but  this  must  depend  upon  the  ground  and 
other  circumstances. 

The  advanced  guard  usually  becomes  the  flank  de- 


142  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

tachment  on  a  flank  march,  but  it  will  be  well  to  in- 
crease its  strength,  as  the  chances  of  attack  are  greater, 
and  it  should  be  able  to  hold  its  ground  against  a  serious 
effort  of  the  enemy.  The  flanking  detachment  should 
have  its  advanced  guard,  rear-guard,  and  flankers,  each 
of  these  sending  out  groups  and  single  men  in  every 
direction,  to  avoid  surprise.  The  main  body  will  need 
but  a  small  advanced  guard  to  march  a  few  hundred 
yards  in  its  front,  the  ordinary  rear-guard  following 
also,  but  nearer  than  usual. 

The  baggage  becomes,  in  a  case  like  this,  more  of  an 
encumbrance  than  usual.  It  may  be  sent  to  join  the 
army  by  a  circuitous  route,  at  a  distance  from  the 
enemy,  or  may  move  on  that  flank  of  its  own  column 
which  is  safest  against  attack. 

Such  are  the  principal  arrangements  necessary  in  a 
flank  march.  See  Fig.  8,  where  M  indicates  the  en- 


o         T}"I  O 

o         BE3J         o 

V 


CL 


Fig.  8. 


FLANK   MARCHES.  143 

emy  in  position  ;  A  the  principal  column,  with  it8 
advanced  guard  #,  and  rear-guard  a' ;  B  the  flank 
detachment,  with  its  advanced  guard  5,  rear-guard 
£',  and  detachment  ft",  on  its  flank.  The  scouts  are 
only  placed  on  the  side  next  the  enemy.  The  baggage, 
D,  moves  on  a  road  parallel  to  that  occupied  by  the 
principal  column. 

The  principal  column  and  the  flanking  detachment 
should  each  march  with  full  distance  between  their  sub- 
divisions, so  that,  by  simply  wheeling  to  the  right  or 
left,  as  the  case  may  be,  line  of  battle  is  at  once  formed. 
Perfect  order  should  be  kept.  If  the  flank  detachment 
discovers  a  lateral  defile,  through  which  the  enemy 
might  debouch,  such  as  a  ridge,  or  a  road  through  a 
marsh  or  village,  that  would  not  need  a  strong  guard, 
a  detachment  should  be  left  until  the  column  has 
passed,  and  it  will  then  join  or  replace  the  rear-guard. 
This  would  be  a  useless  precaution  in  an  open  country, 
as  small  detachments  would  not  then  answer  for  such 
purposes,  and,  moreover,  there  is  not  the  same  liability 
to  surprise  as  in  a  broken  country. 

It  is  obviously  wise  to  conceal  a  flank  march,  if 
possible,  under  cover  of  a  fog  or  the  darkness  of  night, 
or  any  feature  of  the  ground  which  would  screen  the 
movement  from  the  enemy.  Under  no  circumstances 
should  the  use  of  the  flank  detachment  be  omitted. 
If  it  encounters  hostile  patrols,  a  bold  appearance 
must  be  put  on,  so  as  to  lead  to  the  belief  that  the 
whole  army  is  at  hand.  In  the  mean  time,  the  column 


14:4:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

moves  steadily  forward,  and,  when  it  has  passed  suffi- 
ciently far,  the  detachment  leaves  the  position  it  had 
held,  and  retires  rapidly,  taking,  if  necessary,  a  direc- 
tion different  from  that  of  the  main  column,  and 
subsequently  rejoining  it  by  a  detour.  The  enemy  will 
not  follow  it  very  far,  as  he  exposes  his  own  flank  to 
the  troops  which  have  already  passed. 

In  flank  marches,  it  is  particularly  necessary  to  have 
accurate  information  as  to  the  character  of  the  road, 
and  the  obstacles  to  be  surmounted,  for  the  least  delay 
might  prove  fatal,  if  unexpected.  If  a  defile  is  to  be 
passed,  troops  should  be  sent  forward  to  hold  it. 

If  the  flank  march  is  to  be  executed  by  a  large 
body  of  troops,  several  columns  should  be  formed,  if 
the  ground  is  of  a  nature  to  allow  them  to  move 
freely.  The  column  at  the  greatest  distance  from  the 
enemy  should  be  also  farthest  to  the  front,  the  others 
being  thrown  back  in  echelon  so  as  to  afford  mutual 
support.  If  the  enemy  attacks  the  first  column,  he  is 
liable  to  a  flank  attack  from  the  others ;  if  he  attacks 
the  last  column,  those  in  front  are  in  close  supporting 
distance  for  it. 

In  Figure  9,  M  M  represents  the  enemy  in  posi- 
tion ;  A  is  the  flanking  detachment ;  B,  C,  and  D  the 
three  columns  into  which  the  mass  to  be  moved  is  divi- 
ded. The  columns  are  moving  left  in  front,  so  that  by 
simply  wheeling  to  the  right,  line  of  battle  is  formed 
in  echelon  towards  the  enemy.  The  baggage  E  may 
follow  the  same  road  as  D,  or  a  still  more  distant  one, 


FLANK   MARCHES. 


145 


*i 
8, 

•H- 


tt 
t* 


I 


if  there  is  such.  The  columns  may  be  a  thousand 
paces  from  each  other.  The  first  column  might  be  too 
seriously  compromised  if  the  others  were  more  distant. 
When  several  columns  are  to  march  in  this  way  by 
the  flank,  it  may  be  necessary  to  make  roads  to  enable 
them  to  preserve  the  proper  distances.  It  was  for- 
merly a  very  common  thing  to  make  roads  for  the 
numerous  columns  of  an  army  as  they  approached 


146  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

the  field  of  battle ;  but  in  later  years,  when  armies 
are  moved  with  so  much  more  rapidity  and  ease,  it  is 
seldom  done.  However,  Napoleon  had  several  roads 
cut  out  of  the  rocky  banks  of  the  Saale,  in  the  night 
preceding  the  famous  battle  of  Jena.  It  might  be 
done  again  when  necessary.* 

It  was  the  habit  of  Frederick  the  Great,  when  his 
enemy  was  incapable  of  rapid  manoeuvres,  to  fall 
upon  him  by  a  flank  march.  He  formed  his  own  army 
on  such  occasions  in  two  columns  of  companies,  so 
that  by  wheeling  to  the  right  or  left  he  at  once  formed 
line  of  battle  facing  the  enemy.  For  this  pur- 
pose, he  changed  the  direction  of  his  march  when 
near  the  enemy,  under  cover  of  some  inequality  of 
ground  and  protected  by  the  advanced  guard.  These 
long  columns  ran  the  risk  of  being  attacked  in  front, 
and  often  would  have  been  if  the  enemy  had  been 
more  prompt,  but  Frederick  knew  with  whom  he  had 
to  do.  Sometimes,  to  remedy  this  grave  objection,  he 
moved  forward  in  four  columns,  and  upon  changing 
direction  formed  two  which  could  wheel  at  once  into 
a  double  line,  constituting  his  line  of  battle.  See  Fig- 
ure 10.  The  two  central  columns  A  and  A  are  com- 
posed entirely  of  infantry ;  one-half  of  each  goes  in- 
to the  front  line,  and  the  other  half  into  the  second 
line.  The  columns  B  and  C,  of  cavalry,  are  also 
each  divided  equally  between  the  front  and  second 

*  Roads  were  cut  at  Cerro  Gordo  by  the  Americans  under  General 
Scott. 


! 


FLANK    MAKCHES. 


147 


It 


V 


iV_T>    ^_ \x 

\      ^""-•;u"L'JU,bA"o!uiJ-aitJi: 


Fig.  10. 

lines  of  the  line  of  battle,  of  which  they  form  the 
wings.  An  advanced  guard  D  covers  the  heads  of 
the  columns  arid  masks  their  movements.  The  rear- 
guard E  of  the  columns,  becomes  the  reserve  of  the 
line  of  battle. 

Art.  IV.— Marches  in  Retreat. 

A  retreat  may  be  simply  a  retrograde  movement 
of  one  army  before  another,  without  an  engagement 
between  them,  which  demands  nothing  more  than  the 
ordinary  precautions  for  a  march  ;  or  it  may  be  after 
a  defeat,  and  the  general  who  conducts  such  an  oper- 
ation will  need  all  the  firmness  and  experience  of  the 
finished  soldier.  The  essential  thing  in  a  retreat  is  to 
get  the  start  of  the  pursuing  enemy  and  shake  him 


148  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

off.  Forced  marches  become  necessary,  and  they  must 
often  be  made  at  night.  Night  marches  are  not  ob- 
jectionable in  such  circumstances,  as  there  is  little  or 
no  danger  of  the  retreating  army  falling  into  an  am- 
buscade. On  the  other  hand,  the  pursuing  army  has 
that  danger  to  apprehend,  and  must  be  proportionally 
circumspect.  The  necessary  inconveniences  and  fa- 
tigue accompanying  night  marches  must  be  expected 
and  endured,  for  safety  has  become  the  paramount 
consideration.  Marshal  Turenne,  after  his  defeat  at 
Marienthal,  held  his  ground  until  night,  and  then 
took  advantage  of  the  darkness  to  move  off,  com- 
pletely distancing  the  Imperial  troops,  who  dreaded 
an  ambuscade  and  preferred  to  wait  for  daylight. 
Sometimes  a  movement  to  the  rear  may  be  concealed 
from  the  enemy  by  lighting  the  camp  fires  as  if  to 
spend  the  night,  and  leaving  a  few  men  to  keep  them 
burning,  while  the  army  passes  off  quietly.  The  de- 
tachments thus  left  behind  may  set  off  just  before 
daylight  and  readily  rejoin  the  main  body. 

When  a  start  is  gained  in  this  way,  it  is  important 
to  keep  it,  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  some  of  the  wagons 
that  move  too  slowly.  In  such  times  the  safety  of  the 
troops  is  the  important  thing.  Every  thing,  however, 
should  be  carried  off  that  can  be,  and  especially  the 
artillery  should  be  saved. 

As  soon  as  the  commander  has  determined  to  re- 
treat, he  should  order  the  officer  having  charge  of  the 
train  of  wagons  to  move  off  at  once  on  the  route  in- 


MARCHES    IN   KETKEA.T.  149 

dicated  to  him,  and  to  push  along  as  rapidly  as  pos- 
sible. The  road  may  thus  be  cleared  to  some  distance 
to  the  rear. 

It  is  a  very  difficult  thing  for  an  army  to  commence 
a  retreat  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  especially  after  a 
severe  battle.  It  should  hold  its  own  as  well  as  it 
can,  repulsing  the  attacks  of  the  victorious  army,  and 
yielding  ground  only  foot  by  foot,  until  some  position 
is  reached  where  a  stand  may  be  made  during  the 
remainder  of  the  day.  The  general  should  take  advan- 
tage of  the  first  opportunity  to  collect  his  scattered 
troops,  cause  them  to  take  some  food  and  rest,  while 
he  arranges  the  order  of  march  and  organizes  a  rear- 
guard. Notwithstanding  the  darkness,  each  corps 
must  take  the  place  assigned  it,  after  procuring  the 
means  for  transporting  the  wounded.  It  will  thus 
usually  be  midnight  before  the  retreat  really  begins. 
If  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  abandon  the  wounded, 
they  should  be  collected  in  such  houses  as  may  be  at 
hand,  with  physicians  and  other  attendants,  and  left 
to  the  generosity  of  the  victors. 

The  rear-guard  should  be  formed  of  the  best 
troops,  or  of  those  which  have  suffered  least.  It 
should  be  well  provided  with  artillery,  as  this  will 
keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance,  and  force  him  to  fre- 
quent deployments  which  delay  his  movement  for- 
ward, and  give  the  retiring  army  time  to  get  a  good 
start,  and  occupy  some  advantageous  position  for 
checking  the  pursuit.  The  rear-guard  is  expected 


150  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

to  make  a  bold  front  wherever  the  ground  is  favora- 
ble ;  and  as  the  main  body  continues  its  marches,  the 
interval  between  them  must  often  be  considerable. 
The  composition  of  the  rear-guard  should,  therefore, 
be  such  that  it  may  take  care  of  itself  on  all  kinds  of 
ground.  It  is  impossible  to  say  exactly  what  should 
be  its  strength  ;  but,  as  a  general  rule,  a  rear-guard  in 
retreat  should  be  stronger  than  an  advanced  guard  in 
an  advance.  Less  than  one-fifth  the  whole  force 
would  be  too  little,  and  sometimes  one-quarter  would 
cot  be  too  much  for  the  rear-guard,  for,  independently 
of  its  daily  combats,  its  duties  are  extremely  fatiguing, 
since  the  same  troops,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of 
changing  them,  are  often  obliged  to  constitute  the 
rear-guard  during  the  whole  of  a  retreat. 

On  the  march,  the  rear-guard  is  divided  into  three 
parts :  its  main  body,  which  keeps  together  as  much 
as  possible ;  the  rear  detachment,  which  sends  word  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  gives  time  to  make 
arrangements  to  receive  him  ;  and  an  intermediate  de- 
tachment, to  keep  up  communication  with  the  army, 
and  occupy  defiles  which  are  to  be  passed.  In  addi- 
tion, there  are  small  detachments  of  flankers. 

Perfect  order  should  be  preserved  in  the  rear-guard. 
That  detachment  which  is  in  the  immediate  presence 
of  the  enemy  should  march  l>y  the  rear  rank,  so  as  to 
be  with  its  proper  front  rank  to  the  enemy,  if  obliged 
to  halt  and  engage  him. 

In  an  open  country,  the  rear-guard  should  inarch 


MARCHES    IN    KETREAT.  151 

in  several  columns.  In  a  defile,  on  the  contrary,  the 
whole  must  be  in  a  single  column,  except  the  flankers, 
who  try  to  move  along  the  heights.  Squares  are 
formed  in  open  ground,  if  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy  is 
annoying.  These  squares  should  afford  mutual  pro- 
tection, by  flanking  each  other  with  their  fire.  The 
rear  detachment  should  be  of  light  artillery,  and  the 
best  cavalry  in  the  command.  If  it  becomes  engaged 
with  overwhelming  forces,  it  must  retire  at  a  gallop, 
and  take  shelter  with  the  columns  of  infantry,  or  in 
the  intervals  of  the  squares. 

In  a  very  broken  country,  infantry  will  form  the 
rear  detachment,  as  neither  cavalry  nor  artillery  could 
manoeuvre  freely.  The  cavalry  and  artillery  would 
then  be  mostly  with  the  leading  portions  of  the  rear- 
guard. 

The  commander  of  the  rear-guard  should  be  con- 
stantly on  the  qui-vive,  to  avoid  being  surprised.  On 
the  march,  he  will  not  only  keep  out  his  flankers,  but 
will  send  out  detachments,  to  occupy  any  points  where 
the  enemy  might  debouch  upon  the  flank  of  his  line  of 
march.  These  detachments  will  remain  in  position 
until  the  whole  rear-guard  has  passed,  and  will  then 
join  the  rear  detachment.  At  halts,  the  troops  should 
be  in  order  of  battle,  all  approaches  being  carefully 
guarded.  The  men  will  not  be  all  allowed  to  eat  at 
once.  The  march  will  only  be  resumed  when  all  the 
detachments  have  come  in. 

Passing  a  Bridge  in  Retreat— U  there  is  a  bridge  on 


152  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

the  road,  the  main  body,  after  passing  it,  will  leave 
a  sufficient  force  to  hold  it  until  the  arrival  of  the  in- 
termediate detachment,  of  which  mention  has  been 
made.  When  the  rear-guard  is  informed  of  the  facts, 
it  halts  at  some  distance  from  the  bridge  and  deploys, 
in  order  to  check  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy.  When 
the  resistance  has  been  sufficiently  prolonged,  the  rear- 
guard retires  in  echelon  or  in  the  checker  order,  and 
passes  the  bridge  by  the  wings,  taking  position  on  the 
other  bank,  where  a  part  of  the  artillery  has  already 
been  advantageously  placed.  The  rear  detachment 
of  the  rear-guard  makes  a  final  effort  to  defend  the 
entrance  to  the  bridge,  while  the  sappers  make  prepa- 
rations for  burning  or  otherwise  destroying  it.  Several 
pieces  of  artillery  will  be  placed  in  position  to  enfilade 
the  bridge,  and  others  will  cross  their  fire  in  front  of 
the  entrance.  The  sharpshooters  on  the  bank  endeavor 
to  retard  the  establishment  of  the  enemy's  batteries, 
and  the  battalions  take  advantage  of  all  cover  aiforded 
by  the  ground,  to  protect  themselves  from  the  artillery 
fire. 

The  difficulties  of  the  passage  are  much  increased, 
if  the  bridge,  from  peculiarities  of  the  ground,  is 
opposite  one  of  the  extremities  of  the  line  of  battle 
instead  of  the  centre,  as  the  rear-guard  must  then  ma- 
noeuvre by  but  one  wing,  and  the  other  is  necessarily 
fixed  in  front  of  the  bridge  until  the  remainder  of  the 
force  has  passed. 

If  the  bridge  is  destroyed,  the  enemy  is  necessarily 


MARCHES    IN    RETREAT.  153 

checked  for  a  greater  or  less  time.  If  it  cannot  be  de- 
stroyed, the  rear-guard,  after  holding  its  position  as 
long  as  possible  without  compromising  its  safety,  will 
resume  its  march  to  the  rear.  The  commander  will 
first  send  to  the  rear  those  battalions  that  are  farthest 
from  the  bridge;  then  a  part  of  the  artillery  will  take 
up  some  position  where  it  may  sweep  the  road  and 
the  neighboring  ground,  and  the  cavalry  will  be  on 
the  flanks,  to  charge  the  first  troops  engaging  in  the 
pursuit.  Skirmishers  will  cover  the  retreat,  taking 
advantage  of  ditches,  hedges,  and  other  like  obstacles. 
They  thus  form  a  screen  which  protects  and  masks 
the  columns. 

It  may  be  sometimes  advisable  to  cross  the  bridge 
at  a  run,  but  care  should  be  taken  to  avoid  confusion 
in  crossing,  and  there  should  be  prompt  return  to  the 
ranks,  and  order  on  the  other  side  of  the  stream. 

Passing  other  Defiles. — The  hints  given  above  will 
suggest  the  precautions  to  be  taken  in  passing  other 
defiles  than  bridges,  such  as  a  road  through  a  marsh, 
a  long,  narrow  mountain  pass,  a  village  with  narrow 
streets,  thickly  built.  In  such  cases,  care  must  be 
taken  to  get  well  the  start  of  the  pursuing  enemy,  to 
look  for,  seize,  and  hold,  until  all  have  passed,  any 
lateral  roads  by  which  he  might  attempt  to  attack  in 
flank,  and  cut  off  a  portion  of  the  column.  Narrow 
defiles  may  be  obstructed  by  the  use  of  various  simple 
devices,  and  the  enemy  forced  to  great  delay.  It  must 
not  be  forgotten  that  a  defile  is  a  favorable  situation  to 
7* 


154  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

form  an  ambuscade  for  part  of  the  enemy's  force.  An 
attempt  of  this  sort  may  often  be  carried  out  with 
ease,  and  produce  the  effect  of  entirely  stopping  the 
pursuit. 

The  commander  of  a  rear-guard  is  often  placed  in 
the  most  trying  positions.  To  acquit  himself  with 
credit,  he  should  possess  much  firmness  and  activity, 
and  be  acquainted  with  all  the  resources  of  the  tacti- 
cian. He  should  possess  the  confidence  of  his  men 
and  the  respect  of  his  enemies.  If  there  is  no  post 
more  dangerous  than  that  of  commanding  the  rear- 
guard, there  is  certainly  none  more  honorable.  Mar- 
shal JS~ey  acquired  an  imperishable  fame  by  his  con- 
duct as  chief  of  the  rear-guard  of  the  French  army,  in 
its  sad  and  terrible  retreat  from  Moscow.  For  several 
weeks  successively  he  was  fighting  the  enemy  every 
day,  and  more  than  once  engaged  in  hand  to  hand 
conflicts,  like  a  simple  grenadier.  Soldiers  will  never 
forget  the  glorious  deeds  of  that  heroic  spirit,  who  was 
the  last  to  leave  the  hostile  soil,  after  enduring,  with 
a  few  brave  comrades,  all  the  dangers  and  privations 
poured  by  cruel  fortune  upon  the  heads  of  that  fam- 
ished and  shattered  army,  which  entered  Kussia  in 
such  imposing  array  but  a  short  time  before. 


SIMULTANEOUS  MOVEMENTS,  ETC.  155 


Art.  V.— The  simultaneous  movement  of  several 
Columns. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  but  a  single' column  or 
army  corps,  marching  along  one  road.  It  remains  to 
say  something  with  reference  to  the  movement  of  a 
great  army  of  several  corps,  upon  the  supposition  that 
the  enemy  is  near. 

As  each  of  these  columns  is  liable  to  attack  sepa- 
rately, and  may  have  to  take  care  of  itself  for  a  time, 
until  supported,  the  same  precautions  for  its  safety 
should  be  taken  as  if  it^were  isolated  and  alone._  Thus 
every  thing  contained  in  the  preceding  articles  is  ap- 
plicable to  each  of  these  columns.  Each  should  have 
its  advanced  guard,  rear-guard  and  flankers;  and 
should  break  into  as  many  smaller  columns  as  circum- 
stances may  require,  and  the  locality  permit.  Each 
should  select  its  positions,  encampments,  or  bivouacs, 
of  course  within  the  limits  properly  falling  to  it.  But 
each  should  deport  itself  as  a  part  of  the  great  mass, 
and  all  manoeuvre  towards  the  common  end. 

Independently  of  the  special  advanced  guards  of  the 
several  columns,  one  of  the  corps  should  precede  the 
others,  and  form  a  general  advanced  guard  for  the 
army,  and  another  will  form  a  general  rear-guard  or 
reserve.  The  arrangement  of  a  great  army  of  five 


156  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

corps,  marching  on  three  roads,  is  shown  in  fig.  11. 
The  central  road  is  occupied  by  three  corps,  A,  B,  and 
C,  the  first  forming  the  general  advanced  guard,  the 
second  the  centre  of  the  army,  and  the  third  the  gene- 
ral rear-guard,  more  properly  in  such  a  case  called  the 
reserve.  The  other  two  roads  are  followed  by  the 
corps  D  and  E  respectively,  which  serve  as  flankers  to 
the  principal  column. 

The  lateral  extent  of  ground,  as  D  E,  embraced  by 
the  columns,  is  called  the  front  of  the  inarch.  It  is 
usually  a  distance  of  several  leagues,  so  that  all  kinds 
of  ground  may  be  found  within  its  limits.  There  is 
one  rule  never  to  be  disregarded :  to  avoid  leaving 
between  any  two  columns  obstacles  such  as  rivers, 
lakes,  extensive  marshes,  impassable  ranges  of  hills, 
which  would  prevent  the  corps  from  communicating 
with  each  other,  and  rendering  aid  in  case  of  need. 
If  such  an  obstacle  occur,  either  the  whole  army 
should  make  a  detour  to  avoid  it,  or  the  column  which 
would  be  separated  from  the  others,  if  not  moved  in 
the  original  direction,  should  turn  to  the  right  or  left 
and  fall  behind  the  nearest  corps,  where  it  would  remain 
until  enabled  to  regain  its  proper  place.  The  corps 
on  the  flanks  should  occupy  any  defiles  through  which 
their  communication  is  kept  up  with  the  main  column. 

The  distance  between  two  of  the  parallel  columns 
should  not  be  more  than  from  five  to  six  miles.  The 
general  advanced  guard,  being  on  the  principal  road, 
along  which  it  may  fall  back,  if  necessary,  should  be 


SIMULTANEOUS  MOVEMENTS,  ETC.  157 


44 
44 
44 


44- 
+  + 
4  + 


158  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

at  a  greater  distance ;  in  fact,  it  should  be  as  far  to 
the  front  as  possible,  consistently  with  safety.  Twenty 
or  twenty-five  miles  would  often  be  not  too  great  a 
distance,  although  a  precise  limit  cannot  be  laid  down 
for  it.  The  general  reserve  may  be  from  six  to  ten 
miles  in  rear  of  the  main  body. 

The  reserve  artillery,  the  great  train,  and  the  most 
cumbrous  baggage- wagons  are  collected,  as  well  as 
possible,  in  the  safest  place,  as  at  F  in  the  figure.  Each 
column,  however,  is  accompanied  by  whatever  is 
indispensable  in  the  way  of  baggage,  &c.,  which  follows 
in  its  rear,  under  charge  of  a  guard.  The  fewer  the 
wagons,  &c.,  attached  to  a  column,  the  better  for  it ; 
but  there  are  always  too  many. 

The  commander-in-chief  generally  stays  with  the 
central  corps,  because  he  is  then  in  the  most  con- 
venient position  for  transmitting  his  orders  to  the 
other  corps,  and  receiving  reports  from  them.  He 
may  join  the  advanced  guard  when  it  is  necessary  to 
examine  the  ground  before  the  army  reaches  it,  or  to 
see  the  disposition  of  the  troops  of  the  enemy. 

In  order  that  the  march  may  be  executed  in  the 
best  manner,  the  chief  of  each  corps  ought  to  know 
its  general  object ;  to  be  told  what  corps  are  respect- 
ively before  and  behind  him,  and  on  his  flanks ;  from 
what  quarter  he  is  to  expect  support  in  case  of  need  ; 
in  what  direction  he  mast  move  if  assailed  by  very 
superior  forces.  There  should,  moreover,  be  a  con- 
stant interchange  of  couriers,  orderly  officers,  or  aides, 


SIMULTANEOUS  MOVEMENTS,  ETC.  159 

between  the  general  head-quarters  and  the  several 
corps,  in  order  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  chief  of  the 
staff,  who  prepares  the  orders  of  march,  may  be  con- 
stantly informed  how  they  are  carried  out,  and  may 
communicate  to  the  commanding  general  the  real 
condition  of  affairs  at  any  moment ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  commanders  of  corps  may  be  kept 
acquainted  with  passing  events,  and  instructed  as  to 
the  necessary  modification  of  details  in  carrying  out 
the  main  plan.  The  orders  sent  to  the  different  corps 
of  the  French  army,  by  Berthier,  during  the  inarches 
which  preceded  Napoleon's  great  battles,  are  worthy 
of  careful  study. 

If  an  enemy  is  met  in  front  by  an  army  marching, 
as  in  fig.  11,  the  advanced  guard  A  falls  back 
nearer  to  the  main  body,  at  least  until  it  reaches  a 
position  that  may  be  held,  when  it  makes  an  effort  to 
maintain  it.  The  corps  D  and  E  oblique  towards 
the  central  column,  still  gaining  ground  towards  the 
front.  The  central  corps  B  hastens  up  to  the  support 
of  A.  D  and  E  unite  and  form  a  second  line.  The 
reserve  C  will  come  up  and  be  employed  as  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  may  think  fit. 

These  are  the  most  natural  dispositions,  but  they 
may  be  modified  in  many  ways ;  for  example,  D  and 
E  may  join  A,  and  form  a  first  line,  the  other  joining 
B,  and  forming  a  second  line.  Three  corps  may  be 
put  in  the  first  line,  and  two  in  the  second ;  or,  two 
in  the  first  and  three  in  the  second,  &c.  This  will 


160  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

depend  on  the  ulterior  designs  of  the  general,  and  the 
relative  facilities  offered  by  distances  and  the  ground 
of  bringing  up  one  or  the  other  corps  to  the  support 
of  the  advanced  guard ;  or  he  may  be  influenced  by 
some  other  of  the  many  circumstances  which  are  con- 
stantly arising  to  interfere  with  what  would  be 
invariable  rules  in  war.  There  is  one  great  advan- 
tage in  this,  for  the  enemy  cannot  know,  until  the  last 
moment,  the  disposition  of  the  troops  he  is  to  contend 
against. 

If  the  enemy  shows  himself  in  force  in  such  a  posi- 
tion as  to  threaten  the  flank  of  the  army,  all  the  corps 
change  direction  towards  that  side,  and  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  general  arrangement  remains  unchanged. 
There  is  still  an  advanced  corps,  a  reserve,  a  central 
corps,  and  one  on  each  flank.  Suppose,  for  example 
(fig.  11),  the  army  to  have  changed  direction  to  the 
right :  D  forms  the  advanced  guard,  B  remains  in  the 
centre,  A  and  C  are  on  the  flanks,  and  E  is  the 
reserve.  In  retreat,  or  to  attack  an  enemy  who  is  in 
the  rear,  the  arrangement  is  the  same. 

No  general  ever  understood  better  this  mechanical 
part  of  the  art,  or  applied  it  more  skilfully,  than 
Napoleon.  The  history  of  this  wonderful  man  offers 
to  every  student  of  military  affairs  the  most  instructive 
lessons.  It  is  necessary  to  go  back  in  history  as  far 
as  Julius  Caesar  to  find  a  general  at  all  to  be  compared 
with  him. 

The  inarch  of  the  Russian  army  before  the  battle  of 


SIMULTANEOUS   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  161 

Austerlitz  was  made  in  a  manner  entirely  similar  to 
that  shown  above.  This  army,  under  the  orders  of 
Kutosof,  was  moving  along  the  road  from  Olmutz  to 
Brnnn  (see  fig.  12),  in  order  to  engage  the  French 
army,  whose  advanced  guard  was  at  Wichau.  The 
French  main  body  was  between  Brunn  and  Austerlitz. 
Kutosof  divided  his  army  of  95,000  men  into  five 
columns,  leaving  between  them  only  space  enough 
for  deployment.  The  columns  on  the  Hanks  were  but 
subdivisions  of  the  corps  E  and 
D,  being  under  the  same  com- 
mander. Three  corps  were 

.  AU8TERLITZ© 

marching  on  the  main  road  ;  A, 
commanded  by  Bagration,  being 
the  advanced  guard  ;  B,  under 
the  immediate  eye  of  Kutosof, 
but  having  its  own  commander, 
a  lieutenant-general,forming  the 
centre ;  0,  commanded  by  the 
Grand  Duke  Con stan tine,  as 
the  reserve.  The  two  columns 
on  the  right,  D,  composed  a 
corps  under  General  Buxhow- 
den,  and  the  two  left  columns,E,  ^OLMUTZ 

also  a  single  corps,  directed  by  Fig.  12. 

Prince  Li chten stein.  So  far,  all  was  well.  The 
Russians  were  defeated,  but  it  was  because  they  com- 
mitted the  fault  of  making  a  long  circular  movement 
around  Austerlitz  with  a  portion  of  the  army,  in  order 


162  PRINCIPLES    OF    STEATEGY. 

to  turn  the  right  of  the  French  army,  M.  The  centre 
was  too  much  weakened:  Napoleon  fell  in  force  upon 
that  point,  and  the  Russians  were  completely  beaten. 

After  laying  down  the  general  rule,  it  must  be 
stated  that  circumstances  may,  and  often  do,  render 
modifications  of  it  necessary.  The  essential  thing  is 
to  conform  to  the  principle,  that  the  different  corps, 
into  which  an  army  is  necessarily  divided,  ought 
always  to  have  such  relative  positions  that  their  con- 
centration may  be  easily  effected,  before  the  enemy 
can  unite  his  forces  against  one  of  the  corps.  In  an 
open  country  the  rule  must  be  strictly  adhered  to  ; 
but  whenever  any  natural  obstacle  delays  the  march  of 
the  enemy,  and  renders  a  concentrated  attack  upon  his 
part  difficult,  while,  at  the  same  time,  protecting  the 
movements  of  the  other  army,  there  may  be  greater 
space  between  the  columns  of  the  latter,  and  a  more 
extended  field  may  be  embraced  in  the  manoeuvre,  if 
some  important  result  may  thereby  be  gained,  or 
the  object  of  the  campaign  be  more  perfectly  attained. 

In  1805,  when  Napoleon  had  concentrated  his  army 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Stuttgard  and  Ludwigsburg, 
intending  to  cross  the  Danube  and  take  in  the  rear 
the  Austrian  army,  which  was  established  near  Ulm 
(see  fig.  13),  he  divided  his  army  into  four  columns, 
of  which  the  first,  on  the  right,  commanded  by 
Marshal  Ney,  was  to  move  upon  Giinzburg,  near  Ulm, 
to  attract  the  attention  of  the  Austrians  in  that  direc- 
tion. The  second  column,  composed  of  the  corps 


SIMULTANEOUS    MOVEMENTS,    ETC. 


163 


of  Soult,  Murat,  and 
Lannes,  on  the  same 
road,  and  at  a  half  day's 
march  from  each  other, 
was  to  be  directed  upon 
Donauwerth,  twenty- 
five  miles  lower  down 
the  Danube  than  Giinz- 
burg.  The  third  col- 
umn, containing  the 
corps  of  Davoust  and 
Marmont,  passed  the 
Danube  at  Newburg, 
ten  or  twelve  miles  be- 
low Donauwerth.  Fi- 
nally, the  fourth  column,  under  Bernadotte,  was  direct- 
ed towards  Ingolstadt,  eight  or  ten  miles  lower  still. 
There  were  bridges  at  all  the  towns  named  in  the  fig- 
ure. In  this  manoeuvre-march  there  was  a  distance  of 
forty-five  miles  between  the  right  and  left  columns, 
but  the  fact  of  a  great  river  like  the  Danube  being  be- 
tween the  two  armies,  the  certainty  that  the  enemy 
had  not  collected  his  entire  forces,  made  the  probability 
of  attack  very  small.  If  the  right  corps  had  been  at- 
tacked, it  would  have  fallen  back  upon  the  central  col- 
umn moving  along  the  Danube,  which  would  have 
been  a  protection  to  one  of  its  flanks.  The  enemy,  hav- 
ing his  attention  drawn  to  this  retrograde  movement, 
would  have  abandoned  the  right  bank  of  the  river, 


Fig.  13. 


164  PKINCTPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

where  was  his  line  of  operations,  and  the  general  ma- 
noeuvre would  have  equally  succeeded.  There  was, 
therefore,  no  real  disadvantage  in  thus  separating  this 
column  from  the  others.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  enemy 
should  make  a  flank  movement  towards  Donauwerth, 
with  all  his  disposable  force,  he  would  find  there  Na- 
poleon himself  and  the  principal  French  column, 
while  he  was  all  the  time  outflanked  by  the  other  two 
columns,  the  nearest  of  which  might  be  brought  np 
in  a  day.  The  distances  were  so  calculated  that  the 
strongest  column,  the  one  by  Donauwerth,  was  to  arrive 
in  advance  of  the  others,  and  they  were  echeloned  in 
such  a  manner,  that  the  first  having  passed  the  Dan- 
ube during  the  6th  and  7th  of  October,  the  second 
would  arrive  at  Newburg  on  the  8th,  and  the  last  at 
Ingolstadt  on  the  10th.  So  that  really  only  the  Donau- 
werth column  was  attackable,  and  as  it  was  composed 
of  three  corps  near  together,  it  could  dispute  the 
ground  until  the  arrival  of  the  others ;  or  else,  if 
forced  to  retire,  it  might  move  down  the  right  bank 
of  the  Danube,  protected  in  flank  by  the  river,  until 
reinforced  the  next  day  by  the  column  from  ISTew- 
burg,  and  still  later  by  the  column  from  Ingolstadt, 
while,  in  the  mean  time,  the  Giinzburg  column  was 
threatening  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy.  The 
more  study  is  given  to  this  manoeuvre-march,  the  wiser 
does  it  seem.  There  is  no  supposition  to  which  it 
does  not  adjust  itself,  and  still  the  front  of  the  march 
was  more  than  fifty  miles.  This  is  another  proof  that 


ETC.  165 

in  war  every  thing  depends  on  the  skill  with  which 
the  arrangements  are  made  to  suit  the  topography  of 
the  field  of  action. 

After  crossing  the  river,  all  the  corps  changed 
direction  to  the  right,  in  order,  by  a  movement  of 
considerable  extent,  to  envelope  the  position  of  Uhn, 
and  take  possession  of  the  bridges  of  the  Lech,  by 
which  the  Anstrians  might  attempt  to  escape.  The 
whole  army  described  a  circle  around  Giinzburg  while 
Key  held  that  point,  his  corps  becoming  the  pivot  of 
that  grand  movement.  Soult's  corps,  which  at  first 
formed  the  advanced  guard,  became  the  left  flank ; 
Murat  and  Lannes,  who  were  in  the  centre,  became 
the  general  advanced  guard ;  Davoust  and  Marmont 
now  formed  the  centre.  *N"ey  was  on  the  right,  and 
Bernadotte  was  the  reserve.  In  this  way  the  army, 
which  had  arrived  upon  the  Danube,  presenting  the 
right  flank  to  the  enemy,  advanced  upon  him  by  a 
front  march,  after  passing  the  river.  The  results  of 
this  skilful  plan  are  well  known.  Ulm  capitulated  ; 
nearly  a  whole  army  was  captured  ;  only  a  small  part 
of  it  escaped  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  while 
the  French  were  passing  to  the  right. 

Fig.  13  exhibits  the  features  of  this  combination. 
M  M  represents  that  part  of  the  Austrian  army  which 
was  assembled  at  Ulm  and  Giinzburg ;  A  is  the  corps 
of  Key  flanking  the  other  columns,  and  moving  upon 
Giinzburg,  where  he  was  to  hold  the  bridges.  B,  C,  and 
D,  the  corps  of  Soult,  Murat,  and  Lannes,  forming 


166  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

the  principal  column,  are  represented  as  arriving  at 
Donauwerth ;  the  first  of  these,  having  crossed  the  river 
the  previous  day,  is  marching  towards  Augsburg,  to 
secure  the  bridge  over  the  Lech  at  that  point ; 
the  other  two,  after  passing  through  Donauwerth 
and  seizing  Rain,  turn  to  the  right  and  form  the 
new  general  advanced  guard.  E  and  F,  commanded 
by  Davoust  and  Victor,  will  reach  Newburg  the  next 
day,  and,  having  crossed  the  Danube  at  that  point, 
will  turn  to  the  right  and  move  towards  the  bridge  of 
Rain,  to  form  the  centre  of  the  army.  Bernadotte's 
corps,  G,  making  the  fourth  column,  is  directed  upon 
Ingolstadt  and  Munich,  being  intended  to  be  the  gene- 
ral reserve  for  the  army. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  explain  the  merely  me- 
chanical part  of  manoeuvre-marches  made  by  several 
columns,  and  to  show  the  spirit  of  such  combinations. 
If  the  country  is  open,  and  the  enemy  near,  the 
columns  keep  together,  and  march  so  as  to  be  ready 
to  give  prompt  m'utual  support.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
the  troops  of  the  enemy  are  scattered  or  at  a  distance, 
or  if  large  rivers  intersect  the  country  and  give  secu- 
rity against  sudden  attack,  the  columns  may  be  sepa- 
rated by  greater  distances,  and  may  even  present  them- 
selves obliquely,  provided  their  relative  positions  are 
preserved,  so  as  to  permit  concentration  in  case  of 
need.  "When  shall  the  rule  be  strictly  observed? 
When  and  how  far  may  a  deviation  from  it  be  permit- 
ted ?  These  questions  admit  of  no  answers.  Circum- 


SIMULTANEOUS   MOVEMENTS,    ETC.  167 

stances,  which  are  always  different,  must  decide  in 
each  particular  case  that  arises.  Here  is  the  place  for 
the  general  to  show  his  ability.  The  military  art 
would  not  be  so  difficult  in  practice,  and  those  who 
have  become  so  distinguished  in  it  would  not  have 
acquired  their  renown,  had  it  been  a  thing  of  invaria- 
ble rules.  To  be  really  a  general,  a  man  must  have 
great  tact  and  discernment,  in  order  to  adopt  the  best 
plan  in  each  case  as  it  presents  itself;  he  must  have  a 
ready  coup  d'ceil,  so  as  to  do  the  right  thing  at  the 
right  time  and  place,  for  what  is  excellent  one  day 
may  be  very  injudicious  the  next.  The  plans  of  a 
great  captain  seem  like  inspirations,  so  rapid  are  the 
operations  of  the  mind  from  which  they  proceed  ;  not- 
withstanding this,  every  thing  is  taken  into  account 
and  weighed  ;  each  circumstance  is  appreciated  and 
properly  estimated ;  objects  which  escape  entirely  the 
observation  of  ordinary  mindsr  may  to  him  seem  so 
important  as  to  become  the  principal  means  of  indu- 
cing him  to  pursue  a  particular  course.  As  a  necessary 
consequence,  a  deliberative  council  is  a  poor  director 
of  the  operations  of  a  campaign.  As  another  conse- 
quence, no  mere  theorizer  can  be  a  great  general. 


168  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 


CHAPTER  IY. 

BATTLES. 

BATTLTSS  are  the  most  conspicuous  features  of  a  cam- 
paign. A  general  may  often  put  off  a  battle  if  he 
is  not  willing  to  fight;  but  a  prolonged  delay  may 
become  more  damaging  than  a  battle,  on  account  of 
the  many  small  combats  and  daily  skirmishes  which 
lead  to  no  decisive  result,  and  in  the  end  occasion 
considerable  losses ;  besides,  the  country  around,  from 
which  the  armies  draw  their  supplies,  may  become 
exhausted.  It  is  sometimes  impossible  to  pursue  a 
temporizing  policy,  because  the  country  may  not  be 
of  a  suitable  character,  or  the  enemy  may  press  so 
vigorously  as  to  compel  either  a  battle  or  a  retreat. 
Again,  a  commander  may  fight  a  battle,  when  im- 
pelled thereto  not  by  any  necessity,  but  by  the  hope 
of  great  results  from  a  victory.  This  he  may  do,  if 
decidedly  superior  in  the  numbers  and  quality  of  his 
troops,  when  the  enemy  is  expecting  considerable  re- 
enforcements,  or  his  different  corps  are  too  distant  and 
disunited  for  mutual  support,  or  his  generals  are  on 
bad  terms,  or  give  evidence  of  irresolution  and  inca- 
pacity, &c.  Although  success  is  always  doubtful,  as 
fortune  has  quite  as  much  to  do  in  deciding  battles  as 


BATTLES.  169 

the  talents  and  foresight  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
there  are  other  motives  than  those  already  mentioned 
which  may  induce  him  to  fight  a  decisive  engage- 
ment ;  such  as  the  wish  to  relieve  a  besieged  city  ;  to 
extricate  himself  from  a  position  where  supplies  are 
failing ;  to  open  a  campaign  by  a  brilliant  stroke, 
which  will  demoralize  the  opposing  army  and  animate 
his  own.  If  it  were  possible  to  avoid  battles  and  ruin 
the  enemy  by  other  means  less  influenced  by  fortune, 
the  most  ordinary  prudence  should  lead  to  the  adop- 
tion of  the  latter.  But  a  battle  is  generally  the  only 
means  of  putting  an  end  to  the  many  other  ills  of  a 
protracted  war,  and  gives  the  wisest  and  speediest  path 
to  lasting  peace  ;  for,  after  a  great  victory,  the  con- 
queror may  dictate  terms ;  and  even  the  defeated  party 
goes  from  a  severely  contested  field  without  disgrace, 
and  may  reasonably  expect  the  consideration  always 
due  to  courage  and  devotion  to  duty. 

No  general  should  determine  to  bring  about  so 
solemn  and  momentous  a  transaction  as  a  great  battle 
without  having  upon  his  side  as  many  elements  of 
success  as  possible.  Therefore,  all  troops  within  a 
reasonable  distance  of  his  army,  which  are  not  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  guard  other  important  points,, 
should  be  called  to  him,  for  one  battalion  more  or  less 
may  decide  the  fate  of  the  day.  If  he  has  a  great 
number  of  troops,  only  enough  to  engage  the  enemy 
thoroughly  should  be  at  first  brought  into  action,  the 
remainder  being  manoeuvred  against  the  flanks,  or 
8 


170  PEINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

held  in  reserve,  for  use  as  occasion  may  require.  The 
army  should,  if  possible,  be  placed  in  such  a  position 
before  the  battle  is  begun,  as  to  make  the  victory,  if 
gained,  lead  to  great  results;  as,  for  example,  to  the 
separation  of  the  enemy  from  his  depots  and  re-en- 
forcements ;  to  his  being  forced  back,  after  defeat,  upon 
some  obstacle,  like  a  lake,  or  river,  or  defile,  where 
his  forces  may  be  wholly  or  in  part  captured  or  dis- 
persed. "When  the  features  of  the  country  are  unfa- 
vorable to  either  army,  it  should  fight  with  so  much 
the  greater  order  and  obstinacy,  that  it  may  wrest 
from  the  enemy  the  advantages  he  has.  When  vic- 
tory is  essential  for  the  preservation  of  life  or  liberty, 
men  will  perform  prodigies  of  valor.  A  skilful  com- 
mander knows  how  to  bring  success  out  of  what  in- 
spires ordinary  minds  with  despair.  Cortez,  after 
landing  on  the  sea-shore  the  small  force  which  was  to 
conquer  Mexico,  burned  his  ships,  and  thus  compelled 
his  men  to  rely  entirely  on  their  swords,  as  there  was 
no  way  left  for  retreat. 

Art.  I.— Definitions.— Orders  of  Battle. 

If  an  army  were  always  drawn  up  in  the  same 
manner,  it  would  be  certainly  beaten  by  another 
w'hose  dispositions  were  changed  to  suit  varying  cir- 
cumstances. There  is  no  invariable  order  of  battle. 
It  will  always  depend  upon  the  locality.  In  a  con- 
tracted space,  an  army  will  be  drawn  up  in  several 
successive  lines ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  the  front  to  be 


DEFINITIONS. OTtDEJRS    OF    BATTLE.  171 

occupied  is  great,  but  a  single  line  may  be  used. 
This  use  of  one  or  more  lines  will  depend  on  the  topo- 
graphy of  the  battle-field,  the  circumstances  of  the 
moment,  the  forces  and  position  of  the  enemy,  the 
kind  of  troops  forming  the  mass  of  his  army,  the  char- 
acter of  his  commanders,  &c. 

As  a  rule,  troops  in  battle  should  be  drawn  up  in 
several  lines,  as  far  as  possible,  to  prevent  the  whole 
from  being  exposed  to  the  first  shock,  and  to  enable 
one  portion  to  be  used  to  relieve  or  support  another 
when  necessary. 

Usually,  an  army  is  formed  in  two  lines,  affording 
mutual  support.  The  infantry  and  cavalry  are  dis- 
tributed in  these  two  lines,  as  the  commander  may 
deem  expedient ;  but  the  artillery  is  always  in  the 
first  line,  and  even  in  front  of  it,  in  order  to  have  a 
wide  field  of  view,  and  to  take  the  masses  of  the  enemy 
obliquely  as  they  advance  to  the  attack.  The  line  of 
caissons  is  in  rear  of  their  pieces,  but  near  enough  to 
supply  them  readily.  The  first  line  of  the  order  of 
battle  is  disposed  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  able  to  come 
into  action  as  soon  as  the  contending  forces  are  within 
range  of  the  small  arms.  Up  to  that  moment  the 
time  is  occupied  in  manoeuvres,  the  formation  of  lines 
and  columns,  movements  to  the  front  and  rear,  &c. 
The  second  line  keeps  out  of  fire,  taking  advantage  of 
undulations  of  ground,  until  its  support  becomes  neces- 
sary. 

Besides  these  two  lines,  a  reserve  is  organized  of  all 


172  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

arms  of  the  service,  which  is  held  at  some  suitable 
point  in  rear,  until  called  upon  to  move  to  some  point 
where  it  is  needed.  This  reserve,  composed  chiefly  of 
cavalry  and  artillery,  is  under  the  immediate  orders 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  who  uses  it  at  opportune 
moments.  "With  this  reserve,  and  especially  with  the 
artillery,  he  re-enforces  certain  parts  of  his  order  of 
battle  during  the  action ;  with  the  reserve  cavalry, 
enveloping  movements  of  the  enemy  are  repelled  by 
counter-attacks  in  flank ;  with  the  entire  force  of  the 
reserve  he  strikes  the  blow  which  will  decide  the  vic- 
tory, or  else  repairs  a  disaster  and  re-establishes  his 
line.  This  is  of  great  importance,  for  there  is  danger 
in  these  movements  of  the  original  lines,  which  are 
made  under  fire,  and,  being  not  understood  by  the 
men,  give  them  unnecessary  alarm.  More  than  one 
battle  has  been  lost  by  an  attempt  to  make  a  change 
in  the  order  of  battle  during  the  actual  progress  of  the 
engagement.  As  the  movement  of  any  part  of  the 
original  line  is,  therefore,  to  be  avoided,  and  a  change 
of  front  is  sometimes  necessary,  for  this  purpose,  if  for 
no  other,  a  reserve  is  indispensable.  The  Romans 
adopted  the  rule  of  multiplying  reserve  corps  behind 
the  main  army  rather  than  prolong  the  wings,  even  if 
their  force  was  much  superior.  This  is  a  good  rule 
still.  In  case  of  decided  inferiority  of  numbers,  the 
reserve  must,  of  necessity,  be  small  comparatively, 
because  an  army  must  not  allow  itself  to  be  outflanked ; 
but  there  must  be  a  reserve.  Upon  the  proper  use  of 


DEFINITIONS. ORDERS    OF   BATTLE.  173 

this  reserve  success  is  dependent,  no  less  than  upon 
preliminary  arrangements  and  the  courage  of  the 
troops.  Generally,  that  army  whose  reserve  comes 
last  into  action  will  be  successful.  A  general  shows 
his  skill  in  compelling  his  adversary  to  employ  his 
whole  force  while  there  is  still  unused,  on  his  own 
side,  the  weight  which  is  at  last  to  turn  the  scales  in 
his  favor. 

The  battalions  of  the  first  line  should  be  deployed, 
in  order  that  the  artillery  may  injure  them  as  little  as 
possible,  and  that  they  may  deliver  their  own  fire  if 
opportunity  offers ;  those  of  the  second  line  are  held 
in  compact  columns,  so  as  to  be  readily  moved  to  the 
front  through  the  intervals  of  the  first  line,  and  against 
the  enemy,  or  to  execute  any  other  necessary  move- 
ment ;  or,  finally,  to  leave  openings  through  which 
the  battalions  of  the  first  line  may  pass  if  driven  back. 
The  battalions  of  the  second  line  will,  therefore,  be 
drawn  up  in  close  columns,  as  a  rule;  but  this  sup- 
poses.the  ground  to  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  afford 
cover  to  these  masses,  otherwise  the  artillery  would 
be  very  destructive,  unless  the  line  were  held  so  far 
to  the  rear  as  to  be  beyond  good  supporting  distance 
of  the  first.  In  that  case,  the  second  line  would  be 
deployed  like  the  first,  and  at  a  distance  of  300  yards 
or  more.  If  the  ground  favors,  it  should  be  brought 
up  nearer.  The  topography  of  the  field  has,  there- 
fore, a  very  decided  influence  upon  this  first  element 
of  the  order  of  battle. 


174  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

The  troops  of  an  army  corps  should  be  divided  be- 
tween the  two  lines.  For  example,  a  corps  of  four 
divisions  would  usually  have  two  in  each  line.  The 
two  lines,  being  under  the  orders  of  the  same  chief, 
have  a  common  interest,  and  will  afford  mutual  sup- 
port and  assistance.  If,  on  the  contrary,  entire 
corps  are  formed  in  each  line,  it  sometimes  happens 
that  the  commanders  are  jealous  of  each  other,  and 
do  not  act  in  concert ;  or  the  troops  of  the  second  line 
may  give  a  cold  support  to  the  first ;  and  the  latter, 
expecting  such  a  state  of  affairs,  lose  confidence  and 
fight  feebly.  This  arrangement  is,  however,  quite 
frequently  resorted  to,  and  really  has  its  advantages, 
for  the  commander  has  not  his  attention  divided  be- 
tween two  lines;  and  the  second,  being  not  so  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  first,  is  more  disposable 
for  such  movements  as  may  be  necessary.  In  a 
broken  country,  the  first  is  undoubtedly  the  best  ar- 
rangement, inasmuch  as  it  reduces  the  front  by  half, 
and  lends  itself  better  to  varying  ground. 

The  reserve  should  be  composed  of  independent 
and  entire  bodies,  in  order  to  have  independence  and 
capability  of  rapid  movement  wherever  its  presence 
may  be  required. 

A  corps  of  sixteen  battalions,  divided  into  four 
brigades,  two  in  the  first  line  and  two  in  the  second, 
and  with  twenty-four  pieces  of  artillery,  would  re- 
quire about  1,500  or  2,000  yards  front,  or  about  one 
mile.  This  would  be  increased  or  diminished,  accord- 


DEFINITIONS. ORDERS    OF   BATTLE.  175 

ing  to  the  character  of  the  ground.  If  in  one  line, 
the  extent  of  front  required  would  be  about  two  miles, 
— a  greater  space  than  one  man  can  readily  keep  well 
under  his  eye,  especially  in  a  wooded  or  rolling 
country. 

Tacticians  give  different  names  to  the  order  of  bat- 
tle, according  to  the  manner  of  arranging  it.  It  may 
be  the  continuous  order  or  the  order  with  intervals. 
"With  respect  to  the  hostile  army,  it  may  be  parallel 
or  oblique.  These  different  varieties  are  usually  all 
found  in  the  same  army  when  engaged,  some  parts  of 
the  line  being  continuous  and  others  with  intervals, 
some  parts  parallel  and  others  oblique,  in  some  places 
single  and  in  others  double.  But  each  of  these 
dispositions  must  be  examined  separately  in  order  to 
appreciate  its  properties. 

The  parallel  order,  as  its  name  imports,  is  that  in 
which  the  two  armies  are  drawn  in  front  of  each 
other,  so  as  to  become  engaged  simultaneously  along 
the  whole  line.  Such  must  have  been  the  style  of  the 
earliest  battles,  where  no  science  was  required,  and 
success  depended  upon  little  else  than  individual 
strength,  and  upon  the  courage  and  obstinacy  of  the 
combatants.  In  this  order,  an  equal  effort  is  made 
along  the  whole  front.  If  a  victory  is  obtained,  it  is 
doubtless  a  complete  success ;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  defeat  is  alike  decisive.  With  equal  bravery  on 
each  side,  the  victory  belongs  in  advance  to  the 
more  numerous  party. 


176  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

The  oblique  order,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  disposition 
by  which  a  portion  of  the  troops  are  carried  against 
the  enemy's  line,  while  the  remainder  are  kept  disen- 
gaged. To  use  the  technical  terms,  one  wing  is 
thrown  forward,  while  the  other  is  refused.  The  first 
is  strengthened  in  every  possible  way,  while  the  other 
is  reduced  as  much  as  it  can  be,  without  compromi- 
sing its  safety.  An  attempt  is  thus  made  to  outflank 
a  wing  of  the  opposing  army,  to  crush  the  line  at  one 
point,  while  attention  is  drawn  to  others.  If  the 
enemy  can  be  kept  in  a  state  of  uncertainty,  up  to 
the  last  moment,  by  false  attacks,  and  by  a  skilful 
direction  given  to  the  columns  of  attack ;  if  they  are 
promptly  deployed,  and  only  at  the  moment  when 
the  action  is  about  to  begin,  the  enemy  will  have  no 
tune  for  counter-manoeuvres,  or  sending  sufficient  sup- 
ports to  the  wing  attacked,  and  will  probably  be  de- 
feated. Art  may  thus  supply  the  want  of  numbers ; 
and  a  small  army,  well  commanded,  may  defeat  a 
large  one,  whose  chief  has  not  known  how,  or  has  not 
been  able,  to  mass  his  forces  at  the  decisive  point. 
This  art  is  in  our  day  much  more  important  than 
with  the  ancients,  because  our  lines  are  much  more 
extended.  The  troops  drawn  from  parts  not  attacked, 
to  support  those  that  are,  sometimes  cannot  come  up 
soon  enough  to  check  the  confusion;  and  the  bat- 
talions are  overthrown  one  after  another  by  the  at- 
tacking wing  of  the  army  adopting  the  oblique  order, 
which  becomes  more  threatening  by  each  successive 


DEFINITIONS. ORDERS    OF    BATTLE.  177 

step  and  by  the  deployment  of  its  whole  strength.  At 
Leuthen  this  was  the  result,  where  Frederick,  after 
threatening  for  some  time  the  right  wing  of  the  Aus- 
trians,  in  order  to  induce  them  to  draw  a  large  part  of 
their  forces  to  that  point,  attacked  their  left  with  his 
best  troops,  took  it  in  flank,  drove  it  back  upon  the 
centre,  and  followed  up  so  closely  that  the  different 
corps,  which  came  up  from  the  opposite  extremity  to 
arrest  his  progress,  ware  beaten  in  succession. 

Among  the  generals  of  antiquity,  Epaminondas 
seems  to  have  specially  apprehended  the  advantages 
of  the  oblique  order,  and  to  it  he  owed  the  famous 
victories  of  Levetia  and  Mantinea. 

By  refusing  one  wing,  not  only  is  the  advantage 
secured  of  strengthening  the  other  for  the  attack,  but 
at  the  same  time  means  are  held  in  hand  for  recover- 
ing from  the  effect  of  a  check,  if  one  occurs,  or  for 
protecting  the  retreat,  if  necessary.  In  fact,  the  fur- 
ther the  repulsed  wing  falls  back,  the  more  strongly 
it  is  sustained  by  the  troops  left  to  the  rear,  which 
come  now  successively  into  action.  The  front  in- 
creases and  becomes  more  formidable ;  a  fresh  attempt 
may  be  made,  or,  if  the  battle  is  certainly  lost,  a  re- 
treat may  be  commenced  under  the  protection  of  the 
troops  that  have  been  but  slightly  engaged,  and  have 
not  suffered.  "When  the  oblique  order  is  properly 
employed,  it  gives  many  chances  of  success,  as  has 
been  explained,  and  provides,  as  far  as  possible,  against 
mishaps. 
8* 


178  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

When  a  wing  is  refused,  artillery  of  the  heaviest 
calibre  should  be  placed  upon  it,  in  order  to  keep  the 
opposite  wing  of  the  enemy  at  a  respectful  distance, 
arid  to  prevent  the  order  from  becoming  parallel. 
The  retired  wing  should  also,  as  far  as  practicable,  be 
in  a  good  position  for  defence,  which  may,  in  case  of 
need,  be  a  set-off  to  its  want  of  numbers.  All  natural 
features  should  be  taken  advantage  of,  such  as  woods, 
ravines,  hills,  &c.,  to  afford  support  or  cover  to  this 
wing. 

The  oblique  order,  properly  so  called,  is  undoubt- 
edly preferable  to  the  parallel  order ;  but  the  latter 
has  also  its  advantages,  especially  when  it  is  re-enforced 
on  one  of  its  wings.  It  is  very  suitable  for  an  army 
having  a  numerical  superiority,  that  can  present  equal 
forces  to  the  enemy's  along  the  whole  front,  while  at 
the  same  time  it  doubles  its  lines  and  effects  a  con- 
centration of  strength  on  one  wing.  In  thus  attack- 
ing the  enemy  in  front,  the  victory  will  be  more  de- 
cisive, because  the  battle  will  have  raged  seriously  at 
every  point.  This  method,  called  the  parallel  order 
re-enforced,  conforms  to  principles,  because  a  princi- 
pal mass  is  brought  against  one  point  of  the  hostile 
line,  while  at  other  points  the  opposing  forces  are 
equal.  Thus,  in  fact,  the  parallel  order  re-enforced  is 
analogous  to  the  oblique  order,  and  possesses  the  same 
properties,  though  not  in  so  great  a  degree.  In  both 
there  is  a  decisive  effort  at  one  wing,  and  simple  dem- 
onstrations, or  a  less  serious  engagement,  at  the  other. 


DEFINITIONS. ORDEJiS    OF    BATTLE.  179 

If,  now,  we  compare  the  continued  order  with  that 
having  intervals,  either  oblique  or  parallel,  we  will 
see  that  the  first  can  only  be  used  in  large  plains  free 
from  obstacles,  where  cavalry  may  always  be  placed 
on  the  wings.  The  other  may  be  used  in  all  cases  of 
ground,  and  permits  the  use  of  the  cavalry  wherever 
it  can  act,  whether  at  the  centre  or  on  the  wings.  If, 
in  the  continued  order,  the  cavalry  is  put  in  the 
centre,  it  loses  all  its  advantages ;  being  kept  down 
to  the  pace  of  the  infantry  with  which  it  is  in  line,  it 
loses  its  mobility,  its  chief,  or,  more  accurately,  its  sole 
source  of  success ;  exposed,  without  possibility  of  re- 
ply, to  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  it  must  either  stand 
still  and  be  cut  to  pieces,  or  retire  to  a  place  of  safety 
and  leave  a  large  gap  in  the  line  of  battle.  The  chief 
of  the  cavalry  would  doubtless  prefer  to  move  forward, 
being  supposed  to  be  a  man  of  spirit ;  but  in  charging 
infantry,  which  is  in  good  order,  his  force  will  be 
overwhelmed  by  the  fire,  and  probably  dispersed; 
either  way,  the  gap  still  remains  in  the  line  of  battle. 

This  took  place  at  the  battle  of  Hockstaedt,  which 
was  gained,  in  1704,  by  Eugene  and  Marlborough. 
At  the  battle  of  Minden,  Duke  Ferdinand,  seeing 
Marshal  de  Contades  place  his  cavalry  in  the  centre, 
where  the  ground  was  favorable  to  its  action,  directed 
a  portion  of  his  infantry  against  it,  giving  orders  that 
when  the  infantry  had  dispersed  the  cavalry,  it  should 
turn  to  the  right  and  left  and  fall  upon  the  flanks  of 
the  enemy's  line,  while  an  attack  was  made  in  front  by 


180  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

the  remainder  of  the  army.  This  manoeuvre,  imitated 
from  that  at  Hockstaedt,  was  equally  successful.  In  the 
continued  order,  the  cavalry  must  always  be  placed  on 
the  wings,  that  it  may  have  independence  and  mo- 
bility ;  and  if  the  ground  there  is  unfavorable  for  its 
action,  it  is  nearly  useless.  Such  are  the  grave  incon- 
veniences of  the  continued  order. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  different  bodies  of  infantry 
leave  intervals  between  them,  the  cavalry  and  artil- 
lery may  easily  act  at  opportune  moments  and  wher- 
ever necessary.  But  in  order  that  these  intervals  may 
not  have  the  disadvantage,  pointed  out  above,  of  leav- 
ing gaps  through  which  the  enemy  may  penetrate, 
the  line  should  be  formed  in  echelons,  as  shown  in 
fig.  14.  By  this  arrangement  the  cavalry  may  be 
held  behind  the  echelons,  ready  to  charge  through  the 
intervals,  as  shown  by  the  direction  of  the  dotted  line 
A  B.  But  this  is  not  the  sole  advantage.  The  differ- 
ent bodies,  not  being  attached  to  each  other,  can  be 
more  readily  placed  to  suit  the  ground ;  have  greater 
mobility  in  following  up  a  success  or  withdrawing  in 
case  of  reverse ;  the  defeat  of  one  does  not  necessa- 
rily involve  those  adjacent ;  one  may  rally  under  the 
protection  of  another.  Notwithstanding  the  inter- 
vals, the  entire  line  occupies  the  same  front  parallel 
to  the  enemy  as  if  drawn  up  in  the  continued  order, 
while  permitting  a  still  greater  extension  if  circum- 
stances require  it.  Each  echelon  flanks  and  supports 
the  preceding  one,  so  that  if  the  enemy  attempts  to 


DEFINITIONS. ORDEKS    OF    BATTLE. 


181 


pass  through  an  interval,  he  is  taken  in  flank  by  the 
next  echelon  to  the  rear,  while  at  the  same  time  he  ia 
charged  in  front  by  the  cavalry.  Thus  the  order  in 
echelons  facilitates  the  application  of  the  principle, 
that  the  different  arms  should  be  made  to  act  on  the 
ground  best  suited  to  their  manoeuvres ;  but  at  the 
same  time  the  danger  is  avoided  of  leaving  gaps  in 
the  line  of  battle. 

The  first  echelon,  C  D,  may 
be  called  the  point.  The  second 
line  and  the  reserves  support  the 
echelons  of  the  first  line,  by 
adopting  a  similar  formation  or 
by  accumulating  near  the  point, 
or  in  any  other  way  circumstan- 
ces may  demand  or  the  general 
commanding  may  desire. 

The  checker  order  is  the  par- 
allel order  with  intervals,  the 
several  subdivisions  being  drawn 
np  in  two  lines,  so  that  those  of 
the  second  line  are  opposite  the 
intervals  of  the  first.  This  or- 
der is  wanting  in  solidity,  be- 
cause the  subdivisions  of  the  front 
line  are  too  far  apart ;  on  the  same  front  it  gives  but 
half  as  much  fire  as  a  full  line;  with  equal  forces,  it  oc- 
cupies double  as  much  ground,  which  is  almost  always 
an  inconvenience  rather  than  an  advantage,  especially 


Fig.  14. 


182  PRINCIPLES    OF   STKATEGY. 

if  producing  diminished  solidity.  The  artillery  cannot 
be  placed  in  the  intervals  of  the  first  line,  because  it 
would  attract  towards  the  battalions  of  the  second 
all  the  missiles  of  the  enemy ;  for  it  is  an  established 
fact  that  artillery  replies  to  artillery ;  this  being  the 
case,  troops  should  not  be  in  position  behind  batter- 
ies, as  thereby  a  double  mark  is  offered  to  the  enemy. 
The  intervals  in  the  checker  order  or  the  quincunx 
order  are  the  more  dangerous  in  proportion  to  the 
proximity  of  the  enemy,  for  he  may,  through  such 
openings,  penetrate  in  mass,  overthrow  the  simple  line 
which  resists  him,  and  drive  it  back  upon  the  second 
line,  where  the  same  confusion  may  be  produced. 
Generally,  there  should  be  no  other  intervals  in  a  line 
of  battle  than  those  strictly  necessary  for  the  move- 
ments of  the  bodies  of  troops  composing  it. 

This  order,  however,  will  be  less  vicious  if  the  sec- 
ond line  is  formed  of  cavalry,  because  these  troops 
may  then  charge  through  the  openings  before  them. 
Thus  the  checker  order,  somewhat  modified,  might  be 
partially  adopted  in  an  order  of  battle ;  for  example, 
in  a  retired  wing  that  must  be  extended  to  make  a 
greater  show.  In  a  retreat,  this  order  is  employed, 
but  rather  as  a  manoeuvre  than  an  order  of  battle ;  it 
is  then  used  to  withdraw  successively  the  different 
bodies  of  troops  engaged  with  the  enemy.  When  in 
a  line  of  battle  several  of  the  subdivisions  are  drawn 
back  in  order  to  guard  against  flank  attack,  there  is 
formed  what  is  called  a  crochet  to  the  rear,  If  the 


DEFINITIONS. ORDERS    OF   BATTLE.  183 

same  subdivisions  are  thrown  forward  in  advance  of 
the  line  of  battle,  but  so  that  they  are  attached  to  it, 
making  an  angle>  there  is  formed  the  crochet  to  the 
front.  The  former  may  become  the  wedge  and  the 
latter  the  inverted  wedge,  when  the  two  branches  of 
the  line  are  about  of  equal  length.  The  wedge  is  es- 
sentially offensive,  as  an  army  would  only  adopt  this 
formation  with  the  intention  of  making  an  attack  to 
pierce  the  opposing  line,  whilst  the  crochet  to  the  rear 
would  be  adopted  as  a  defence  against  an  enveloping 
attack.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  crochet  to  the 
front  and  the  inverted  wedge,  but  in  a  contrary  sense; 
as  the  inverted  wedge  would  be  used  when  the  object 
was  to  yield  in  the  centre  to  the  enemy  advancing  on 
that  point,  while  enveloping  his  wings,  it  is  a  defen- 
sive formation,  the  crochet  to  the  front  being  offen- 
sive. History  describes  a  famous  example  where  two 
armies  were  formed,  one  like  the  wedge  and  the  other 
like  the  inverted  wedge.  It  was  the  battle  of  Casilin, 
fought  in  533  between  the  Franks  and  Romans,  near 
Capua.  The  Franks  were  drawn  up  between  two 
woods;  they  re-enforced  their  centre,  forming  a  real 
wedge.  The  Romans  were  less  numerous,  and  adopt- 
ed an  order  having  less  depth  but  more  extent,  form- 
ing an  inverted  wedge.  They  gave  ground  in  the 
centre  and  made  their  principal  efforts  against  the 
wings  of  the  Franks,  the  cavalry,  in  the  mean  time,  at- 
tacking them  in  the  rear  after  passing  around  one  of 
the  woods,  The  front  of  the  Frank  wedge,  continu- 


184:  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

ing  to  press  forward,  reached  the  Roman  camp,  the 
confusion  of  the  pillage  leading  to  their  own  defeat. 
The  victory  of  the  Romans  was  complete. 

Art.  II. — Employment  of  the  Different  Arms. 

When  the  columns  have  reached  the  field  of  battle, 
and  each  is  in  the  place  marked  out  for  it,  the  com- 
manding general  gives  the  signal  for  the  action  to  be- 
gin, arid  each  of  his  subordinate  commanders  prepares 
to  execute  the  general  instructions  he  has  received, 
retaining  a  great  latitude  in  the  means  of  carrying 
them  out.  They  know,  for  example,  that  the  right  is 
to  make  the  great  eifort ;  that  the  left  will  be  but 
feebly  engaged,  and  in  a  manner  only  to  give  the 
enemy  uneasiness  and  to  retain  him  in  his  position ; 
they  regulate  themselves  accordingly,  directing  all 
their  movements  and  manoeuvres  towards  the  com- 
mon end.  It  is  a  sacred  duty  for  each  of  them  to 
give  any  support  his  colleagues  may  require.  As  the 
general-in-chief  cannot  be  everywhere,  it  is  for  them 
to  supply  his  absence,  and  make  every  arrangement 
that  critical  circumstances  may  require.  They  will 
do  well  if  in  nothing  they  act  in  opposition  to  his 
general  plan.  The  greater  their  responsibility,  the 
greater  will  be  their  part  of  the  glory  if  success 
crowns  their  efforts,  or  even  if  deserted  by  fortune 
they  fail,  provided  they  have  borne  themselves  brave- 
ly and  honorably. 

The  battle  is  begun  by  skirmishers,  who  are  thrown 


EMPLOYMENT    OF    THE    DIFFERENT   ARMS.  185 

ont  to  the  front,  sometimes  a  thousand  or  fifteen  hun- 
dred paces.  Supported  at  suitable  intervals  by  more 
compact  bodies  of  troops  and*  by  light  batteries,  they 
attempt  to  check  the  enemy  until  the  columns  have 
had  time  to  deploy;  or  else,  when  an  attack  is  to 
be  made,  they  cover  the  advancing  columns,  mask  the 
dispositions  for  the  offensive,  repel  the  opposing  skir- 
mishers, observe  the  latest  positions  of  the  enemy, 
discover  the  vulnerable  parts  of  his  line,  at  the  same 
time  keeping  him  uncertain  of  the  real  point  of  at- 
tack, which  should  not  be  disclosed  until  the  complete 
deployment  of  the  columns  and  the  onset  is  just  about 
to  be  made. 

Now  the  skirmishers  should  retire,  either  to  permit 
the  columns  to  become  engaged,  or  because  they  can 
no  longer  resist  the  enemy  and  are  obliged  to  give 
way,  disputing  the  ground  foot  by  foot.  When  with- 
in a  short  distance  of  the  line  of  battle  deployed  be- 
hind them,  they  fall  back  rapidly  through  the  inter- 
vals of  the  battalions  and  join  their  respective  corps 
or  rally  in  rear. 

As  soon  as  the  front  of  the  army  is  unmasked,  the 
firing  of  the  first  line  begins,  the  artillery  first,  and 
then  the  infantry,  when  the  armies  are  sufficiently  near 
for  small  arms  to  be  effective.  The  firing  is  continued 
until  some  disorder  is  observed  in  the  opposing  ranks. 
This  is  the  moment  for  forming  columns  of  attack  and 
charging.  If  the  enemy  retires  before  this  offensive 
movement,  the  pursuit  must  not  be  headlong  or  disor- 


186  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

derly,  but  the  columns  should  be  halted,  perfect  order 
restored  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  then  the  onward 
movement  resumed  against  the  second  line,  which  is 
usually  disordered  by  the  confusion  of  the  first ;  care 
must  also  be  taken  that  no  part  of  the  line  of  battle 
be  advanced  far  beyond  the  remainder.  It  is  only 
when  the  victory  is  certain,  that  the  enemy  may  be 
rapidly  followed  up,  and  then  with  the  object  of 
making  his  retreat  a  rout. 

When,  on  the  other  hand,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
fall  back,  the  ground  should  be  disputed  foot  by  foot,  or- 
der being  preserved  in  the  ranks  as  far  as  possible,  that 
advantage  may  be  taken  of  the  least  fault  committed  by 
the  enemy.  In  every  case,  the  second  line  will  move  up 
to  support  the  first,  and  take  its  place,  making,  if  possi- 
ble, a  counter-attack  upon  the  advancing  enemy.  This 
will  restore  confidence  to  the  troops,  and  prevent  their 
thoughts  dwelling  upon  retreat ;  and  will,  moreover, 
arrest  the  enemy  or  drive  him  back.  The  same  ground 
is  thus  often  taken  and  retaken  several  times  by  brave 
troops. 

The  cavalry  may  charge  at  any  favorable  time,  and 
should  never  let  slip  any  opportunity  of  rushing  upon 
disordered  infantry,  or  an  exposed  flank,  or  a  badly 
supported  battery,  or  of  making  a  counter-movement 
against  cavalry  in  motion.  For  this  reason  it  is  neces- 
sary to  have  convenient  intervals,  which  will  permit 
the  cavalry  to  pass  through,  and  to  seize  proper  mo- 
ments for  falling  with  lightning  speed  upon  the  ranks 


EMPLOYMENT    OF   THE    DIFFERENT    AKMS.  1ST 

of  the  enemy.  Generally  it  is  advantageous  not  to 
employ  cavalry  until  a  late  period  in  the  battle,  as  its 
effect  is  better  then,  and  it  is  also  in  better  condition 
to  pursue  the  enemy  in  case  of  success,  or  to  check 
his  advance  in  case  of  reverse. 

The  artillery  continues  firing  during  the  whole  en- 
gagement. The  cannon  are  often  heard  during  the 
first  skirmishing,  and  also  give  the  enemy  a  parting 
salute  when  the  victory  is  gained.  The  caissons  should, 
therefore,  be  abundantly  supplied  with  ammunition. 
The  artillery  is  distributed  in  strong  batteries,  so  as  to 
produce  large  gaps  at  certain  points  of  the  line  in  front, 
into  which  the  cavalry  may  rush.  Without,  perhaps, 
doing  more  absolute  injury  in  this  way  than  if  dis- 
tributed uniformly  along  the  front,  the  moral  effect  is 
much  greater.  The  soldier  is  filled  with  horror  when 
he  sees  his  comrades  fall  rapidly  around  him,  and 
whole  battalions  swept  away  in  an  instant ;  he  loses 
his  presence  of  mind,  he  recoils ;  and  if  the  cavalry 
presents  itself  at  this  moment,  he  is  not  in  a  condition 
for  resistance.  All  the  artillery  should  not  be  accu- 
mulated at  one  point,  even  if  it  were  possible.  It  is 
easier  to  cover,  by  undulations  of  the  ground,  several 
separate  batteries  than  a  single  one,  containing  all  the 
pieces.  The  fire  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  conver- 
gent upon  the  important  points  of  the  line  of  the 
enemy,  as,  for  example,  a  wing  that  is  to  be  crushed, 
a  salient  angle  that  is  to  be  enveloped,  or  a  battery 
that  is  to  be  dismounted,  &c. 


188  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

The  light  artillery  moves  to  the  front  to  begin  the 
action,  following  oblique  directions,  as  far  as  practica- 
ble, both  to  unmask  the  other  troops  and  to  get  slant- 
ing fires  upon  the  enemy's  lines.  This  kind  of  artil- 
lery should  be  bold,  as  its  lightness  enables  it  to  escape 
with  ease.  Usually  accompanied  by  supports  of  cav- 
alry, it  falls  suddenly  upon  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
advances,  retires,  halts,  in  order  to  avoid  the  attempts 
made  against  it,  takes  advantage  of  every  favorable 
position  to  fire  a  few  rounds.  As  soon  as  the  victory 
is  gained,  the  light  artillery  moves  rapidly  to  the  front 
with  the  cavalry,  in  order  to  break  up  the  arrange- 
ments for  retreat,  following  closely  upon  the  heels  of 
the  enemy,  giving  him  no  rest,  and  in  every  way  in- 
creasing the  confusion  in  his  ranks.  It  is  of  the  first 
importance  that  light-artillery  horses  be  of  the  best  for 
strength  and  swiftness,  and  the  cannoneers  should  be 
picked  men. 

The  heavy  artillery  is  collected  in  several  strong 
batteries,  either  in  the  line  in  advance  of  the  intervals 
between  the  divisions,  or  upon  the  wings ;  anywhere, 
in  fact,  where  it  interferes  least  with  the  infantry,  and 
where  the  ground  suits  it.  The  smallest  undulations 
are  taken  advantage  of,  to  cover  the  pieces  and  give 
them  elevation.  A  hill  thirty  or  forty  feet  high  gives 
an  excellent  position  for  artillery,  as  the  fire  is  grazing 
and  not  too  plunging,  and  the  infantry  supports  can 
be  kept  near  at  hand  and  out  of  sight  and  fire. 

Salient  points  of  the  order  of  battle  are  good  posi- 


EMPLOYMENT    OF    THE    DIFFEKLNT    ARMS. 


189 


tions  for  the  artillery.  Batteries  thus  placed  give  a 
concave  formation  to  the  first  line,  which  is  very  fa- 
vorable, as  the  enemy  is  enveloped  and  liable  to  a 
converging  fire.  In  order,  however,  that  a  battery 
may  be  established  on  a  salient  point  in  this  manner, 
it  should  be  protected  by  some  obsta-  SW^fl 
cle,  either  natural  or  artificial,  from 
the  flank  fire  it  might  otherwise  be 
exposed  to.  Take,  for  example,  the 
case  shown  in  figure  15,  where,  in 
the  centre,  two  batteries  are  pro- 
tected from  enfilading  fire  by  the 
hill  between  them  ;  on  the  left,  an- 
other battery  is  masked  by  a  village ; 
and  on  the  right,  still  another  by  a 
wood.  The  infantry  is  formed  in  line 
of  battle  between  the  batteries,  and 
the  light  troops  occupy  the  village, 
wood  and  hill.  If  no  obstacle  exists 
to  cover  the  artillery  and  permit  it 
to  fire  obliquely,  as  in  the  example 
shown,  it  is  placed  in  the  line,  or, 
more  exactly,  a  little  in  front  of  it, 
fires  directly  to  the  front,  and  ordi- 
narily in  reply  to  the  artillery  of  the 
enemy.  If  the  artillery  is  silenced, 
it  fires  upon  the  infantry,  to  break 
the  ranks,  cut  up  the  columns,  pre- 
vent their  deployments  and  to  keep 


190  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

them  at  a   distance  ;   shells  are   thrown  among  the 
cavalry,  which  cause  both  destruction  and  alarm. 

Firing  at  too  long  range  should  be  avoided,  for 
it  wastes  ammunition.  The  small  effect  it  produ- 
ces is  discouraging  to  one  party,  and  tends  to  em- 
bolden the  other.  The  ravages  of  artillery  are 
greatest  within  the  range  of  grape.  It  would,  how- 
ever, be  foolish  to  permit  an  enemy  to  approach  so 
near  undisturbed,  because  the  effects  of  artillery  are 
very  considerable  at  fifteen  hundred  paces  or  more. 
The  guns  of  smallest  calibre  are  most  advanced,  while 
the  pieces  of  heavy  metal  are  placed  at  greater  dis- 
tances, as  with  a  retired  wing,  upon  heights,  &c. 

Art.  III.— Offeii§ive  Battles. 

The  Reconnaissance. — The  general  arrangements  for 
an  attack  can  only  be  made  after  an  examination  of 
the  position  and  force  of  the  enemy.  This  examina- 
tion is  made  by  the  commander-in-chief  himself,  and 
if  the  battle  is  put  off  to  the  next  day,  he  must  then, 
before  giving  his  final  orders,  be  certain  that  no  change 
has  been  made  by  the  enemy  in  his  position.  With- 
out this  precaution,  the  measures  adopted  might  prove 
very  unsuitable  to  the  new  state  of  affairs.  Whilst 
he  is  on  some  elevated  point,  glass  in  hand,  glancing 
rapidly  over  the  field  and  the  position  of  the  enemy, 
the  commanders  of  corps  will  be  around  him  ;  he  com- 
municates his  intentions,  arid  gives  notice  of  any  modi- 
fications of  previous  orders,  or  reiterates  them. 


OFFENSIVE  BATTLES.  191 

But  if  the  battle  is  to  be  fought  the  same  day,  the 
skirmishers  of  the  enemy  must  be  driven  in  before  the 
general  can  approach  near  enough  to  get  a  good  idea 
of  the  advantages  and  inconveniences  of  the  ground, 
on  which  the  two  armies  are  about  to  engage.  He 
must  at  any  cost  reach  some  high  point,  where  he  can 
see,  at  least  to  a  considerable  extent,  the  surrounding 
ground,  as  well  as  the  forces  and  dispositions  of  the 
enemy.  "While  he  is  making  his  examination,  and  set- 
tling his  plan  of  attack  in  accordance  with  what  he 
has  seen,  he  transmits  to  the  different  columns  the 
orders  relating  to  them  ;  he  sends  the  officers  of  his 
staff  to  guide  them,  and  goes  in  person  to  that  corps 
which  will  be  first  engaged,  or  is  to  take  the  principal 
part  in  the  action  ;  he  ascertains  from  a  brief  conver- 
sation with  the  commander  of  this  column  whether 
his  orders  have  been  understood ;  he  gives  whatever 
explanations  may  be  necessary,  and  hastens  to  other 
points.  It  is  evident,  from  what  has  been  said,  that 
if  the  general  is  not  with  the  advanced  guard  when 
the  enemy  is  reported  in  presence,  he  should  join  it  as 
rapidly  as  possible,  in  order  to  have  time  for  the  re- 
connoissance,  and  to  make  his  dispositions  for  battle. 

It  is  from  this  rapid  examination  that  he  determines 
the  point  upon  which  the  strongest  attack  should  be 
made,  and  whose  possession  will  decide  the  fate  of  the 
battle. 

Determination  of  the  point  of  attack. — If  the  topo- 
graphy of  the  field  is  alone  considered,  it  may  be  said, 


192  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

that  generally,  a  height,  a  village,  a  wood  occupied 
by  the  enemy,  are  so  many  points  to  be  taken  from 
him.  In  fact,  a  height  is  often  the  key  of  the  battle- 
field, and  should  be  the  point  upon  which  the  first 
and  great  attack  should  be  made,  because  such  a  point 
may  give  a  commanding  view  and  fire  over  all  the 
surrounding  ground.  At  the  same  time  it  serves  as  a 
screen,  behind  which  new  dispositions  for  attack  may 
be  arranged,  and  from  the  high  ground  a  rush  may 
at  any  moment  be  made  upon  the  enemy  below. 
Frederick  said:  "Always  attack  the  mountain  or 
highest  ground  occupied  by  the  enemy,  for  if  you 
force  that  position,  all  other  points  will  fall  into  your 
possession ;  troops  are  always  more  vigorous  and 
orderly  in  the  first  stages  of  an  engagement.  Do  not, 
therefore,  waste  time  and  blood  upon  points  of  minor 
importance,  and  afterwards  proceed  with  disordered 
and  decimated  battalions  to  attack  the  principal  points 
of  the  enemy's  position,  where  the  greater  part  of  his 
force  will  by  this  time  be  massed  by  the  course  of 
events  if  not  by  design." 

The  possession  of  a  large  village,  with  store-houses, 
is  always  a  great  advantage  on  the  field  of  battle,  be- 
cause it  may  be  very  easily  put  in  a  defensive  state, 
and  is  a  kind  of  fortification.  Such  a  village  often 
becomes  the  scene  of  the  most  severe  fighting,  as,  for 
example,  Gross-Aspern  and  Essling,  at  the  battle  of 
Essling  and  Castel  Ceriolo,  at  Marengo. 

A  wood  presents  similar  advantages.     It  covers  and 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  193 

masks  the  artillery ;  it  is  easily  held  by  skirmishers  ; 
cavalry  cannot  approach  it.  A  wood  protects  the 
flank  of  a  line  which  rests  on  it,  and  the  position  of 
the  latter  cannot  be  held  until  the  former  is  carried. 

But  the  topography  of  the  field  of  battle  is  by  no 
means  the  only  thing  to  be  taken  into  account  in  de- 
termining the  point  of  attack.  There  are  considera- 
tions of  another  kind,  much  more  extensive  in  their 
relations.  The  commander  must  first  observe  the  dis- 
tances separating  the  various  hostile  corps,  for  it  will 
be  proper  to  direct  his  principal  efforts  against  the 
centre  or  one  extremity,  according  as  they  are  too 
much  spread  out,  or  are  well  connected  with  each 
other.  He  ought  then  to  examine  what  is  the  posi- 
tion of  the  opposing  army  with  reference  to  its  line 
of  operations,  or  any  obstacles  the  country  may  pre- 
sent, in  order  to  try  to  throw  it  back  upon  those  obsta- 
cles or  to  cut  its  line  of  communications.  The  various 
reasons  influencing  to  a  movement  in  one  or  the  other 
direction  are  often  quite  in  opposition,  and  make  the 
determination  of  the  point  of  attack  a  problem  of 
great  difficulty,  frequently  admitting  of  a  correct  so- 
lution only  from  considerations  of  a  character  likely 
to  escape  common  minds,  and  appreciated  solely  by 
those  of  vast  powers. 

It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  rules  upon  a  subject 
like  this,  which  is  a  matter  of  inspiration  and  genius  ; 
but  we  may  group  under  three  heads  the  considera- 
tions to  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  the 
9 


194  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

point  of  attack  :  first,  those  of  a  strategical  character, 
relating  to  combinations  of  the  highest  order ;  second, 
the  grand  tactical,  determining  the  principal  manoeu- 
vre of  the  battle ;  third,  the  tactical,  which,  resulting 
from  the  nature  of  the  ground  where  the  troops  are  to 
act,  may  influence  the  details  and  execution  of  the 
general  movements.  It  will  be  profitable  to  develop 
these  ideas  a  little,  and  to  cite  some  examples  to  ex- 
plain more  definitely  what  is  meant. 

If,  for  example,  the  opposing  army  has  its  right  nearer 
the  frontier  of  its  own  country  than  the  left,  and  the  line 
of  operations  is  exposed,  the  attack  should  be  made  on 
the  right,  because  there  is  a  prospect  in  this  way  of 
cutting  its  communications,  and  separating  it  from  its 
base ;  if  a  victory  is  obtained,  the  results  may  be  very 
great.  This  is  the  strategical  consideration.  If  the 
enemy  is  near  a  lake,  a  river,  a  great  marsh,  a  thick 
forest,  or  a  difficult  defile,  the  grand  tactical  considera- 
tion, which  is  dependent  upon  the  locality  and  the 
configuration  of  the  battle-field  and  its  environs,  would 
lead  to  an  attack  on  the  side  from  the  obstacle,  in 
order  to  drive  the  enemy  back  upon  it.  If  there  is  a 
height  on  the  field  of  battle,  attack  that  first,  be- 
cause success  there  will  lead  to  decisive  results.  If  a 
salient  point  is  presented  in  the  order  of  battle  of  the 
enemy,  direct  the  first  efforts  upon  this,  because  it 
may  be  enveloped  and  crushed.  If  his  line  is  too  dis- 
jointed and  extended,  strike  at  the  centre,  pierce  it, 
and  then  beat  in  detail  the  separated  wings.  There 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES. 


195 


are  other  grand  tactical  considerations.  Finally,  when 
the  country  is  more  open  and  practicable  on  one  wing 
than  the  other,  the  desire  to  have  unity  and  prompti- 
tude of  movement,  which  is  the  tactical  consideration, 
invites  to  an  attack  upon  that  wing.  This  last  is  the 
least  important  consideration,  because  vigorous  efforts 
will  enable  troops  to  surmount  almost  any  difficulties 
the  ground  may  present,  and  often  these  obstacles  once 
passed  are  a  guarantee  of  further  success,  because  the 
enemy  supposed  himself  secure  in  that  direction  and 
was  less  on  his  guard.  The  tactical  consideration 
should  yield  to  the  other  two  when  there  is  antagonism 
among  them  in  fixing  upon  the  point  of  attack.  When 
they  are  all  in  accord,  there  can  be  no  doubt  about 
the  true  point  of  attack,  and  none  but  the  most  un- 
skilful commander  would  fail  to  detect  it.  Suppose 
an  army,  A  B  (fig.  16),  drawn  up  in  such  a  line  as  to 


ng.  la, 


196  PEItfCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

make  an  obtuse  angle  with  its  line  of  operations,  A  C, 
which  is  towards  its  right  and  rear ;  let  the  left  of  the 
army  rest  on  a  river,  and  the  right  be  established  on 
the  high  ground,  A ;  let  the  ground  in  front  of  the 
left  wing  be  a  marshy  wood,  and  that  on  the  right 
open  and  unobstructed.  Every  consideration  then 
leads  to  making  the  principal  attack  at  A,  for  that  is 
undoubtedly  the  key  of  the  battle-field,  and  must  be 
attacked,  whatever  may  be  the  enemy's  means  of  re- 
sistance there.  If  this  height  is  carried,  the  line  of 
operations,  A  C,  is  cut,  and  the  enemy  driven  back 
upon  the  river.  The  army,  A  B,  instead  of  taking 
the  position  supposed,  should  have  formed  the  line 
A  D,  re-enforced  on  the  wing  D.  In  this  position  the 
assailant  is  very  much  embarrassed  as  to  the  choice 
of  a  point  of  attack.  In  the  first  place,  he  cannot 
attack  the  left,  which  is  on  the  strong  ground,  and 
threaten  the  line  of  communications  of  the  other  army, 
without  running  the  risk  of  being  taken  in  flank,  or 
turned  by  the  re-enforced  wing  D,  which  may  force 
him  back  upon  the  river.  Or  else,  to  avoid  such 
a  mishap,  he  will  attack  the  right,  D,  at  the  same 
time  holding  the  left  in  check ;  but  then,  even  a 
success  can  have  no  decisive  result,  inasmuch  as  it 
does  not  lead  to  the  possession  of  the  commanding 
ground. 

Suppose,  in  the  next  place,that  the  army,  A  B  (figure 
17"),  rests  upon  a  lake  in  an  open  country,  and  that  its 
line  of  operations,  C  D,  is  directed  towards  the  banks, 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES. 


197 


Fig.  17. 


and  to  the  rear  of  the 
lake.  The  strategical 
considerations  would 
lead  to  an  attack  upon 
the  left  wing,  B,  with  a 
view  of  cutting  the  line 
C  D,  but  the  grand  tacti- 
cal considerations  would 
induce  to  attack  the  right  wing,  with  the  intention  of 
driving  the  whole  army  back  upon  the  lake.  Here 
strategy  and  grand  tactics  advise  opposite  plans,  and, 
in  such  a  case,  a  battle  should  only  be  fought  when  the 
victory  is,  from  other  causes,  almost  certain.  It  would 
be  much  better  to  attempt  by  manoeuvres  to  prevail 
upon  the  army,  A  B,  to  leave  its  position.  In  fact, 
an  indecisive  success  on  the  right  wing,  A,  does  not 
drive  the  enemy  upon  the  lake,  nor  cut  his  line  of 
communications.  On  the  other  hand,  it  will  not  do  to 
violate  the  law  of  grand  tactics  and  attack  at  B,  for, 
if  the  attempt  failed,  the  enemy  might  take  the  initia- 
tive and  drive  the  attacking  army  into  the  lake.  If 
a  battle  must  be  fought,  the  strategical  considerations 
would,  in  this  case,  be  deemed  less  important  than  the 
tactical,  although  the  general  rule  is  otherwise.  In 
fighting  a  battle,  we  must  always  take  into  account 
the  contingency  of  a  defeat,  and  not  place  an 
army  in  such  a  position  that  defeat  would  be  destruc- 
tion. 

If  an  army  is  posted  between  two  rivers,  covering 


198  PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

its  flanks,  and  the  line  of  operations  is  perpendicular 
to  the  line  it  occupies  at.  the  middle  point,  there  is 
nothing  special  to  be  gained  by  attacking  on  one  side 
rather  than  the  other — it  is  entirely  a  tactical  question. 

When  the  point  of  attack  is  once  chosen,  it  should 
be  pressed  vigorously,  all  the  arms  of  the  service  co- 
operating, and  as  many  troops  being  employed  there 
as  can  be  without  confusion.  The  enemy  should  be 
kept  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  up  to  the  last  moment. 
If  the  first  attempt  fails,  renew  it  again  and  again,  if 
necessary.  Such  pertinacity  often  leads  to  victory. 
If  the  first  effort  is  successful,  the  enemy  should  be 
vigorously  followed  up,  and  no  time  or  opportunity 
afforded  him.  to  recover  himself. 

Attack  of  heights. — Although  it  is  a  rule  to  attack 
heights  in  opening  an  engagement,  it  should  only  be 
done  when  they  are  attainable,  and  the  troops,  upon 
reaching  the  high  ground,  will  have  room  to  extend 
themselves ;  for.  if  such  positions  can  only  be  ap- 
proached through  narrow  defiles  and  under  fire,  and 
the  troops  must  advance  with  a  very  small  front,  there 
is  little  prospect  of  success.  Such  a  position  must  be 
turned.  But  it  must  be  recollected  that,  in  seeking 
to  turn  a  position,  the  turning  party  runs  the  risk  of 
being  taken  in  flank  and  seeing  his  own  communica- 
tions cut.  Such  a  movement  should,  therefore,  only 
be  attempted  when  there  is  no  opportunity  for  the 
enemy  to  debouch  on  the  flank. 

High  ground  may  not  always  present  its  front,  but 


OFFENSIVE   BATTLES.  199 

may  be  a  chain  of  hills,  perpendicular  to  the  general 

line  of  the  two  armies,   both  resting  one  wing  upon 

them.     In  such  a  case,  the  attack  should  proceed  from 

the  higher  to  the    lower  portions.      Thus,  the   two 

armies,  A  B  and  C  D  (figure  18),  having  each  one  wing 

in   the  plain   and    the 

other      on      the     high 

ground,     the     general 

direction    of  which    is 

perpendicular  to   their 

front,    the   army   A  B 

should    attack    by    its 

right,  in  order  to  dis-  rig.  is. 

lodge  the  left  of  the  enemy,  D,  before  bringing  B 

into  action.     The  centre,  E,  follows  the  right,  and 

serves  as  a  connection  between  the  wings.     The  attack 

is  thus  progressive  from  right  to  left,  and  becomes 

general  only  when  the  right  and  centre  have  repulsed 

the  left  and  centre  of  the  enemy.     The  order  of  battle, 

from  being  at  first  parallel,  becomes  oblique  and  in 

echelon. 

The  enveloping  attack. — If  the  attacking  army  is 
sufficiently  numerous,  the  enemy  may  be  enveloped 
upon  a  single  wing,  or  upon  both.  If  the  attempt  is 
successful,  victory  is  nearly  certain,  as  the  long  shallow 
lines  of  a  modern  army  are  almost  defenceless  against 
such  an  attack  on  the  flank.  A  too  extended  move- 
ment must,  however,  be  guarded  against  in  such  an 
operation,  for  a  line  with  great  development  becomes 


200  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

proportionately  weaker,  and  may  easily  be  pierced,  as 
the  Russians  discovered  at  Austerlitz.  It  is  better  to 
keep  the  army  concentrated  and  to  fight  in  front,  than 
to  attack  a  flank  in  the  manner  referred  to.  The 
enveloping  attack  requires,  therefore,  superior  num- 
bers, and  precautions  should  be  taken  to  keep  the 
enemy  occupied  throughout  his  front  while  the 
enveloping  mass  assails  the  flank,  but  by  no  very 
extended  movement.  For  still  stronger  reasons  are 
those  very  great  circuits  to  be  avoided,  by  which  a 
body  of  troops  is  sent  to  attack  the  enemy  in  rear. 
They  are  in  opposition  to  a  fundamental  rule  in  war, 
which  requires  the  concentration  of  all  the  disposable 
forces  when  an  engagement  is  to  take  place. 

The  flank  attack,  properly  so  called,  differs  from 
that  just  referred  to,  since,  in  this  case,  the  flank  of 
the  enemy  is  assailed  not  only  by  a  single  corps  while 
the  others  hold  him  in  check  along  the  front,  but  the 
whole  army  is  drawn  up  in  a  line  crossing  that  of  the 
enemy,  at  a  greater  or  less  angle.  It  is  certainly  to 
have  gained  an  important  advantage  to  have  been 
enabled  to  take  up  such  a  position,  since  only  a  part 
of  the  troops  of  the  enemy  can  be  brought  into  action, 
and  as  the  other  portions  come  up  they  may  be  suc- 
cessively overthrown.  The  advantages  of  the  oblique 
order  are  here  seen  in  all  their  force.  But  is  it  prob- 
able the  enemy  will  stand  still  and  suffer  himself  to 
be  thus  taken  in  flank,  if  his  attention  is  not  drawn  in 
some  other  direction?  Is  it  not  easy  for  him,  by  a 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  201 

similar  operation,  to  counteract  a  circular  movement 
such  as  must  precede  an  attack  of  this  kind  ?  May 
he  not  even  attack  at  some  favorable  moment,  while  the 
army  is  filing  before  him  and  in  taking  position  prepar- 
atory to  battle  ?  All  this  may  happen,  and  hence  the 
flank  attack  is  extremely  hazardous.  If  the  great 
Frederick  owed  most  of  his  victories  to  this  kind  of 
an  attack,  it  was  because  the  opposing  army  manoeu- 
vred with  excessive  slowness  and  heaviness,  and  because 
he  knew  how  to  conceal  his  preparatory  march  by  a 
demonstration  in  another  direction.  As  a  rule,  the 
turning  party  is  also  turned  ;  if  he  threatens  the  line 
of  communications  of  the  enemy,  he  exposes  his  own 
at  the  same  time,  so  that  a  manoeuvre-march,  made 
with  the  view  of  massing  the  army  on  the  flank  or 
rear  of  the  enemy,  can  only  be  justified  by  a  favorable 
locality,  and  the  possibility  of  its  accomplishment 
without  exposing  the  line  of  operations.  For  example, 
fig.  19,  the  army  M  may,  without  much  risk,  and  with 
considerable  prospect  of  success,  manoeuvre  against 
the  flank  of  the  army  N,  if  the  line  of  operations,  P  Q, 
which  it  is  obliged  to  leave  temporarily,  is  protected 
by  a  river  and  by  difficult  ground  on  its  flanks.  A 
weak  corps,  m',  stationed  on  this  line,  behind  a  stream 
with  a  deep  bed,  making  a  strong  defensive  point, 
may  hold  the  enemy  in  check  long  enough  to  allow 
the  main  body,  M,  to  move  around  along  the  dotted 
line  from  m'  to  M.  Even  in  this  case,  a  body  of 
troops,  m,  should  be  placed  in  such  a  position  as  to 
9* 


202 


PEINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 


Fig.  19. 

have  a  commanding  view  of  the  enemy,  and  give 
warning  of  any  attempt  on  his  part  to  strike  at  M  in 
flank  while  on  the  march.  Although  the  corps  M,  m, 
and  m'  are  somewhat  separated  from  each  other,  the 
connection  is  sufficient,  as  the  intervals  cannot  be 
penetrated  by  the  enemy.  Napoleon  practised  a 
manoeuvre  almost  identical  with  this,  during  which 
the  famous  battle  of  Arcola  was  fought. 

It  seems,  therefore,  evident,  that  if  an  attack  in 
mass  by  the  flank  is  sometimes  practicable,  it  is  only 
so  under  the  cover  of  natural  obstacles,  and  with  cer- 
tain precautions ;  such  as  concealing  the  movement, 
occupying  in  sufficient  force  all  points  which,  if  in 
possession  of  the  enemy,  would  enable  him  to  fall  on 
the  flank  of  the  moving  mass.  Generally,  on  the 
battle-field,  the  enemy  must  be  fairly  attacked,  without 
consuming  time  in  movements  to  turn  him,  which 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES. 


203 


often  prove  dangerous,  and  frequently  useless,  because 
easily  avoided. 

A  body  of  troops  may  sometimes,  by  a  simple  de- 
ployment to  the  right  or  left,  gain  ground  in  that 
direction  so  as  to  outflank  one  wing  of  the  enemy. 
Suppose,  for  example,  it  is  desired  to  attack,  with  five 
battalions,  an  enemy  in  equal  force,  and  to  take  him 
in  flank.  Two  columns,  A  and  B  (fig.  20),  will  be 


Fig.  20. 

moved  forward  towards  the  centre  of  the  hostile  line. 
The  first,  A,  will  consist  of  two  battalions  at  half-dis- 
tance by  divisions  ;  the  second,  B,  of  three  battalions 
closed  in  mass,  and  with  one  color  concealed.  The 
columns  will  seem  to  the  enemy  to  be  of  equal  size, 
and  he  will  not  know  where  the  principal  attack  is  to 
be  made.  He  will  think  it  is  to  be  in  front  and 


204r  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

parallel,  until  the  deployments,  under  cover  of  the 
skirmishers,  show  him  a  fifth  battalion  on  the  extrem- 
ity of  his  left  wing.  The  skirmishers  that  should  be 
displayed  against  his  right  will  contribute  to  the  suc- 
cess of  this  manoeuvre.  If  the  attack  is  vigorously 
made  before  the  enemy  has  recovered  from  his  aston- 
ishment, it  will  be  almost  certain  of  success.  What  a 
small  corps  of  five  battalions  has  done  in  this  case,  a 
large  army  with  numerous  columns  may  repeat.  Every 
head  of  a  column  shown  to  the  enemy  increases  his 
uncertainty,  and  this  is  a  reason  for  pushing  them 
forward  equally,  as  if  the  intention  was  to  adopt  the 
parallel  order  of  battle.  Being  in  this  state  of  uncer- 
tainty until  the  last  moment,  he  cannot  prepare  well 
for  the  blow  which  is  to  fall  upon  him. 

If  the  ground  on  one  of  the  wings  presents  any  fea- 
ture, under  cover  of  which  a  body  of  troops  may  slip 
along  unperceived,  advantage  should  be  taken  of  it. 
Even  a  small  body,  appearing  at  an  unexpected  place 
and  time,  will  astonish  the  enemy,  and  if  the  attack 
is  pressed  at  this  moment  it  will  certainly  succeed. 

Attack  upon  the  Centre. — Although  the  centre  is 
the  strongest  part  of  an  order  of  battle,  there  may  be 
circumstances  making  it  advisable  to  direct  the  main 
attack  against  that  point.  Suppose,  for  example,  that 
a  height,  the  key  of  the  field,  is  in  the  centre  of  the 
line.  In  such  a  case  the  bull  must  be  taken  by  the 
horns  if  a  decisive  result  is  desired,  and  consequently 
the  most  vigorous  efforts  should  be  made  to  carry  the 


OFFENSIVE   BATTLES. 


205 


Fig.  21. 

high  ground,  the  possession  of  which  is  equivalent  to 
a  control  of  the  field.  An  advantage  obtained  on  one 
wing  would  amount  to  nothing  so  long  as  the  enemy 
held  the  high  ground,  and  it  would  be  always  neces- 
sary to  drive  him  away  from  that  part  at  last,  or  else 
retire  from  the  contest.  Therefore,  however  perilous 
this  attack  may  be,  there  is  no  time  for  hesitation  ;  the 


206  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

attempt  must  be  made  as  the  only  possible  chance  for 
success,  unless,  indeed,  the  position  can  be  turned,  in 
which  case  it  would  be  better  to  manoeuvre  than  to 
fight.  If  the  attack  is  made,  the  best  troops  should 
be  selected  for  that  purpose,  and  every  possible  pains 
taken  to  insure  success.  The  natural  order  in  such  a 
case  is  the  oblique  order  in  echelon  by  both  wings, 
presenting  a  figure  somewhat  similar  to  the  wedge  of 
the  ancients.  The  point,  A  B,  of  this  wedge  (fig. 
21),  intended  to  pierce  the  centre  of  the  army,  M,  is 
re-enforced  by  doubling  its  line  and  by  drawing  nearer 
the  reserve  C.  On  the  other  hand,  the  echelons,  A'  and 
B',  of  the  two  wings  are  formed  in  a  single  line,  as 
they  are  to  be  but  slightly  engaged,  only,  indeed,  to  a 
sufficient  extent  to  hold  the  opposing  wings  in  check. 
The  artillery,  being  non-effective  against  the  high 
ground,  is  put  in  position  to  fire  obliquely  on  those 
parts  of  the  line  adjacent  to  the  centre,  and  thus  in  a 
measure  to  separate  the  centre  and  wings.  In  short, 
every  effort  must  be  made  to  have  this  attack  success- 
ful. If  not,  the  battle  is  lost,  and  it  is  time  to  think 
of  retreating.  The  figure,  showing  the  army  M  sup- 
ported on  the  flanks  by  natural  obstacles  that  cannot 
be  turned,  explains  sufficiently  why  it  has  been  neces- 
sary to  attempt  to  carry  the  centre. 

There  is  still  another  case  when  it  is  proper  to  attack 
the  centre,  even  when  the  opposing  army  is  well  con- 
centrated. It  is  when  the  latter  is  in  front  of  a  defile, 
which  offers  but  few  advantages  for  a  retreat ;  because 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  207 

if  the  centre  is  pierced,  and  the  mouth  of  the  defile 
seized,  the  enemy  is  lost,  being  obliged  to  fly  in  con- 
fusion, abandon  his  baggage,  and  lose  many  prisoners. 
The  entrance  of  the  defile  is  in  such  a  case  the  key  of 
the  field  of  battle.  At  Waterloo,  Napoleon  directed 
his  main  attack  against  the  centre  of  the  English 
army,  because  the  latter  had  the  great  forest  of 
Soignes  behind  it,  and  the  only  line  of  retreat  for  the 
cavalry  and  the  baggage  was  along  the  road  to  Brus- 
sels. This  attack  failed  only  because  the  defenders  of 
the  position  were  as  brave  as  the  assailants,  were  more 
numerous,  and  towards  the  end  of  the  battle  received 
considerable  re -enforcements,  which  decided  the  vic- 
tory in  their  favor. 

The  attack  on  the  centre,  which  is  but  an  excep- 
tional case  when  the  opposing  army  is  well  concen- 
trated, becomes  the  rule  when  the  army  is  much 
spread  out,  and  the  different  corps  in  it  are  too  far 
apart.  By  making  simple  demonstrations  upon  the 
extremities  of  this  long  line,  and  pressing  vigorously 
upon  the  centre,  it  will  almost  surely  be  pierced,  and 
the  two  wings  will  never  succeed  in  reuniting.  It 
will  be  practicable  under  such  circumstances,  if  time 
is  used  to  good  advantage,  to  envelope  and  destroy 
the  wings  in  succession,  or  else  oblige  them  to  retreat 
upon  divergent  lines.  In  1808,  the  Spanish  army  of 
45,000  men  took  up  a  position  in  front  of  Tudela ; 
but  the  general,  Castaiios,  instead  of  assembling  them 
on  a  front  of  two  miles,  as  he  should  have  done, 


208  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

extended  them  over  three  and  a  half.  Marshal 
Lannes,  who  commanded  the  French  army,  perceived 
the  weakness  of  such  a  disposition  of  troops,  and 
attacked  in  the  centre.  One  division  of  infantry 
promptly  broke  the  line,  and  the  cavalry,  passing 
through  the  gap,  and  turning  to  the  left,  enveloped  the 
Spanish  right  wing,  and  completely  routed  it.  The 
left  wing  could  make  no  further  resistance,  although 
composed  of  the  best  troops,  and  retired  with  precipi- 
tation. 

Concentration. — In  whatever  direction  the  attack  be 
made,  whether  upon  one  of  the  wings  or  the  centre, 
whether  the  order  of  battle  be  parallel  or  oblique,  the 
mass  intended  for  the  attack  should  be  composed  of 
all  arms,  and  should  contain  as  many  battalions, 
squadrons,  and  batteries  as  can  be  brought  together 
and  can  act  without  confusion.  No  eifort  should  be 
Spared  to  make  the  blow  a  decisive  one.  The  lines 
should  be  doubled  and  the  reserves  brought  near. 
Success  depends  upon  the  simultaneous,  cordial,  and 
vigorous  action  of  all  the  individual  parts. 

To  give  an  idea  of  the  method  of  effecting  such  a 
concentration  of  force  and  action  as  is  necessary,  we 
will  take  the  case  of  an  army  of  four  divisions,  re- 
quired to  act  in  an  open  field,  with  the  intention  of 
making  a  powerful  attack  from  its  right,  after  engag- 
ing the  centre.  The  army  may  consist  of  the  follow- 
ing troops : 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  209 

40  battalions 30,000 

30  companies  of  riflemen  or  sharpshooters  .    3,000 

12  squadrons 2,096 

16  batteries,  each  of  6  pieces 2,800 

4  companies  of  engineers 400 

Total 38,296  men. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  proportion  of  cavalry 
and  artillery  in  this  army  is  small.*  It  is  supposed 
that  the  advanced  guard  has  rejoined  the  main  army 
and  that  all  the  troops  are  with  their  respective  divi- 
sions. The  entire  force  of  cavalry  is  joined  to  the 
division  which  is  to  form  the  reserve.  All  the  dispo- 
sable artillery  and  riflemen  are  also  held  with  the 
reserve. 

The  principal  attack  is  to  be  made  by  the  right,  and 
the  right  division  is  consequently  strengthened  by  the 
addition  of  five  companies  of  riflemen,  giving  it  ten, 
each  of  the  two  other  divisions  five,  and  the  reserve 
ten.  Three  divisions  are  to  form  the  line  of  battle, 
each  presenting  a  front  of  four  battalions,  and  the  re- 
maining six  to  be  disposed  of  in  the  best  manner  to 
carry  out  the  plan  of  battle. 

This  arrangement  is  agreed  upon  the  evening  pre- 
ceding the  battle,  but  is  only  definitely  settled  the  next 

*  Jomini  says :  "Asa  general  rule,  it  may  be  stated  that  an  army  in 
an  open  country  should  contain  cavalry  to  the  amount  of  one-sixth  ita 
whole  strength  ;  in  mountainous  countries  one-tenth  will  suffice." 

Of  artillery,  the  same  authority  says:  "  The  proportions  of  artillery 
have  varied  in  different  wars.  Usually  three  pieces  to  a  thousand 
combatants  are  allowed,  but  this  allowance  will  depend  on  circum- 
stances."— TRANSLATOR. 


210  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

morning,  when  an  examination  of  the  field  has  shown 
that  the  enemy  has  made  no  changes  in  his  disposi- 
tions. The  following  order  is  then  sent  to  the  division 
commanders : 

"  The  principal  attack  will  be  from  the  right,  the 
left  being  retired. 

"  The  army  will  advance  in  three  columns,  at  suffi- 
cient intervals  for  deployment.  They  will  regulate 
their  motions  by  the  right,  and  neither  will  get  in  ad- 
vance. The  reserve  will  follow  the  central  column. 
Each  column  will  be  preceded  by  an  advanced  guard, 
composed  of  its  riflemen,  the  flank  companies  of  the 
leading  brigade,  and  a  battery. 

"  The  deployment  will  be  effected  in  the  usual 
order,  each  brigade  forming  one  line,  the  artillery  on 
the  right,  the  riflemen  in  the  intervals  of  the  battalions, 
and  the  flank  companies  on  the  wings.  If  at  any  time 
during  the  battle  the  artillery  moves  to  the  front  at 
any  point,  the  battalions  will  form  columns,  to  make 
room  for  its  passage." 

Under  this  order  the  divisions  are  moved  to  the 
front,  preserving  their  proper  intervals,  and  preceded 
by  their  advanced  guards  some  1200  or  1500  paces. 
They  commence  to  deploy  at  a  signal  of  three  guns 
fired  by  the  reserve.  When  the  advanced  guards  are 
sufficiently  near  the  enemy,  the  riflemen  are  deployed 
as  skirmishers  to  engage  the  skirmishers  of  the  enemy. 
The  flank  companies,  already  referred  to,  form  their 
supports,  each  keeping  near  the  battalion  to  which  it 


OFFENSIVE   BATTLES.       '  211 

belongs.  The  artillery  will,  in  the  mean  time,  have 
opened  upon  the  enemy  whenever  his  masses  have 
been  discovered. 

The  combat  of  the  skirmishers  is  continued  until 
they  are  driven  in  or  called  in  nearer  to  the  line  of 
battle,  which  is  formed  by  this  time.  The  batteries 
move  up  at  a  trot,  to  join  the  troops  already  in  posi- 
tion. The  supports  relieve  the  riflemen,  who  rally 
behind  them.  One-half  forms  the  line  of  skirmishers 
and  the  other  the  supports,  and  in  this  order  they  fall 
back  gradually  towards  the  intervals  of  the  battalions. 
The  batteries  are  first  unmasked  and  immediately 
commence  firing.  The  riflemen  take  position  in  the 
intervals  of  the  battalions  and  the  flank  companies, 
which  have  formed  their  supports,  doubling  on  the 
wings. 

The  two  right  divisions  now  become  engaged,  open- 
ing fire  if  the  enemy  is  in  good  range,  or  charging  with 
the  bayonet.  The  left  division  cannonades  the  right 
of  the  enemy  and  makes  a  display  of  troops ;  the 
only  object  there  being  to  hold  that  part  of  the  op- 
posing line  in  position. 

Figure  22  shows  these  arrangements,  and  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  generals  of  division  have  conformed 
to  the  spirit  of  their  instructions.  The  general  of  the 
right  division  has  withdrawn  one  battalion  from  each 

O 

line  to  form  a  small  reserve,  which  he  has  placed  be- 
hind the  centre.  He  will  engage  in  the  parallel  order. 
The  general  of  the  central  division  has  formed  his 


212 


PEINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 


first  line  in  two  echelons,  but  has  doubled  the  right 
battalion  and  placed  all  the  riflemen  with  the  first 
line.  The  second  line  has  nothing  peculiar  about  it, 
except  that  the  three  right  battalions  are  nearer  to- 
gether than  the  two  on  the  left.  This  is  in  conformity 
with  the  primary  idea  of  making  the  main  attack 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  213 

towards  the  right  and  refusing  the  left.  The  general 
of  the  left  division,  in  order  to  retire  the  left,  has 
formed  his  first  line  in  echelons  by  battalions  deployed 
at  100  yards  distance  from  each  other.  One  of  his 
batteries  has  been  thrown  to  the  left  and  front,  in  order 
to  cover  his  echelons  and  lead  the  enemy  to  expect  an 
attack  on  that  side.  The  five  companies  of  riflemen 
form  a  support  for  that  battery,  and  the  flank  compa- 
nies of  the  battalion  form  the  line  of  skirmishers. 
The  second  brigade  remains  in  column  to  the  rear. 

The  general-in-chief,  having  placed  his  reserve  be- 
hind the  centre  of  the  right  division  and  seeing  the 
engagement  commenced,  judges  that  the  moment  has 
arrived  for  the  development  of  his  plan.  He  detaches 
one  brigade  of  the  reserve,  with  four  companies  of 
riflemen,  six  batteries,  and  half  the  cavalry.  He  sends 
verbally  the  following  orders :  "  The  artillery  to  move 
up  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  batteries  of  the  right 
division,  and  to  take  the  line  of  the  enemy  by  as  slant 
a  fire  as  possible ;  the  infantry  to  be  massed  on  the 
right  of  the  artillery,  as  supports,  guarding  against  at- 
tacks of  cavalry  (the  smoke  of  the  cannon  will  facili- 
tate this  movement);  the  cavalry  to  follow  the  in- 
fantry, keeping  to  the  right  and  rear,  and  being  pre- 
pared to  take  in  flank  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  should 
it  attempt  to  attack."  Two  of  the  reserve  batteries 
are  also  sent  to  re-enforce  those  of  the  central  division. 
The  figure  (22)  shows  these  movements  executed. 

The  right  and  left  battalions  of  the  right  division 


214:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

form  column,  to  make  room  for  the  artillery;  and  those 
of  the  second  line  close  in  towards  the  centre,  to  avoid 
being  behind  the  batteries.  The  infantry  brigade 
gains  ground  to  the  right,  preceded  by  the  riflemen, 
who  are  ready  for  deployment  as  skirmishers.  This 
brigade  may  either  charge  in  mass,  deploy  the  leading 
battalions,  or  form  squares  to  close  the  front  line.  The 
cavalry  is  deployed,  to  appear  more  numerous,  two 
squadrons  being  always  kept  in  column. 

The  order  of  battle,  at  first  parallel,  thus  becomes 
oblique,  and  the  enemy  will  be  turned  if  he  does  not 
hasten  to  withdraw  his  left  wing.  In  the  figure  (22) 
the  two  armies  are  four  hundred  or  four  hundred  and 
fifty  yards  apart,  which  supposes  that  the  enemy  has 
brought  into  action  as  yet  only  skirmishers  and  artil- 
lery, or  has  already  fallen  back  to  avoid  the  flank  at- 
tack with  which  he  is  threatened.  But  that  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  movements  just  described,  which 
are  so  much  the  more  decisive  if  the  armies  are  in 
close  musket  range. 

The  reserve  being  weakened  by  these  movements, 
the  general  sends  orders  to  the  second  brigade  of  the 
third  division  to  draw  near  the  centre,  to  act  as  a  sec- 
ond reserve  in  case  of  need.  When  the  first  division 
is  about  to  move  to  the  front,  its  two  deployed  bat- 
talions will  first  advance,  in  order  to  give  a  good  volume 
of  fire  within  effective  range ;  when  the  time  for 
charging  has  arrived,  these  battalions  form  column, 
those  of  the  second  line  take  their  places  in  the  inter- 


OFFENSIVE    BATTLES.  215 

vals,  and  all  advance  together.  The  muskets  will  not 
be  brought  to  the  position  of  "charge  bayonets"  until 
the  columns  are  within  ten  or  twenty  paces  of  the 
enemy.  It  is  a  bad  plan  to  bring  them  down  sooner, 
as  the  marching  is  more  awkward  and  the  align- 
ment lost.  The  enemy  seldom  waits  to  receive  such 
an  onset.  If  a  second  deployment  is  necessary,  it  will 
be  done  by  the  battalions  of  the  second  line,  those  of 
the  first  taking  the  places  of  the  latter.  During  these 
manoeuvres,  the  riflemen  and  flank  companies,  placed 
in  the  intervals  of  the  columns,  will  have  opportuni- 
ties of  using  their  fire-arms  effectively. 

In  the  general  movement,  the  centre  will  be  regu- 
lated by  the  right,  constantly  endeavoring  to  gain 
ground.  If  any  gap  occurs  in  the  line  on  account  of 
the  manosuvres,  it  should  be  filled  by  the  battalions 
of  the  second  line.  The  officers  should  use  every  ex- 
ertion to  have  the  engagement  progress  from  right  to 
left,  all  disconnected  movements  being  carefully 
avoided.  Finally,  the  left,  which  has  been  retired  in 
the  beginning,  becomes  engaged,  and  the  .action  is 
general.  The  troops  along  the  entire  line  are  engaged 
with  the  enemy,  who,  being  outflanked  on  his  left  and 
assailed  in  front  by  doubled  battalions,  ought  to  be 
defeated,  unless  he  is  very  superior  in  artillery,  for  this 
arm,  in  its  present  state  of  improvement,  has  very 
much  to  do  in  the  decision  of  battles,  especially  in 
open  ground. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  give  an  idea  of  the  method 


216  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

of  concentrating  upon  a  given  point  a  large  mass  of 
troops,  and  of  handling  them  in  action.  It  will  be 
observed  that  upon  the  right,  now  become  really  the 
centre  by  reason  of  the  offensive  movement  which  has 
been  explained,  the  troops  are  really  drawn  up  in 
three  lines.  This  arrangement  might  have  been  made 
still  stronger  by  forming  a  greater  number  of  battal- 
ions in  column  and  closing  them  more,  but  they  would 
thus  have  afforded  a  better  mark  for  the  artillery  of 
the  enemy,  and  there  would  have  been  the  additional 
inconvenience  of  having  a  portion  of  the  troops  re- 
duced to  a  state  of  inaction.  "With  modern  weapons, 
the  problem  to  be  resolved  is  to  cover  as  much  front 
and  to  obtain  as  long  a  line  of  troops  firing  as  possi- 
ble, without  having  too  much  weakness  in  the  line  of 
battle. 

In  the  example  selected,  the  ground  is  supposed  to 
be  level  and  open,  so  that  the  artillery  would  be  the 
most  important  arm.  That  is  by  no  means  the  gen- 
eral case.  The  dispositions  must  always  be  made  to 
conform  to  the  ground.  Where  it  is  more  broken,  the 
troops  will  remain  more  in  columns,  which  will  move 
over  the  practicable  parts  of  the  field ;  the  combat  of 
skirmishers  will  be  continued  longer,  and,  as  the  artil- 
lery of  the  enemy  is  less  effective,  they  may  advance 
nearer;  the  bayonet  will  be  more  frequently  used  ;  the 
artillery  will  regulate  its  movements  by  those  of  the 
infantry,  and  will  not  be  so  much  massed,  on  account 
of  the  want  of  suitable  ground ;  finally,  the  cavalry 


OFFENSIVE  BATTLES.  217 

will  be  little  else  than  spectators  until  the  pursuit 
begins. 

Even  in  an  open  country,  manoeuvres  cannot  be 
conducted  with  such  methodical  regularity  and  exact 
distances  as  have  been  seen  in  the  example  given,  if 
the  enemy  is  met  on  the  march  and  a  battle  ensues 
the  same  day.  It  may  begin  when  but  two  divisions 
are  at  hand.  Sometimes  a  single  division,  with  the 
advanced  guard,  will  be  obliged  to  receive  the  first  at- 
tack of  the  enemy,  while  the  other  divisions  are  com- 
ing up  in  succession  into  line.  An  oblique  line  in 
echelons  will  necessarily  result  under  such  circum- 
stances, and  the  commanding  general,  having  made 
provision  for  first  emergencies,  should  give  suitable 
orders  to  the  different  corps  as  they  successively  ar- 
rive on  the  field.  Upon  such  occasions  a  skilful 
commander  demonstrates  his  ability ;  he  has  no  time 
for  protracted  reflection ;  his  arrangements  must  be 
made  upon  the  spur  of  the  moment.  His  combina- 
tions should  be  simple,  his  orders  brief,  and  he  must 
be  cool  when  every  one  around  him  is  in  motion  and 
excitement.  Any  man  of  ordinary  capacity  and  some 
experience  in  moving  troops  may,  after  reflection, 
make  suitable  dispositions  of  an  army  for  battle,  but 
he  must  be  born  a  general  who  can  improvise  them 
under  fire. 

Pursuits. — It  may  happen  that  while  a  decisive 
attack  is  made  on  one  wing,  the  enemy  may  be  doing 
the  same  thing  on  the  other,  and  the  two  armies  may 
10 


218  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

each  be  victorious  on  one  wing  and  defeated  at  the 
other.  It  is,  therefore,  important  to  modify  the  ardor 
of  the  troops,  and  instead  of  indulging  in  a  headlong 
pursuit,  to  keep  them  well  in  hand,  and  move  them 
all  or  in  part  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  other  wing 
of  the  enemy.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  follow  up  fugi- 
tives with  the  light  cavalry,  supported  by  light  artillery 
and  a  few  battalions  of  infantry.  In  the  mean  time, 
the  wing  of  the  enemy  which  has  been  victorious 
may  be  enveloped,  and  its  defeat  made  so  much  the 
more  complete  as  it  had  advanced  beyond  its  original 
line.  At  the  battle  of  Naseby,  fought  in  1645,  be- 
tween Charles  I.  and  the  parliamentary  forces,  Prince 
Rupert  defeated  the  troops  in  his  front  and  pursued 
them  vigorously.  But  Cromwell,  who  had  defeated 
the  royalists  immediately  in  his  front,  did  not  pursue, 
but  turned  on  those  that  were  still  fighting,  took  them 
in  flank,  and  entirely  routed  them.  If  Prince  Rupert 
had  pursued  this  course,  he  would  probably  have 
saved  Charles  his  crown. 

After  a  first  success,  therefore,  the  pursuit  of  the 
enemy  should  be  made  with  circumspection ;  the  ranks 
should  be  reformed,  and  order  preserved  in  anticipa- 
tion of  further  attacks.  When  it  appears  safe  to 
move  forward,  the  pursuit  may  be  recommenced  in 
such  direction  as  to  separate  the  corps  of  the  enemy 
and  prevent  their  reunion.  While  the  battalions  are 
preparing  for  this  pursuit,  the  light  troops  will  har- 
ass the  retiring  enemy;  the  artillery  will  follow  up 


OFFENSIVE   BATTLES.  219 

and  give  him  no  rest;  the  cavalry  will  charge  vigor- 
ously those  corps  which  seem  to  be  recovering  their 
order,  and  will  cut  them  to  pieces  or  oblige  them  to 
lay  down  their  arms. 

In  following  out  the  rule  of  reforming  the  ranks  be- 
fore pursuing  actively  the  enemy  when  he  is  thrown 
into  confusion  at  any  point,  care  must  be  taken  not  to 
lose  too  much  time  in  making  the  necessary  rectifica- 
tions of  alignments.  Perfect  alignment  is  not  so  im- 
portant to  the  preservation  of  order  as  the  touch  of 
man  to  man.  Keep  the  troops  well  closed  and  push 
forward ;  nothing  more  is  necessary,  to  overthrow 
completely  an  enemy  who  has  once  yielded  ground. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  time  is  lost  in  aligning  the  ranks 
as  upon  a  drill-ground,  the  enemy  will  be  enabled  to 
reform  and  offer  battle  a  second  time. 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  two  extremes  are  to  be 
avoided  when  the  enemy  is  falling  back.  Too  much 
circumspection  may  prevent  a  first  success  from  lead- 
ing to  decisive  results,  and  too  much  rashness  may 
cause  total  ruin.  A  union  of  prudence  and  boldness 
is  necessary.  A  commander  must  look  not  only  be- 
fore him,  but  often  to  the  sides  and  sometimes  behind. 
He  must  know  what  is  passing  in  the  neighboring 
corps ;  must  observe  whether  he  is  supported ;  if  the 
line  of  which  he  forms  a  part  is  maintaining  its  posi- 
tion ;  if  the  reserves  are  engaged ;  if  he  must  depend 
upon  his  own  means,  &c. 

The  commander-in-chief  will  direct  the  movements 


220  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

of  the  whole  army  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  his  vic- 
tory decisive,  by  gaining  as  much  ground  as  possible  in 
the  direction  of  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy,  in  or- 
der to  cut  him  off;  the  last  reserves  will  be  disposed  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  overthrow  any  remaining  resist- 
ance. While  the  different  corps  are  pressing  the  defeat- 
ed enemy,  turning  them,  driving  them  upon  obstacles, 
making  prisoners  and  capturing  material,  the  general 
should  take  some  rest,  dictate  orders  for  a  bivouac  of 
the  army,  and  for  moving  the  next  day ;  he  should 
give  attention  to  the  wounded,  and  should  signify  his 
satisfaction  to  the  troops  in  an  order  of  the  day,  in 
which  he  will  recount  what  each  corps  did  in  gaining 
the  victory.  Finally,  he  should  take  measures  to  re- 
place expended  munitions,  fill  up  the  ranks  of  his 
army,  and  draw  from  the  country  such  supplies  as  he 
needs  and  it  can  furnish. 


Art.  IV — Defensive  Battles. 

The  weaker  army  is  usually  obliged  to  receive  an 
attack  from  the  stronger.  It  chooses  as  favorable  a 
site  as  possible  and  awaits  the  enemy  there,  endeavor- 
ing thus  to  supply  its  numerical  inferiority  by  superi- 
ority of  position. 

Positions. — A  good  position  is  one  which,  not  too 
high,  still  overlooks  the  surrounding  ground  and  af- 
fords space  enough  for  deploying  the  troops.  The 
ground  should  be  sufficiently  smooth  and  unbroken 


DEFENSIVE   BATTLES.  221 

to  facilitate  the  manoeuvres  of  all  the  arms  of  the  ser- 
vice, but  especially  the  artillery  and  cavalry.  Its  ex- 
tent should  be  proportioned  to  the  strength  of  the 
army ;  and  it  may  here  be  remarked,  that  in  a  good 
position  the  same  troops  may  occupy  a  greater  front 
than  in  a  plain,  as  there  is  not  the  same  necessity  for 
doubling  the  line  throughout.  It  will  be  sufficient  if 
two  lines  are  drawn  up  on  the  most  easily  accessible 
parts  of  the  field ;  one  line  will  answer  at  other  points, 
and  moreover  considerable  spaces  may  be  left  be- 
tween different  corps,  which  will  be  occupied  by  skir- 
mishers. Some  localities  permit  such  deviation  from 
general  rules.  All  salient  points  being  held  by  the 
artillery,  or  even  by  sharpshooters  and  infantry,  the 
enemy  cannot,  with  a  prudent  regard  for  his  own 
safety,  expose  his  flanks  by  penetrating  between  them 
and  finding  the  reserves  in  his  front  at  the  same  time. 
A  division  of  sixteen  battalions,  four  batteries,  a  bat- 
talion of  sharpshooters,  and  four  squadrons  may  con- 
veniently occupy  a  front  of  two  thousand  yards. 

The  wings  of  the  position  should  rest  upon  strong 
natural  obstacles,  such  as  large  marshes,  a  lake,  a 
deep  river,  a  wood,  impassable  rocks,  which  secure 
the  array  against  attack  in  flank,  or  oblige  the  enemy 
to  make  wide  detours  to  turn  the  flank.  In  front  the 
ground  should  fall  away  gently,  so  that  it  may  be 
thoroughly  swept  by  the  artillery  ;  and  it  also  permits 
forward  movements  against  the  enemy  when  advisa- 
ble. There  should  also  be  at  intervals  along  the  front 


222  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

clumps  of  trees,  villages,  farm-houses,  or  enclosures, 
which,  being  occupied  in  a  proper  manner,  become 
formidable  salient  points,  that  furnish  cross-fires  and 
must  be  carried  by  the  enemy  before  attacking  the 
real  line. 

A  position  whose  front  is  covered  by  a  river,  or  by 
very  steep  and  difficult  ground,  is  only  suitable  for 
an  army  which  is  too  weak  to  venture  a  forward  move- 
ment against  the  enemy,  but  must  be  content  to 
remain  strictly  on  the  defensive.  Even  in  such  cases 
there  should  always  be  efforts  made  to  facilitate  offen- 
sive returns  upon  the  enemy  at  opportune  moments, 
as  these  have  a  powerful  effect  in  arresting  an  attack. 

In  rear  the  roads  should  be  good,  in  order  to  facili- 
tate a  retreat  in  case  of  reverse.  A  single  road  is  not 
enough  for  the  easy  and  prompt  evacuation  of  a  battle- 
field. Moreover,  if  the  enemy  should  seize  that  sin- 
gle road  to  the  rear,  the  army  is  lost ;  this  is  especially 
dangerous  if  the  road  leads  from  one  of  the  wings, 
and  not  from  the  centre.  The  most  favorable  case  is 
that  where  there  are  several  good  roads  through  a 
wooded  and  broken  country,  where  the  army  may 
find  good  positions  for  checking  the  enemy.  An  open 
country  is  dangerous,  as  nothing  is  more  to  be  dreaded 
than  charges  of  cavalry  upon  a  retreating  army  which 
is  in  more  or  less  confusion. 

Besides  the  roads  leading  to  the  rear,  whose  gen- 
eral direction  is  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  battle,  it 
is  well  to  have  in  rear  of  the  line  a  cross-road  from 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  223 

right  to  left,  so  that  the  artillery  may  move  freely 
from  point  to  point.  The  best  place  for  this  road  is 
behind  the  second  line.  Besides  the  foregoing  advan- 
tages which  the  position  should  offer  to  the  defending 
army,  the  low  ground  that  is  left  to  the  enemy  should 
be  cut  up  and  obstructed  by  ditches,  ponds,  hedges, 
walls,  &c. — obstacles  that  are  not  impassable,  but 
greatly  tend  to  delay  and  confuse  the  advancing 
troops,  especially  if  under  fire. 

The  general  form  of  the  position  should  be  concave 
towards  the  front,  if  its  extent  is  limited,  but  convex 
if  there  is  considerable  development.  In  the  first  case 
the  army  occupies  the  entire  extent  of  the  position, 
and  has  its  wings  strongly  posted,  so  as  to  be  in  no 
danger  of  being  enveloped ;  it  has  only  to  stand  and 
deliver  a  close,  converging  fire  upon  the  enemy.  In 
the  second  case,  however,  as  it  will  generally  be 
necessary  to  move  troops  from  one  part  of  the  field  to 
another,  to  repel  the  various  attacks  of  the  enemy 
upon  the  extended  front,  it  is  best  to  have  the  position 
convex  towards  the  front,  as  the  troops  may  then 
move  on  the  chords  of  the  arcs  passed  over  by  the 
enemy.  But,  properly  speaking,  such  a  position  as 
the  last  is  not  a  good  field  for  a  defensive  battle, 
which  should  always  be  in  strict  proportion  to  the 
army  holding  it ;  it  should  rather  be  deemed  a  piece 
of  ground  offering  facilities  for  manoeuvre-marches, 
and  giving  opportunities  for  prompt  movements  upon 
threatened  points,  or  for  effecting  a  concentration  of 


224:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

troops  at  vulnerable  parts  of  the  enemy's  position. 
The  advantages  of  such  ground  are  rather  strategical 
than  tactical. 

Positions  actually  occupied,  seldom  possess  all  the 
advantageous  conditions  that  have  been  mentioned, 
and  the  best  are  those  in  which  the  most  of  them  are 
found.  The  general  shows  his  skill  in  making  the 
best  use  of  every  advantage  presented  by  his  position, 
and  in  supplying  what  is  wanting  by  field-works,  or  a 
good  disposition  of  his  troops,  or  both. 

In  order  that  a  village  may  form  a  strong  point 
upon  the  front  or  flank  of  a  position,  it  should  be  of 
solid  construction.  Wooden  houses,  far  from  being 
favorable  in  the  defence,  may  become  very  hurtful, 
because  they  may  be  so  readily  fired.  Tillages  may 
be  occupied  by  several  battalions,  by  sharpshooters 
and  by  artillery,  according  to  their  importance ;  the 
walls  of  the  outer  enclosures,  by  being  loopholed, 
greatly  assist  in  the  defence,  and  guns  may  be  con- 
cealed behind  the  houses  in  favorable  positions  for 
procuring  a  flank  or  slant  fire  upon  the  troops  of  the 
enemy.  The  line,  of  which  the  villages  are  the  salient 
points,  should  be  near  enough  to  support  them  read- 
ily, and  prevent  their  being  turned  and  surrounded. 

However  excellent  the  features  of  a  position  may 
be  an  army  should  seldom  be  satisfied  with  a  purely 
passive  defence.  On  the  contrary,  it  should  always 
take  the  offensive  whenever  a  favorable  opportunity 
offers  for  striking  an  effective  blow.  By  moving  out 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  225 

to  attack,  instead  of  waiting  to  be  attacked,  the  weaker 
party,  by  seeming  boldness,  may  conceal  real  weak- 
ness ;  by  unexpected  offensive  movements  a  detached 
or  venturesome  corps  of  the  enemy  may  be  cut  off;  at 
any  rate,  he  will  be  made  more  circumspect  in  his 
proceedings,  and  the  morale  of  the  defensive  army 
will  be  elevated. 

Disposition  for  the  Defensive. — Since  strong  posi- 
tions are  not  always  to  be  found,  and  obstacles 
are  not  always  at  the  proper  distances  apart  to 
form  good  points  for  the  flanks  to  rest  upon,  it  is 
necessary  for  a  general,  while  knowing  how  to  take 
advantage  of  any  favoring  features  of  the  ground,  to 
be  able  also  to  supply  the  want  of  these,  as  far  as 
practicable,  by  a  judicious  arrangement  of  the  troops 
at  his  disposal.  The  essential  thing  is  to  make  the 
wings  secure  against  a  flank  attack.  To  guard  these 
weak  points  against  charges  of  cavalry,  it  is  sufficient 
to  place  there  several  battalions,  which  may  be  drawn 
up  in  squares.  At  the  battle  of  Molwitz,  gained  by 
Frederick  in  1741,  the  cavalry  of  his  right  wing  had 
been  routed,  and  the  infantry  were  about  to  be  taken 
in  flank,  but  the  victorious  cavalry  of  the  enemy  was 
checked  by  three  battalions,  which  for  want  of  space, 
could  not  be  deployed,  as  was  expected,  in  the  line  of 
battle,  and  were  drawn  up  behind  the  wing.  This 
infantry,  although  repeatedly  charged,  stood  firm 
until  Marshal  Schwerin  brought  up  the  left  wing, 
hitherto  retired,  and  gained  the  victory.  Had  not 


226  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

these  three  battalions  been  accidentally  in  the  position 
they  occupied,  Frederick  would  probably  have  been 
defeated.  It  is  seldom  an  evil  when  want  of  space 
compels  some  of  the  battalions  to  remain  in  column 
behind  the  line,  or  several  companies  behind  a  bat- 
talion. 

The  wings  may  also  be  strengthened  by  forming 
behind  them  in  echelon  several  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
to  make  counter-charges,  in  case  the  enemy  should 
attack  in  flank.  In  the  orders  for  the  battle  of  Hohen- 
friedberg,  Frederick  directed  a  regiment  of  hussars  to 
form  a  third  line  behind  each  of  the  wings  of  the 
army,  "  either  to  cover  the  flanks  or  to  be  used  in  the 
pursuit."  If  no  cavalry  can  be  formed  for  such  a 
purpose,  battalion  squares,  in  echelon  on  the  wings, 
will  secure  them  against  enveloping  attack  from  the 
cavalry  of  the  enemy. 

The  more  serious  efforts  of  infantry  against  the 
flanks  during  a  battle,  while  the  front  is  strongly  en- 
gaged, may  be  paralyzed  by  causing  the  second  line 
to  outflank  the  first,  and  the  third  to  outflank  the 
second,  so  that  the  enemy  is  'himself  turned  when  he 
attempts  to  assail  the  flank,  or  he  is  obliged  to  make 
an  extended  and  hazardous  circular  movement,  should 
he  endeavor  to  turn  all  the  lines  at  once.  In  this 
way,  during  the  first  attack  of  the  enemy,  and  until 
his  real  designs  are  displayed,  as  few  troops  as  possible 
are  exposed.  One  of  the  wings  may  thus  be  kept 
disengaged,  or  the  whole  disposable  force  brought 


DEFENSIVE   BATTLES.  227 

into  action,  as  occasion  requires,  by  successive  por- 
tions, without  interference  or  confusion. 

In  order  to  give  a  clearer  understanding  of  the  pre- 
ceding remarks,  the  same  army  of  four  divisions,  al- 
ready described  as  fighting  an  offensive  battle,  will  now 
be  supposed  placed  upon  the  defensive.  A  plain  will 
be  taken  as  the  field  of  battle,  entirely  bare  of  obsta- 
cles, that  we  may  examine  simply  the  arrangement  of 
the  troops,  and  strip  the  example  of  every  thing  extra- 
neous. 

The  commanding  general,  wishing  to  retain  a  strong 
reserve,  withdraws  two  battalions  of  each  division 
in  order  to  form  a  supplementary  brigade,  which  he 
attaches  to  the  reserve  division.  The  divisions  of  the 
line  of  battle  have  each  eight  battalions,  two  batteries, 
and  four  companies  of  sharpshooters.  The  cavalry 
and  the  remainder  of  the  sharpshooters  are  joined  to 
the  reserve,  which  is  thus  composed  of  sixteen  bat- 
talions, twelve  squadrons,  ten  batteries,  fifteen  compa- 
nies of  sharpshooters,  and  four  companies  of  engi- 
neers. 

The  first  two  divisions  will  be  deployed  in  two  lines, 
with  their  artillery  on  the  right,  as  shown  in  figure  23  ; 
the  second  line  outflanking  the  first  by  the  length  of 
two  battalions  on  the  right  of  the  first  division,  and 
on  the  left  of  the  second.  The  two  battalions  on  the 
right  and  on  the  left  of  the  second  line  will  be  de- 
ployed, the  others  remaining  in  column  as  usual.  The 
intervals  between  the  ends  of  the  two  lines  will  be 


228 


PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 


Fig.  28. 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  229 

occupied  by  three  companies  of  sharpshooters,  in 
column,  at  the  extremities  of  the  first  line;  the  two 
other  companies  of  sharpshooters,  in  each  division, 
will  form  a  part  of  the  second  line,  in  the  vacant  space 
in  the  centre,  occasioned  by  the  second  line  outflank- 
ing the  first.  These  companies,  however,  will  only 
take  up  these  positions  after  they  have  opened  the 
engagement  in  the  capacity  of  skirmishers. 

The  third  division  forms  in  echelon  on  the  left, 
farther  in  rear  than  the  second  line,  but  will  deploy 
only  two  battalions  of  its  first  brigade  ;  the  remaining 
two  battalions  of  this  brigade  will  remain  in  column 
behind  the  left  wing,  and  the  whole  of  the  second  bri- 
gade will  be  massed  ready  for  movement.  The  artil- 
lery of  this  division  will  be  placed  in  battery,  on  the 
prolongation  of  the  second  line,  and  two  companies 
of  sharpshooters  will  be  placed  as  a  link  between  the 
battery  and  the  first  battalion. 

The  reserve  will  approach  the  right,  which  seems 
to  be  threatened ;  the  supplementary  brigade  of  in- 
fantry will  support  the  right  wing,  adopting  the  same 
formation  as  the  brigade  of  the  left  wing.  Of  the  five 
companies  of  sharpshooters  accompanying  this  bri- 
gade, two  will  take  position  on  the  left,  in  advance 
of  the  brigade,  and  near  the  adjacent  battery ;  the 
other  three  companies  will  remain  with  the  column, 
and  may  be  extended  to  the  right  as  skirmishers. 
Half  of  the  cavalry  will  form  in  echelon  on  the  extreme 
right,  which  will  complete  the  defensive  arrangements. 


230  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

Such  dispositions  as  have  been  indicated,  will  only 
last  until  the  moment  when  the  enemy  displays  his 
designs,  and  will  then  be  modified  to  suit  circum- 
stances. An  attack  upon  the  right  is  supposed,  but 
the  left  is  not  left  without  resources.  The  latter  is 
sufficiently  strong  to  resist  a  serious  attack  until  the 
reserve  can  be  brought  up ;  the  second  brigade  of  the 
third  division  is  disposable  for  a  flank  attack  upon 
any  bodies  of  the  enemy  attempting  to  outflank  the 
army  on  this  side,  or  it  may  form  squares,  if  circum- 
stances require. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  real  attack  is  made  on 
the  right,  every  thing  is  in  readiness  to  receive  it;  the 
enemy  finds  four  echelons  before  him,  which  compels 
him  to  extend  his  line  very  much,  unless  he  prefers 
to  attack  one  of  the  echelons,  and  then  he  is  himself 
exposed  to  attack.  If  it  becomes  necessary  to  call  the 
reserve  into  action,  the  disposable  brigade  of  the  left 
wing  may  replace  it. 

Although  this  order  of  battle  makes  sufficient  pro- 
vision for  the  security  of  the  flanks,  still  it  occupies  a 
third  more  space  than  if  the  first  three  divisions  were 
simply  deployed  in  two  lines,  in  the  usual  way.  The 
army  may  thus  resist  four  divisions  of  the  same 
strength  ;  and  in  order  that  the  enemy  may  attempt  to 
envelope  it,  with  any  chance  of  success,  he  must  be 
in  decidedly  superior  numbers.  In  the  places  where 
there  is  but  one  line  of  infantry,  and  a  consequent  ap- 
pearance of  weakness,  the  infantry  is  covered  by  a 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  231 

good  line  of  sharpshooters,  who  restore  the  equilib- 
rium. It  may  be  observed  that  the  defensive  dispo- 
sition, adopted  by  the  army  while  in  a  state  of  expec- 
tation, presents  a  convex  line  to  the  front  in  its  general 
outline.  This  form,  to  which  the  reasoning  has  led 
us,  is  the  one  which  offers  the  greatest  facilities  for 
moving  the  reserves  to  threatened  points,  by  following 
chords  or  radii,  which  are  the  shortest  lines;  the  army 
on  the  defensive  has  thus  the  advantage  of  greater 
mobility.  This  fundamental  principle  is  discovered 
in  fortifications:  every  work,  whose  extremities  do 
not  rest  on  natural  obstacles,  should  have  an  outline 
convex  towards  the  front.  But  if  this  form  is  advan- 
tageous for  providing  against  the  preparatory  move- 
ments made  by  the  enemy  for  carrying  out  his  plans, 
it  is  so  no  longer  when  the  lines  are  actually  engaged 
and  fighting  has  taken  the  place  of  manoeuvring; 
then  the  concave  form  is  the  best,  because  it  is  natu- 
rally enveloping,  and  delivers  a  converging  fire.  The 
skill  of  a  general  is  shown  in  passing  from  one  to  the 
other  form  during  the  battle,  by  taking  advantage  of 
successes  gained  by  one  of  the  wings.  When  the 
ground  presents  firm  points  of  support,  it  becomes 
possible  to  adopt  the  right  line  or  the  concave  line  in 
defence,  as  there  is  then  no  danger  of  being  enveloped. 
The  ground  will  always  have  a  great  influence  upon 
the  arrangements  adopted,  as  well  in  the  offensive  as 
the  defensive. 

It  is  very  important,  whenever  the  field  of  battle  is 


232  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

obstructed  and  cut  up,  to  make  wide  openings  through 
hedges,  &c.,  and  to  provide  ample  communications 
across  ravines  and  small  streams  lying  between  differ- 
ent corps  of  the  army.  The  existing  roads  should  be 
repaired  and  widened. 

Squares. — In  the  case  now  under  consideration, 
squares  are  formed  by  divisions  or  brigades.  Bat- 
talion squares  are  too  small  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  an 
order  of  battle,  but  they  are  excellent  when  a  part  of 
the  line  is  strongly  pressed.  These  small  squares  are 
rapidly  formed,  especially  when  the  battalions  are 
already  in  close  columns,  as  usually  happens ;  it  is 
easy  to  place  them  in  echelon  or  quincunx  order,  to 
flank  each  other.  These  battalion  squares  may  be 
considered  as  a  good  manoeuvre  in  certain  cases  ;  but 
when  squares  are  the  basis  of  the  order  of  battle 
against  an  enemy  whose  principal  strength  is  in  cav- 
alry, they  should  be  formed  of  at  least  four  battalions, 
that  they  may  double  their  ranks  without  diminishing 
too  much  the  interior  space.  This  space  is  necessary 
for  the  reception  of  the  staffs,  and  sometimes  to  con- 
tain even  the  cavalry  when  it  is  too  weak  to  act. 

This  doubling  ranks,  when  forming  squares,  is  par- 
ticularly applicable  to  those  troops  whose  usual  forma- 
tion is  in  two  ranks.  It  should  not  be  done,  however, 
by  doubling  companies  or  platoons,  as  there  would  be 
an  improper  mixture  of  subdivisions,  and  confusion 
would  result  at  critical  moments,  a  thing  to  be  spe- 
cially avoided.  The  doubling  should  be  effected  by 


DEFENSIVE   BATTLES.  233 

placing  the  left  half  of  each  battalion  behind  the 
right  half,  or  by  placing  even  divisions  behind  the 
odd. 

When  the  troops  are  thus  formed  in  a  doubled 
square,  the  front  ranks  of  one  or  more  faces  may  be 
detached  without  breaking  the  square.  The  angles 
are  the  weak  points,  and  it  is  well  to  put  the  sharp- 
shooters there  in  small  solid  squares,  flanking  the 
larger.  The  artillery  is  also  placed  at  the  angles,  the 
pieces  outside  and  the  caissons  inside ;  or,  it  may  be 
in  the  middle  of  a  face,  or  on  the  diagonal  line,  join- 
ing two  adjacent  squares.  Several  companies,  dis- 
tributed as  reserves  in  the  interior,  will  be  very  useful 
in  re-enforcing  points  that  are  attacked,  and  giving 
support  wherever  necessary. 

The  cavalry  is  placed  between  the  squares,  so  as  to 
be  flanked  by  them.  From  these  positions  it  may 
fall  upon  the  cavalry  of  the  enemy,  when  disordered 
by  the  fire  of  the  infantry ;  but  when  too  weak  to  act, 
it  takes  refuge  inside  the  squares. 

Defensive  Properties  of  Ground. — When  the  ground 
is  not  precisely  what  is  called  a  position ,  but  still  pre- 
sents some  favorable  features,  they  must  be  taken 
advantage  of,  no  matter  how  insignificant  they  may 
appear,  for  whatever  is  not  for  us,  in  such  cases,  is 
against  us.  Thus,  in  1690,  Waldec  lost  the  first  bat- 
tle of  Fleurus,  because  he  did  not  take  possession  of  a 
plateau  which  had  a  very  slight  command  of  the  field 
of  battle.  Marshal  Luxembourg  saw  the  fault,  and 


234:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

at  once  took  advantage  of  it,  and,  in  consequence, 
gained  a  victory. 

A  simple  wood,  in  which  a  few  companies  of  skir- 
mishers may  be  thrown,  permits  the  line  of  battle  to 
.be  extended,  and  a  strong  front  to  be  presented,  equal 
in  extent  to  the  enemy's.  A  piece  of  high  ground 
gives  advantages  of  another  kind :  if  isolated,  and  of 
limited  extent,  forming  a  little  eminence  in  the  midst 
of  a  plain,  it  is  proper,  if  there  is  no  other  reason  to 
the  contrary,  to  place  the  centre  of  the  line  upon  it, 
as  the  enemy  will  generally  be  obliged  to  attack  there, 
which  will  usually  be  unfavorable  for  him. 

When,  for  any  cause  whatever,  as,  for  example,  to 
cover  the  line  of  retreat,  it  becomes  necessary  to  have 
the  high  ground  on  the  flank  instead  of  in  the  centre, 
it  should  be  held  by  one  of  the  wings  as  strongly  as 
possible.  As  it  is  advantageous  to  you,  if  held  dur- 
ing a  battle,  so  will  it  be  of  importance  to  the  enemy 
to  seize  it.  If  the  rising  ground  is  of  varying  eleva- 
tion, the  highest  is  the  most  important  point.  Much 
will  be  gained  if,  in  such  a  case,  a  block-house  or  re- 
doubt can  be  erected. 

The  heights  may  form  a  line  of  hills  whose  direc- 
tion is  either  parallel  to  the  line  of  retreat  or  cuts  it. 
What  has  been  said  above  is  applicable  to  the  first 
case,  and  in  the  second  the  heights  present  in  a 
greater  or  less  degree  the  advantages  of  a  good  posi-. 
tion.  The  first  line  will  then  be  placed  at  the  crest 
of  the  slopes ;  the  second  line  and  the  reserves  on  the 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES. 


235 


plateau  or  the  reverse  slopes,  so  as  to  be  greatly  or 
entirely  out  of  view  of  the  enemy.  The  line  of  battle 
thus  follows  the  general  direction  of  the  chain  of 
hills,  and  will  be  more  advantageous,  as  it  cuts  the 
line  of  retreat  more  nearly  at  right  angles.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  more  oblique  the  line  of  retreat,  the 
less  favorable  is  the  position.  The  army  A  B  (fig- 


rig.  24. 


ure  24),  occupying  the  heights  whose  general  direction 
forms  with  its  line  of  retreat,  X  Y,  an  obtuse  angle, 
has  its  left  flank  very  much  exposed ;  for  the  enemy 
may  envelop  this  extremity  with  superior  forces  by 
taking  a  position  E  F  perpendicular  to  its  line  of 
operations  ;  that  is  to  say,  by  a  natural  deployment, 
and  without  an  eccentric  movement,  it  is  ready  to 
make  a  flank  attack,  which  can  only  be  counteracted 
successfully  by  changing  the  position  of  A  B.  This 


236  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

can  only  be  made  when  the  high  ground  presents  a 
plateau  of  sufficient  extent  to  permit  a  change  of 
front,  which  is  contrary  to  the  supposition.  In  such 
a  case  it  becomes  necessary  either  to  receive  the  flank 
attack  or  to  abandon  the  high  ground.  It  appears, 
therefore,  that  whon  there  is  high  ground  upon  the 
line  of  retreat,  it  will  not  necessarily  be  proper  for 
the  army  to  occupy  it  and  await  the  attack  of  the 
enemy,  but  the  ground  should  have  a  suitable  position 
and  direction  with  reference  to  the  line  of  retreat. 
The  two  lines  should  form  nearly  a  right  angle. 

The  danger  just  pointed  out  is  not  the  only  one. 
The  enemy  may  take  the  position  C  I  D,  preferring 
the  strategical  to  the  tactical  consideration.  On  his 
right,  0  I  will  suffice  to  guard  his  own  line  of  retreat, 
while  the  main  eifort  is  made  on  the  left.  If  this 
attack  succeeds,  it  is  evident  the  army  A  B  is  in  great 
danger  of  being  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat. 

Use  of  Fortifications. — It  is  sometimes  necessary  to 
take  positions  where  there  is  no  natural  support  for 
the  wings.  Artificial  ones  must  be  created  under 
such  circumstances,  if  time  permits.  Yery  slight 
works  of  this  kind,  if  judiciously  constructed,  may 
have  a  great  value. 

The  engineer  has  sometimes  also  the  important 
duty  of  fortifying  a  position  selected  and  prepared  for 
one  of  those  mighty  battles  which  decide  the  fate  of 
empires.  Time,  that  precious  element  in  war,  is  then 
allowed  him ;  he  may  then  be  extremely  useful,  if  he 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  237 

has  that  eye  for  ground  which  enables  him  to  make 
the  best  dispositions  of  his  works,  and  that  activity 
and  devotion  which  ensures  their  execution.  He 
should  give  ample  opportunity  for  offensive  move- 
ments, as  a  mere  passive  defence  of  intreuchments  is 
injudicious.  The  works,  whatever  may  be  their  char- 
acter, should  be  separated  from  each  other,  leaving 
wide  openings  through  which  troops  may  debouch 
with  considerable  front.  Each  work  should  be  well 
arranged,  fraised,  palisaded,  and  closed  at  the  gorge, 
in  order  to  offer  a  strong  resistance.  It  is  better  to 
have  a  few  works  with  a  considerable  relief  and  large 
ditches,  than  a  number  of  insignificant  affairs  which 
would  not  check  good  troops  for  five  minutes.  Under 
protection  of  these  works,  and  in  a  favorable  position, 
an  active  defence  may  be  made,  which  is  so  well 
suited  to  men  of  spirit,  and  tends  so  much  to  increase 
the  morale  of  soldiers.  This  method  is  the  best, 
because  the  impetuosity  of  attack  is  necessary  for 
victory.  A  man  feels  inspirited  when  he  is  moving 
forward.  To  adopt  a  continuous  system  of  intrench- 
ments  is  to  confess  our  own  weakness,  to  render  our- 
selves incapable  of  getting  at  the  enemy,  and  to  chill 
the  ardor  of  the  troops.  The  influence  of  fortifica- 
tions in  deciding  battles  is  too  well  known  to  make  it 
necessary  to  cite  any  examples  of  the  fact. 

Defensive  Manoeuvres. — We  have  hitherto  supposed 
an  army,  obliged  to  act  on  the  defensive,  to  have 
chosen  a  good  position,  with  flanks  well  supported  by 


238  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

obstacles,  or  by  troops  suitably  posted.  It  may  hap- 
pen to  be  attacked  in  flank  before  its  arrangements 
are  completed.  What  shall  be  done  then  ?  It  may 
either  change  front,  pivoting  on  the  least  exposed 
wing,  or  a  crotchet  to  the  rear  may  be  formed,  or  the 
second  line  disposed  in  echelon  to  outflank  the  first 
at  the  menaced  end,  or  the  reserve  thrown  upon  the 
flank  of  the  enemy  making  the  attack.  The  last  is 
the  best  course,  as  there  is  a  boldness  about  it  which 
is  inspiring.  It  does  not  derange  the  positions  of  the 
several  corps,  that  may  then  act  to  suit  circumstances, 
under  the  protection  of  the  attack  of  the  reserve, 
which  will  surprise  the  enemy  and  check  his  move- 
ment. 

The  other  plans  are  dangerous.  The  crotchet  has 
the  disadvantage  of  being  easily  enveloped,  and  hav- 
ing two  long  branches  exposed  to  enfilade  fire  from 
artillery,  which  may  prove  very  destructive.  The  faces 
are  in  such  relative  positions  to  each  other  that  the 
troops  cannot  move  forward  without  separating  them 
at  the  angle  and  making  an  opening  through  which 
the  enemy  may  advance,  nor  can  they  fall  back  with- 
out crowding.  If  the  crotchet  is  formed  under  the 
lire  of  the  enemy,  confusion  is  the  almost  certain  re-« 
suit.  For  a  still  stronger  reason  should  a  change 
of  front  of  the  entire  army  be  avoided  under  such 
circumstances. 

To  move  the  second  line  by  the  flank  towards  the 
point  attacked  is  scarcely  better.     The  troops  of  the 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  239 

first  line,  seeing  themselves  unsupported,  lose  their 
confidence  and  do  not  hold  their  ground  well.  The 
two  lines  should  be  kept  together  as  well  as  possible. 
Moreover,  the  second  line  may  be  outflanked  as  well 
as  the  first,  and  the  movement  referred  to  becomes 
impossible.  It  is  only  by  arrangements  made  previ- 
ous to  the  battle  that  the  second  line  can  be  made  to 
outflank  the  first  by  echelon.  But  at  present  we  are 
speaking  of  movements  made  at  the  instant  of  fight- 
ing. It  is  prudent,  then,  to  make  no  change  in  the 
primitive  order  of  battle,  and  to  leave  the  lines  sup- 
porting each  other. 

The  reserves  alone  are  disposable  for  use  every- 
where. The  reserves  must  now  be  thrown  against 
the  wing  of  the  enemy.  In  the  mean  time,  what  are 
the  other  troops  to  do  ?  They  should  effect  a  change 
of  front,  not  in  a  methodical  manner,  as  upon  a  drill- 
ground,  where  each  corps  must  preserve  its  distance 
and  alignments  with  the  utmost  rigor,  but  each  will 
move  by  the  shortest  path  to  the  point  where  it  may 
soonest  enter  effectively  into  action.  To  explain  by 
an  example :  take  the  line  M,  figure  25,  surprised  on 
its  left  flank  by  the  army  K,  which  prepares  to  attack. 
As  soon  as  the  enemy  is  discovered,  the  line  M,  which 
is  supposed  to  be  composed  of  four  brigades,  is  broken 
to  the  left  by  divisions  and  formed  in  close  column  in 
each  brigade.  While  these  preparatory  movements 
are  going  on,  the  reserve  R  moves  to  the  position  S, 
where  it  deploys  so  as  to  threaten  the  right  flank  of 


240 


PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

jr 


Fig.  25. 

the  enemy.  The  fourth  brigade  will  be  deployed 
upon  its  left  division  and  the  following  brigade  upon 
its  right  division  in  such  a  way  that  when  the  deploy- 
ment is  ended,  which  will  require  but  a  short  time, 
these  two  brigades  will  be  in  echelon  in  front  of  the 
line  of  the  enemy,  and  having  a  connection  with  the 
reserve.  The  second  brigade  moves  off  diagonally 
and  takes  position  in  echelon  to  the  right  of  the  fourth. 
The  first  brigade  remains  in  column  behind  the  cen- 
tre, to  act  as  a  reserve.  In  this  way  there  is  very 
rapidly  brought  into  line  in  the  new  direction  a  force 
equal  to  that  in  the  former  line,  if  we  suppose  the 
reserve  to  have  been  one-fifth  of  the  whole. 

If  the  army,  K,  extended  towards  its  right  still 


DEFENSIVE   BATTLES.  241 

more  than  shown  in  the  figure,  the  reserve  should  not 
attempt  to  take  K  in  flank,  as  this  would  separate  it 
too  far  from  the  third  brigade.  It  would  then  be 
proper  for  the  reserve  simply  to  deploy  in  front  of  IS". 
but  the  second  brigade  would  threaten  the  left  flank 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  general  result  would  be  the 
same  in  character. 

For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  we  have  supposed  but 
one  line.  If  there  were  two,  the  second  would  follow 
the  movements  of  the  first.  The  manoeuvres  we  have 
just  indicated  are  equally  applicable  to  the  case  of  a 
column  suddenly  arrested,  while  on  the  march,  by  an 
enemy  in  position.  They  are  equally  suitable  for 
weak  corps  and  for  large  armies.  Thus,  a  battalion 
would  first  deploy  two  companies  to  receive  the  first 
shock  of  the  enemy,  while  the  remaining  companies 
would  be  manoeuvred  into  position.  An  inversion 
may  be  necessary,  and  hence  the  propriety  of  practis- 
ing inversions  at  drill. 

Retreat. — Whatever  precautions  may  have  been 
taken,  or  whatever  courage  displayed,  it  often  becomes 
necessary  to  yield  to  mere  numbers,  or  to  the  caprices 
of  fortune.  Happy,  then,  is  the  general  who  succeeds, 
after  a  battle  long  and  severely  contested,  in  with- 
drawing his  army  from  the  field  in  comparatively 
good  order. 

The  movement  to  the  rear  is  begun  unnoticed,  in  a 
measure,  the  troops  insensibly  falling  back  as  the 
enemy  gains  ground,  on  account  of  his  superiority, 
11 


242  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

which  becomes  more  and  more  evident.  Then  comes 
the  moment  when  longer  resistance  appears  useless, 
and  the  general  gives  orders  for  the  retreat. 

Taking  for  granted  that  the  army  is  drawn  up  in  two 
lines,  the  retreat  is  begun  by  the  first,  which  retires 
checkerwise ;  that  is  to  say,  the  even-numbered  batta- 
lions fall  back  to  the  rear  some  sixty  or  a  hundred 
paces,  while  the  odd-numbered  battalions  hold  their 
ground.  When  the  former  have  halted  and  taken 
position,  and  are  ready  to  receive  the  enemy,  the  others 
retire  in  the  same  way,  and  so  on. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  reserve,  infantry  and  artillery, 
or  part  of  the  reserve,  goes  to  the  rear,  to  occupy  the 
defiles  the  army  has  to  pass  in  retreat.  The  second 
line  regulates  its  movements  by  those  of  the  first, 
sometimes  hastening  them,  in  order  to  gain  some 
advantageous  position  where  it  may  check  the  enemy 
temporarily.  If  the  first  line  has  suffered  greatly, 
the  second  should  replace  it,  a  passage  of  lines  being 
executed.  It  is  better  for  the  second  line  to  pass 
offensively  through  the  intervals  of  the  first,  than  for 
the  first  to  fall  back  through  those  of  the  second. 
Each  battalion,  being  formed  in  a  close  column,  is 
moved  a  few  paces  to  the  front  of  the  second  line,  and 
rapidly  deployed,  or,  better  still,  charges  with  the 
bayonet.  The  enemy  is  thus,  in  a  measure,  thrown 
upon  the  defensive,  and  becomes  much  more  circum- 
spect in  his  onward  movement.  The  second  method 
is  dangerous,  because  the  first  line,  coming  back  in  a 


DEFENSIVE   BATTLES.  243 

state  of  some  confusion  upon  the  second,  may  produce 
disorder  in  the  ranks  of  the  latter.  The  moral  effect 
upon  the  troops  of  both  lines  is  also  bad. 

In  general,  troops  who  are  falling  back  should  do 
so  slowly  and  calmly,  keeping  their  ranks  well  closed 
and  in  good  order.  They  should  frequently  halt  and 
turn  to  deliver  their  fire  upon  the  enemy  if  he  presses 
too  closely.  They  may  thus  succeed,  without  very 
great  disorder,  in  reaching  some  advantageotfs  posi- 
tion, or  being  covered  by  the  shades  of  night. 
Cavalry  alone  may  retire  rapidly  ;  it  is  even  its  duty 
to  do  so,  because  in  its  rapidity  of  movement  consists 
its  safety.  It  should,  however,  return  as  rapidly  to 
the  charge,  when  rallied,  in  order  to  disengage  the 
infantry. 

When  a  regiment  or  a  battalion  is  entirely  broken, 
and  the  men  absolutely  running,  the  commander 
should  seize  a  flag  and  plant  it  in  some  conspicuous 
place,  at  the  same  time  causing  the  drummers  to  beat. 
The  men,  ashamed  to  abandon  the  flag  they  have 
vowed  to  defend  with  life  even,  will  gradualy  rally, 
and  if  the  officers  of  all  grades  are  active  in  reforming 
the  ranks,  order  may  be  restored  and  confidence  re- 
gained. Upon  such  occasions,  the  value  of  good 
officers  is  displayed,  as  well  as  the  excellent  effect  of 
the  example  of  old  soldiers. 

While  the  two  lines  are  retiring  the  reserve  does 
not  remain  inactive,  but  the  infantry  will  occupy 
points  where  a  firm  stand  may  be  made,  or  will  form 


244  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

into  squares,  between  which  the  army  may  fall  back. 
Thus,  at  Marengo,  the  Consular  Guard  formed  that 
famous  square  against  which  all  the  .charges  of  the 
Austrian  cavalry  failed,  and  which  gained  from  the 
army  the  name  of  the  granite  square.  At  the  same 
time,  the  cavalry  should  make  every  effort  to  protect 
the  retreat,  by  daring  and  repeated  charges.  It 
should  never  stop  to  count  the  numbers  of  the  enemy, 
but  should  rush  upon  him,  wherever  he  may  be  and 
however  strong,  in  order  to  oblige  him  to  deploy,  and 
thus  delay  his  movement  forward.  It  is  absolutely 
essential  to  s*afety  to  gain  time,  and  nothing  is  more 
likely  to  effect  this  than  dashing,  furious  attacks  of 
cavalry,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  result  to  itself.  Th  e 
artillery  should  cross  its  fire  upon  all  points  to  be 
passed  over  by  the  enemy  in  pursuit,  selecting  favor- 
able positions  for  this  purpose.  It  must  run  some 
risks,  even  to  the  loss  of  a  few  pieces,  as  without  its 
effective  support  the  retreat  of  the  infantry  under  the 
close  murderous  fire  of  the  enemy  must  become  a  rout. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  baggage  train  should  move  off 
rapidly,  under  the  escort  of  some  troops.  It  has  been 
kept  at  a  considerable  distance  during  the  battle,  and 
is  set  in  motion  as  soon  as  the  order  is  given  to  retreat. 
Its  movement  should  be  hastened  as  much  as  possible, 
in  order  to  clear  the  way  for  the  army. 

Night  at  last  comes  on.  The  enemy,  tired  of 
fighting  and  exhausted  by  his  losses,  is  forced  to  halt. 
This  is  the  time  for  rallying  and  reorganizing  the 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLES.  245 

retreating  army,  and  giving  the  men  some  food  ;  but 
sleep  is  out  of  the  question,  as  this  opportunity  must 
be  used  for  getting  the  start  of  the  enemy.  A  strong 
rear-guard,  commanded  by  a  bold  and  experienced 
officer,  remains  in  position  to  cover  the  retreat.  This 
rear-guard,  when  forced  to  retire,  will  do  so  slowly, 
and  forcing  the  enemy  to  be  cautious,  by  disputing 
the  ground  foot  by  foot. 

The  worst  consequence  of  a  defeat  is  not  the  number 
of  men  killed,  and  cannon  captured,  but  the  demorali- 
zation of  the  troops.  Every  means  should,  therefore, 
be  used  to  remove  their  sad  depression  of  spirits.  The 
officers  should  wear  cheerful  countenances  and  speak 
encouraging  words.  The  commander-in-chief,  far 
from  appearing  disheartened,  should  seem  entirely 
calm  and  collected ;  should  visit  the  different  bivouacs, 
and  give  his  orders  as  if  no  reverse  had  occurred.  He 
will  thus  impart  to  the  men  confidence  in  his  firmness 
and  courage.  The  troops  will  recover  their  spirits, 
and  be  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  again.  The  victor 
of  the  preceding  day  may  find,  to  his  cost,  that  he 
did  not  know  how  to  use  his  success,  if  he  has  per- 
mitted his  army  to  sleep  and  his  adversary  to  recover 
from  his  defeat.  He  will  verify  again  the  adage,  that 
"  in  war  nothing  is  done  so  long  as  there  remains  any 
thing  to  do." 

Frederick  the  Great  recommended  that  a  beaten 
army  should  not  retreat  far,  but  halt  at  the  first  favor- 
able position,  to  restore  spirit  and  order  to  the  ranks. 


246  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

The  Dukes  of  Weimar  and  Rohan,  the  two  greatest 
generals  of  their  day,  after  "losing  the  battle  of  Rhin- 
feld,  halted  about  fifteen  miles  from  the  field,  and  there 
rallied  the  remains  of  their  army.  By  a  night  march, 
they  presented  themselves  suddenly  before  the  camp 
of  the  Bavarians,  who  did  not  expect  such  an  attack, 
and  were  keeping  a  very  poor  lookout.  They  were 
surprised  and  routed  completely,  losing  all  their 
cannon  and  baggage.  Here  the  Bavarians  were 
accessory  to  their  own  ruin  by  sleeping  on  the  field 
of  battle,  and  giving  themselves  up  to  idle  joy,  instead 
of  vigorously  pursuing  their  beaten  enemy.  The  rule 
laid  down  by  Frederick,  which  he  put  in  practice 
after  the  battle  of  Hohenkirch,  accords  with  what  has 
just  been  stated  ;  but  it  is  not  always  practicable  for  a 
defeated  general  to  halt  his  army  when  and  where  he 
pleases.  The  more  faithfully  the  army  has  performed 
its  duty  on  the  battle-field,  the  more  difficult  it  is  for 
him  to  do  so ;  for  the  greater  the  obstinacy  it  has  dis- 
played, and  the  more  determined  the  resistance,  the 
less  the  probability  of  its  withdrawing  in  order.  It 
then  becomes  necessary  to  retreat  to  a  considerable 
distance,  to  collect  its  scattered  fragments  and  to 
receive  re-enforcements. 

We  often  see  an  army  with  one  wing  defeated,  while 
the  other  still  holds  its  ground  and  serves  as  a  rally- 
ing point  for  the  scattered  battalions  of  the  former, 
the  whole  then  moving  impetuously  upon  the  enemy. 
Such  conduct  is  often  followed  by  complete  success. 


DEFENSIVE    BATTLES.  247 

If,  instead  of  that,  the  general  orders  a  retreat,  he  may 
succeed  in  retiring  without  serious  losses,  but  he  is 
not  the  less  certainly  beaten.  Indeed,  victory  is  a 
prize  sufficiently  great  to  be  renounced  only  after 
strenuous  efforts  to  secure  it.  The  first  of  duties  is  to 
fight  well,  and  then  to  do  whatever  else  is  possible. 
A  victory  which  is  the  result  of  a  battle  faithfully 
fought,  may  be  equivalent  to  the  destruction  of  the 
opposing  army  and  the  conclusion  of  the  war.  On 
the  contrary,  even  in  defeat,  under  such  circumstances, 
honor  is  safe,  and  the  vigor  displayed  in  the  fight 
and  the  losses  incurred  may  dissuade  even  a  successful 
enemy  from  engaging  in  similar  contests. 


PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 


CHAPTER  Y. 


DEFENCE   OF  RIVERS   AND   MOUNTAINS  -  COVERING   A 
SIEGE. 

Art.  I.—  Defence  of  River§. 

Disposition  of  the  Troops.  —  In  order  to  defend  a 
river,  the  army  should  be  divided  into  several  corps 
of  observation,  placed  in  front  of  the  points  most  threat- 
ened by  the  enemy,  and  not  so  near  the  banks  as  to  be 
exposed  to  artillery  fire.  Each  corps  remains  concen- 
trated, only  sending  out  small  detachments  to  observe 
what  is  going  on  upon  the  opposite  bank.  Communi- 
cation between  the  corps  is  constantly  kept  up  by 
patrols.  The  detachments  should  be  as  few  as  can  per- 
form the  duty  thoroughly.  They  should  be  posted  in 
clumps  of  trees  and  behind  rising  ground  ;  in  fact, 
wherever  they  can  best  observe  the  opposite  bank 
without  being  seen  themselves.  The  distance  between 
the  corps  of  observation  will  depend  upon  the  breadth 
of  the  river  and  the  time  required  for  constructing 
bridges  across  it.  The  corps  should  be  so  near  together, 
that  either  may  receive  the  support  of  those  next  it  in 
time  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  passing  the  river  in 
its  vicinity.  If  two  or  three  hours  are  required  for 


DEFENCE   OF   EIVEIiS.  24:9 

building  the  bridges,  the  corps  may  be  from  six  to  ten 
miles  apart.  Three  corps  of  observation  would  thus 
watch  twenty  or  twenty-five  miles  of  the  river,  as  the 
enemy  could  not  attempt  a  passage  above  or  below  all 
three,  or  between  any  two  of  the  corps,  without  resist- 
ance, first  from  one,  and  soon  from  two  or  three. 

A  strong  reserve  or  principal  corps  should  be  kept 
to  the  rear,  at  a  distance  depending  upon  the  front 
occupied  by  the  corps  of  observation,  and  such  that  it 
can  arrive  at  the  point  where  the  attempt  is  made  to 
cross,  before  the  enemy  can  carry  out  his  object.  If 
the  part  of  the  river  to  be  watched  is  very  long,  two 
reserves  should  be  formed  instead  of  one. 

To  enable  the  corps  to  move  readily  from  point  to 
point,  there  should  be  a  good  road  parallel  to  the 
river,  and  cross-roads  connecting  it  with  the  position 
of  the  reserve.  When  the  parallel  road  is  very  near 
the  river,  and  under  fire  from  the  opposite  bank,  it 
loses  its  advantages,  and  a  new  one  must  be  cut,  far- 
ther to  the  rear. 

Besides  the  general  dispositions  already  mentioned, 
there  are  many  details  to  be  attended  to.  There 
should  be  a  good  system  of  signals,  both  for  night  and 
day-;  boats  should  be  brought  to  the  bank  which  is 
held  by  the  af my,  and  those  that  cannot  be  brought 
over  should  be  sunk  ;  the  largest  of  them  should  be 
carried  up  stream,  to  be  filled  with  stones  and  floated 
down  to  break  the  bridges  of  the  enemy.  If  the  river 
is  fordable  in  some  places,  pits  and  trenches  should  be 
11* 


250  PKINCirLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

dug  in  the  bottom,  if  possible ;  if  not,  the  end  of  the 
ford  should  be  obstructed  by  an  abatis,  or  a  field  for- 
tification of  suitable  character.  If  between  two  fords 
or  two  points  favorable  for  passing  the  river,  a  narrow 
defile  exists,  it  should  be  fortified  and  held,  in  order 
to  control  the  road,  and  prevent  the  bodies  of  the 
enemy  which  may  have  passed,  from  effecting  a  junc- 
tion without  being  attacked.  When  the  bridges  are 
of  such  a  character  as  to  be  defended  with  difficulty, 
they  should  be  cut,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  country.  In  such  cases,  private 
interests  must  yield  to  the  general  welfare.  As  far  as 
possible,  however,  such  demolitions  should  be  avoided. 
If  a  partial  destruction  will  stop  the  enemy's  progress, 
more  than  that  is  unjustifiable. 

•Bridge-heads. — If  the  bridge  is  to  be  preserved,  it 
should  be  covered  by  strong  field  fortifications,  while 
all  proper  precautions  are  taken  upon  the  bridge 
itself,  and  behind  it.  A  bridge  thus  held  gives  to  the 
possessors  the  power  of  passing  the  river,  whenever  it 
is  desirable.  The  fortifications  erected  to  control  a 
bridge  constitute  what  is  called  a  bridge-head,  and 
should  be  arranged  to  suit  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  in  accordance  with  the  principles  laid  down  in 
treatises  on  the  subject  of  Field  Fortifications. 

The  river,  instead  of  crossing  the  line  of  operations 
of  the  enemy,  may  be  parallel  to  it.  In  this  case,  a 
bridge  that  is  to  be  held  must  be  defended  by  fortifi- 
cations on  both  sides,  as  it  is  impossible  to  say  on 

' 


DEFENCE    OF   RIVEKS.  251 

which  side  the  attack  may  be  made.  There  is  thus 
formed  a  double  bridge-head.  Such  a  work  gives 
great  advantages  to  the  party  on  the  defensive,  if  it 
manoeuvres  rapidly,  for  there  is  always  a  safe  passage 
from  one  bank  to  the  other,  and  the  bridge-head  may 
be  occupied  by  only  a  sufficient  garrison  to  hold  it 
against  the  enemy ;  this  garrison  may  be  relieved  or 
re-enforced  at  pleasure,  so  as  to  make  a  very  efficient 
defence.  The  enemy  cannot  safely  pass  by,  leaving 
such  a  point  upon  his  line  of  operations.  He  must 
therefore  attack  the  fortifications,  and  may  thus  be 
forced  to  a  considerable  loss  of  time,  men,  and  mate- 
rial. If  he  divides  his  forces  to  surround  the  work, 
and  attack  both  sides  at  once,  the  army  on  the  defen- 
sive may  concentrate  in  force  against  a  fraction  of  the 
enemy  and  destroy  it.  In  order  to  operate  success- 
fully, therefore,  against  such  a  work,  the  enemy  must 
have  a  very  great  superiority  of  force. 

The  Archduke  Charles  remarks :  "  There  is  no 
better  defensive  position  than  one  which  keeps  the 
enemy  constantly  apprehensive  of  being  attacked. 
An  army  behind  a  river,  with  strong  bridge-heads,  is 
in  precisely  such  a  position.  Almost  any  other  may 
be  turned,  but  a  bridge-head,  well  built,  secure  from 
capture  by  assault,  and  perfectly  covering  a  passage 
of  the  river,  need  never  suffer  from  an  insufficiency  of 
numbers  in  the  garrison,  or  from  want  of  provisions 
and  munitions  of  war.  The  enemy  is  forced  to 
watch  carefully  such  a  communication,  by  which 


252  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

superior  forces  may  be  at  any  moment  thrown  upon 
him." 

When  a  simply  passive  defence  of  a  river  can  alone 
be  made,  which  is  an  unfortunate  state  of  affairs, 
special  attention  must  be  given  to  those  points  that 
offer  the  enemy  advantages  for  building  bridges. 
Such  are  those  where  the  river  makes  an  elbow  convex 
towards  the  enemy,  as  batteries  may  be  constructed  to 
cross  their  fire  in  front  of  the  ground  where  his  lead- 
ing troops  would  be  landed.  Other  favorable  points 
for  him  are  those  where  the  river  is  divided  into  seve- 
ral arms  by  islands,  that  may  conceal  the  preparations 
made  for  passing ;  also  the  mouths  of  tributary  streams, 
by  means  of  which  the  enemy  may  bring  up  from  the 
interior  boats  and  other  materials  for  bridges.  Bat- 
teries should  be  constructed  at  such  places,  so  as  to 
sweep  with  their  fire  the  opposite  banks,  and  the 
ground  adjacent.  When  there  is  no  time  to  finish  in 
a  complete  manner  such  works  of  fortification  as  may 
be  suitable,  simple  trenches  and  rifle-pits  should  be 
rapidly  built,  so  as  to  envelope  the  space  upon  which 
the  enemy  must  place  the  foremost  of  his  troops,  and 
expose  them  to  a  close  converging  fire.  Upon  one 
occasion  Eugene  had  gained  a  inarch  upon  Yendome, 
and  was  attempting  to  throw  a  bridge  across  the  Adda 
at  a  very  favorable  spot.  Yendome  came  up  as  soon 
as  he  could,  and  arrived  before  the  bridge  was  com- 
pleted. He  tried  to  arrest  the  work  of  the  pontoniers, 
but  in  vain.  The  ground  was  so  well  swept  by  the 


DEFENCE    OF   RIVERS.  253 

artillery  of  Eugene,  that  he  could  not  get  near  enough 
to  injure  the  workmen.  Still,  the  passage  of  the  river 
must  be  prevented.  Vendome  put  his  army  to  work 
upon  a  trench  and  parapet,  surrounding  the  ground 
which  the  Imperialists  must  occupy  after  crossing. 
They  were  finished  nearly  as  soon  as  the  bridges; 
Eugene  deemed  the  passage  of  the  river  impracticable, 
and  ordered  a  retreat. 

When  the  attacking  party  is  thus  caught  in  the  act 
of  constructing  his  bridges,  he  is  taken  at  great  disad- 
vantage, because  the  main  body  of  his  army  is  not 
across,  while  the  few  troops  who  have  passed  in  boats 
are  not  in  sufficient  numbers  to  force  their  way  for- 
ward, and  make  room  for  the  army  to  debouch  from 
the  bridges  and  deploy  in  line  of  battle,  even  if  it  be 
practicable  for  it  to  do  so  under  the  converging  lire 
of  the  artillery  and  infantry  of  the  defenders. 

The  enemy  is  also  in  a  perilous  condition,  if  a  por- 
tion of  his  forces  have  crossed,  and  the  defenders  suc- 
ceed in  breaking  the  bridges,  and  thus  cutting  his 
army  in  two.  Every  effort  should  therefore  be  made 
to  do  this.  If  large  boats,  filled  with  stones,  and 
heavy  rafts,  constructed  of  trunks  of  trees,  be  sent 
down  the  stream,  there  is  great  probability,  if  the  cur- 
rent is  rapid,  that  some,  or  all  of  them,  will  strike  the 
bridges  and  break  them.  In  1809,  the  Austrians  suc- 
ceeded in  cutting  the  French  army  in  two,  by  throw- 
ing into  the  stream  several  wooden  mills  which  were 
upon  the  banks  of  the  Danube.  The  corps  which  had 


254:  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

passed  the  river,  and  taken  possession  of  Gros-Aspern 
and  Essling  on  the  left  bank,  were  surrounded  by  the 
whole  army  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  obliged, 
after  a  heroic  but  ineffectual  resistance,  to  retire  to 
the  large  island  of  Lobau,  that  here  divides  the  Danube 
into  two  channels.  After  this  check,  two  months 
were  consumed  by  the  French  in  immense  and  per- 
severing labor,  in  building  several  strong  bridges,  and 
preventing  them  from  rupture  by  stockades  above 
them. 

Secondary  Means. — It  is  very  important  for  an  army 
engaged  in  defending  a  river  not  to  be  deceived  by 
false  demonstrations,  and  to  have  timely  warning  of  a 
real  attempt  at  a  passage.  Officers  of  experience 
should  be  sent  to  the  posts  of  observation,  who  are 
not  easily  deceived  by  feints.  Signals  must  be  agreed 
upon,  by  which  timely  notice  may  be  given  of  suspi- 
cious movements  of  the  enemy. 

There  is,  moreover,  a  military  law,  a  law  which 
can  never  be  violated  without  dishonor,  that  requires 
a  commander  to  go  in  the  direction  of  a  cannonade 
when  it  is  so  near  and  so  prolonged  that  there  can  be 
no  reasonable  doubt  in  his  mind  of  a  serious  engage- 
ment being  in  progress.  No  excuse  can  justify  him 
for  remaining  unmoved  in  his  position  when  the  thun- 
der of  the  cannon  tells  him  that  a  battle  is  going  on 
at  no  great  distance.  He  cannot  even  plead  the  orders 
of  a  senior,  for  contrary  orders  may  have  been  sent 
but  intercepted,  or  their  bearers  may  have  been  killed. 


DEFENCE   OF   KTVEES.  255 

He  must  decide  as  to  the  urgency  of  the  case,  and 
take  the  responsibility  of  moving  where  honor  and 
danger  call.  If  the  soldier  and  subordinate  officer 
should  render  implicit  obedience  to  the  orders  of  their 
superiors,  the  case  is  different  with  a  chief  of  long  ex- 
perience in  war ;  he  must  necessarily  exercise  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  discretion  in  the  performance  of  his 
duty,  especially  when  an  unforeseen  case  arises.  Unity 
of  effort  towards  a  common  end  is  a  fundamental 
principle  in  the  operations  of  war,  and  this  requires 
movement  towards  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  when 
there  is  doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  commander. 

Movements  of  Troops. — As  soon  as  the  alarm  is 
given,  the  posts  of  observation  nearest  the  point  of 
passage  hasten  up  and  charge  the  troops  already  over, 
whatever  may  be  their  numbers,  to  drive  them  into 
the  river,  if  possible,  before  others  can  cross  to  their 
assistance,  or  at  least  hold  them  in  check  until  re-en- 
forcements arrive  from  the  rear.  If  the  enemy  com' 
mits  the  fault  of  commencing  the  construction  of  his 
bridges  before  he  has  possession  of  both  banks,  the 
sharpshooters  may  draw  near  and  pick  off  the  pon- 
toniers  with  ease. 

The  artillery  and  cavalry  ought  to  be  the  first  to 
arrive  to  the  support  of  the  advanced  posts.  If  the 
ground  favors,  the  cavalry  charges  vigorously,  while 
the  artillery  takes  position  to  reply  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  or  to  crush  the  troops  already  over.  The 
horse  artillery  may  be  very  useful  on  such  occasions, 


256  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

from  the  rapidity  with  which  it  may  be  brought  upon 
the  ground  and  placed  in  position.  The  corps  of  ob- 
servation, on  the  right  and  left,  are  put  in  motion  im- 
mediately, and  lose  no  time  in  coming  up  and  taking 
part  in  the  action,  which  becomes  continually  warmer. 
The  position  of  the  enemy  becomes  more  critical,  as 
he  can  scarcely  use  his  artillery  for  fear  of  firing  upon 
his  own  troops.  He  will  be  unable  to  hold  his  ground, 
pressed  and  surrounded  as  he  is,  if  he  has  not  suc- 
ceeded in  completing  his  bridges  by  the  time  the  re- 
serve cornes  up.  The  troops  that  have  crossed  must 
lay  down  their  arms. 

It  often  happens  that  the  defenders  are  taken  by 
surprise,  notwithstanding  all  their  precautions,  be- 
cause the  enemy  may  deceive  them  in  a  thousand 
ways.  The  troops  will  then  reach  the  ground  too 
late,  or,  coming  up  in  successive  portions,  may  be  de- 
stroyed. The  passage  is  forced,  and,  as  the  assailant 
is  usually  the  stronger  in  such  cases,  the  other  army 
must  fall  back  to  some  other  position  in  rear. 

Whatever  may  be  the  danger  of  the  passage  of  the 
river  by  the  enemy,  there  is  no  reason  for  occupying 
a  great  extent  of  the  river  to  prevent  it,  and  thus 
spreading  out  the  troops  in  a  long  weak  line.  The 
enemy  must  do  one  of  two  things.  He  must  either 
keep  his  forces  united,  or  divide  them.  If  he  concen- 
trates, the  army  on  the  defensive  should  pursue  the 
same  course,  remaining  opposite  to  him  and  gaining 
all  possible  information  of  his  movements.  It  will  be 


DEFENCE    OF   RIVERS.  257 

difficult  for  the  enemy,  in  such  a  case,  to  effect  a  pas- 
sage by  surprise,  unless  the  locality  is  very  favorable 
to  him,  and  information  of  his  movements  cannot 
be  obtained,  either  through  spies  or  the  inhabitants 
of  the  country.  If  he  occupies  a  great  extent  of 
country  by  separate  corps,  he  need  not  be  feared 
at  any  point.  The  army  on  the  defensive  should 
be  kept  together  opposite  the  centre  of  his  line, 
thrown  upon  any  corps  that  might  succeed  in  crossing, 
and  crush  it  before  the  arrival  of  other  detachments, 
which,  in  the  case  supposed,  are  quite  distant.  By 
concentration,  is  not  meant  crowding  the  whole  army 
in  a  single  camp.  It  would  then  be  impossible  to 
watch  the  banks  of  the  stream.  The  troops  are  suffi- 
ciently concentrated  when  the  corps  are  near  enough 
to  afford  mutual  support ;  and  it  is  quite  certain  that 
when  this  is  the  case,  the  enemy  cannot  effect  a  pas- 
sage between  two  of  the  corps  before  they  can  resist 
him  with  effect.  The  word  concentration  must,  there- 
fore, be  not  understood  in  an  absolute  sense,  but  re- 
ceive a  liberal  interpretation,  as,  indeed,  is  the  case 
with  all  military  terms. 

A  very  effectual  method  of  disconcerting  the  enemy, 
and  neutralizing  the  moral  effect  of  the  successful 
passage  of  a  river  by  him,  is  to  cross  at  some  other 
point  and  begin  offensive  operations  upon  his  terri- 
tory. Such  a  determination  upon  the  part  of  a  general 
would  show  him  to  be  a  man  of  spirit.  The  imagi- 
nation of  the  troops  is  excited,  their  hopes  aroused, 


258  PEINCIPLES    OF    STEATEGT. 

and  their  courage  renewed,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
the  enemy  is  astonished  and  demoralized  at  the  very 
natural  supposition  that  the  opposing  army  is  in 
greater  force  and  better  supplied  than  was  believed. 
The  enemy  will  speedily  repass  the  river,  to  protect 
his  own  territory.  In  1674,  Montecuculi  crossed  the 
Rhine.  Turenne  at  once  crossed  in  the  other  direc- 
tion, instead  of  seeking  to  defend  the  frontiers  of 
France  by  the  usual  means.  The  initiative  that  Mon- 
tecuculi had  so  skilfully  taken  was  of  no  avail,  as  he 
was  obliged,  by  the  still  more  skilful  manoeuvre  of 
Turenne,  to  return  to  the  right  bank  of  the  river. 

Sometimes  the  defenders  withdraw  designedly  from 
the  river,  in  order  to  entice  the  enemy  across,  and 
then  return  upon  him  before  his  whole  army  is  over 
and  in  position.  The  general  who  retires  in  this  way 
is  only  justified  in  so  doing  by  the  character  of  the 
ground,  which  permits  him,  upon  his  return,  to  have 
a  good  position,  while  the  enemy  is  crowded  and 
unable  to  deploy  his  forces.  Unless  these  are  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,  he  runs  the  risk  of  a  defeat 
if  the  enemy  succeeds  in  throwing  over  troops  enough. 
Such  a  mistake  has  been  actually  made.  Marshal. 
Crequi,  at  Consarbruck,  suffered  the  enemy  to  cross, 
deferring  his  attack  with  the  expectation  of  envelop- 
ing and  routing  a  greater  number.  To  those  who 
were  surprised  at  his  course,  and  expostulated  with 
him,  he  replied,  that  the  greater  the  number  who 
passed,  the  more  decisive  would  be  their  defeat. 


DEFENCE   OF   MOUNTAINS.  259 

However,  so  many  passed  that  lie  could  not  resist 
them,  and  the  marshal  was  completely  beaten  and 
covered  with  shame.  This  mistake  made  a  fine  gen- 
eral for  France,  as  Crequi  was  cured  of  his  rashness, 
but  still  retained  ardor  enough  for  great  undertakings. 
We  may  learn,  also,  from  the  life  of  CrequiJ  that  a 
man  who  is  truly  great,  and  worthy  to  command 
others,  knows  how  to  profit  even  by  his  own  faults. 

Art.  If. — Defence  of  Mountains 

Such  a  country  is  best  defended  by  rapid  manoeu- 
vring and  energetic  attacks  upon  the  enemy.  His 
plans  are  thus  thwarted,  and  he  is  obliged  to  think 
about  his  own  safety.  He  has  not  the  same  freedom 
of  movement  as  the  defenders,  because  he  is  obliged 
to  protect  and  keep  open  his  line  of  operations,  whilst 
they  are  at  home  and  find  a  line  of  retreat  in  any  di- 
rection. The  inhabitants  of  the  country  are  also  gen- 
erally ready  to  aid  the  defenders,  and  fall  upon  the 
assailants  at  all  favorable  opportunities.  They  will  at 
least  render  important  services  by  watching  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy  and  giving  notice  of  them.  Some 
of  them  will  always  act  as  partisans,  and  do  much 
valuable  service. 

The  first  rule  to  be  observed  in  defending  a  moun- 
tainous region  is  not  to  try  to  close  all  the  passes,  as 
an  attempt  to  do  this  would  lead  to  injudicious  scat- 
tering of  the  troops,  and  a  very  weak  front  is  offered 


260  TKINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

to  the  enemy  at  every  point.  The  plan  of  concentra- 
tion should  be  followed,  as  far  as  the  country  will 
permit.  Those  positions  should  be  strongly  held, 
from  which  troops  may  be  rapidly  moved  to  any 
point  threatened  by  the  enemy.  It  is  possible  to  as- 
semble several  battalions  only  in  the  valleys ;  these, 
then,  will  usually  be  the  places  where  the  defence  will 
be  mainly  made ;  but  the  advantages  given  by  the 
higher  ground  in  arresting  the  movements  of  the 
assailants  must  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

In  the  next  place,  there  are  two  things  to  be  done 
in  a  warfare  of  this  kind  :  to  manoeuvre  offensively,  in 
order  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  take  his  columns  in 
flank,  separate  his  detached  corps,  seize  his  convoys, 
&c. ;  and  to  fight  defensively,  that  is  to  say,  to  take 
position  in  the  most  advantageous  way  possible  when- 
ever it  is  necessary  to  engage  seriously.  Although 
these  two  precepts  may  seem  contradictory,  a  skilful 
officer  will  know  how  to  apply  them  together ;  he 
manoeuvres  to  get  upon  the  flank  or  rear  of  the  enemy, 
and  having  succeeded  in  doing  so,  he  takes  a  position, 
or,  at  any  rate,  does  not  attack  unless  he  has  the  de- 
cided advantage  over  the  enemy.  The  latter,  being 
unable  to  move  farther  without  danger  of  having  his 
line  of  retreat  cut,  is  obliged  to  turn  upon  the  corps 
which  is  in  position  and  attack  it.  Until  that  is  done, 
he  is  in  constant  danger  of  being  separated  from  his 
re-enforcements  and  means  of  subsistence.  He  must, 
therefore,  be  the  cost  what  it  may,  march  upon  this 


I 
DEFENCE    OF    MOUNTAINS.  261 

position  and  attack  it  before  advancing  to  other  ope- 
rations. To  oblige  him  to  do  this  was  the  object  of 
the  manoeuvre ;  if  his  attack  succeeds,  he  will  at  any 
rate  suffer  greatly;  and  if  he  fails,  his  position  is 
critical. 

Artificial  Obstacles. — Besides  manoeuvres  of  the 
troops,  whose  importance  is  undoubted,  there  are  other 
means,  not  to  be  neglected  in  a  good  defensive  sys- 
tem ;  these  art  provides,  for  the  purpose  of  delaying 
or  completely  arresting  the  movements  of  the  enemy 
in  certain  localities,  and  for  strengthening  positions  for 
engagements.  Thus,  preparations  should  be  made  in 
advance  for  obstructing  roads.  Mines  will  be  placed 
in  the  piers  of  stone  bridges,  and  combustible  mate- 
rials got  in  readiness  for  burning  those  of  wood. 
Parts  of  the  roads  that  are  narrow  and  cannot  be 
turned  will  be  blown  out  with  powder,  and  temporary 
bridges  made,  which  can  be  readily  destroyed.  At 
other  places  mines  will  be  prepared  to  throw  down 
masses  of  rock  in  the  roads,  either  in  anticipation  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy  or  when  he  is  passing,  and 
thus  be  the  occasion  of  much  damage  to  him.  Aba- 
tis may  be  formed  across  narrow  roads,  or  barricades 
constructed  of  earth,  timber,  or  rocks.  These  meas- 
ures suppose  some  haste  in  their  execution ;  but,  when 
time  is  abundant,  the  better  plan  is  to  build  block- 
houses or  larger  earthen  works  in  those  parts  of  the 
valleys  which  are  commanding  from  their  position, 
and  yet  so  contracted  as  not  to  require  works  of  great 


262  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

extent.  A  strong  redoubt,  well  fraised  and  having  a 
considerable  command,  is  a  difficult  obstacle  for  an 
enemy  to  pass  in  such  a  locality  as  is  here  spoken  of. 

Positions. — Good  positions,  well  defended,  will 
always  give  the  enemy  much  trouble  in  mountainous 
warfare.  He  can  take  them  by  assault  only,  at  great 
loss  to  himself,  and  much  time  will  be  consumed  if 
he  attempts  to  turn  them. 

Positions  will  be  found  upon  the  high  ground  or  in 
the  valleys.  The  first,  although  ordinarily  strong 
against  attack  in  front,  are  often  easily  turned.  It  is, 
moreover,  generally  difficult  to  furnish  food  and  water 
to  the  troops  holding  them,  and  they  should,  there- 
fore, be  held  by  only  sufficient  forces  to  repulse  the 
enemy  with  loss  if  he  attacks  in  front.  Small  bod- 
ies will  retire  with  facility  and  without  fear  of  being 
overtaken ;  they  will  take  every  advantage  of  the 
ground  to  check  the  enemy,  and  will  give  themselves 
up  more  to  fighting  than  to  getting  out  of  the  way. 
Finally,  if  a  small  body  is  unfortunately  captured, 
the  moral  effect  is  not  near  so  great  as  would  be  pro- 
duced by  the  loss  of  a  large  detachment. 

The  detachments  that  defend  the  heights,  usually 
belong  to  more  numerous  corps  encamped  in  the 
lower  ground.  The  troops  should  not  be  scattered 
around,  holding  every  little  by-path,  as  this  will  pre- 
vent a  strong  resistance  being  made  at  any  point. 
The  detachments  will  be  grouped  near  the  main  pass, 
which  they  should  hold  long  enough  to  give  time 


DEFENCE   OF    MOUNTAINS.  263 

to  the  troops  below  to  come  to  their  support.  By 
placing  reserves  in  rear  and  on  the  flanks,  at  points 
where  the  lateral  roads  come  in,  they  will  guard 
against  being  cut  off.  The  natives  may  be  very 
useful  in  giving  warning  by  signals  of  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  and  a  few  of  them,  with  arms  in  their 
hands,  will  guard  the  by-paths  as  well  as  the  best 
soldiers,  and  with  more  confidence,  on  account  of 
their  being  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  country, 
and  certain  of  their  ability  to  escape  at  the  last  mo- 
ment. 

The  best  positions  are  usually  in  the  valleys,  be- 
cause they  are  generally  better  supported,  being  occu- 
pied in  force,  and  with  the  high  ground  on  the  flanks 
guarded.  The  enemy  cannot  turn  them  so  easily  as 
those  upon  the  hills;  if  he  wishes  to  do  so,  he  is 
obliged  to  make  wide  detours  through  other  valleys. 
Positions,  properly  so  called,  are  comparatively  few. 
They  are  either  across  or  along  a  valley. 

When  the  defence  is  made  while  ascending  a  val- 
ley, the  enemy  attacking  from  below,  the  ground, 
without  presenting  what  are  called  positions,  is  never- 
theless favorable  almost  everywhere.  But  when  the 
top  of  the  ascent  is  passed,  and  the  defenders  are  de- 
scending while  the  enemy  is  higher,  he  has  the  deci- 
ded advantage.  It  is  only  at  considerable  intervals 
that  such  elevations  in  the  valley  occur  as  to  form 
defensible  positions;  but  these  are  generally  very  good, 
because  contracted  in  extent,  and  having  the  flanks 


264:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

upon  the  precipitous  sides  of  the  mountains.  These 
positions  often  have  the  disadvantage  of  being  cut 
in  two  by  the  stream  which  flows  at  the  foot  of  the 
valley,  and,  if  it  is  not  fordable,  the  wings  cannot 
support  each  other.  Thus  the  enemy  may  attack  one 
wing  with  superior  numbers,  and,  when  it  is  driven 
back,  threaten  the  other  in  flank  and  oblige  it  to  re- 
tire also.  Such  positions,  therefore,  to  be  available  to 
the  defence,  should  offer  free  communications  between 
the  different  corps  of  the  army,  while  those  of  the 
enemy  are  difficult  or  impossible.  With  this  view,  the 
bridges  above  the  position  should  be  cut,  while  those 
upon  it  and  below  should  be  retained  and  even  new 
ones  constructed.  Such  is  the  position  across  a  valley. 
A  position  is  taken  up  along  a  valley,  wrhen  it  is 
desired  to  arrest  the  progress  of  an  enemy  wishing  to 
emerge  from  a  cross  valley.  The  ground  will  usually 
rise  like  an  amphitheatre  in  front  of  the  mouth  of  the 
transversal  valley,  so  that  the  heads  of  the  columns 
of  the  enemy,  in  debouching,  will  be  exposed  to  a  cross 
and  enfilading  fire,  and  it  will  be  extremely  difficult 
for  him  under  these  disadvantages  to  advance  to  the 
attack.  But,  in  order  that  the  position  be  thus  favor- 
able to  the  defence,  and  that  the  general  may  expect 
to  force  the  assailant  to  retire,  the  valley  must  be  so 
narrow  as  to  enable  troops  on  the  opposite  slope  to 
reach  with  their  fire  the  enemy  emerging  from  the 
transversal  valley.  If  the  main  valley  is  too  wide 
for  this  plan  to  be  pursued,  the  army  on  the  defensive 


DEFENCE   OF   MOUNTAINS.  265 

must  be  on  the  side  next  the  secondary  valley,  and 
must  act  offensively,  enveloping  the  enemy  as  he 
debouches.  There  will  not  be  the  same  advantage  or 
position  as  before,  but  the  defenders  are  enabled  to 
bring  fresh  masses  of  troops  against  those  of  the 
enemy,  who  are  necessarily  much  strung  out,  and 
perhaps  fatigued  by  painful  marching.  When  an 
attack  is  thus  made  upon  an  enemy  seeking  to  debouch 
from  a  secondary  into  the  main  valley,  the  artillery 
ought  to  be  placed  in  front  of  the  infantry  ;  this  is  in 
violation  of  the  ordinary  rule,  but  it  is  permissible, 
because  the  enemy,  in  such  a  case,  will  usually  have 
little  or  no  artillery  in  action  ;  and  it  is  necessary,  be- 
cause the  space  required  for  the  ordinary  dispositions 
is  wanting,  and  the  artillery  must  be  in  front  to  attain 
the  enemy  at  the  greatest  possible  distance. 

Intrenchments. — There  are  some  examples  of  valleys 
defended  by  intrenched  lines.  These  are,  undoubtedly, 
good  when  the  valley  is  narrow,  and  the  mountains  on 
the  flanks  very  steep  and  only  turned  with  great  diffi- 
culty ;  when  the  intrenchments  have  masonry  revet- 
ments, and  the  ground  on  which  they  are  built  has  such 
a  command  over  the  valley  that  the  artillery  can  sweep 
it  to  a  great  distance.  These  conditions  are  not  so 
often  satisfied  as  is  supposed,  and  hence  the  proper 
use  of  this  kind  of  defences  is  not  frequent.  Refer- 
ence is  not  now  intended  to  small  redoubts  for  detached 
posts,  nor  to  the  larger  earthworks  often  advantage- 
ously used  in  mountain  warfare,  but  to  those  extensive 
12 


266  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

lines  intended  to  close  up  an  entire  valley  ;  such  lines, 
to  have  any  real  value,  must  fulfil  the  conditions  laid 
down  above. 

Movements  of  Troops. — When  all  hope  of  a  success- 
ful defence  of  a  valley  is  lost,  the  commander  may 
attempt  an  offensive  movement  through  a  lateral 
valley,  rather  than  retire  immediately  into  the  interior. 
Nothing  can  be  more  honorable  and  brilliant  than 
such  an  effort,  and  it  is  often  crowned  with  the  success 
Fortune  loves  to  bestow  upon  daring  actions.  A  timid 
chief,  who  thinks  only  of  defending  positions,  and  who 
falls  back  constantly  as  the  enemy  advances,  deserves 
and  receives  none  of  her  favors.  In  warfare  in  a 
mountainous  country  some  risk  must  be  run  in 
making  eccentric  movements  upon  the  flanks  and  rear 
of  the  enemy,  because  the  character  of  the  topography 
favors ;  the  body  of  troops  making  the  movement  is 
not  likely  to  be  enveloped,  even  when  very  inferior  in 
numbers,  because  the  enemy,  usually  spread  out  in 
the  valleys  over  a  great  length,  can  with  difficulty 
assemble  his  troops,  and,  even  when  that  is  practicable, 
he  requires  some  time  to  reach  the  high  ground  and 
rid  himself  of  the  restraint  imposed  upon  his  actions 
by  want  of  space.  A  small  body,  well  posted,  will 
perhaps  fight  all  day  before  the  enemy  can  reach  its 
flanks,  so  difficult  will  he  find  it  to  make  combined 
movements  when  attacked  thus  unexpectedly.  The 
paucity  of  communications  is  unfavorable  to  the 
prompt  transmission  of  his  orders,  and  when,  at  last, 


DEFENCE    OF    MOUNTAINS.  267 

they  reach  their  destination,  the  time  for  their  execu- 
tion may  have  passed.  The  attacking  party  has, 
therefore,  many  chances  of  gaining  some  signal  success, 
and  the  fame  of  it,  increasing  as  it  goes,  will  make 
the  enemy  uneasy  and  encourage  the  defenders.  The 
worst  thing  that  can  happen  in  such  a  case  is  to  be 
obliged  to  fall  back  after  an  unsuccessful  attack  ;  but 
retreat  is  easy  and  not  very  dangerous,  as  the  troops 
that  retire  are  getting  constantly  nearer  their  supports, 
while  the  enemy  is  leaving  his  behind.  Here  is 
another  example  of  the  modifying  influence  of  lo- 
calities upon  general  rules. 

When  a  defensive  corps  has  succeeded  in  regaining 
some  important  pass  or  high  ground,  by  which  means 
the  communications  of  the  enemy  are  interrupted,  it 
may  either  take  the  offensive  or  remain  in  position. 
The  first  course  will  be  pursued  if  the  enemy  is  not 
in  great  force  and  the  ground  is  favorable ;  in  the 
other  case,  the  defenders  will  simply  hold  on  to  what 
has  been  gained,  and  make  preparations  to  receive  an 
attack,  by  occupying  woods  and  commanding  ground 
with  sharpshooters,  by  making  abatis  across  the  roads, 
and  collecting  large  rocks  and  trunks  of  trees  to  roll 
down  upon  the  assailants.  The  enemy  will  make  a 
powerful  effort  to  reopen  his  line  of  communications ; 
if  it  is  unsuccessful,  the  assailed  should  not  give  them- 
selves up  to  an  imprudent  pursuit,  but  should  reoccupy 
their  position,  and  prepare  for  the^.eiieu}y  a  similar 
reception  whenever  he 


2 08  PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY. 

A  great  advantage  is  gained  in  an  attack  in  such 
country  by  occupying  a  height  which  had  been  deemed 
inaccessible,  and  planting  a  piece  or  two  of  artillery 
upon  it,  even  if  of  small  calibre.  The  enemy  is  dis- 
concerted and  alarmed,  and  inclined  to  abandon  his 
position  at  once,  especially  if  attacked  in  front.  Thus, 
at  the  combat  of  Val  Carlos,  General  Nogues  had  a 
piece  of  artillery  carried  by  main  strength  up  very 
steep  slopes  to  the  heights  which  commanded  the 
camp  of  the  Spaniards.  The  latter  were  astonished, 
as  they  had  supposed  the  heights  inaccessible,  and 
they  rapidly  retired  from  their  position  before  an 
enemy  greatly  inferior  in  forces. 

It  has  been  already  seen  how  the  character  of  the 
ground  will  modify  general  rules.  Still  another 
example  in  point  may  be  mentioned.  The  combined 
movement  of  several  detachments  to  envelop  the 
enemy  in  an  open  country  is  very  properly  con- 
demned ;  but,  among  mountains,  such  a  manoeuvre 
may  be  safe  and  very  successful.  The  enemy  is  unable 
to  interpose  between  the  detachments  and  beat  them 
separately ;  each  should  be  strong  enough  to  defend 
the  valley  it  occupies,  and  it  is  then  in  no  danger  of 
being  surrounded;  moreover,  all  the  detachments  can 
retire  safely  if  they  fail  in  their  attempt.  They  should 
have,  at  least,  mountain  artillery  with  them,  not  only 
for  the  effect  to  be  produced  upon  the  enemy,  but  to 
make  signals.  This  is  often  the  sole  means  of  communi- 
cating between  the  detachments. 


DEFENCE   OF   MOUNTAINS.  269 

If  a  detachment  of  tlie  enemy  is  met  in  one  of  the 
valleys,  it  should  be  attacked  in  front,  while  infantry, 
in  dispersed  order,  attempt  to  gain  the  high  ground 
on  the  flanks  and  rear.  This  precaution  should  be 
taken  in  all  movements  along  valleys. 

"With  the  precautions  that  have  been  mentioned, 
boldness  may  be  displayed,  even  to  rashness,  and  will 
generally  lead  to  success.  The  Archduke  Charles 
says :  "  Nowhere  are  such  wonders  accomplished  by 
boldness  as  in  broken  countries,  and  especially  among 
high  mountains  ;  where  the  warfare  is  necessarily  one 
of  posts,  the  engagements  are  generally  unexpected, 
and  the  enemy,  surprised  by  unusual  daring,  is 
paralyzed  at  the  critical  moment."  In  combined 
movements,  rivers  and  lakes  may  furnish  a  very 
excellent  means  of  communication.  The  transports 
should  be  propelled  by  steam,  and  armed,  or  escorted 
by  gunboats. 

If,  after  disputing  the  upper  valleys  foot  by  foot, 
by  taking  successive  positions  in  them,  or  by  manoeu- 
vring to  separate  the  columns  of  the  enemy  and  divert 
them  from  their  object,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
abandon  them,  the  lower  valleys  still  remain  to  be 
defended,  where  larger  bodies  of  troops  can  be  con- 
centrated, and  the  ground  offers  many  positions  where 
a  good  general  may  use  his  tactical  ability  most 
effectively.  A  point  will  be  selected,  for  example,  at 
the  junction  of  several  valleys,  or  at  the  mouth  of  a 
single  one.  The  defensive  army  will  have  great  fa- 


270  PRINCIPLES   OF    STEATEGY. 

cilities  for  moving  rapidly  from  one  outlet  to  another 
by  the  shortest  lines,  while  the  enemy  can  only  ope- 
rate in  a  single  valley,  or  cannot  communicate  between 
adjacent  valleys  except  by  great  labor  or  wide  detours. 
The  plan  then  will  be  to  retard  him  simply  in  the 
narrow  valleys,  which  can  be  done  by  small  detach- 
ments, while  the  main  body  attacks  where  a  greater 
display  of  force  is  practicable.  After  beating  the 
enemy  here,  a  rapid  movement  may  be  made  to  the 
outlet  of  the  nearest  valley,  where  it  is  more  than 
probable  a  similar  success  may  be  gained. 

Suppose,  for  example,  that  an  army  of  30,000  men 
is  advancing  by  three  valleys  towards  an  objective 
point,  M,  figure  26,  which  is  probably  the  principal 
city  on  the  outskirts  of  the  mountains.  The  roads 
through  these  valleys  converge  towards  M,  but  the 
two  on  the  right  unite  before  reaching  M.  The 
invading  army,  in  order  to  occupy  these  three  valleys, 
is  obliged  to  send  an  equal  force  of  10,000  men  into 
each.  Suppose  the  defensive  army  to  contain  about* 
19,000  men.  They  may  or  not  have  been  also  divided 
into  three  equal  parts,  but  the  moment  has  now 
arrived  for  a  decisive  concentration  ;  3,000  men  can 
check  10,000  in  each  valley,  or  at  least  delay  them 
sufficiently  by  cutting  bridges,  closing  defiles,  taking 
flank  positions,  &c.  The  general  will,  therefore, 
leave  three  detachments,  a,  6,  <?,  each  of  3,000  men, 
in  these  valleys,  and  with  10,000  men  will  take  up 
a  position  d,  near  m,  where  two  of  the  roads  meet. 


272  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

If  the  valley  on  the  right  is  most  accessible,  he  will 
strike  his  first  blow  there.  He  will  inform  the  com- 
mander of  ~b  of  his  intentions,  ordering  him  to  main- 
tain his  position  firmly,  while  he  joins  a  and  fights  a 
battle.  He  will  have  13,000  against  10,000  of  the 
enemy's  forces,  and  the  result  cannot  be  very  doubt- 
ful, especially  if  the  ground  favors  his  operations.  If 
the  enemy  retires  without  a  battle,  the  news  must  be 
proclaimed  far  and  wide,  but  the  general  should  not 
engage  in  a  pursuit  by  which  he  would  be  removed 
too  far  from  m,  which  is  now  the  essential  point ;  he 
will,  on  the  contrary,  after  a  show  of  pursuit,  return 
to  his  former  position,  to  manoeuvre  from  it  as  circum- 
stances may  justify  or  require. 

If  the  enemy  fights  and  is  beaten,  the  corps  a 
should  be  sent  in  pursuit,  while  the  main  body  hastens 
to  J,  to  fight  again  with  a  similar  superiority  of  forces. 
Immediately  afterwards  the  main  body  d  moves  by 
the  cross-road  m  n  to  the  third  detachment  <?,  &  having 
been  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy  in  the  middle  val- 
ley, or  ordered  to  hold  him  in  check.  Upon  this  last 
occasion  the  victorious  army  will  follow  up  its  advan- 
tage, pressing  the  third  corps  of  the  enemy  vigorously, 
and  gaining  the  flank  of  the  other  two,  which  will 
thus  be  forced  to  retreat. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  enemy  does  not  advance 
along  several  valleys,  as  has  been  supposed  in  the  ex- 
ample above,  but  by  a  single  road,  with  a  view  of  pene- 
trating into  the  interior  of  the  country,  his  forces  will 


DEFENCE   OF   MOUNTAINS.  273 

be  concentrated,  it  is  true,  but  he  will  want  room  to 
use  them  efficiently.  The  defenders  should  not  be 
alarmed  at  this  concentration,  but  bravely  prepare  to 
meet  the  enemy  at  the  mouth  of  the  valley.  Such  a 
position  and  order  of  battle  will  be  selected  that  the 
enemy  will  be  enveloped  as  he  debouches,  and  exposed 
to  powerful  cross-fires.  Courage  and  firmness  are  espe- 
cially necessary  now,  for  if  the  defensive  army  is  beaten 
in  this  position,  with  the  ground  favoring  it  so  much, 
it  will  not  probably  be  successful  elsewhere. 

Communications. — The  preceding  remarks  demon- 
strate the  necessity  of  good  roads  for  the  defence  of  a 
mountainous  country,  as  without  them  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  move  rapidly  to  threatened  points,  to  effect 
the  speedy  concentration  of  troops  when  desirable,  and 
to  make  those  offensive  returns  which  have  so  excel- 
lent an  effect  in  raising  the  morale  of  the  army  and 
disconcerting  the  enemy.  If  possible,  therefore,  a  sys- 
tem of  roads  should  be  prepared  in  advance  for  the 
defence  of  a  mountainous  country.  At  ten  or  twelve 
miles  to  the  rear  of  the  principal  crests  of  the  chain, 
a  road  should  be  built  parallel  to  it,  passing  over  the 
spurs  and  crossing  the  perpendicular  roads,  thus  giving 
an  opportunity  to  move  freely  from  right  to  left  in  case 
of  need.  Each  of  the  perpendicular  roads  should  be 
closed  by  a  strong  fort,  well  located  between  the  crest 
of  the  chain  and  the  parallel  road.  Still  farther  to 
the  rear,  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain,  a  second  parallel 
road  should  be  built,  crossing  the  outlets  of  the  val- 
12* 


274  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

ley.  By  means  of  such  a  network  of  cross  and  longi- 
tudinal roads,  the  defence  might  be  made  as  active 
as  possible.  If  such  an  arrangement  is  impossible, 
on  account  of  topographical  difficulties,  the  spirit 
of  it,  at  least,  may  be  attained. 

Summary. — From  what  has  been  said  on  the  subject 
of  conducting  a  defensive  war  in  a  mountainous  coun- 
try, it  appears  it  should  be  characterized  by  peculiar 
boldness  and  activity.  Every  thing  depends  upon 
rapidity  of  movement  and  the  art  of  acting  offensively, 
even  if  upon  the  defensive.  The  enemy  cannot  be 
driven  out  by  attacking  him  in  his  chosen  positions, 
but  by  manoeuvres  to  turn  his  flank  and  get  in  his 
rear ;  by  obliging  him  to  fight  offensively  and  upon  un- 
favorable ground ;  in  a  word,  the  course  to  be  pursued 
is,  as  before  stated,  to  mano&uvre  offensively  and  fight 
defensively. 

Art.  III.— Covering  a  Siege. 

While  a  portion  of  the  army  is  besieging  a  fortified 
place,  the  remainder  repels  the  enemy,  if  he  attempts 
to  succor  it.  The  besieging  army  performs  all  the  ac- 
tual labor  of  the  siege ;  the  covering  army  is  called 
sometimes  an  army  of  observation.  The  former  is 
established  in  camps,  near  the  besieged  place,  and 
beyond  the  range  of  its  cannon  ;  the  camps  are 
fortified  both  against  sorties  from  within  and  at- 
tack from  a  succoring  army.  The  details  of  siege 
operations  are  described  in  treatises  especially  devoted 


COVERING   A   SIEGE.  275 

to  such  subjects.     "We  will  simply  state  some  rules  for 
the  government  of  the  covering  army. 

It  should  not  be  too  distant  from  the  besieging  army, 
in  order  that,  in  case  of  need,  re-enforcements  may  be 
drawn  from  the  latter,  who  will  return  to  their  camps 
after  the  necessity  for  their  assistance  has  passed  away. 
Such  re-enforcements,  arriving  at  an  opportune  mo- 
ment when  an  engagment  is  imminent  or  in  progress, 
will  be  of  great  value,  and  will  have  a  powerful  effect 
in  defeating  or  repulsing  the  enemy.  "When  Bona- 
parte was  besieging  Mantua,  he  did  not  limit  himself 
to  drawing  several  battalions  from  the  besieging  army 
when  about  to  engage  the  numerous  forces  that  seemed 
to  surround  him,  but  he  brought  up  the  whole  be- 
sieging army,  and,  uniting  it  to  the  army  of  observa- 
tion, he  gained  the  battles  of  Lonato  and  Castiglione. 
But  it  is  disadvantageous  to  be  obliged  thus  to  with- 
draw the  whole  besieging  army,  because  the  siege- 
works  must  then  be  suspended  and  the  siege  artillery 
abandoned ;  the  latter  can  be  only  recovered  by  de- 
feating the  succoring  army  and  capturing  the  besieged 
place.  If  the  covering  army  is  too  distant,  the  enemy 
may,  by  a  rapid  movement,  come  unexpectedly  upon 
the  besieging  army,  which  is  often,  indeed  generally, 
in  no  condition  to  fight  a  battle.  The  consequence 
of  such  an  occurrence  would  be  the  raising  of  the 
siege  and  the  abandonment  of  all  the  siege  materials. 
In  such  a  case  the  covering  army  should  rapidly  fol- 
low upon  the  heels  of  the  enemy  and  attack  him  in 


276  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

rear,  while  the  besieging  army  should  concentrate  and 
attempt  to  hold  its  ground  by  the  aid  of  the  fortifica- 
tions already  erected  around  the  camps.  There  is  no 
other  way  of  recovering  from  the  injury  caused  by  the 
rapid  march  of  the  enemy. 

The  covering  army  will  remain  in  a  fortified  posi- 
tion only  when  it  is  accessible  in  a  single  direction. 
If  the  enemy  can  pass  along  some  other  route,  or  can 
come  up  by  several  roads,  they  should  be  all  watched 
by  detachments,  while  the  central  mass,  far  from  being 
tied  down  in  intrenchments,  should  be  as  easily  moved 
as  possible ;  with  this  object  the  commander  should 
send  to  the  camps  of  the  besieging  army  all  unneces- 
sary baggage  and  all  the  sick  and  wounded ;  his  artil- 
lery should  be  in  perfect  marching  order,  the  roads 
should  be  repaired,  (fee.  But  if  the  main  body,  in  the 
case  supposed,  should  not  make  use  of  intrenchments, 
the  detachments  of  observation  should  by  all  means 
do  so,  when  the  ground  favors  ;  defiles  should  be  forti- 
fied and  bridge-heads  constructed,  to  enable  these 
detachments  to  resist  superior  forces,  and  for  a  time 
even  to  check  the  entire  succoring  army. 

Scouting  parties  should  be  sent  cut  to  a  distance, 
and  frequent  reconnoisances  made,  to  ascertain  what 
the  enemy  is  doing  or  going  to  do.  If  he  is  concen- 
trating his  forces  an  attack  may  be  expected,  and  pre- 
parations must  be  made  accordingly  ;  if  he  is  collect- 
ing wagons  and  provisions,  he  is  about  to  attempt  to 
throw  supplies  into  the  besieged  place  ;  the  besieging 


COVERING    A    SIEGE.  277 

army  should  be  informed  of  this  design,  and  arrange- 
ments made  to  capture  the  train,  or  at  least  prevent  its 
passing  in. 

If  several  roads  lead  from  the  enemy's  positions  to 
the  city  under  siege,  the  covering  army  occupies  the 
central  one,  defending  the  others  indirectly,  by  the 
fear  occasioned  the  enemy  of  being  taken  in  flank  or 
rear,  should  he  attempt  to  pass  along  one  of  the  lateral 
roads.  Here,  as  in  every  other  case  of  defence,  disper- 
sion of  the  forces,  that  inevitably  leads  to  partial  re- 
verses or  total  ruin,  must  be  carefully  guarded  against. 

When  the  enemy  has  developed  his  designs,  the 
covering  army  should  march  to  meet  him  and  attack 
resolutely,  whatever  may  be  the  relative  forces ;  this 
is  no  time  for  counting  numbers.  In  the  mean  time, 
the  noise  of  the  cannon,  staff  officers,  and  couriers  will 
have  given  notice  to  the  besieging  army  of  what  is 
passing.  Its  commander  will  call  out  his  whole  dis- 
posable force,  after  making  sufficient  provision  for 
guarding  the  trenches,  and  taking  proper  precautions 
for  repelling  sorties  from  the  place,  which  are  more  to 
be  apprehended  at  this  than  at  any  other  time.  The 
troops  intended  to  participate  in  the  engagement 
should  lose  ,no  time  in  leaving,  and  when  they  arrive 
upon  the  field  of  battle,  they  take  their  places  in  the 
line,  or  form  a  reserve,  or  fall  upon  the  flank  or  rear 
of  the  enemy,  according  to  circumstances.  Nothing 
can  have  a  more  powerful  effect  in  procuring  a  vic- 
tory than  the  appearance  of  such  re-enforcements  upon 


278  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

the  field  of  battle  at  a  critical  moment  in  the  contest. 
Desaix's  division,  suddenly  debouching  upon  the  field 
of  Marengo,  regained  the  day  for  the  French.  If,  not- 
withstanding the  assistance  rendered  by  the  besieging 
to  the  covering  army,  the  latter  is  obliged  to  fall  back, 
it  should  endeavor  to  do  so  in  good  order,  and  take 
position  at  a  little  distance  from  the  field  of  battle,  in 
order  to  keep  the  enemy  in  a  state  of  uneasiness,  and 
to  prevent  him  from  falling  with  all  his  force  upon 
the  siege-works.  The  covering  army  will  be  put  in  as 
good  condition  as  possible,  calling  in  all  detachments  at 
some  distance,  and  if  it  is  then  sufficiently  strong  an- 
other attack  may  be  made  upon  the  succoring  army, 
which  will  have  been  during  this  time  arrested  by  the 
intrenchments  of  the  besieging  army.  Then,  if  both 
parties  are  equally  determined,  will  be  witnessed  the 
singular  spectacle  of  two  armies  at  once  besieging  and 
besieged. 

If  the  covering  army  has  been  unable  to  resist  -the 
succoring  army,  and  the  latter  has  immediately 
attacked  the  lines  of  the  besiegers  and  forced  them, 
aifairs  are  certainly  in  a  bad  state,  and  the  siege  must 
be  raised ;  but  all  is  not  yet  lost.  The  remains  of  the 
two  armies  must  be  rallied  and  a  new  one  formed, 
which  will  soon  be  in  condition  to  fight  again. 

If  the  enemy  is  fearful  of  compromising  himself, 
and  remains  closely  within  the  walls  of  the  fortifica- 
tions, no  attack  can  be  made  upon  him ;  but  many 
mouths  to  be  filled  soon  exhaust  the  supplies,  and  the 


COVERING    A    SIEGE.  279 

place  will  capitulate  for  want  of  provisions.  Every 
tiling  that  had  been  previously  lost  will  now  be  re- 
covered, and  at  the  same  time  the  result  is  obtained 
without  loss  of  life — a  most  pleasing  thing  to  a  chief 
who  loves  his  men  and  is  averse  to  shedding  their 
blood. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  enemy  has  more  confidence, 
and  remains  in  the  open  field  rather  than  shut  him- 
self up  in  the  fortifications,  new  combats  will  follow, 
and  the  effort  must  be  made,  by  partial  successes,  or 
by  the  gain  of  a  battle  when  the  enemy  will  fight 
one,  to  force  him  into  such  a  position  that  he  may  be 
blockaded.  If,  finally,  the  enemy  divide  his  forces, 
leaving  a  part  in  the  place  for  its  defence,  and  with 
the  remainder  takes  the  field,  so  much  the  better  for 
the  other  party,  as  there  is  an  opportunity  offered  for 
cutting  off  from  the  garrison  the  portion  in  the  field. 
The  attempt  should  be  made  to  slip  in  between  the 
two  by  a  night  march,  such  precautions  having  been 
taken  that  the  corps  in  the  field  may  be  attacked, 
thoroughly  beaten  and  dispersed,  or  captured,  before 
assistance  can  arrive  from  the  place.  Thus,  Marshal 
Soult,  at  the  siege  of  Badajoz,  having  to  deal  with  an 
army  stronger  than  his  own,  skilfully  took  advantage 
of  an  opportunity  that  offered  of  restoring  the  equilib- 
rium. Ten  thousand  Spaniards,  to  avoid  being  too 
much  crowded,  passed  out  of  Badajoz  and  encamped 
upon  some  high  ground,  which  was  separated  from  the 
French  army  by  the  Guadiana  and  covered  by  the 


280  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

Gebora.  Fire  was  opened  upon  the  Spanish  camp 
from  the  French  camp,  with  long-range  howitzers, 
with  a  view  of  obliging  it  to  be  pitched  as  far  as  pos- 
sible from  the  outworks  of  the  place.  An  hour  before 
dawn,  a  passage  of  the  Guadiana  was  effected  in  boats, 
the  Gebora  was  forded,  and,  while  Marshal  Mortier 
made  an  attack  in  front  upon  the  high  ground,  and 
sent  his  cavalry  to  turn  the  right,  two  or  three  thou- 
sand infantry  were  posted  in  the  valley  between  the 
fortress  and  the  camp.  The  Spaniards  were  thus 
completely  cut  off.  Eight  thousand  prisoners  were 
taken,  five  or  six  hundred  killed,  and  the  rest  escaped. 
This  was  the  brilliant  combat  of  Gebora,  fought  Feb- 
ruary 19,  1811. 


COMBATS   AND   AFFAIRS.  281 


CHAPTEK  YI. 

COMBATS   AND   AFFAIES. 

THE  term  combat  is  applied  to  a  partial  engage- 
ment— to  a  conflict  of  parts  of  two  opposing  armies. 
Generally,  the  losses  in  combats  are  proportionally 
greater  than  in  battle  ;  often,  when  the  forces  en- 
gaged are  numerous,  the  action  is  called  a  battle,  al- 
though more  strictly  a  simple  combat.  But  too  much 
importance  must  not  be  ascribed  to  mere  definitions, 
for  the  name  has  really  no  influence  upon  the  thing  ; 
a  combat  is  a  small  battle,  and  a  battle  is  a  great 
combat. 

A  combat  may  occur  between  two  bodies  of  in- 
fantry, between  two  bodies  of  cavalry,  or  between  a 
body  of  infantry  and  one  of  cavalry,  between  troops 
with  artillery  and  troops  without  artillery.  It  may 
occur  in  the  open  field  or  in  intrenchments,  &c.  It 
is  well  to  examine  these  different  cases  separately, 
although  it  generally  happens  that  they  all  may  be 
discovered  in  a  single  engagement. 

Art.  I.— Combat  of  Infantry  with  Infantry. 

A  combat  of  infantry  against  infantry  presents 
much  the  same  appearance  as  a  battle;  skirmishers 
in  front  to  open  the  engagement,  the  first  line  de- 


282  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

ployed  to  deliver  its  fire,  the  second  line  covered  by 
accidents  of  the  ground,  and  out  of  range  of  fire-arms, 
several  masses  upon  the  wings  and  in  reserve,  to 
guard  against  turning  movements.  If  the  troops  are 
few,  they  will  form  a  single  line  with  a  reserve.  In 
such  an  engagement,  the  best  armed  men  and  the 
best  marksmen  have  a  great  advantage,  for  the  op- 
posing lines  are  not  very  distant,  and  the  firing  is 
kept  up  a  long  time,  as  there  is  neither  cavalry  nor 
artillery  to  be  feared. 

"When  several  battalions  are  engaged,  some  of  the 
manoeuvres  prescribed  in  the  works  on  tactics  may  be 
applied,  and  may  lead  to  important  results  for  the 
party  that  knows  how  to  perform  them  with  prompti- 
tude and  precision ;  these  are  changes  of  front  of  a 
whole  line,  &c. ;  the  study  of  minor  tactics  is  there- 
fore principally  important  as  a  preparation  for  partial 
engagements,  for  combats.  In  more  extensive  affairs 
the  movements  are  more  simple,  and  are  little  else 
than  deployments  and  formations  in  column,  the  pas- 
sages of  lines,  the  formations  of  squares,  of  echelons, 
&c.,  which  are  in  common  use.  But  our  object  now 
is  not  to  discuss  or  explain  tactical  manoeuvres  which 
are  prescribed  by  regulations ;  it  is  taken  for  granted 
that  these  are  well  known. 

A  commander  who  expects  an  engagement  should 
cause  his  troops  to  take  some  food,  for  the  reason 
that  it  can  no  longer  be  done  after  the  action  begins, 
and  men  who  are  fasting  cannot  be  expected  to  dis- 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTE Y  WITH  INFANTRY.     283 

play  much  vigor.  If  the  weather  is  cold,  they  should 
not  be  marched  across  a  ford  to  meet  the  enemy,  be- 
cause half-frozen  limbs  are  not  active,  and  a  soldier 
who  is  thoroughly  chilled  is  already  half  beaten.  An 
exception  may  be  made  to  this  rule  in  case  of  passing 
through  the  water  to  use  the  bayonet,  because  the 
blood  is  then  kept  warm  by  the  excitement  of  the  mo- 
ment, and  such  a  movement  will  generally  succeed 
on  account  of  its  daring. 

Before  engaging,  an  inspection  of  the  arms  should 
be  made,  to  see  that  all  are  in  good  condition,  that 
nothing  is  wanting,  the  cartridge-boxes  full,  &c.  The 
general  should  assemble  the  principal  subordinates 
and  inform  them  of  his  intentions  and  expectations, 
a*  well  as  all  he  knows  of  the  plans  of  the  enemy. 
He  encourages  them  by  the  confidence  thus  mani- 
fested, and  a  proper  spirit  of  emulation  is  excited. 
He  especially  recommends  them  to  lend  mutual  assist- 
ance, to  avoid  partial  efforts,  to  act  impetuously  and 
together,  to  show  a  fine  example  to  the  soldiers,  and 
to  do  nothing  but  what  is  perfectly  honorable.  Points 
of  assembly  in  case  of  reverse  are  agreed  upon,  and 
they  are  then  sent  back  to  their  respective  commands. 

If  the  combat  is  foreseen  the  troops  should  fight  in 
full  uniform.  This  mark  of  politeness  is  due  to  a  re- 
spectable enemy,  and  troops  who  are  trying  to  appear 
to  the  best  advantage  will  usually  do  their  duty  best 
in  the  engagement. 

In  a  Plain. — The  action  is  begun  by  the  skirmish- 


284  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

ers,  who  are  spread  out  to  the  front  sufficiently  far  to 
cover  the  deployments  ;  and  when,  after  a  longer  or 
shorter  time,  according  to  circumstances,  the  skir- 
mishers have  unmasked  the  front  and  rallied  to  the 
rear,  the  firing  of  the  real  line  will  begin.  The  firing 
should  not  be  commenced  at  too  great  a  distance,  for, 
in  that  case,  some  of  the  shots  are  lost ;  neither,  from 
an  excess  of  confidence,  which  has  sometimes  proved 
fatal,  should  the  firing  be  delayed  until  the  enemy 
gets  too  near,  because  the  ranks,  having  to  receive 
several  discharges,  become  somewhat  thinned,  espe- 
cially as  the  first  shots  are  always  better  aimed  than 
the  subsequent  ones.  Firing  by  file  is  almost  exclu- 
sively used,  because  that  by  platoons  can  seldom  be 
maintained,  on  account  of  the  noise  and  confusion  ;  and, 
moreover,  the  soldier  fires  more  accurately  when  he 
takes  his  own  time.  Volley  firing,  by  battalion  or 
half  battalion,  sometimes  has  a  good  effect,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, when  poured  into  a  body  of  troops  boldly  ad- 
vancing to  the  charge.  In  such  a  case  as  this,  bold- 
ness should  be  met  by  boldness,  the  fire  reserved  until 
the  enemy  is  within  thirty  or  forty  paces,  a  volley  de- 
livered in  his  face,  and  then  a  rush  made  upon  him 
with  the  bayonet.  A  body  of  troops  advancing  find 
themselves  but  little  injured  by  distant  firing,  their 
courage  is  really  increased,  and  they  become  irresist- 
ible. If,  on  the  contrary,  the  fire  is  reserved,  the 
men  are  disconcerted  at  their  unexpected  reception, 
and  when  at  last  the  volley  cornes,  they  are  ready  to 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     285 

take  to  their  heels.     If  this  murderous  discharge  is 

O 

followed  up  by  a  rapid  charge,  it  will  almost  certainly 
prove  successful. 

While  a  fusilade  is  going  on  from  both  sides,  one 
or  the  other  will  insensibly  gain  ground,  by  that  in- 
stinct of  the  soldier  which  urges  him  to  press  upon  an 
adversary  he  deems  his  inferior.  Thus,  without  an 
apparent  movement,  without  any  command  being 
given,  a  wing  will  be  gradually  advanced.  Then  a 
reserve  force  should  be  brought  up  and  deployed 
against  the  yielding  enemy,  or  thrown  upon  him  in 
column.  If  this  attack  is  successful,  the  whole  line 
advances  and  attacks  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet, 
marching  in  line  of  battle,  or  forming  columns  of 
attack  with  skirmishers  in  the  intervals. 

This  last  course  is  preferable  in  ordinary  cases ;  the 
commanders  encourage  their  columns,  and  correct  the 
disorder  which  is  almost  inevitable  in  those  which 
have  suffered  most.  As  soon  as  a  battalion  has  broken 
the  line  of  the  enemy,  it  should  prepare  to  attack  in 
flank  the  nearest  troops  which  are  still  in  good  order. 
For  that  purpose,  each  column  should  be  so  organized 
that  it  may  readily  be  divided  in  two  parts,  and  moved 
by  both  flanks  ;  the  column  of  attack  permits  this. 
If  the  enemy's  line  is  broken  in  this  way  at  two  or 
three  places,  it  cannot  stand  much  longer  at  any 
point. 

But  when  the  opposing  bodies  are  very  near,  it  is 
sometimes  better  to  charge  in  line  than  to  take  time 


286  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

to  form  the  columns  of  attack.  If  the  battalions  are 
well  drilled,  this  last  method  is  very  effectual  in  break- 
ing the  line  of  the  enemy  when  he  seems  to  be  waver- 
ing, or  has  suffered  greatly.  By  attacking  thus  along 
the  whole  front,  the  enemy  is  unable  to  practise  the 
stratagem  of  making  an  opening  in  his  line,  with  the 
purpose  of  drawing  on  the  assailants,  and  then  envel- 
oping and  destroying  them. 

Sometimes  the  line  will  advance  upon  the  enemy 
with  some  battalions  deployed,  and  others  in  columns, 
the  latter  being  formed  under  cover  of  the  skirmish- 
ers, and  the  deployed  battalions  continuing  their  fire. 
The  whole  line  then  moves  forward,  the  deployed  bat- 
talions halt  at  short  range,  and  pour  in  their  fire,  while 
the  columns  rush  upon  the  enemy,  break  through  his 
line  and  threaten  the  flanks.  The  deployed  battalions 
advance  again  and  sweep  the  ground  with  their  fire. 
Mutual  assistance  and  support  are  thus  rendered  by 
the  deployed  battalions  and  those  in  column.  This 
order  is  sometimes  adopted  at  the  outset  of  the  en- 
gagement, to  give  more  solidity  to  the  line,  while  pre- 
serving the  advantage  of  a  good  front  for  firing.  It 
will  be  used  when  it  is  desired  to  act  offensively  upon 
a  particular  part  of  the  enemy's  line,  to  seize  the  key- 
point  of  the  field,  &c.  At  the  battle  of  Fuentes  de 
Onore,  in  1811,  a  brigade,  composed  of  five  battalions, 
had  three  formed  in  close  columns  by  division,  and 
the  two  intervening  deployed.  In  his  admirable  Italian 
campaign,  in  passing  a  ford  of  the  Tagliamento,  JBo- 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     287 

naparte  had  in  each  regiment  one  battalion  deployed, 
and  the  other  two  in  close  columns  on  the  wings  of 
the  iirst.  Oftener  still  this  order  of  attack  results 
from  the  fact  that,  at  the  moment  of  advancing,  some 
battalions  are  formed  in  column,  while  others,  being 
better  situated  for  delivering  their  fire,  remain  in  line. 
The  openings  thus  formed  in  the  line  should  be  filled 
by  skirmishers. 

The  rule  for  charges  is,  to  persist  in  them  when  once 
begun,  not  to  fire  a  shot,  but  to  press  upon  the  enemy 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  both  to  avoid  the  effect  of  his 
fire  and  to  overthrow  him  by  the  shock.  The  bayo- 
net should  not  be  brought  down  until  within  ten  paces 
of  the  enemy,  as  order  in  the  ranks  is  much  better 
preserved  in  this  way.  There  is  nothing  more  im- 
posing than  a  column  advancing  in  this  way  at  the 
u  double  quick  ;"  the  ground  trembles  under  the  tread 
of  many  feet. 

When  the  line  of  the  enemy  is  routed,  a  few  compa- 
nies should  be  detached  in  pursuit,  and  the  ranks  are 
reformed  for  a  renewal  of  the  contest,  if  necessary,  with 
the  second  line  or  the  reserve.  Ko  longer  halt,  how- 
ever, should,  be  permitted  than  is  necessary  to  rally 
the  troops ;  an  advance  should  at  once  be  made  upon 
the  second  line,  which,  being  discouraged  by  the  de- 
feat of  the  first,  and  perhaps  thrown  into  confusion  by 
its  disordered  and  flying  battalions,  will  probably 
make  but  a  faint  resistance. 

If  the  combat  is  obstinate,  and  his  first  line  has  suf- 


288  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

fered  severely,  the  general  should  bring  up  his  second, 
and  move  it  through  the  intervals  of  the  first.  This 
offensive  movement,  made  under  cover  of  the  skirmish- 
ers, will  shake  the  enemy's  line ;  he  will  with  diffi- 
culty be  able  to  stand  the  fire  of  these  new  battalions, 
that  have  just  deployed  their  fresh  troops  in  front  of 
his,  who  are  wearied  and  harassed.  Here  it  should 
be  observed,  that  if  the  passage  of  the  lines  were  ef- 
fected, by  the  battalions  of  the  first  line  falling  back 
through  the  intervals  of  the  second,  the  result  would 
have  been  much  more  doubtful.  Every  retrograde 
movement  is  dangerous,  because  of  its  bad  effect  upon 
the  morale  of  the  troops.  To  fall  back  is,  with  most 
men,  to  acknowledge  themselves  worsted.  It  is  par- 
ticularly important  to  avoid  movements  to  the  rear 
with  raw  troops,  who  easily  lose  their  equanimity. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  first  line  becomes  the  second, 
reforms,  sends  off  its  wounded  men,  takes  some  rest, 
and  makes  preparations  for  new  efforts,  in  order  to 
bring  the  contest  to  a  close. 

But  fortune  may  be  adverse,  and  the  general  will 
then  observe  his  troops  begin  to  give  ground,  and  to 
waver  and  fall  into  confusion.  A  portion  of  the  re- 
serve should  then  be  brought  up,  and  if  these  fresh 
troops  do  not  succeed  in  regaining  the  lost  ground,  it 
is  time  to  prepare  for  retreat.  The  first  line  will 
already,  and  in  spite  of  its  efforts,  have  fallen  back 
towards  the  second  line,  and  may  be  so  near,  that, 
to  avoid  producing  disorder  in  the  latter,  it  may  be 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     289 

necessary  to  effect  a  passage  of  the  first  to  the  rear  of 
the  second.  If  the  first  line  falls  back  in  good  order,  it 
should  halt  at  three  or  four  hundred  paces  to  the  rear, 
and  face  about ;  but  if  some  of  the  battalions  are 
scattered,  their  chiefs  should  plant  their  colors  in  some 
conspicuous  places,  and  cause  the  drums  to  beat  at  the 
same  time.  The  soldiers  will  have  rallying  points  in 
this  way. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  second  line  cannot  hold  its 
ground  long  against  the  victorious  troops  of  the  en- 
emy ;  it  must  therefore  commence  to  retire  in  an 
orderly  way,  either  falling  back  in  line,  occasionally 
halting,  turning  upon  the  enemy  and  giving  him  seve- 
ral volleys ;  or  adopting  the  checker  formation,  either 
by  battalions  or  half  battalions,  or  moving  in  echelon, 
if  one  wing  is  less  pressed  than  the  other.  At  the 
same  time,  skirmishers  should,  if  practicable,  be  thrown 
out  upon  the  flanks  of  the  enemy,  to  check  his  pur- 
suit. This  is  the  moment  for  engaging  the  troops 
which  have  thus  far  been  held  in  reserve.  These  will 
pass  to  the  front,  and  rush  impetuously  upon  the  enemy 
with  the  bayonet ;  by  vigorous  conduct  of  this  sort 
they  may  check  his  advance,  or  oblige  him  at  least 
to  move  with  more  slowness  and  circumspection.  In 
this  way  efforts  will  be  made  to  dispute  the  field,  inch 
by  inch,  until  night.  The  baggage  and  the  wounded 
are  sent  to  the  rear,  to  be  out  of  the  way  of  the  re- 
treating troops.  If  there  is  a  defile,  such  as  a  bridge, 
or  causeway  through  a  marsh,  &c.,  to  be  passed,  the 
13 


290  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

troops  must  form  line  of  battle  in  front  of  it,  and  per- 
form the  manoeuvres  prescribed  for  passing  defiles  in 
retreat.  If  the  defile  is  short,  the  troops  will  reform 
on  the  other  side ;  if  it  is  of  considerable  length,  and 
the  enemy  presses  on  in  pursuit,  a  defence  must  be 
made  from  point  to  point,  advantage  being  taken  of 
the  ground.  Sometimes  an  ambuscade  may  be  pre- 
pared for  an  incautious  enemy.  This  is  a  resource 
upon  which  too  much  reliance  should  not  be  placed. 
Still  it  should  not  be  forgotten  or  neglected. 

It  may  happen,  and,  unfortunately,  often  does 
happen,  that  a  vigorous  defence  of  a  position  against 
superior  numbers  may  result  in  the  defenders  being 
surrounded.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  is  certainly  very 
critical,  but  it  need  not  necessarily  end  in  a  surrender. 
On  the  contrary,  the  commander  should  gather  all 
his  forces,  before  he  is  too  closely  pressed,  and  rush 
headlong  upon  the  enemy  at  the  point  where  his  line 
seems  weakest,  or  in  the  direction  where  the  chances 
of  escape  are  greatest.  Fortune  usually  smiles  upon 
such  efforts ;  the  enveloping  line  is  weakened  by  its 
extent,  is  pierced,  and  all  or  part  of  the  troops  escape. 
In  1795,  the  Piedmontese  general,  Roccaviva,  being 
surrounded  at  Loano  by  a  French  division,  refused  to 
surrender,  fell  in  mass  upon  the  enveloping  line, 
broke  through  it,  and  succeeded  in  joining  the  Austrian 
army.  Even  if  such  an  attempt  fails,  the  captured 
soldiers  will  at  least  have  done  every  thing  required  by 
the  most  exalted  honor. 


COMBAT   OF    INFANTRY 


Upon  Heights.  —  Combats  do  not  always  occur  in 
level  ground;  on  the  contrary,  undulations  of  the 
ground  are  often  advantageous  to  the  defence,  and 
lead  to  its  occupation.  It  then  becomes  necessary  to 
attack  the  enemy  in  position,  if  he  cannot  be  turned. 

A  height  may  be  attacked  either  in  front  or  on  the 
side.  Most  frequently  both  attacks  are  used  together, 
because  it  is  necessary  to  divide  the  attention  of  the 
enemy.  Without  that,  he  might  have  too  much  the 
advantage.  If  the  defenders  are  uncovered,  occupy- 
ing the  slopes  and  not  the  crest,  the  attack  may  be 
opened  by  firing  upon  him,  to  thin  his  ranks.  But 
this  will  not  be  kept  up  long,  as  the  advancing  columns 
will  soon  put  an  end  to  it  ;  they  will  slowly  ascend 
the  slopes,  stopping  occasionally  to  take  breath. 
When  they  have  nearly  reached  the  enemy,  they 
should  increase  the  pace,  and  charge  with  the  bayonet. 
The  columns  should  be  rather  numerous  than  long  ; 
too  great  length  makes  them  heavy,  and  they  present 
too  good  a  mark  for  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  They 
should  all  advance  equally,  otherwise  those  leading 
may  be  seriously  checked,  and  the  effect  produced  is 
bad. 

If  the  enemy  is  entirely  on  the  summit,  it  will  be 
useless  to  fire,  as  the  crest  hides  him,  unless  he  has 
some  troops  on  the  slopes  for  the  purpose  of  firing. 
The  columns,  being  in  readiness  to  attack  after 
ascending  the  slopes,  halt  to  take  breath  and  reform, 
especially  if,  from  the  form  of  the  ground  and  the 


292  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

retired  position  of  the  enemy,  both  parties  are  con- 
cealed from  each  other.  A  warm  reception  and  a 
murderous  fire  must  be  expected,  for  the  defenders, 
being  three-quarters  covered  by  the  ground,  have  a 
very  great  advantage  over  the  assailants  when  they 
first  show  themselves.  Moreover,  the  defenders  are 
fresh  and  in  line,  whereas  the  assailants  are  more  or 
less  fatigued  and  in  column.  Therefore,  when  the 
movement  is  begun,  it  should  be  made  with  great 
impetuosity  and  rapidity,  to  prevent  the  defenders 
from  firing  even  a  single  volley,  if  possible.  A  ruse 
may  sometimes  be  resorted  to,  to  draw  their  fire,  by 
sending  forward  a  few  skirmishers  in  open  order,  and, 
under  their  protection,  the  main  body  may  advance, 
the  men  stooping  down  and  raising  their  caps  on  the 
end  of  their  bayonets,  so  as  to  make  the  fire  pass  over 
their  heads;  if  the  enemy  fires,  an  immediate  rush 
must  be  made  upon  him. 

The  columns  should  always  be  accompanied  by 
numerous  skirmishers,  closing  the  intervals  between 
them  and  covering  the  flanks.  These  skirmishers, 
forming  a  closer  line  than  usual,  fire  rapidly ;  they 
act  like  a  deployed  line,  preparing  the  way  by  its 
fire  for  the  advance  of  the  columns  of  attack. 

The  course  to  be  pursued  in  defending  heights  is 
indicated  by  what  has  already  been  said.  The  troops 
who  first  show  themselves  having  been  received  by  a 
well-aimed  fire,  a  rush  should  be  made  upon  them 
without  reloading;  when  they  are  repulsed,  the 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     293 

defenders  may  return  to  their  former  covered  position. 
This  method  was  more  than  once  successfully  practised 
by  the  English  against  the  attacks  of  the  French 
columns,  and  particularly  at  Pampeluna,  in  1813. 
If  the  defenders  do  not  halt  and  fall  back  to  their 
position,  after  repelling  the  enemy,  they  run  the  risk 
of  being  drawn  on  by  a  pretended  flight  to  the  bottom 
of  the  hill,  where  the  assailants  turn  upon  them  and 
defeat  them.  It  is  never  safe  to  indulge  in  a  headlong 
pursuit,  even  of  a  disordered  enemy.  Certain  pre- 
cautions should  always  be  taken,  which  have  been 
more  than  once  pointed  out. 

If  there  are  fortifications  on  the  high  ground,  care 
should  be  taken  not  to  mask  their  fire,  as  otherwise 
their  whole  advantage  may  be  neutralized.  General 
Taupin  committed  a  fault  of  this  kind  at  the  battle 
of  Toulouse,  where  he  placed  his  troops  in  front  of  a 
redoubt,  which  was  really  the  strong  point  of  his 
position.  He  made  another  mistake  which  it  may  be 
well  to  point  out,  as  it  relates  to  the  subject  now 
under  consideration.  He  formed  his  whole  division 
into  a  single  column,  which  was  enveloped  by  the 
fire  of  the  enemy,  and  could  only  reply  from  the  head 
of  the  leading  battalion ;  it  lost  its  momentum,  was 
repulsed,  and  driven  in  disorder  off  the  ground.  This 
kind  of  attack  was  proper  against  an  enemy  with 
a  stream  behind  him,  and  climbing  a  hill  with  diffi- 
culty, but  there  should  have  been  several  columns, 
and  not  a  single  one.  If  the  French  had  been  less 


294  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

impetuous,  and  had  been  deployed  upon  the  top  of 
the  high  ground,  imitating  the  method  used  by  their 
adversaries,  the  presumption  is  a  reasonable  one  that 
they  might  have  driven  them  back  to  the  stream  and 
into  it. 

Hence  it  appears  that,  if  the  defenders  are  deployed, 
and  the  enemy  advance  in  a  single  column,  there  is 
no  cause  for  apprehension.  The  line  should  be  formed 
in  a  circle,  or  like  the  letter  V,  in  order  to  envelop 
the  column,  which  can  only  fire  from  its  head. 
Coolness  and  good  aiming  are  all  that  are  requisite, 
and  this  formidable  column  will  almost  surely  be 
checked  in  disorder  ;  if  it  continues  to  move  on,  resist- 
ance to  it  in  front  is  useless ;  the  line  should  yield  and 
the  attack  be  made  upon  the  flanks  ;  not  a  single  shot 
will  be  lost,  and  the  overthrow  of  the  enemy  is  certain. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  resist  the  attack  of  several 
columns.  However,  if  it  is  foreseen,  if  the  troops 
on  the  defensive  are  in  good  order,  a  steady  fire  should 
be  opened  at  good  range.  The  flank  companies  will 
deliver  their  fire  upon  the  flanks  of  the  advancing 
columns,  and  the  enemy,  seeing  his  losses  increase, 
will  either  halt  in  order  to  deploy  and  return  the  fire, 
or  his  impetuosity  will  at  least  be  much  diminished. 

In  Woods. — If  the  enemy  is  holding  a  wood,  skir- 
mishers must  be  principally  used  to  dislodge  him,  as 
great  loss  would  be  caused  the  assailants  were  they  to 
attack  at  the  outset  either  in  line  or  in  column.  The 
skirmishers  should  envelop  the  salient  portions  of  the 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     295 

wood,  for  they  will  in  this  way  be  enabled  to  take 
in  flank  those  men  who  are  trying  to  conceal  them- 
selves behind  trees.  If  there  is  any  part  of  the  wood 
commanded  by  neighboring  heights,  or  that  may  be 
approached  unobserved,  the  skirmishers  should  select 
these  points,  as  they  are  evidently  weak. 

In  order  to  get  near  the  point  of  attack,  the  assail- 
ants should  take  advantage  of  all  local  features, 
creeping  along  hedges  and  ditches,  and  covering  them- 
selves by  every  little  elevation  of  ground,  by  clumps 
of  trees,  &c.  The  enemy  should  be  fired  upon  from 
every  point  that  is  gained,  in  order  to  harass  him  as 
much  as  possible ;  and  even  when  he  is  really  not  much 
injured,  the  accuracy  of  his  fire  will  be  affected.  While 
efforts  are  made  to  advance  in  front  by  quite  open 
lines  of  skirmishers,  the  attention  of  the  enemy  should 
be  diverted  by  false  attacks  at  distant  points. 

As  soon  as  the  skirmishers  have  taken  possession  of 
the  outskirts  of  the  wood  and  are  covered  by  the  trees, 
detachments  should  be  brought  up  to  their  support, 
and  as  they  penetrate  into  the  forest,  the  main  body 
advances,  divided  into  several  small  columns  that 
move  forward  to  the  sound  of  drums  and  trumpets  ; 
they  should  always  be  at  some  distance  behind  the 
skirmishers,  but  ready  to  support  them  if  necessary. 
If  an  open  space  is  found,  the  troops  must  be  rallied 
before  crossing  it,  and  new  measures  taken  to  attack 
the  other  part  of  the  forest ;  the  same  course  should  be 
pursued  whenever  any  obstacle  is  encountered ;  no 


296  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

individuals  or  detached  bodies  should  alone  cross  a 
ditch  or  a  ravine  or  a  strong  hedge,  for  there  is  always 
danger  of  meeting  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  other 
side,  and  it  may  be  impossible  to  assemble  men  enough 
to  resist  him. 

When  the  forest  is  of  small  extent,  it  is  better  to  try 
to  turn  it ;  in  this  case,  the  assailants  will  keep  out  of 
range  of  fire-arms. 

In  the  defence,  an  effort  should  be  made  to  occupy 
the  skirts  by  skirmishers ;  if  time  permits,  the  adjoin- 
ing ground  should  be  cleared  up,  ditches  filled,  &c., 
in  order  to  afford  a  better  view  of  the  assailants  and 
to  remove  every  thing  which  might  cover  his  advance ; 
abatis  should  be  constructed  in  the  most  accessible 
places,  and  especially  by  cutting  down  the  trees  at  the 
most  salient  positions  ;  salients  may  also  be  flanked 
by  small  field-works,  in  order  to  prevent  the  assailant 
from  enveloping  them  ;  trunks  of  trees,  laid  one  upon 
the  other,  and  held  in  place  by  stakes,  are  excellent 
for  this  purpose. 

Behind  the  line  of  skirmishers,  supports  are  placed, 
either  to  secure  their  retreat  or  to  re- enforce  them  ; 
they  are  also  on  the  wings,  to  prevent  them  from  being 
turned.  Still  farther  to  the  rear,  and  at  a  point  equally 
distant  from  the  threatened  points,  is  placed  the  reserve, 
to  act  according  to  circumstances.  Thus,  for  exam- 
ple, if  the  attack  is  disconnected  and  the  defence  of 
the  outskirts  is  successful,  the  reserve  may  take  the 
offensive  by  debouching  from  the  wood  or  by  passing 


COMBAT  OF  INFANTRY  WITH  INFANTRY.     297 

around  it.  Such  an  operation  may  succeed,  because 
the  troops  that  execute  it  are  concealed  during  the 
movement  and  the  assailant  may  be  surprised. 

In  Inhabited  Places. — The  attack  of  a  body  of  in- 
fantry, posted  in  a  town  or  village  which  is  favorable 
to  defence,  is  a  very  difficult  operation  without  the  aid 
of  artillery.  In  such  affairs  the  artillery  is  the  most 
important  arm.  However,  if  the  enemy  has  not  had 
time  to  fortify  himself,  the  attempt  may  be  made  with 
infantry  alone,  if  the  assailant  is  in  superior  numbers. 
"We  will  suppose  that  infantry  alone  is  used.  Gener- 
ally the  attack  will  be  made  in  columns ;  skirmishers 
should  envelop  the  village,  to  drive  the  defenders  from 
hedges  and  garden  walls,  to  fire  into  windows,  and  at- 
tempt to  take  possession  of  several  detached  houses, 
where  they  may  take  post  and  fight  the  enemy  on 
equal  terms. 

The  columns  will  not  advance  until  the  fire  of  the 
skirmishers  has  produced  its  effect,  which  will  be  in- 
ferred from  the  slackening  of  the  fire  of  the  defenders. 
Until  this  time  the  columns  should  keep  out  of  range  or 
covered  by  some  accident  of  the  ground.  While  one 
column  attacks  in  front  and  attempts  to  penetrate  the 
principal  street  of  the  village,  others  should  be  at  its 
sides  to  look  for  other  entrances,  or  to  turn  the  place, 
if  possible.  The  columns  will  be  preceded  by  sappers 
or  workmen,  provided  with  axes  and  crowbars,  shov- 
els and  picks,  who  throw  down  walls,  cut  hedges  and 
palisades,  fill  up  ditches ;  in  a  word,  remove  all  obsta- 
13* 


298  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

cles  that  might  impede  the  movements  of  the  troops. 
If  a  house  offers  a  particularly  obstinate  resistance,  it 
should  be  surrounded  and  attacked  on  all  sides;  and, 
if  the  defenders  obstinately  refuse  to  lay  down  their 
arms,  they  should  be  threatened  with  having  the  house 
burned  over  their  heads.  For  that  purpose  straw  and 
piles  of  brush  will  be  brought  up,  but  lire  should  not 
be  set  to  it  until  the  defenders  have  again  been  sum- 
moned to  surrender,  as  no  unnecessary  cruelty  should 
be  practised  even  in  war. 

If  the  enemy  defends  the  village  from  house  to 
house,  the  same  course  must  be  pursued  by  the  assail- 
ants, that  is  to  say,  fire  will  be  poured  from  the  win- 
dows and  roofs  of  those  which  are  in  possession  of  the 
latter.  It  will  readily  be  perceived  that  this  kind  of 
a  contest  can  only  take  place  in  large  villages  or  towns 
where  the  streets  are,  like  those  of  cities,  lined  with 
continuous  rows  of  houses  solidly  constructed.  In 
such  places  one  precaution  must  be  taken :  it  consists 
in  advancing  singly  along  a  street  that  is  to  be  seized  ; 
men  slipping  along  the  walls  are  covered  by  very  small 
projections,  and  may  succeed  at  last  in  reaching  im- 
portant points  without  too  much  exposure.  Generally, 
when  troops  are  making  an  assault  in  a  defile,  they 
should  not  be  crowded,  as  a  repulse  of  those  in  front 
may  lead  to  terrible  slaughter  and  confusion.  The 
advance  should,  in  such  cases,  be  made  by  successive 
companies  at  considerable  intervals,  those  not  actually 
engaged  being  kept  under  cover.  In  proceeding  along 


COMBAT    OF    INFANTRY    WITH    INFANTRY.  299 

a  street  an  entrance  may  be  effected  in  one  house,  and 
the  assailants  may  then  sometimes  pass  from  house  to 
house  under  cover,  breaking  down  division  walls. 

In  order  to  defend  a  village,  the  infantry  should  be 
distributed  in  the  gardens,  behind  walls  and  hedges, 
and  at  the  windows  of  houses.  A  single  rank  is  suffi- 

O 

cient  for  such  purposes,  and,  consequently,  a  quite  ex- 
tended line  may  be  occupied ;  however,  it  should  not 
be  more  so  than  necessary.  This  is  a  fine  opportunity 
for  riflemen  and  sharpshooters  to  show  their  skill,  be- 
cause they  are  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy  and  can 
quietly  take  perfect  aim.  Platoons  or  companies 
should  be  placed  in  the  streets  or  avenues,  to  support 
the  line  of  sharpshooters,  and  a  reserve  at  the  centre 
of  the  village  or  a  little  to  the  rear,  in  readiness  to 
move  in  any  direction  to  meet  the  enemy.  If  time 
permits,  openings  should  be  pierced  in  the  walls  to 
serve  as  loopholes ;  the  principal  streets  should  be  bar- 
ricaded, &c. 

When  the  village  is  surrounded  or  preceded  by  a 
ravine  or  a  little  stream,  or  any  other  obstacle,  the  de- 
fence should  commence  there ;  if  necessary,  a  retreat 
will  be  made  upon  the  village,  which  will  have  been 
previously  occupied  by  a  portion  of  the  troops  and  put 
rapidly  in  a  defensible  condition.  The  resistance  that 
may  be  made  under  cover  of  the  houses,  walls,  and  other 
enclosures,  will  be  the  more  energetic  and  prolonged, 
as  the  enemy  will  be  less  likely  to  turn  the  position, 
either  on  account  of  its  natural  features  or  the  disposi- 


PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 


tion  of  the  troops.  In  this  case,  vigorous  sorties  will 
succeed  well,  if  made  at  suitable  places  and  not  pushed 
too  far,  for  fear  of  the  parties  being  cut  off;  the  ave- 
nues by  which  they  will  return  should  be  suitably  oc- 
cupied, so  that  the  enemy  may  not  re-enter  pellmell 
with  them.  Offensive  returns  of  this  sort  always  pro- 
duce a  good  effect,  and  they  should  be  frequently  re- 
peated ;  they  elevate  the  morale  of  the  defenders  and 
disconcert  the  assailants. 

In  order  to  avoid  confusion,  each  detachment  should 
be  charged  with  the  defence  of  a  particular  part  of  the 
village,  and  instructed  in  the  manner  of  doing  this,  and 
of  effecting  a  retreat,  in  case  such  an  operation  becomes 
necessary.  This  precept  is  applicable  not  only  to  the 
defence  of  a  village,  but  to  any  military  operation. 

After  all  that  has  been  said,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  wooden  villages  are  rather  dangerous  than  useful 
to  occupy,  because  they  are  readily  set  on  fire.  A 
village  which  can  be  surrounded  on  all  sides  cannot 
be  well  defended.  To  make  a  good  defence,  it  is 
therefore  necessary  :  1st,  that  the  village  be  built  of 
masonry  ;  2d,  that  it  rest  upon  some  obstacle  which 
prevents  its  being  turned,  or  else  it  mast  be  supported 
in  rear  by  good  troops. 

Art.  II  —  Cavalry   against   Cavalry. 

The  fundamental  rule  for  cavalry  is,  not  to  wait  to 
receive  an  attack,  but  to  act  always  offensively,  and  to 
be  galloping  at  the  moment  of  meeting  the  enemy. 


CAVALRY  AGAINST  CAVALRY.          301 

Otherwise  it  will  be  thrown  into  confusion  and  dis- 
persed, for  it  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  by  expe- 
rience that  a  squadron,  even  of  heavy  cavalry,  cannot 
withstand,  at  a  halt,  the  attack  of  another  squadron  of 
which  the  horses  are  very  small,  provided  the  latter 
is  at  the  gallop.  This  is  not  because  the  shock  of  a 
body  of  cavalry  is  proportional  to  the  mass  and  the 
velocity  with  which  it  moves,  but  because  the  gallop 
gives  impetuosity,  excites  the  horses,  and  timid  riders 
are  drawn  along  with  the  others. 

When  two  bodies  of  cavalry  are  advancing  towards 
each  other  to  engage  in  front,  that  one  will  have  the 
advantage  which  has  several  squadrons  in  a  position  to 
charge  at  the  same  time  upon  the  flank  of  the  other. 
The  result  of  such  a  movement  is  even  more  decisive 
than  in  combats  of  infantry,  both  on  account  of  the 
rapidity  with  which  it  is  executed,  and  the  difficulty 
the  assailed  line  has  in  opposing  it.  There  should, 
therefore,  be  placed  in  rear  of  the  wings  of  a  line  of 
cavalry,  columns  composed  of  several  squadrons  or 
platoons,  according  to  the  strength  of  the  force  in 
line.  These  columns,  formed  at  full  distance,  while 
they  enable  an  attack  to  be  made  upon  the  enemy's 
flank,  are  the  surest  means  of  guarding  against  a  sim- 
ilar attack  from  him,  since  a  column  at  full  distance 
may  in  a  moment  deploy  and  be  ready  to  meet  an  at- 
tempt to  envelop  the  extremity  of  the  line.  In  an 
attack  made  by  heavy  cavalry,  the  columns  on  the 
wings  may  be  formed  of  light  horse,  which,  in  addi- 


302  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

tion  to  the  duty  already  assigned  them,  may  pursue 
the  enemy  after  the  charge,  while  the  line  of  battle  is 
reforming.  As  the  enemy  may  adopt  the  same  meas- 
ures, the  precaution  should  be  taken  of  holding  a 
small  reserve,  if  only  a  platoon,  in  echelon  with  the 
columns  on  the  wings.  To  avoid  inversions  in  de- 
ploying these  columns,  that  on  the  right  wing  should 
have  its  left  in  front,  and  that  on  the  left  its  right  in 
front.  But,  as  has  already  been  explained,  cavalry 
should  be  perfectly  accustomed  to  inversions,  in  order 
to  be  always  ready  to  deploy  in  either  direction. 

When  cavalry  can  rest  its  wings  on  any  natural 
obstacle  which  prevents  the  enemy  from  mano3uvring 
on  the  flank,  the  columns  on  the  wings  are  no  longer 
necessary,  but,  as  a  general  rule,  their  presence  can- 
not be  too  strongly  insisted  on.  It  appears,"  therefore, 
that  a  body  of  cavalry  moving  to  the  attack,  is  partly 
deployed  and  partly  in  column.  While  satisfying 
these  conditions,  it  should  occupy  as  large  a  front  as 
possible,  because  it  is  important  to  have  as  many  en- 
gaged at  once  as  possible.  If  a  body  of  cavalry  should 
advance  in  column,  it  would  be  almost  certainly 
beaten,  as  none  but  the  men  in  front  could  use  their 
weapons ;  enveloped  and  attacked  on  the  flanks,  the 
column  could  only  extricate  itself  by  a  speedy  flight. 

If  cavalry  advances  in  a  single  unbroken  line,  with 
but  small  intervals  between  the  squadrons,  it  is  said 
to  charge  en  muraitte,  or  as  a  wall.  This  method  of 
attack  is  very  imposing,  but  is  only  practicable  for  a 


CAVALRY  AGAINST  CAVALRY.          303 

few  squadrons,  because,  on  account  of  the  irregulari- 
ties of  the  ground  and  other  obstacles,  and  the  inevi- 
table crowding  that  takes  place  in  a  line  of  consider- 
able length,  the  shock  is  not  a  single  one,  but  com- 
posed of  partial  shocks,  whose  effect  is  by  no  means  so 
great;  if  the  line  is  thrown  into  confusion  at  any 
point,  and  especially  if  it  is  pierced  by  the  enemy, 
the  disorder  may  become  general  throughout  the  line ; 
mistakes  are  corrected  with  difficulty ;  finally,  one  of 
the  principal  advantages  of  this  arm — its  mobility — is 
lost.  The  charge  in  a  continued  line  of  great  extent 
is  hardly  practicable,  when  the  design  is  to  sweep 
over  a  field  of  battle  covered  with  broken  battalions, 
of  which  some  are  making  a  show  of  resistance. 

The  attack  in  echelons  is  much  used  by  cavalry 
commanders,  and  oifers  the  advantages  of  not  enga- 
ging the  whole  force  at  once,  and  of  giving  better  op- 
portunities of  retrieving  chance  reverses  during  the 
action.  The  most  retired  echelons  are  last  engaged, 
and,  up  to  the  moment  of  being  so,  are  disposable  for 
the  support  of  the  others,  or  to  attack  the  enemy 
in  flank.  This  formation  is  especially  advantageous 
when  the  cavalry,  in  order  to  attack,  passes  from 
column  into  line,  as  would  happen,  for  example,  in 
issuing  from  a  defile  :  under  such  circumstances  it  is 

O  ' 

not  necessary  to  wait  until  all  the  echelons  are  in 
line  before  making  the  charge,  as  it  is  sufficient  for 
the  first  to  be  formed,  and  the  others  will  come  up  in 
succession.  So  long  as  the  deployment  is  unfinished, 


304  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

the  enemy  is  uncertain  where  the  attack  is  to  be 
made,  and  this  is  an  advantage  for  the  assailant. 
Two  or  three  echelons  may  be  placed  in  position  to 
threaten  his  left;  he  will  re-enforce  that  part.  The 
remaining  echelons  may  then  be  launched  against  his 
weakened  right,  which  will  very  probably  give  way, 
as  there  is  not  time  enough  for  a  counter-manoeuvre 
on  his  part.  If  the  leading  echelon  is  successful,  it 
may  take  the  line  in  flank  while  the  others  attack  in 
front.  The  echelons  must  have  considerable  strength 
in  themselves,  that  their  successive  shocks  may  pro- 
duce the  expected  effect.  They  should,  therefore,  be 
formed  of  regiments,  or,  at  least,  of  squadrons ;  eche- 
lons of  platoons  are  of  little  value.  We  repeat,  cav- 
alry in  attacking  cavalry  should  always  form  a  front 
of  considerable  extent,  without,  however,  dispensing 
with  the  columns  on  the  wino-s  or  other  means  of  at- 

O 

tacking  the  enemy  in  flank  at  the  same  time  as  in 
front. 

Whatever  dispositions  are  adopted,  the  rules  for  the 
charge  are  invariable.  The  troops  move  off  at  a  walk, 
then  taking  the  trot,  which  becomes  gradually  more 
rapid  until  they  fall  into  the  gallop  at  some  distance 
from  the  enemy,  and  at  last  into  the  full  run  when  at 
about  a  hundred  paces,  uttering  at  the  same  time  loud 
cries.  Without  these  precautions,  if  the  gallop  is 
taken  too  soon,  the  horses  are  blown  and  the  ranks 
disunited  before  the  enemy  is  reached,  the  imposing 
effect  of  the  onset  of  one  great  mass  is  lost,  the  shocks 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    CAVALRY.  305 

are  partial  and  of  no  avail.  The  shouts  inspire  the 
men  and  excite  the  horses.  At  the  moment  of  the 
shock  and  in  the  ensuing  melee,  it  is  better  generally 
to  use  the  point  rather  than  the  edge  of  the  sabre. 

If  light  cavalry  finds  itself  in  presence  of  heavy  cav- 
alry it  should  not  receive  attack,  but  should  scatter 
and  charge  in  dispersed  order  upon  the  flanks,  some- 
times cantering  around  the  line,  flying  before  it,  and 
eluding  it  by  superior  speed  and  agility,  sometimes 
pouring  in  a  fire  from  musketoons  or  pistols.  This  is 
almost  the  only  case  where  fire-arms  can  be  employed 
in  combats  of  cavalry,  for  the  musketoon  is  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  horsemen,  not  for  use  in  line  of  battle, 
but  simply  for  skirmishing,  for  getting  out  of  a  diffi- 
cult position  when  dismounted,  and  for  other  excep- 
tional cases.  To  stop  during  a  charge  and  fire  would 
be  a  great  mistake,  as  the  momentum  would  be  lost, 
and  the  attack  almost  certainly  repelled.  It  would 
be  equally  an  error  to  receive  an  attack  in  this  way5 
for  the  line  would  be  routed  before  the  musketoons 
could  be  put  away  and  the  sabres  be  drawn. 

When  the  cavalry  is  numerous,  it  is  formed  in  two 
lines,  like  infantry.  The  first  is  always  deployed. 
The  second,  which  is  often  inferior  in  numbers,  is 
either  deployed  in  part  and  outflanking  the  wings  of 
the  first,  so  as  to  prevent  its  being  turned,  or  formed 
in  as  many  columns  of  platoons  at  full  distance  as 
there  are  squadrons.  All  these  columns  are  ready  to 
form  line  of  battle  by  a  very  rapid  movement  to  the 


306  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

front,  and  they  also  leave  wide  intervals  between 
them,  through  which  the  squadrons  of  the  first  line 
may  readily  pass  to  the  rear  after  being  routed  or 
thrown  into  confusion  by  an  unsuccessful  charge. 
"Without  this  precaution,  the  second  line  would  run 
the  risk  of  being  pressed  back  by  the  first.  The 
second  line  remains  at  several  hundred  paces  from 
the  first,  whose  movements  it  follows,  whether  in 
advance  or  retreat.  If  the  first  line  is  repulsed,  the 
second  sends  its  flank  squadrons  to  take  the  enemy  in 
flank,  and  disengage  the  first.  In  the  mean  time,  the 
columns  move  to  the  front  at  a  trot,  in  order  to  de- 
ploy as  soon  as  they  are  unmasked,  and  to  rush  upon 
the  enemy's  line,  which  must  be  also  more  or  less  in 
confusion.  Thus,  in  combats  of  cavalry,  a  body,  at 
first  victorious,  is  checked  by  other  squadrons  taking 
the  places  of  those  that  have  been  beaten,  and  the 
whole  face  of  affairs  is  changed  in  a  moment. 

To  avoid  accidents,  it  is  well  always  to  rally,  even 
after  the  most  brilliant  success.  But  it  is  not  neces- 
sary that  all  should  halt :  several  platoons  in  dispersed 
order  should  harass  the  enemy,  while  the  standards 
are  moved  forward  at  a  walk.  The  soldiers,  obedient 
to  the  call  of  the  trumpet,  will  regain  their  places  in 
ranks,  and  the  squadrons,  all  the  time  advancing,  are 
soon  reformed  and  ready  to  charge  again. 

The  close  column  is  best  for  the  manoeuvres  of  in- 
fantry on  the  field  of  battle ;  but,  for  cavalry,  the  usual 
formation  is  at  full  distance,  because  the  subdivisions 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    INFANTRY.  307 

may  thus  with  greater  facility  and  rapidity  form  line 
in  whatever  direction  the  enemy  may  appear.  How- 
ever, when  cavalry  has  nothing  to  fear  upon  its  flanks, 
it  may  manoeuvre  at  half  distance,  in  order  to  have 
less  depth  of  column.  The  enemy  may  be  deceived 
as  to  the  number  of  cavalry,  if  some  columns  move  at 
half  and  others  at  full  distance. 


Art.  III.— Cavalry  against    Infantry. 

Charges  against  infantry  are  principally  made  in 
columns  of  squadrons  at  double  distance,  so  that,  if  one 
squadron  is  repulsed,  the  men  may  turn  to  the  right 
and  left  and  rally  behind  the  column.  The  second 
squadron  charges  and  performs  the  same  manoeuvre  as 
the  iirst ;  the  third  comes  in  turn,  and  then  the  fourth. 
If  the  infantry  is  not  very  firm,  and  does  not  manage 
its  fire  well,  it  will  undoubtedly  be  broken. 

Attacks  in*  columns  at  double  distance  are  chiefly 
directed  against  the  angles  of  squares  which  are  not 
well  defended.  Against  deployed  lines,  that  cannot 
be  turned,  charges  are  usually  made  in  echelon.  How- 
ever, charges  in  column  would  answer  well  in  such  a 
case,  if  made  simultaneously  at  several  points.  Both 
are  better  than  a  charge  in  a  continuous  line  against 
infantry,  because  the  loss  of  a  squadron  does  not  check 
the  whole,  and  there  is  sufficient  freedom  of  movement 
to  allow  attack  upon  weak  spots,  or  those  temporarily 
deprived  of  fire  ;  finally,  renewed  or  successive  shocks 


308  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

are  more  exhausting  to  infantry,  and  produce  more 
real  effect  than  a  single  charge,  however  grand  and 
imposing  the  latter  may  be.  A  charge  in  an  unbroken 
line  against  infantry  can  only  succeed  when  the  latter 
has  been  much  cut  up  and  disorganized  by  artillery, 
or  when  bad  weather  prevents  them  from  firing.  At 
the  battle  of  Dresden,  Murat  took  advantage  of  such 
a  state  of  affairs,  broke  a  line  of  Austrian  infantry, 
and  sabred  many  of  the  men. 

Cavalry  should  avoid  passing  near  woods  and  thick- 
ets, unless  certain  they  do  not  conceal  infantry  skir- 
mishers, as  much  injury  might  be  caused  them  by  the 
fire  of  the  infantry,  to  which  no  reply  could  be  made. 

When  a  charge  is  successful,  and  the  enemy's  line 
broken,  the  important  thing  is  not  to  sabre  the  fugi- 
tives, but  to  turn  upon  those  who  still  stand  their 
ground.  For  this  purpose,  the  cavalry  is  rallied,  and 
manoeuvred  to  envelop  the  flank  of  the  portions  of  the 
line  yet  fighting.  The  infantry  will  be  almost  cer- 
tainly swept  away. 

When,  on  the  contrary,  a  charge  is  repulsed,  the 
horsemen  should  gallop  back  to  the  place  for  rallying. 
If  there  is  a  second  line,  it  should  be  promptly  un- 
masked, to  give  it  an  opportunity  of  coming  into  ac- 
tion. The  ranks  are  reformed,  preparations  are  made 
for  a  new  charge,  as  the  failure  of  the  first  attempt 
should  be  no  cause  for  discouragement.  Good  cavalry 
will  charge  again  and  again. 

When  infantry  is  formed  in  square  it  should  dis- 


CAVALKY   AGAINST   INFANTRY.  309 

miss  all  apprehensions,  and  pour  into  the  cavalry  a  well- 
aimed  fire,  that  should  not  be  begun  too  soon ;  volleys, 
commenced  when  the  cavalry  is  at  about  one  hundred 
yards,  will  have  a  good  effect.  The  fire  by  ranks  is  the 
best  to  use.  In  this  way,  four  well-aimed  volleys  may  be 
delivered,  and  without  precipitation,  while  the  cavalry 
is  passing  over  the  one  hundred  yards  which  separates 
it  from  the  infantry  when  the  firing  begins.  This  sup- 
poses the  front  of  the  square  to  consist  of  four  ranks. 
First,  the  two  rearmost  ranks  fire  successively,  while 
the  men  of  the  two  foremost  ranks  stoop.  These  then 
rise  and  fire  at  the  word  of  command,  the  front  rank 
last,  and  in  the  very  faces  of  the  cavalry.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  two  rear  ranks  have  reloaded  their  arms,  and 
may  again  use  them  against  those  horsemen  who  may 
have  succeeded  in  reaching  the  line.  This  firing  by 
ranks,  when  there  are  four,  is  only  practicable  when 
each  rank  fires  but  once,  for  a  renewal  of  it  would  be 
dangerous  to  the  men  of  the  front  ranks,  in  the  midst 
of  the  smoke  and  confusion  of  the  combat.  Four  suc- 
cessive volleys,  well  aimed,  are  enough  to  check  the 
best  cavalry.  Four  ranks  are  absolutely  necessary, 
unless  artillery  is  at  hand  to  keep  the  cavalry  at  a 
distance.  Infantry,  formed  in  two  ranks,  is  too  weak 
for  such  combats;  at  least  three  are  necessary,  and 
four  are  better. 

The  bayonet  is  the  last  resource  against  cavalry 
that  has  not  been  checked  by  fire.  It  has  been  pro- 
posed to  stretch  ropes,  and  place  chevaux-de-frise  in 


310  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

front  of  the  infantry,  but  these  devices,  which  answer 
very  well  on  a  drill-ground,  are  of  no  practical  value 
in  presence  of  an  enemy ;  they  simply  embarrass  the 
infantry,  and  clog  its  movements.  The  foot-soldier 
may  and  should  expect  to  repel  cavalry  by  the  use  of 
his  ordinary  weapon  ;  he  should  be  cool,  and  convinced 
that  horses  can  never  pass  through  a  line  of  infantry 
well  closed  up  and  bristling  with  bayonets  ;  timidity, 
confusion,  and  the  ravages  of  artillery  are  the  only 
things  that  can  compromise  him.  Let  alarm  be  felt 
neither  at  the  approach  of  the  horses,  nor  the  cries  of 
the  horsemen ;  let  the  ranks  be  well  closed  up ;  let  the 
fire  be  carefully  husbanded,  and  there  need  be  no 
doubt  as  to  the  result  of  a  charge. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  this  confidence  in  their 
weapons  will  be  felt  by  other  than  veterans,  who  have 
had  occasion  to  test  their  value,  and  know,  from  expe- 
rience, what  they  are  worth.  It  is  for  such  as  these 
to  ask,  as  was  done  in  Egypt  and  at  Marengo,  that 
the  cavalry  be  permitted  to  come  within  fifty  paces, 
and  even  less,  when  a  most  destructive  fire  may  be 
poured  into  their  ranks.  It  would  be  dangerous  to 
try  this  with  raw  troops,  who  may  experience  a  not 
unreasonable  feeling  of  apprehension  at  the  approach 
of  cavalry  upon  them  for  the  first  time.  For  such 
soldiers,  one  hundred  paces  is  about  the  distance  at 
which  they  should  begin  to  fire. 

The  resistance  of  infantry  to  cavalry  is  chiefly  due 
to  the  order  of  battle  adopted  for  that  purpose.  Its 


CAVALRY    AGAINST    INFANTRY.  311 

power  of  resistance  is  greatly  increased  by  forming 
several  squares,  which  protect  each  other  by  their  fire ; 
and  the  flank  and  reverse  fire,  procured  in  this  way,  is 
much  more  feared  by  the  cavalry  than  that  coming  in 
front.  Mention  has  been  made  in  another  place  of 
large  squares,  formed  by  divisions  or  brigades.  We 
have  now  reference  to  battalion  squares,  because  we 
are  considering  a  simple  combat  between  a  body  of 
infantry  and  one  of  cavalry ;  in  this  case,  the  small- 
ness  of  the  squares  is  not  only  not  disadvantageous,  as 
interior  space  is  not  required,  but  several  small  squares 
are  better  than  a  single  large  one,  because,  if  the  latter 
is  broken  through  on  one  front,  all  is  lost ;  but,  one  or 
more  of  a  combination  of  small  squares  may  be  de- 
stroyed, and  the  remainder  hold  firm ;  besides,  they 
give  mutual  support  by  cross  and  flank  fires,  and  the 
enemy's  attention  is,  moreover,  divided. 

The  formation  of  these  battalion  squares  is  very 
simple,  and  is  explained  in  detail  in  the  authorized 
works  on  tactics.  There  may  be  either  a  line  of  ob- 
lique squares,  or  in  echelon,  with  a  view  of  flanking 
each  other.  Squares,  if  small,  may  be  moved  consid- 
erable distances  without  material  inconvenience. 

The  infantry  should  carefully  avoid  throwing  away 
its  fire  upon  skirmishers  sent  forward  by  the  cavalry, 
often  for  the  very  purpose  of  drawing  it,  or  raising  a 
dust,  under  cover  of  which  some  movement  may  be 
concealed.  If  the  infantry  imprudently  delivers  its 
fire  upon  these  skirmishers,  the  squadrons  should 


312  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

immediately  charge,  before  the  arms  can  be  re- 
loaded. The  skirmishers  should  be  kept  at  a  distance, 
by  sending  out  a  few  good  marksmen  in  front  of  the 
squares. 

The  only  manoeuvres  and  formations  infantry  may 
safely  adopt  in  presence  of  cavalry,  are  those  of  squares 
and  close  columns. 


Art.  IV.— Combats  of  Artillery. 

Artillery  should  never  be  brought  into  action,  unless 
well  supported  by  other  troops.  The  supports  take 
positions  to  the  right  and  left  of  the  batteries,  covering 
themselves,  by  any  features  of  the  ground,  from  the 
fire  of  the  enemy,  only  emerging  to  resist  attacks 
upon  the  battery  or  upon  themselves.  Positions  are 
selected  for  artillery  where  it  may  act  with  greatest 
effect.  A  firm  soil  is  requisite  to  prevent  the  wheels 
from  sinking  too  much.  A  rocky  site  would  be  unfa- 
vorable, from  the  many  dangerous  fragments  produced 
by  the  shot  of  the  enemy.  The  space  should  be  suffi- 
ciently extensive  to  afford  room  for  all  the  pieces  of 
the  battery,  and  high  enough  to  give  a  good  command 
over  the  surrounding  ground  within  range,  but  not  so 
high  that  the  fire  would  be  too  plunging.  Slopes 
of  about  one-hundredth  are  the  best.  If  the  object 
aimed  at  is  near,  the  elevation  of  the  site  of  the  bat- 
tery should  be  small,  but  this  may  be  greater  as  the 
range  increases. 


COMBATS    OF    ARTILLERY.  313 

Artillery  duels  rarely  lead  to  decisive  results,  and 
are  usually  avoided.  Sometimes  they  are  inevita- 
ble. In  such  a  case,  other  things  being  equal,  that 
party  will  evidently  have  the  advantage  which  has  the 
best  view  of  the  enemy,  and  has  at  the  same  time  the 
best  cover.  Artillery  cannot  endure  a  flank  or  very 
oblique  fire,  and,  when  such  a  fire  is  received,  an  im- 
mediate change  of  position  becomes  necessary.  This 
may  sometimes  be  accomplished  under  cover  of  the 
smoke,  or  some  undulation  of  the  ground.  At  the 
battle  of  lena,  Colonel  Seruzier  was  in  command  of  a 
battery  of  twenty  pieces,  which  was  opposed  by  a  very 
superior  one,  and  his  was  on  the  point  of  being  de- 
stroyed. He  immediately  withdrew  the  alternate 
pieces,  keeping  up  the  fire  with  the  others,  until,  by  a 
rapid  movement  under  cover  of  the  smoke,  he  reached 
a  position  where  he  had  a  very  slant  fire  upon  the 
enemy  ;  his  remaining  pieces  were  soon  disengaged. 

A  battery,  in  taking  position  to  get  an  enfilading 
or  slant  fire  upon  an  opposing  battery,  runs  the  risk 
of  exposing  its  own  flank  to  attack.  A  battery  may 
present  a  poor  mark  to  the  enemy  by  having  wide 
intervals  between  its  pieces,  while,  at  the  same  time, 
some  of  them  must  obtain  a  slant  fire  upon  him  ;  the 
fire  of  all  the  pieces  is  convergent.  The  effect  of  such 
a  fire  is  very  powerful.  A  battery  of  eight  pieces 
united  would  scarcely  be  able  to  contend  successfully 
with  one  of  six  pieces  divided  into  two  or  three 
parts,  at  some  distance  from  each  other,  but  all  con- 
U 


PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

verging  their  fire  on  the  larger  battery.  It  should 
be  observed  that  in  this  we  do  not  find  a  violation 
of  the  principle  which  sanctions  the  employment  of 
as  many  pieces  as  possible  in  a  battery.  Concentra- 
tion of  fire  is  the  object  to  be  attained  in  both  cases, 
and  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  two. 

The  caissons  should  be  covered  as  much  as  possible 
from  fire,  and  even  from  sight.  It  is  better  to  aim 
low  than  high,  to  use  the  ricochet  when  it  is  practi- 
cable, to  fire  slowly  at  distances  greater  than  700 
yards,  and  rapidly  inside  of  that,  and  every  shot 
should  be  well  aimed.  The  use  of  shells  is  recom- 
mended for  broken  ground  ;  solid  shot  against  columns 
of  attack,  although,  at  close  range,  grape  and  canister 
are  better,  as  also  against  cavalry  and  infantry  in  line. 
A  strict  defensive  should  not  be  observed,  for  if  it  is 
well  to  select  a  strong  position,  and  to  profit  by  every 
accidental  cover  presented  by  the  ground,  it  is  equally 
so  to  inspire  the  enemy  with  an  apprehension  of 
attack,  and  to  advance  upon  his  position  when  pru- 
dence permits,  as  the  moral  and  real  effect  of  such  a 
course  is  great. 

The  cavalry  is  the  best  arm  for  supporting  that 
portion  of  the  artillery  which  should  move  rapidly  from 
point  to  point,  but  the  supports  of  batteries  of  position 
should  be  of  infantry,  and,  indeed,  that  arm  is  the  best 
in  all  cases  when  the  simple  protection  of  the  artillery 
is  considered.  If  both  arms  are  united  as  supports, 
infantry  skirmishers  will  be  to  the  right  and  left  to  en- 


COMBATS    OF   ARTILLERY.  315 

gage  the  opposing  skirmishers ;  the  main  body  of  the 
infantry  will  be  somewhat  to  the  rear,  as  well  cover- 
ed as  possible,  and  the  cavalry  in  echelon  on  the  flanks, 

A  battery,  whose  supports  are  very  weak  or  do  not 
contain  cavalry  to  meet  that  of  the  enemy,  may  be  in 
danger  of  being  captured,  and  should  select  a  posi- 
tion unfavorable  to  the  action  of  cavalry.  Colonel 
Foy,  seeing  a  body  of  Russian  cavalry  issuing  from 
the  bridge  near  Schaffhause,  rapidly  withdrew  his  ar- 
tillery into  a  clump  of  pines  which  was  fortunately 
at  hand  ;  he  there  formed  his  battery  into  a  square, 
and  was  enabled  to  keep  the  cavalry  off  until  two 
regiments  of  infantry  came  up  to  his  assistance. 

When  a  battery  is  very  destructive  in  its  effects, 
it  may  become  necessary  to  attempt  its  capture. 
Skirmishers  will  precede  the  assaulting  party,  the 
intervals  of  the  line  being  as  great  as  possible,  to  offer 
a  poor  mark  to  the  enemy,  and  to  enable  the  men  to 
shelter  themselves  behind  any  little  accidental  covers. 
These  skirmishers  will  be  specially  useful,  if  they  are 
good  marksmen,  in  killing  the'  gunners  and  horses. 
While  skirmishers  advance  on  the  front  of  the  battery, 
small  columns  will  threaten  the  flanks.  If  the  fire  is 
directed  upon  the  columns,  the  skirmishers  will 
advance  rapidly  upon  the  front ;  if,  on  the  contrary, 
the  skirmishers  attract  the  fire,  the  columns  may 
advance  without  much  loss.  When  these  are  near  the 
supports,  they  will  charge  vigorously,  and  if  the 
supports  are  driven  off,  the  battery  is  attacked  in  rear. 


316  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

As  cavalry  moves  very  rapidly,  it  is  a  good  arrange- 
ment to  have  the  assaulting  party  contain  both  infantry 
and  cavalry,  the  former  to  act  as  skirmishers  and 
occupy  the  battery  in  front,  while  the  latter  form  the 
columns  on  the  flanks. 

If  the  pieces  are  captured,  and  the  horses  are  still 
at  hand  for  use,  they  should  be  rapidly  carried  off; 
if  this  is  impracticable,  they  should  be  spiked,  and  the 
elevating  screws  and  rammers  carried  off. 

Art.  V.— Attack  and  Defence    of  a  Redoubt. 

A  redoubt  may  be  armed  with  cannon,  or  defended 
by  infantry  alone.  In  the  first  case,  the  cannon  must 
be  silenced  by  other  cannon  ;  but  in  the  second  case, 
the  attack  may  be  made  without  any  such  prelimina- 
ries. 

Marksmen  envelop  a  part  of  the  redoubt,  aiming 
at  the  crest  of  the  parapet  to  prevent  the  defenders 
from  showing  themselves,  or,  at  least,  to  cause  them 
to  fire  rapidly  and  inaccurately.  The  circle  of  skir- 
mishers is  gradually  contracted,  an  active  fire  being 
all  the  time  kept  up.  When  sufficiently  near  the 
ditch,  they  advance  at  a  run  and  jump  into  it,  unless 
they  are  checked  by  some  such  obstacle  as  abatis, 
palisades,  trous-de-loup,  &c. ;  if  these  are  encountered, 
a  way  must  be  opened  through  them  before  farther 
progress  is  made.  While  some  descend  into  the 
ditch,  others  remain  upon  the  counterscarp  to  fire 


ATTACK   AND   DEFENCE   OF   A   KEDOUBT.  317 

upon  the  defenders  who  show  themselves.  "When  the 
troops  in  the  ditch  have  rested  somewhat,  they  make 
the  assault.  The  soldiers  assist  each  other  in  ascend- 
ing the  scarp  and  getting  upon  the  berme,  from  which 
point  they  rush  over  the  parapet  in  a  body,  and  com- 
pel the  defenders  to  lay  down  their  arms. 

If  the  redoubt  is  armed  with  cannon,  and  of  greater 
strength  than  is  supposed  above,  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  use  artillery,  to  break  down  palisades,  dismount 
the  pieces,  and  breach  the  parapets.  The  best  positions 
for  the  artillery  are  those  from  which  a  plunging  or 
enfilading  fire  can  be  obtained.  If  the  redoubt  has 
embrasures,  one  or  two  pieces  should  be  directed 
against  each  of  them,  as  there  is  an  opportunity,  not 
only  of  dismounting  the  pieces,  but  also  of  firing 
through  the  embrasures  into  the  interior  of  the  work. 

o 

A  few  good  marksmen  may  also  be  detailed  to  pick 
off  the  gunners,  whenever  they  show  themselves  at 
the  embrasures. 

When  the  artillery  has  produced  its  full  effect,  the 
skirmishers  will  be  advanced,  as  above  described.  The 
skirmishers  will  generally  be  followed  by  supporting 
columns,  that  will  advance  upon  the  salients  of  the 
work.  Each  column  should  be  preceded  by  workmen 
provided  with  axes,  and  ladders  should  be  carried  by 
men  detailed  for  the  purpose.  It  is  a  good  plan  to 
give  each  of  the  leading  men  a  fascine,  with  which  he 
may  shield  his  body  greatly,  and  he  may  use  it  for 
partly  filling  up  the  ditch.  The  skirmishers  open  out 


318  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

and  permit  the  columns  to  pass  through  their  line, 
keeping  up  a  rapid  fire  until  the  ascent  of  the  parapet 
by  the  storming  party  begins.  The  important  thing, 
at  this  decisive  moment,  is  unity  of  movement 
and  action,  an  entrance  being  made  on  all  sides  at 
once.  The  troops  should,  therefore,  pause  a  moment 
on  the  berme,  until  a  signal  is  given,  and  then  all  will 
rush  forward  together.  Such  an  attack  as  this  is 
almost  certain  of  success. 

The  commander  of  a  redoubt  should  use  every  effort 
to  increase  the  confidence  of  his  men,  especially  by 
his  own  demeanor  ;  still  every  thing  should  be  kept  in 
the  best  possible  order.  If  the  attack  is  not  to  take 
place  at  once,  the  redoubt  should  be  surrounded  with 
an  abatis;  large  stones  should  be  obtained  to  roll 
down  into  the  ditches ;  sand-bags  and  sods  should  be 
prepared  for  making  loopholes  along  the  parapet.  As 
soon  as  the  batteries  of  the  enemy  are  seen,  fire  should 
be  at  once  opened  upon  them ;  but  when  their  guns  are 
fairly  in  position  and  partly  covered  by  the  ground, 
the  contest  becomes  an  unequal  one.  Only  those 
pieces  will  be  kept  in  position  which  are  covered  from 
the  enemy's  fire  by  traverses  or  otherwise.  A  few 
other  pieces  may  sometimes  be  temporarily  run  into 
battery  and  fired  with  grape  upon  the  infantry.  The 
effect  will  be  good. 

A  few  marksmen  will  at  first  shelter  themselves 
wherever  they  can  along  the  parapet ;  but  when  the 
fire  of  the  assailants  ceases,  for  fear  of  injuring  their 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE  OF  A  REDOUBT.      319 

own  men,  the  defenders  will  line  the  parapets  and 
open  a  warm  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery  upon  the 
columns  of  attack,  and  upon  the  skirmishers  who  are 
attempting  to  pass  the  obstacles  in  front  of  the  ditch. 
This  is  the  time  to  explode  any  mines  that  may 
have  been  prepared  in  the  ground  over  which  the 
assailants  must  pass.  If  the  enemy  succeed  in  getting 
into  the  ditch,  and  collecting  their  forces  to  make  the 
assault,  shells  should  be  rolled  down  upon  them,  as 
well  as  trunks  of  trees,  large  rocks,  beehives — any 
thing  that  may  cause  confusion.  The  defenders  must 
then  mount  the  parapet  to  receive  the  enemy  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet.  More  than  one  attack  has  been 
repelled  at  this  stage  of  it.  At  Iluningue,  in  1796, 
Captain  Foy  of  the  artillery,  observing  that  the  enemy 
had  planted  scaling  ladders  to  ascend  into  a  demilune 
he  was  holding,  had  shells  rolled  down  upon  them,  by 
which  considerable  injury  was  done  them,  crowded  as 
as  they  were  in  the  ditcl;.  The  gunners  seized  their 
rammers  and  handspikes,  and,  mounting  the  parapet, 
knocked  on  the  head  and  back  into  the  ditch  the 
first  men  who  showed  themselves.  The  enemy 
abandoned  the  attack.  "When  we  reflect  upon  the 
disordered  condition  of  the  assailants  at  such  a 
moment,  and  the  difficulty  they  must  experience  in 
using  their  weapons,  as  well  as  upon  the  physical  and 
moral  advantages  in  favor  of  the  defenders,  who  have 
a  firm  foothold  upon  the  parapet  and  nothing  to  clog 
their  freedom  of  motion,  it  will  be  manifest  that,  not 


320  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

only  have  the  defenders  many  chances  of  success,  but 
it  seems  impossible  that  such  an  attack  can  result  in 
any  thing  but  failure. 

Art.  T I.— Attack,  and  Defence  of  a  strong  Dwell- 
ing-house, with  out-buildings  and  enclosures, 
all  of  masonry. 

A  careful  examination  of  the  locality  should  be 
made  before  the  attack,  and  this  may  be  attempted 
with  least  danger  just  before  dawn.  Nothing  is  sup- 
posed to  be  known  of  the  arrangement  of  the  inte- 
rior. All  that  meets  the  eye  are  several  walls  pierced 
with  loopholes,  and  several  ways  of  approach  along 
which  an  attack  may  be  made.  By  the  time  the  out- 
skirts are  seized,  there  will  be  light  enough  to  see  how 
to  advance  farther.  Much  danger  will  be  incurred  in 
the  onward  movements,  and  it  might  well  be  desired  to 
have  them  made  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  but  this 
always  leads  to  confusion  and  gives  those  who  are  so 
inclined  an  opportunity  to  skulk.  In  night  attacks 
there  is  generally  a  want  of  concert,  mistakes  occur, 
panics  take  place,  by  all  of  which  means  the  best  plans 
miscarry.  Therefore  it  is  better  to  make  every  prepa- 
ration for  the  attack  in  the  night  and  execute  it 
just  at  dawn.  Darkness  is  only  favorable  in  case  of 
a  surprise. 

Every  preparation  should  be  made  for  forcing  locks 
and  hinges  and  breaking  through  doors.  If  none  of  the 
soldiers  have  the  skill  necessary  for  using  tools,  native 


ATTACK  AND  DEFENCE    OF    HOUSES,    ETC.  321 

mechanics  must  be  pressed  into  the  service,  and  made 
to  act,  if  they  are  unwilling.  Ladders  should  be  col- 
lected, in  order  to  facilitate  entrance  by  the  windows, 
or,  at  least,  to  enable  grenades  to  be  thrown  in.  The 
attack  is  supposed  to  be  made  by  infantry  alone,  for 
artillery  can  soon  destroy  such  structures  as  we  are 
now  considering. 

The  approach  should  be  made  in  silence,  until  the 
sentinels  challenge  and  the  enemy  begins  to  fire ;  a 
rush  must  then  be  ma'de  upon  several  points  at  once, 
in  order  to  divide  his  attention.  A  loopholed  wall  is 
supposed  to  be  the  first  obstacle,  but  by  inserting  the 
muskets  of  several  men  into  each  hole,  the  enemy  may 
soon  be  forced  to  leave  it.  The  gate  of  the  enclosure 
must  then<be  broken  down,  or  a  portion  of  the  wall. 
The  foot  of  the  wall  of  the  house  is  reached  ;  the  first 
thing  is  to  stop  up  the  lower  loopholes  with  bags  of 
earth  or  with  timbers ;  efforts  must  be  made  to  break 
down  the  door  with  axes,  or  by  battering,  or  to  burst 
off  the  hinges ;  this  will  soon  be  accomplished,  unless 
the  doors  are  strongly  braced  from  behind  ;  in  the 
mean  time,  sharpshooters  should  watch  the  windows 
and  fire  whenever  a  man  shows  himself.  The  men 
should  keep  dispersed  as  much  as  possible.  When- 
ever a  window  seems  abandoned,  attempts  should  be 
made  to  enter  it.  To  increase  the  number  of  openings 
into  the  interior,  the  wall  may  be  battered  down  with 
any  heavy  timbers  that  are  at  hand.  Finally,  an  en- 
trance is  effected  into  the  lower  story,  and  the  defend- 
U* 


322  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

ers  driven  above.  They  may  now  be  summoned  to  sur- 
render. If  they  accept,  all  is  over,  and  the  captives 
should  receive  the  treatment  due  to  brave  'men.  If 
they  decline  to  surrender,  a  large  fire  lighted  below 
will  soon  bring  them  to  terms. 

In  the  defence,  doors  will  be  barricaded  and  loop- 
holes made  in  all  the  stories,  taking  care  to  have  them 
as  small  as  possible  and  those  of  the  lower  story  so 
high  that  the  enemy  cannot  close  them  nor  fire 
through  them.  Banquettes,  to  stand  upon,  may  be 
made  of  plank  placed  on  barrels,  boxes,  &c.  The 
angles  are  weak  points,  and  an  effort  must  be  made  to 
pierce  loopholes  there.  If  the  roof  will  burn,  it  must 
be  taken  off  and  the  upper  floor  covered  with  earth. 
The  principal  beams  of  the  frame  of  the  hc^use  should 
be  propped,  so  as  not  to  fall  if  the  wall  is  breached ; 
to  close  the  breach,  various  household  articles  may  be 
used.  Books  are  quite  impenetrable  to  musket-balls. 
Bedsacks  and  pillow-cases  filled  with  earth,  also  car- 
pets rolled  up,  resist  bullets  well.  Balconies  may  be 
fitted  up  as  machicoulis,  &c. 

Art.  Til — Attack  and  Defence  of  a  Tillage. 

In  Art.  I.  of  this  chapter  some  observations  were 
made  with  reference  to  combats  of  infantry  in  towns 
and  villages,  but  they  were  supposed  to  be  of  an  open 
character.  What  follows  is  to  be  understood  as  relat- 
ing to  an  intrenched  village. 


ATTACK    AND   DEFENCE   OF   A   VILLAGE.  323 

Here  the  artillery  plays  the  principal  part,  because 
it  would  be  otherwise  impossible  to  prostrate  the  ob- 
stacles prepared  by  the  defence  to  aid  in  holding  a  post 
which  may  be  of  great  importance,  either  as  a  bridge- 
head, or  a  strong  point  of  a  line  of  battle,  or  a  pivot 
for  manoeuvres.  The  most  favorable  positions  should 
therefore  be  selected  that  are  offered  by  the  surround- 
ings of  the  village,  either  commanding  points,  or  others 
from  which  the  principal  street  may  be  enfiladed,  or 
the  walls'  breached  that  give  shelter  to  the  enemy. 
If  a  redoubt  defends  the  approaches,  it  should  be  first 
attacked,  for  success  at  other  points  will  lead  to  no  de- 
cisive result  so  long  as  that  holds  out.  Several  pieces 
of  artillery  may  be  directed  against  a  single  embrasure, 
and  their  fire  directed  to  others  in  succession,  as  fast  as 
the  guns  are  dismounted  or  withdrawn.  Other  pieces 
should  enfilade  the  terre-plein,  break  down  palisades, 
&c.  All  this  maybe  done  openly,  if  time  presses  and 
the  ground  favors,  but  it  is  more  prudent  to  make  a 
careful  examination  of  the  locality  in  the  first  place, 
and,  during  the  night,  throw  up  epaulements  of  earth  to 
cover  the  guns  in  the  position  selected  for  them.  It  is 
also  the  part  of  a  wise  man,  before  attempting  a  deci- 
sive movement,  to  procure  ladders  and  tools  of  every 
kind  necessary  for  throwing  down  walls  and  parapets. 

These  arrangements  having  been  made,  fire  will  be 
opened  at  dawn.  The  artillery  will  make  vigorous  ef- 
forts to  produce  the  effect  expected.  There  will  be  the 
greater  probability  of  this  as  the  pieces  are  of  heavier 


224:  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

metal.  When  the  breaches  begin  to  open,  and  some  of 
the  artillery  of  the  work  is  silenced,  the  skirmishers 
may  be  advanced  to  envelop  with  their  fire  as  much  of 
the  village  as  they  can.  The  skirmishers  should  not 
mask  the  artillery,  which  continues  its  fire,  but  they 
will  aim  at  windows,  loopholes,  at  every  man  who  shows 
himself.  They  will  be  followed  by  workmen,  provided 
with  tools  for  levelling  hedges  and  palisades,  filling  up 
ditches,  breaking  down  gates,  enlarging  breaches,  &c. 
In  the  mean  time,  the  skirmishers  close  in  upon  the 
village.  The  artillery  is  now  silent,  except  it  may 
throw  shells  into  the  town.  The  skirmishers  still  ad- 
vance, the  boldest  even  approaching  the  breaches  and 
attempting  to  enter,  while  the  workmen  are  busy  with 
their  tools,  preparing  the  way  for  the  advance  of  the 
columns  over  the  outer  obstacles  :  until  now  they  have 
been  out  of  range,  or  concealed  by  the  ground,  trees, 
&c.  They  move  out  at  a  given  signal  towards  the 
breaches  and  other  points  indicated  ;  they  destroy  any 
barriers  which  may  still  exist,  leap  into  the  ditches  and 
scale  the  parapets,  break  down  palisading,  burst  open 
gates  by  means  of  powder-bags  or  levers.  During  the 
same  time  the  skirmishers  between  the  columns  en- 
ter by  any  available  openings,  leaping  over  hedges, 
climbing  walls,  wherever  they  do  not  meet  a  too  formida- 
ble resistance.  Finally,  the  exterior  defences  are  car- 
ried ;  the  troops,  before  penetrating  farther,  ought  to 
rally  and  make  new  dispositions  for  driving  the  enemy 
from  any  houses  still  in  their  possession. 


ATTACK   AND   DEFENCE   OF   A   VILLAGE.  325 

If  the  defence  is  obstinate,  much  caution  is  requisite 
in  pushing  forward  into  the  interior.  The  outer  houses 
should  be  seized,  as  they  might  be  occupied  by  parties  of 
the  defenders,  who  could  take  the  troops  in  the  streets 
at  great  disadvantage.  If  the  houses  are  detached,  they 
will  be  captured  by  surrounding  them  ;  if  contiguous 
and  vigorously  defended,  a  passage  may  be  effected 
from  one  to  another  in  succession  by  breaking  through 
the  separating  walls.  The  defenders  having  thus  been 
driven  from  point  to  point,  an  effort  will  be  made  to 
cut  them  off  from  the  line  of  retreat,  which  is  usually 
through  a  defile,  such  as  a  bridge  or  narrow  street ; 
this  manoeuvre  will  generally  hasten  the  evacuation 
of  the  village. 

A  village  is  seldom  without  support  from  troops  on 
the  exterior  ;  it  would,  therefore,  be  impossible -to  at- 
tempt an  attack,  without  having  force  enough  to  hold 
these  supports  in  check  or  to  engage  them.  To  obtain 
success  a  marked  superiority  of  forces  is  requisite,  as 
well  as  in  the  number  and  calibre  of  cannon.  It 
would  be  very  rash  to  attack  an  intrenched  village, 
which  formed  part  of  a  line  of  battle,  without  this  su- 
periority. An  isolated  village  should  be  turned,  rather 
than  attacked. 

Some  time  is  necessary  to  prepare  for  the  defence 
of  a  village,  for  there  is  much  to  be  done  if  a  vigorous 
resistance  is  to  be  made.  A  continuous  enclosure 
must  be  arranged,  advantage  being  taken  of  hedges 
and  walls  which  will  answer  the  purpose,  and  all 


326  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

others  being  thrown  down,  in  order  to  give  no  covers 
for  the  enemy.  Those  may  be  left  standing  which 
are  completely  under  fire,  and  will  be  hindrances  to 
their  movements.  The  same  course  will  be  pursued 
with  ditches.  Behind  the  enclosure,  every  facility  for 
circulation  of  troops  should  be  found.  The  enclosure 
should  be  a  broken  line  in  order  that  its  parts  may 
flank  each  other  and  give  cross-fires.  If  it  is  inter- 
rupted at  any  point,  the  break  should  be  supplied  by 
abatis,  palisades,  barricades,  or  earthworks ;  batteries 
are  constructed  for  the  cannon,  and  sometimes  re- 
doubts built. 

Behind  the  standing  hedges,  trenches  may  be  dug 
and  the  earth  thrown  to  the  front,  as  shelter  from  the 
fire  of  infantry  is  thus  obtained.  A  wall  that  is  over 
six  feet  high  is  more  valuable  ;  loopholes  may  be 
made  in  it,  and  they  should  be  small  and  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  enemy.  A  banquette  for  them,  of  boards, 
may  be  supported  on  barrels  or  any  thing  of  that  kind. 
It  is  not  always  easy  to  make  these  loopholes  of  suit- 
able dimensions,  as  the  stones  in  the  wall  may  be  too 
large  ;  this  defect  may  be  cured  by  using  stiff  mortar 
or  sods. 

Finally,  a  keep  should  be  arranged  in  the  interior 
of  the  village,  to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  defenders, 
and  to  give  them  more  confidence  in  resistance.  This 
may  be  a  church  and  cemetery,  or  a  large  dwelling- 
house  and  enclosure. 

A  fortified  village  is  a  strong  point  of  support  for 


OBSERVATIONS   UPON   MANOEUVRES.  327 

an  army  on  a  field  of  battle,  as  frequent  examples 
have  proved. 

Art.  VIII.— Observations    upon   the    Subject   of 
Manoeuvres. 

After  what  has  been  said  with  reference  to  various 
operations  in  war,  in  which  the  manoeuvres  and  evo- 
lutions prescribed  in  the  tactics  find  applications,  it 
will  not  be  out  of  place  to  close  this  chapter  by  some 
remarks  with  reference  to  these  movements,  in  order 
that  their  spirit  may  be  appreciated.  Their  charac- 
teristics should  be  as  follows : 

1st.  Promptness  /  for,  while  a  manoeuvre  is  in  pro- 
gress, the  troops  are  comparatively  helpless  as  a  mass, 
and  it  should  be  consummated  as  speedily  as  possible. 

2d.  Simplicity r,  in  order  that  officers  and  soldiers 
may  execute  the  manoeuvre  mechanically,  so  to  speak, 
and  without  thinking  of  it.  A  complicated  move- 
ment produces  confusion,  and  this  may  lead  to  defeat. 
Simplicity,  in  this  case,  means  facility  of  execution. 

3d.  Security  ;  that  is  to  say,  if  the  enemy  appears 
unexpectedly  while  the  movement  is  being  executed, 
the  troops  should  be  in  the  best  order  to  resist  him. 

4th.  Precision,  in  order  that  every  movement  may 
have  well-defined  limits,  which  regulate  its  progress 
and  direction. 

5th.  A  brief  and  clear  command  /  for  upon  the  na- 
ture of  the  command  often  depends  the  success  of  a 


328  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

manoeuvre.  If  the  command  is  such,  that  a  man 
hearing  it  cannot  doubt  as  to  the  meaning,  the  ma- 
noeuvre will  succeed.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  language 
is  ambiguous  in  sense,  or  the  words  improperly  ar- 
ranged, there  can  be  neither  certainty  of  conception 
nor  promptness  of  execution. 

A  manoeuvre,  to  be  good,  should,  as  far  as  possible, 
be  offensive  ;  that  is  to  say,  it  is  better  in  its  execution 
for  the  troops  to  move  forward  than  to  the  rear,  be- 
cause a  retrograde  movement  has  a  disheartening  ef- 
fect, and  may  bring  on  a  shameful  flight ;  on  the  con- 
trary, the  courage  of  the  troops  is  better  sustained 
when  they  advance,  as  it  were,  to  meet  the  enemy. 
Manoeuvres  should  be  not  only  well  arranged,  but 
properly  executed.  Skill  can  only  be  gained  and  re- 
tained by  constant  practice,  and  therefore  the  drill  is 
necessary  for  veterans  as  well  as  for  recruits.  While 
keeping  soldiers  in  good  drill,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid 
insisting  too  much  upon  things  really  of  little  import- 
ance. Insist  upon  what  is  necessary,  and  reject  what 
is  superfluous.  Soldiers  should  be  accustomed  to  re- 
main together  and  in  good  order,  but  it  is  sufficient, 
with  this  view,  to  require  the  touch  of  the  elbows ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  each  man  feel  his  neighbor 
lightly,  and  that  the  whole  battalion,  facing  in  the 
same  direction,  be  on  a  line  nearly  straight.  No  com- 
mander should  be  so  foolish  as  to  bring  his  "  guides  on 
the  line"  in  a  shower  of  grape  or  musket  balls,  or 
should  listen  to  the  remonstrances  of  a  major  or  an 


OBSERVATIONS    UPON   MANOEUVRES.  329 

adjutant  who  would  think  all  was  lost  if  the  battalion 
were  not  in  a  perfectly  straight  line.  And  as  to  those 
wonderful  firings  of  a  whole  battalion  as  one  man, 
that  are  sometimes  esteemed  so  highly,  is  any  thing 
like  them  ever  heard  in  a  great  battle  ?  Amid  the 
thundering  of  the  artillery,  the  beating  of  drums,  the 
cries  of  the  wounded  and  dying,  the  excitement  of  the 
combatants,  are  they  able  to  give  that  close  attention 
to  the  word  of  command  which  alone  makes  such  fir- 
ing possible?  If  possible,  what  value  has  it?  Are 
more  of  the  enemy  killed  and  wounded  than  by  a  roll- 
ing fire  ?  Every  operation  in  war  is  accompanied  by 
more  or  less  disorder,  but  this,  to  the  eye  of  the  real 
soldier,  is  grand  and  beautiful  when  it  is  the  result  of  a 
noble  daring  and  enthusiasm,  and  is  infinitely  prefer- 
able to  the  frigid  regularity  of  indifference  or  luke- 
warmness.  It  is  an  excellent  thing  to  drill  soldiers 
upon  irregular  ground,  such  as  they  find  upon  the 
field  of  battle. 

Good  marching  is  the  important  thing.  A  body  of 
troops  that  marches  well  is  always  imposing,  and  by 
this  alone  victory  is  often  attracted,  independently  of 
all  the  advantages  procured  by  that  good  order  which 
results  from  fine  marching.  It  is  not  out  of  place  to 
repeat  again  the  maxim  of  Marshal  Saxe,  that  victory 
resides  in  the  legs  of  the  soldiers.  Marching  should, 
therefore,  be  deemed  of  great  importance,  and  much 
time  and  pains  should  be  devoted  to  it,  first  in  level 
drill  grounds,  then  along  roads,  and  finally  over  ir- 


330  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

regular  ground  of  all  kinds.  The  cadenced  step,  light- 
ness of  carriage,  and  the  touch  of  the  elbow  are  the 
things  for  each  man  to  learn ;  and  for  the  whole  body, 
the  preservation  of  distances  and  direction. 

By  keeping  tlie  step,  wavering  is  avoided,  and  a 
whole  battalion  moves  like  a  single  man.  If  a  body 
of  troops  is  charging  another,  it  is  only  by  all  keeping 
the  same  step  of  uniform  length  that*the  enemy's  line 
is  attacked  along  the  whole  front  at  once.  By  the 
touch  of  the  elbow^  soldiers  remain  together  and  pre- 
serve the  alignment  necessary  for  an  engagement. 
Any  pressure,  coming  from  the  direction  of  the  guide, 
should  be  yielded  to  gradually,  and  without  crowd- 
ing. At  the  same  time,  the  touch  towards  the  guide 
shall  always  be  lightly  kept  up.  The  preservation  of 
distances  on  the  march  is  of  the  greatest  importance. 
It  is  a  less  evil  for  the  distance  to  be  diminished  than 
increased,  because  it  is  much  worse  to  have  gaps  in  a 
line  than  to  have  some  men  crowded  to  the  rear,  who 
may  be  usefully  employed  in  replacing  or  caring  for 
the  wounded.  The  preservation  of  distances  is  in  the 
hands  of  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers, 
who,  taken  together,  form  what  is  called  the  frame- 
work (cadre)  of  the  battalions.  It  is  of  very  great  im- 
portance that  the  cadre  be  well  composed.  Young 
soldiers,  directed  upon  the  field  of  battle  by  good  offi- 
cers and  non-commissioned  officers,  will  rival  veterans 
upon  the  field  of  battle,  as  Lutzen  and  Bautzen 
testify. 


OBSERVATIONS    UPOX    MANCEUVRES.  331 

The  preservation  of  direction  is  quite  as  important 
as  distance,  in  order  that  crowding  and  confusion  in 
ranks  be  avoided,  and  that  there  be  any  certainty  in 
the  execution  of  manoeuvres.  It  is  important  to  prac- 
tise battalions  in  running,  as  it  is  sometimes  neces- 
sary in  order  to  achieve  success,  to  get  over  ground 
very  rapidly,  and  it  is  frequently  advantageous.  It 
usually  produces  more  or  less  confusion,  and  the  men 
should  learn  to  avoid  that  evil  as  much  as  they  can. 
There  is  a  thing  rarely  seen  at  drills,  which  is,  how- 
ever, very  important ;  that  is,  rallying  to  the  colors,  on 
the  supposition  that  a  battalion  may  be  dispersed  and 
rally  again  to  re-enter  the  engagement.  Soldiers 
should  be  taught  how  obligatory  it  is  upon  them  to 
rally  to  the  flag  as  long  as  it  floats,  and  to  sacrifice 
their  lives  to  save  it  from  capture.  Honors  paid  to 
the  flag  are  not  mere  empty  ceremony ;  they  are  in. 
tended  to  inspire  the  respect  due  from  every  soldier 
to  this  symbol  of  valor  and  devotion.  See  the  veteran 
uncover  himself  in  presence  of  the  ensign  that  he  has 
often  followed  to  victory  ;  he  is  proud,  as  of  his  own 
wounds,  of  the  marks  of  the  enemy's  bullets  upon  it ; 
he  venerates  those  folds  which  have  survived  twent}^ 
battles.  The  names  inscribed  upon  it  are  his  titles  of 
nobility  ;  they  bring  to  mind  grand  and  glorious 
memories ;  he  values  more  those  brilliant  and  de- 
served mementoes  of  his  services  than  every  thing  else 
which  men  usually  so  much  desire. 


332  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 


CHAPTEE  Y1L 

RECONNOISSANCES. 

RECONNOISSANCES  are  either  armed  or  topographical. 
Both  kinds  will  be  treated  briefly,  although  the  last 
have  little  to  do  with  our  general  subject. 

Art.  I.— Armed  Reconnois§aiices. 

Armed  reconnoissances  are  made  to  procure  infor- 
mation with  reference  to  the  position  and  force  of  the 
enemy.  So  long  as  a  commander  is  ignorant  upon 
these  points,  he  can  have  no  confidence  in  his  mea- 
sures, either  for  attack  or  defence ;  if  he  is  on  the 
march,  he  must  feel  his  way  with  great  caution  ;  he 
is  in  danger  of  falling  into  an  ambuscade,  or  of  making 
a  blundering  offensive  movement,  or  of  being  suddenly 
attacked.  It  is,  therefore,  necessary  to  endeavor  not 
only  to  learn  exactly  the  composition,  strength,  arid 
position  of  the  different  corps  in  the  opposing  army, 
but  to  be  informed  of  their  movements  and  simple 
changes  of  position,  in  order  to  divine  the  intentions 
of  their  commanding  general  and  take  precautions  to 
thwart  his  projects.  As  much  information  as  practic- 
able should  be  gathered  from  intercepted  communica- 
tions, spies,  deserters,  and  travellers.  This  should  be 


AKMED   KECONNOISSANCES.  333 

classified  under  various  heads,  and  always  kept  com- 
plete and  ready  for  reference.  With  these  notes  and 
a  good  map,  upon  which  are  indicated  the  positions  of 
the  several  corps,  by  means  of  numbers  or  conven- 
tional colors  or  colored  pins,  a  very  good  idea  may  be 
formed  of  the  force  and  the  location  of  the  hostile 
forces.  When  the  enemy  is  very  near,  it  is  necessary 
to  ascertain  every  day  what  changes  of  position  have 
been  made  for  the  purpose  either  of  concentration  or 
withdrawal.  Hence  arises  the  necessity  for  armed 
reconnoissances,  which  are  often  very  bloody  aifairs. 

The  custom,  usually  prevailing,  of  covering  camps 
with  chains  of  posts  and  sentinels,  makes  it  impossible 
generally  to  see  them  and  the  arrangements  of  the 
enemy  for,  attack  or  defence.  To  remove  this  uncer- 
tainty, a  reconnoissance becomes  necessary,  which  must 
be  pushed  on  past  the  screen  of  post  and  sentinels, 
to  a  point  where  the  officer  in  charge  may  see  plainly 
the  hostile  army,  appreciate  the  advantages  or  incon- 
veniences of  its  position,  count  its  battalions,  judge  of 
its  means  of  resistance,  whether  it  is  intrenched  and 
is  strong  in  artillery,  whether  the  ground  is  favorable 
for  the  action  of  cavalry,  &c.  These  different  objects 
should  be  seized  with  the  promptness  of  a  practised  eye, 
for  such  an  operation  will  usually  call  to  arms  the 
whole  of  the  enemy's  force,  which  may  be  very  supe- 
rior in  numbers,  and  it  may  be  necessary  to  leave  the 
ground  speedily  But  the  object  has  been  attained, 
since  the  enemy  has  displayed  his  forces. 


334:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

Such  reconnoissances  usually  precede  battles.  By 
means  of  them  the  general  ascertains  the  true  condi- 
tion of  affairs,  before  giving  his  final  orders ;  he  sees 
whether  the  corps  of  the  enemy  have  the  positions 
they  have  been  reported  to  occupy ;  are  in  supporting 
distance  of  each  other ;  are  too  much  spread  out ; 
have  their  wings  supported,  &c.  On  the  march,  the 
advanced  guard  reconnoitres  the  enemy.  Sometimes 
the  reconnoissance  is  made  in  order  to  discover  if  a 
single  point  is  strongly  occupied ;  if  a  bridge  has  been 
broken  ;  if  a  defile  is  fortified  ;  if  the  enemy  has  cannon, 
in  a  particular  place  ;  if  he  holds  a  certain  village ;  if 
he  is  moving  along  such  and  such  a  road  after  a 
defeat,  &c.  In  some  cases  the  reconnoitring  party  is 
less  numerous,  and  composed  of  cavalry  alone,  in  order 
that  its  march  may  be  more  rapid.  But  when  the 
party  is  expected  to  have  an  engagement,  it  should  be 
composed  of  all  arms  and  commanded  by  an  officer 
of  experience. 

The  commander  usually  receives  written  instruc- 
tions. These  he  should  understand  perfectly  before 
setting  out.  He  should  have  a  map,  a  glass,  and  all 
necessary  materials  for  writing  and  sketching.  He 
should  procure  two  or  three  of  the  residents  of  the 
country  to  act  as  guides,  and  answer  his  questions  rela- 
tive to  the  names  and  sizes  of  villages,  the  character 
of  the  roads,  the  extent  of  woods,  the  features  of  streams 
and  the  country  generally,  &c.  He  should  take  with 
him  an  officer  who  speaks  the  language  of  the  country ; 


ARMED   KECONNOISSANCES.  335 

it  is  better  still  if  he  knows  the  language  himself. 
Finally,  he  should  carefully  inspect  every  man,  animal 
and  vehicle  of  the  command,  to  be  certain  that  all  are 
in  good  condition  and  provided  with  provisions  and 
munitions. 

A  detachment,  intrusted  with  such  a  duty,  should 
take  all  the  precautions  of  advanced  guard,  flankers, 
&c. ;  scouts  should  examine  hollow  roads,  woods, 
villages,  every  place  where  the  enemy  might  be  con- 
cealed. Every  one  who  is  met  should  be  questioned 
as  to  the  road,  &c.  When  a  detachment  passes 
through  a  village,  the  commander  should  halt  some 
minutes  to  obtain  news  of  the  position  of  the  enemy. 
If  he  suspects  deceit,  he  should  take  hostages,  and  re- 
lease them  only  when  he  is  certain  that  correct  informa- 
tion has  been  given  him.  His  inquiries  should  not  be 
too  prolonged,  lest  the  enemy  might  learn  his  where- 
abouts, and  take  measures  to  thwart  him  in  his 
object. 

The  commander  should  note  particularly  the  features 
of  the  country  he  passes  through,  in  order  to  deter- 
mine in  advance  points  upon  which  he  might  fall 
back  and  make  a  stand,  if  necessary.  At  cross-roads 
he  should  question  the  guides,  to  ascertain  their  direc- 
tion and  termination.  He  will  test  and  correct  his 
map.  To  get  an  accurate  notion  of  the  country,  he 
should  turn  back  frequently  and  examine  it  in  its 
various  aspects  from  different  points  of  view. 

The  detachment  remains  united  as  well  as  possible 


336  1  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

during  the  march,  in  order  to  be  always  in  condition 
to  sustain  an  attack  or  drive  in  an  advanced  post. 
The  main  body  should,  therefore,  not  lose  sight  of  the 
advanced  guard,  nor  that  of  its  scouts.  At  night  the 
scouts  may  be  called  in,  as  useless,  or,  at  least,  they 
may  be  drawn  in  within  hearing  distance.  In  such 
cases,  frequent  halts  must  be  made  in  order  to  listen. 
Tillages  should  not  be  entered  if  any  thing  suspicious 
is  discovered,  and  until  the  return  of  two  or  three 
men  sent  out  to  examine  them. 

When  the  length  of  the  march  requires  a  halt,  it 
should  be  made  behind  a  wood,  or  some  feature  of 
the  ground  which  will  conceal  the  troops.  Sentinels, 
placed  in  the  woods  or  upon  high  points,  so  as  to  see 
the  country  without  being  seen,  will  give  notice  of 
every  thing  that  goes  on.  Cavalry  sentinels,  in  pairs, 
will  be  posted  at  a  still  greater  distance  on  the  roads 
towards  the  enemy,  in  order  that  one  may  leave  their 
post  and  bring  any  information  the  commander  should 
have,  while  the  other  remains  on  the  lookout.  If  it 
is  necessary  to  halt  near  a  village  to  take  food,  the 
troops  should  pass  through  and  take  position  on  the 
side  next, the  enemy,  in  order  that  he  may  not  seize  it. 
The  commander  will  oblige  the  inhabitants  to  supply 
provisions,  which  he  will  distribute,  neither  officers  nor 
men  being  permitted  to  occupy  houses.  A  guard  will  be 
stationed  in  the  village  to  enforce  this  regulation,  and 
to  see  that  the  requisition  for  provisions  is  complied 
with.  It  is  the  better  plan  to  pay  for  these,  if  possible. 


ARMED   KBCONNOIS8ANCK8.  337 

So  long  as  the  object  of  the  reconnoissance  is  not 
attained,  the  detachment  should  press  forward,  with- 
out fear  of  being  compromised,  as  it  is  here  supposed 
to  be  strong  enough  to  overthrow  easily  any  body  of 
troops  it  may  probably  encounter.  There  are  other 
reconnoissances,  made  by  small  detachments,  where 
stratagem  is  employed,  rather  than  force,  to  discover 
what  is  desired,  and  in  such  cases,  of  course,  an  en- 
gagement is  to  be  avoided.  In  a  strong  reconnoissance, 
on  the  contrary,  where  the  object  is  to  penetrate  as  far 
as  the  positions  of  the  enemy,  the  detachment  should 
not  permit  itself  to  be  checked  by  any  body  of  troops 
it  may  chance  to  meet,  but  rather  regard  it  as  a  piece 
of  good  fortune,  as  prisoners  may  be  captured  who  can 
give  valuable  information,  and  a  running  fight  may 
be  kept  up  to  the  outposts  of  the  enemy,  where  the 
flying  party  will  give  the  alarm.  The  line  is  soon 
pierced,  and  a  good  opportunity  is  given  of  seeing  the 
troops  of  the  enemy  as  they  deploy  to  repel  the  attack. 
They  are  thus  forced  to  show  their  strength.  The 
commander  should,  at  this  moment,  look  for  a  high 
point  whence  he  may  examine  the  ground  and  get  an 
idea  of  the  position  itself,  and  the  manner  in  which  it 
is  occupied,  as  well  as  the  force  and  composition  of 
the  troops.  He  makes,  or  causes  to  be  made,  a  rapid 
sketch  of  the  ground  and  the  position  of  the  enemy. 

He  should  not,  in  the  heat  of  a  first  success,  permit 
an  inconsiderate  pursuit  of  the  fugitives,  and,  losing 
eight  of  the  object  of  his  expedition,  become  engaged 
15 


338  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

so  deeply  as  to  be  unable  to  withdraw.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  must  know  how  to  stop  and  order  a  retreat, 
even  in  the  midst  of  a  successful  engagement,  when 
he  has  seen  what  he  wishes.  Prudence  must  here 
control  courage,  and  coolness  regulate  the  whole 
operation. 

The  commander  of  a  reconnoitring  party  should 
avoid  an  engagement  that  would  draw  him  off  from 
his  object,  for  his  mission  is  not  to  damage  the  enemy, 
but  to  discover  his  plans  and  acquire  an  accurate  idea 
of  his  position.  When  it  comes  in  his  way,  he  may 
attack,  defeat  detachments  of  the  enemy,  make 
prisoners,  capture  or  spike  cannon ;  but  he  would  be 
reprehensible  for  turning  out  of  his  route  and  losing 
time  to  attempt  to  surprise  a  park,  or  carry  off  a  con- 
voy, or  disperse  a  careless  body  of  troops,  even  if  suc- 
cessful. Such  operations  are  not  allowable,  unless  it 
would  be  too  dangerous  to  advance  without  driving 
off  troops  who  might  be  at  the  sides  of  his  route. 

Secret  reconnoissances  are  conducted  upon  princi- 
ples entirely  different.  Few  men  are  taken,  in  order  to 
elude  better  the  observation  of  the  enemy  or  his  pur- 
suit. The  effort  is  made  to  approach  by  night  the 
point  that  is  to  be  reached.  The  detachment  moves 
stealthily  through  ravines  and  hollow  roads,  making 
long  detours  to  avoid  meeting  the  patrols  of  the  enemy, 
and  returning  by  some  other  way,  so  as  to  escape  any 
trap  he  may  have  laid. 

A  party  of  this  sort  is  usually  composed  of  but  one 


ARMED   KECONNOISSANCE3.  339 

kind  of  troops,  cavalry  in  a  flat  open, country,  and  in- 
fantry in  a  rugged  or  obstructed  country.  It  may  be 
commanded  by  an  officer  of  low  rank,  if  he  is  intelli- 
gent and  brave.  From  such  services  young  officers 
acquire  reputation  and  receive  advancement.  The 
detachment  moves  cautiously  ;  it  is  not  of  sufficient 
numbers  to  have  an  advanced  guard,  but  is  preceded 
by  a  group  of  scouts,  and  one  of  these  is  in  front  of 
the  others.  Two  or  three  flankers  are  necessary  on 
each  side.  The  commander  has  with  him  a  guide  or 
two,  a  special  necessity  for  him,  as  he  must  often  leave 
the  main  roads.  If  the  scouts  report  the  presence  of  a 
body  of  the  enemy,  he  turns  to  one  side  and  tries  to 
avoid  it,  by  riding  behind  a  clump  of  trees,  a  rise  in 
the  ground,  or  in  any  other  way.  If  he  cannot  escape 
observation,  he  will  fight  or  retreat,  according  to  the 
numbers  of  the  enemy.  If  it  is  a  strong  column  of 
the  enemy,  and  he  has  been  able  to  remain  concealed, 
he  scans  it  closely  and  endeavors  to  form  an  accurate 
idea  of  its  strength,  before  giving  notice  of  its  presence. 
He  then  sends  one  of  the  fleetest  soldiers  by  a  detour, 
with  a  brief  note  to  the  general.  In  the  mean  time, 
if  the  column  is  about  to  reach  the  advanced  posts,  he 
should  attack,  in  order  to  stop  it  and  give  the  alarm, 
but  he  should  be  careful  not  to  engage  the  main  body  ; 
indeed,  to  avoid  every  thing  but  the  leading  detach- 
ment of  the  advanced  guard,  if  the  enemy  is  in  force. 
His  object  is  thus  accomplished.  The  enemy,  being 
uncertain  what  force  is  before  him,  is  compelled  to  halt 


3iO  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

aiid  prepare  for  defence.  Time  is  thus  gained.  The 
commander  of  the  reconnoitring  party  will  take  care 
to  send  several  orderlies  to  the  commander  of  the  ad- 
vanced posts  ;  but,  as  they  might  be  captured,  and  the 
firing  might  not  be  heard,  several  bundles  of  straw 
should  be  set  on  fire. 

When  the  party  has  reached  its  destination,  the 
commander  conceals  it  behind  a  screen  of  some  kind, 
as  a  clump  of  trees,  a  hill,  an  old  wall,  in  a  ravine  or 
hollow,  and,  taking  a  few  men  whom  he  places  along 
at  intervals,  he  ascends  to  some  place  where  he  can  see 
the  enemy,  being  accompanied  to  that  point  only  by 
the  guide  and  two  or  three  men.  lie  makes  notes  of 
what  he  sees,  along  with  the  explanations  given  him 
by  the  guide.  If  the  positions  of  the  enemy  are  in 
plain  sight,  he  makes  a  sketch,  which  it  is  well  to  do, 
even  if  the  drawing  is  very  rough.  He  must  not  per- 
mit himself  to  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  glance,  but  ex- 
amine every  thing  with  coolness,  and  endeavor  to  gain 
exact  information,  even  at  considerable  personal  risk ; 
false  reports  are  worse  than  total  ignorance  in  such 
matters.  It  requires  experience  to  perform  a  duty  of 
this  kind  satisfactorily.  Many  examples  might  be 
cited  where  incorrect  information,  made  so  either  by 
inexperience  or  fear,  has  led  to  grave  mistakes  or  seri- 
ous disasters.  If  the  officer  is  discovered  while  making 
his  observations,  and  sees  a  body  of  troops  approach- 
ing that  he  cannot  resist  with  the  few  men  near  him, 
he  hastens  to  rejoin  the  detachment  at  the  foot  of  the 


AHMED   RECONNOIS3AXCES. 

hill,  in  order  to  fall  back  upon  the  reserve,  which  will 
advance  to  his  support,  as  concealment  can  no  longer 
be  practised.  When  his  whole  force  is  united,  he  may 
attempt  to  repulse  the  enemy,  if  his  task  is  not  com- 
pleted ;  but  if  it  is,  he  should  retire,  even  if  sure  of 
success.  When  the  object  of  liis  mission  is  once  at- 
tained, it  is  to  his  credit  to  bring  back  his  whole  com- 
mand rather  than  be  seeking  trophies  from  the  enemy. 
In  this  connection  may  be  mentioned  a  remarkable 
instance  of  presence  of  mind.  At  the  siege  of  Luxem- 
bourg, Vauban,  wishing  to  ascertain,  by  personal  ob- 
servation, the  real  condition  of  affairs,  as  was  his  cus- 
tom, advanced  under  the  escort  of  a  few  grenadiers, 
who  were  left  in  rear  lying  upon  the  ground.  He  was 
crossing  the  glacis  alone,  under  cover  of  the  twilight 
darkness,  when  he  was  discovered.  He  beckoned 
with  his  hand  to  the  sentinels  not  to  fire,  and  con- 
tinued to  advance  instead  of  retiring.  The  enemy 
took  him  for  one  of  themselves,  and  Yauban,  having 
seen  what  he  wished,  retired  slowly  and  was  saved  by 
his  admirable  coolness. 

We  will  indicate  some  of  the  precautions  that  should 
be  taken  to  assure  the  success  of  a  secret  reconnois- 
sance.  In  the  first  place,  the  detachment  should  con- 
sist of  trusty  men,  arid  of  non-commissioned  officers 
who,  in  case  of  need,  might  take  the  place  of  officers. 
If  they  know  the  language  of  the  enemy,  it  will  help 
them  greatly  in  attempting  those  ruses,  by  which  a 
quick  wit  extricates  its  possessor  from  critical  situa- 


342  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

tions.  In  every  case  it  is  necessary  for  some  of  the 
party  to  speak  the  language.  Two  guides  should  be 
obtained,  who  are  mounted,  if  the  detachment  is  of 
cavalry,  and  always  watched  by  men  detailed  for  that 
purpose.  They  should  not  be  permitted  to  communi- 
cate with  each  other,  as  they  might  concert  some  plan 
for  the  destruction  or  injury  of  the  party.  Silence 
should  be  observed,  but  especially  at  night,  when 
every  man  should  be  all  ears.  When  there  is  danger 
of  discovery,  main  roads  should  be  avoided  and  cross- 
roads used,  efforts  being  made  by  the  party  to  find 
concealment  behind  woods,  hedges,  rising  ground  ; 
with  this  object,  fields  may  be  crossed  ;  it  is  not  safe 
to  pass  by  a  hill  without  ascertaining  whether  any  one 
is  behind  it,  a  duty  performed  by  the  scouts,  who  make 
signs  if  all  is  safe.  The  same  precaution  is  necessary 
in  passing  near  woods,  ravines,  farm-houses,  &c.,  where 
the  enemy  might  be  concealed.  Tillages  are  avoided 
as  much  as  possible,  in  order  not  to  give  the  alarm, 
especially  in  going  out  upon  the  expedition  ;  if  it  is 
necessary  to  pass  through  a  village,  it  should  be  pre- 
viously examined  with  care  ;  some  of  the  principal 
persons  should  be  questioned  as  to  the  position  and 
plans  of  the  enemy  ;  at  the  same  time,  incorrect  infor- 
mation will  be  given  as  to  the  destination  of  the  de- 
tachment. Food  and  other  necessaries  will  be  pro- 
cured for  the  troops,  if  they  were  not  brought  along. 
The  best  plan  is  to  carry  every  thing  that  is  necessary, 
but  sometimes  it  is  impossible  to  do  this,  for  want  of 


ARMED    RECONNOISSANCES.  343 

time  ;  the  first  opportunity  should  then  be  taken  to 
procure  what  is  wanting. 

At  night  the  men  are  not  permitted  to  smoke. 
When  the  party  arrives,  at  daybreak,  near  the  advanced 
posts  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be  carefully  put  under 
cover,  because  it  is  the  time  when  patrols  are  moving 
about ;  sentinels  are  placed  upon^  all  the  avenues,  so 
that  notice  may  be  given  of  the  approach  of  patrols, 
or  measures  may  be  taken  to  capture  them.  If  pris- 
oners are  taken,  useful  information  is  obtained.  This 
is  also  an  excellent  time  for  ascertaining  the  strength 
of  the  enemy,  for  the  troops  are  usually  under  arms 
until  the  return  of  the  patrols.  The  commander  will 
look  for  a  high  point,  from  which  he  may,  by  using 
his  glass  and  without  being  seen,  discover  what  is 
passing  at  the  outposts.  The  fires,  smoking  in  the  dis- 
ance,  indicate,  in  a  general  manner,  the  force  and  lo- 
cation of  the  corps  covered  by  the  advanced  posts. 
If  it  is  necessary  to  penetrate  so  far,  it  can  only  be 
done  by  a  night  march,  and  by  making  a  wide  detour, 
in  order  to  reach,  by  the  rear,  the  villages  occupied 
by  the  enemy  ;  for  there  would  be  no  probability  of 
success  in  attempting  to  pass  through  the  line  of  posts 
covering  the  front.  At  this  time  the  men  who  speak 
the  language  are  useful ;  they  approach  the  villages 
carefully,  replying  to  the  challenges  of  the  sentinels, 
and  gaining  access  to  some  farm-house  in  order  to 
question  the  inhabitants.  The  sentinels  in  the  rear 
are  generally  neither  numerous  nor  vigilant,  and  it  is 


PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

possible  to  capture  them  and  learn  every  thing  that 
may  be  desired.  To  accomplish  such  an  object,  the 
French  company,  which  gained  such  renown  at  the 
siege  of  Dantzic,  under  the  orders  of  Chambure,  made 
use  of  the  following  stratagem  :  several  soldiers  ob- 
tained bells  and,  mingling  with  the  cattle,  crept  up  to 
the  sentinels  and  killed  them ;  they  then  attacked  the 
p«~,st  by  assault,  and  the  remainder  of  the  company, 
which  had  been  concealed,  ran  up,  and  the  village  was 
soon  in  their  possession.  In  order  to  avoid  recogni- 
tion by  their  accent,  Chambure's  men  replied  in  Rus- 
sian to  the  Prussians,  when  they  crossed  the  posts,  and 
in  German  to  the  Russians.  There  will  be  many  op- 
portunities for  imitating  this  ruse,  when  the  hostile 
army  is  composed  of  troops  of  two  or  more  nations. 

When  the  reconnoissance  is  finished,  the  officer  who 
has  had  charge  of  it  gives  the  general  a  written  re- 
port, when  a  verbal  report  would  be  insufficient. 
This  should  be  clear,  simple,  and  as  brief  as  possible. 
The  object  of  the  report  is  the  important  thing,  and 
not  the  more  or  less  elegant  manner  in  which  it  is 
written.  The  officer  should  mention  only  those  things 
of  which  he  is  certain  ;  his  conjectures  should  be  pre- 
sented with  caution ;  he  should  carefully  avoid  draw- 
ing upon  his  imagination  for  facts.  Finally,  he  should 
not  spea'k  much  of  himself;  for  if  there  i^  ground  for 
pride  on  account  of  the  manner  in  which  the  duty  has 
been  performed,  the  troops  should  receive  all  the 
praise,  from  him  at  least. 


AKMED    RECONNOI'SSANCES.  345 

The  small  reconnoissaiices  every  morning  at  the 
advanced  posts,  to  ascertain  that  the  enemy  has  not 
come  nearer  during  the  night,  are  made  by  patrols, 
who  advance  a  short  distance  beyond  the  line  of  posts. 
This  is  a  special  duty  for  which  all  the  officers  should 
be  detailed  in  turn.  They  seldom  remain  out  more 
than  an  hour,  and  in  the  mean  time  the  grand  guards 
and  pickets  are  kept  under  arms.  All  the  precau- 
tions prescribed  for  secret  reconnoissances  are  appli- 
cable to  these.  The  commander  should  move  with* 
much  circumspection,  sending  out  scouts,  advancing 
in  silence,  and  under  such  covers  as  the  country  may 
aiford,  stopping  often  to  listen  and  examine,  giving 
the  alarm  if  the  enemy  is  met,  and  avoiding  engage- 
ments with  him.  If  the  reconnoissance  has  a  special 
object,  at  some  distance,  and  it  is  necessary  to  know 
the  result  speedily,  mounted  men  should  be  distri- 
buted along  the  route  passed  over,  to  form  a  continu- 
ous connection  between  the  detachment  and  the  out- 
post. 

Among  the  means  of  obtaining  news  of  the  enemy, 
spies  should  be  mentioned.  It  is,  unfortunately,  too 
true  that  men  are  found  everywhere  who  are  ready  to 
sell  their  honor  and  to  betray  their  country  for  a 
greater  or  less  sum,  according  to  the  position  they  oc- 
cupy in  society.  This  means,  costly  as  it  is,  should 
not  be  neglected,  for  news  opportunely  received  often 
decides  the  result  of  an  enterprise.  Large  sums  may 
therefore  be  paid  for  such  services,  however  contemp- 
15* 


346  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

tible  the  agents  are.  They  are  often  in  the  pay  of 
both  parties,  and  spying  for  both.  A  treacherous  spy 
should  receive  no  pity  if  his  guilt  is  clearly  proved. 

Art.  II. — Topographical  Recoiuiois§aiices. 

Such  reconnoissances  are  no  less  important  than 
those  treated  above,  as  a  general  cannot  arrange  a 
plan  of  attack,  or  make  the  least  movement  of  his 
forces,  unless  he  has  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the 
ground.  He  should  know  the  distances  between 
places  and  the  obstacles  to  be  encountered,  in  order 
to  arrange  a  combined  march  of  several  columns. 
This  information  can  only  be  obtained  by  special  re- 
connoissances, for  the  most  finished  maps  are  incom- 
plete for  his  uses  ;  they  never  show  the  nature  of  the 
soil,  the  quality  of  the  roads,  the  state  of  rivers  and 
bridges,  the  thickness  of  woods,  nor  the  exact  slopes 
of  mountains  and  hills,  which  are  all  things  that  must 
be  known  before  any  plan  can  be  carried  out. 

It  is  difficult  to  give  a  perfect  representation  of 
ground  upon  paper ;  at  any  rate,  it  can  only  be  done 
by  those  who  have  bestowed  upon  the  subject  much 
study  and  practice.  Moreover,  to  make  an  accurate 
map  requires  time.  I  propose,  therefore,  several  sim- 
plifications. Slopes  may  be  indicated  by  two  lines, 
one  at  the  top  and  the  other  at  the  bottom,  marking 
simply  the  contour.  These  are  not  level  lines,  but 
are  readily  seized  by  the  eye,  and  indeed  present 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    RECONNOISSANCES.  347 

themselves  when  it  is  desired  to  give  but  an  outline  of 
a  plateau,  a  hill,  a  ridge,  &c.  The  space  between 
these  lines  gives  room  enough  to  write  a  few  descrip- 
tive words.  It  will  be  noted  whether  the  slope  is 
gentle  or  steep,  accessible  or  not  for  cavalry,  what  is 
its  approximate  height.  In  order  that  the  circum- 
scribing lines  of  heights  be  not  confounded  with  those 
which  give  other  indications,  they  are  made  broken, 
as  shown  in  Figure  27.  At  the  top  of  the  sketch  the 
two  circumscribing  lines  point  out  plainly  a  plateau 
which,  is  connected  with  the  plain  by  a  gentle  slope. 
Lower,  and  near  the  river,  there  are  two  other  lines 
representing  an  elongated  hill,  and  what  is  written  be- 
tween the  curves  gives  an  idea  of  the  nature  of  the 
slopes,  or,  at  least,  all  that  is  necessary  in  a  military 
point  of  view.  On  the  right  of  the  sketch  is  a  spur 
shown  by  the  circumscribing  lines,  terminated  at  the 
river  by  steep  rocky  slopes ;  a  small  hill,  rising  at  its 
extremity,  is  also  indicated  by  its  circumscribing  lines. 
The  numbers  in  brackets  give  the  heights  of  the  points 
of  the  upper  curve  above  those  directly  below  in  the 
lower  curve,  it  being  understood  that  these  heights 
are  only  estimated.  We  see,  therefore,  that  the  pla- 
teau is  on  the  right,  100  feet  above  the  plain,  in  the 
centre  90,  and  on  the  left  75 ;  the  isolated  hill  is  10 
feet  high  at  one  end,  and  12  feet  at  the  other,  &c. 
It  is  not  easy  to  judge  of  heights  by  the  eye,  and  they 
are  rarely  placed  upon  a  mere  sketch.  I  have  only 
desired  to  show  how  it  is  possible  to  put  such  informa- 


348 


PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 


tion  on  a  sketch  without  causing  confusion,  Every 
officer  should  be  able,  by  using  such  simple  means  as 
those  indicated,  to  represent,  with  considerable  accu- 
racy, the  features  of  a  piece  of  ground  he  has  passed 
over  attentively. 

Having  now  shown  how  a  military  sketch  may  be 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    RECONNOISSANCES.  349 

made  in  a  simple  manner,  it  remains  to  settle  upon 
some  conventional  signs  to  represent  the  different  ob- 
jects found  in  a  country.  These  are  streams,  ponds, 
marshes,  roads,  rocks,  woods,  vineyards,  towns,  vil- 
lages, large  isolated  houses,  which  may  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  a  combat,  dikes,  boats,  fords,  bridges 
of  stone  or  wood.  All  of  these  are  shown  in  Figure 
27.  We  will  examine  them  separately. 

Water-courses. — These  are  represented  either  by 
two  lines,  one  larger  than  the  other,  or  by  a  succession 
of  parallel  lines  between  the  first  two.  A  blue  tint 
might  well  replace  the  interior  lines.  The  arrow  in- 
dicates the  direction  of  the  current.  On  the  lower 
part  of  the  stream  is  a  water-mill.  The  affluent,  on 
the  right  is  a  brook  whose  banks  are  steep,  which  is 
indicated  by  two  irregular  lines  traced  along  the 
bunks. 

Means  of  Passing. — On  the  left  is  a  ferry-boat,  in 
the  centre  a  stone  bridge,  which  is  distinguished  from 
the  wooden  bridge  constructed  over  the  affluent  by 
the  narrowness  of  the  latter  and  its  having  no  abut- 
ments on  the  banks.  Higher  up  is  a  ford,  indicated 
by  a  finely  dotted  line  across  the  stream. 

Stagnant  Water. — Ponds  and  lakes  are  represented 
in  the  same  way  as  rivers,  the  only  difference  being  in 
the  shape.  Marshes  are  shown  by  an  outline  and 
several  lines  drawn  parallel  to  the  bottom  of  the 
paper  with  a  few  tufts  of  grass  scattered.  It  may  be 
noted  whether  the  marsh  is  impracticable  or  not. 


350  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

Woods  and  Vineyards. — It  takes  much  time  to 
draw  these  in  the  usual  way.  We  have  simplified  it 
by  tracing  the  . outline,  and  making  on  the  inside 
straight  parallel  marks  for  woods,  and  a  small  imitation 
of  a  vine  for  vineyards.  A  tint  of  Indian-ink  or  yellow- 
ish green  may  replace  the  marks  for  woods,  if  colors  are 
used,  as  well  as  a  purple  tint  for  vineyards.  Besides 
the  marks,  the  character  of  the  woods  should  be  written. 

IZocks. — The  most  difficult  thing  is  the  representa- 
tion of  rocks,  on  account  of  their  great  variety  of 
form.  A  single  sign  is  not  sufficient  to  distinguish 
all  the  cases.  An  attempt  must  be  made  to  imitate 
them  to  a  certain  degree.  When  they  have  long 
walls,  it  will  be  sufficient,  as  shown  in  the  sketch,  to 
draw  the  top  and  bottom  line  with  a  few  crossings  to 
give  an  idea  of  the  object.  This  method  is  shown  on 
the  right  of  the  drawing. 

Habitations. — If  it  were  necessary  to  draw  all  the 
houses  in  towns  and  villages,  as  in  a  regular  topo- 
graphical map,  it  would  require  considerable  time, 
and  discourage  most  officers.  If  a  simple  sign  is  used 
to  mark  the  place,  the  thing  becomes  very  easy.  A 
village  will,  therefore,  be  represented  by  a  circle 
crossed  closely,  and  the  town-  by  changing  the  circle 
into  a  square.  A  is  a  town  on  our  sketch  ;  B,  C,  D, 
and  E  are  villages.  If  it  is  important  to  have  the 
form  of  one  of  those  villages,  a  special  sheet  will  be 
necessary  on  a  large  scale.  A  red  tint  may  replace 
the  cross  lines. 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    RECONNOISSANCES.  351 

Isolated  houses,  such  as  farm-houses,  large  enclo- 
sures, post-houses,  inns,  &c.,  are  shown  in  their  real 
form,  and  without  regard  to  the  scale.  A  small  bugle 
or  horn  may  indicate  a  post-house;  a  cup,  an  inn.  On 
the  left  of  the  plateau  is  the  usual  sign  for  wind- 
mills. 

Communications. — What  has  been  said  of  isolated 
buildings  applies  also  to  roads,  that  is  to  say,  it  is 
necessary  to  exaggerate  their  width,  in  order  to  make 
them  more  visible.  A  main  road,  such  as  that  from 
A  to  B,  is  represented  by  two  parallel  lines ;  in  the 
same  way  the  wagon  road  from  C  to  D,  with  the 
single  difference  that  the  lines  are  made  somewhat 
nearer  together.  Roads  practicable  only  for  small 
vehicles,  such  as  that  from  C  to  B,  are  indicated  by  a 
single  full  line  and  a  dotted  line ;  paths  for  pack  ani- 
mals, by  a  single  line  ;  three  of  these  meet  near  the 
ferry.  Distances  being  very  important  in  a  drawing, 
such  as  we  are  considering,  they  should  be  written 
along  the  roads  between  striking  objects.  The  num- 
bers indicate  the  times  required  by  a  foot  soldier  to 
pass  over  the  corresponding  spaces,  at  the  rate  of  three 
miles  to  the  hour.  If  these  distances  were  taken  from 
the  walk  of  a  horse,  a  note  should  be  appended,  tell- 
ing the  rate  of  movement  of  the  horse.  When  roads 
lie  partly  on  the  sheet,  there  should  be  written  on 
each  the  name  of  the  place  towards  which  it  leads, 
with  an  indication  of  the  distance,  if  it  is  known. 

Levees  and  Dikes. — It   is   important   to   represent 


352  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

these  objects,  because  troops  may  be  sheltered  by  them. 
If  the  parallel  lines  were  used,  they  might  be  taken  to 
mean  a  road  ;  to  avoid  this  uncertainty,  the  space  be- 
tween the  lines  is  filled  by  cross  marks.  This  is  shown 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  stream  near  the  bridge. 

These  are  the  different  conventional  signs,  by  means 
of  which  an  officer  may  promptly  and  easily  trace 
upon  paper  the  result  of  his  observations  in  a  recon- 
noissanee.  He  will  not  produce  a  fine  map,  but  he 
will  have  a  military  sketch,  which  maybe  very  useful, 
if  the  forms  of  objects  and  relative  distances  are  only 
approximately  obtained.  To  complete  the  sketch,  a 
meridian  line  should  be  added,  and  a  scale  of  yards,  to 
determine  distances  not  written.  This  scale  is  de- 
duced from  the  space  a  man  on  foot  can  pass  over  in 
an  hour,  about  three  miles.  Also,  as  distances  along 
the  roads  are  expressed  in  the  time  required  to  pass 
over  them,  it  will  be  well  to  add  a  second  scale  agree- 
ing with  the  first,  giving  distances  passed  in  a  minute. 
Officers  will  find  it  convenient  to  have  these  scales 
marked  upon  a  little  rule,  in  order  to  save  them  the 
trouble  of  re-marking  them  continually. 

An  officer  who  expects  to  make  a  reconnoissance, 
should  prepare  his  paper,  if  he  has  time,  by  attaching 
it  to  pasteboard,  to  keep  the  wind  from  blowing  it 
about,  and  by  marking  upon  it  the  scales  and,  approx- 
imately, the  positions  of  known  objects  within  the 
limits  of  his  work,  but  so  lightly  that  they  can  be 
effaced  and  corrected,  if  necessary. 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    EECOXNOISSANCES.  353 

We  will  suppose  that  the  patrols  of  the  enemy 
have  shown  themselves  in  the  country,  and  that  the 
officer  has  been  put  on  his  guard  against  them.  He 
lias  arrived  the  evening  before  in  the  town  A,  with 
his  detachment ;  he  has  slept  there,  and  gathered  all 
the  information  he  can  with  respect  to  the  surround- 
ing country.  He  knows  already  the  population  of  B, 
C,  D,  and  E,  their  distances  apart,  and  also  from  the 
places  to  which  roads  lead  from  them ;  he  learns  that, 
in  addition  to  the  bridge  on  the  main  road,  he  can 
pass  the  river  in  the  ferry-boat  at  D,  and  that  there 
should  be,  higher  up,  a  ford  practicable  for  cavalry. 
He  has  embodied  this  information  in  his  note-book, 
and  has  secured  a  good  guide  before  seeking  any  rest. 
It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  usual  military 
precautions  for  safety  should  be  taken,  as  he  is  in- 
formed of  the  presence  of  the  enemy  upon  the  heights 
across  the  river. 

The  next  day  he  should  be  on  his  way  before  the 
rising  of  the  sun,  his  detachment  having  been  assem- 
bled at  dawn.  A  small  party  is  sent  out  in  charge  of 
an  officer,  to  examine  the  villages  D  and  E,  and  ascer- 
tain whether  any  one  is  there ;  another  party  is  sent 
out  to  the  right  to  visit  the  country  house.,  and  to  scout 
the  ravine  and  the  banks  of  the  stream.  These  par- 
ties are  ordered  to  rejoin  him  at  the  -bridge.  He  pro- 
ceeds along  the  main  road  with  the  principal  body  of 
the  troops,  but  stops  a  half  hour  at  the  inn,  to  give 
time  for  the  two  detachments  to  make  their  circuits, 


354:  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

and  collect  precise  information  about  the  ford  which, 
has  been  spoken  of  to  him,  some  one  being  sent  to 
sound  it.  He  then  moves  on,  marking  distances  by 
his  watch,  and  commencing  to  trace  the  direction 
upon  his  paper.  Having  reached  the  bridge,  he  waits 
until  his  detachments  rejoin  him.  A  third  of  the 
troops  are  then  left  to  guard  the  bridge,  and  he  con- 
tinues with  the  remainder  to  move  on  towards  B,  pre- 
ceded by  scouts  and  accompanied  by  flankers,  who 
never  should  be  out  of  sight ;  he  sketches  in  the  road 
as  he  advances,  laying  down  distances  by  the  times 
required  to  pass  over  them.  He  marks  the  branching 
of  roads  and  paths,  the  feet  and  tops  of  slopes,  post- 
house's,  &c.  On  the  subject  of  slopes,  it  should  be  ob- 
served that  the  lengths  given  by  the  scale  of  minutes 
should  be  diminished  in  proportion  to  the  steepness 
of  the  slope,  because  the  horizontal  distances,  which 
are  alone  put  upon  the  sketch,  are  less  in  slopes  ;  and 
also,  in  such  ground  less  space  is  passed  over  in  a 
given  time.  A  reduction  of  one-tenth  for  gentle 
slopes  is  sufficient,  and  one-fifth  for  steeper.  The  eye, 
when  it  is  practised  in  the  estimation  of  distances, 
is  a  great  help  in  such  cases.  Every  .soldier  should 
endeavor  to  acquire  this  faculty. 

Arrived  at  the  village  B,  the  officer  leaves  a  third 
of  his  detachment,  and  with  the  remaining  portion 
pushes  on  a  mile  or  two,  to  ascertain  whether  any  one 
is  approaching  in  that  direction.  He  may  then  have 
an  engagement  with  the  enemy.  If  he  meets  a  force 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    RECONXOISSANCES.  355 

inferior  to  his  own,  or  comes  on  a  small  post,  lie  at- 
tacks and  endeavors  to  capture  several  prisoners,  who 
may  inform  him  of  the  position  of  the  corps  further 
on.  After  pushing  to  the  front  in  this  way,  he  retires 
rapidly  to  B,  and  then  his  topographical  labor  really 
begins.  He  is  preceded  by  a  few  scouts,  and  is  ac- 
companied only  by  a  good  non-commissioned  officer 
and  two  or  three  soldiers  ;  the  main  body  of  his 
detachment  remains  at  B,  where  it  is  established  in 
a  military  manner  on  the  side  towards  the  enemy. 

The  officer  goes,  in  the  first  place,  to  the  left  of  the 
plateau,  towards  the  windmills,  in  order  to  see  the 
slopes  and  country  on  that  side.  He  passes  around 
the  plateau,  and  returns  to  the  village  by  way  of  the 
post-house.  Thence  he  goes  to  the  village  C,  with 
half  of  the  troops  he  has  with  him  ;  the  other  half 
is  ordered  to  leave  the  village  in  an  hour,  and  take 
position  at  the  foot  of  the  slopes.  The  officer,  pre- 
ceded by  scouts,  advances  along  the  road  B  C,  stop- 
ping a  moment  at  the  top  and  bottom  of  the  slopes  to 
mark  their  direction  on  his  sketch.  In  the  village  C 
he  learns  where  the  two  roads  go  from  that  point, 
and  what  are.  the  distances  of  the  nearest  villages; 
these  will  be  written  upon  the  plan.  He  proceeds  as 
far  as  the  stream  by  the  path,  and  crosses  the  wood 
and  returns  to  the  village.  In  this  way  the  principal 
bend  of  the  river  is  marked  upon  the  sketch.  From 
the  village  two  men  should  attempt  to  cross  the  marsh 
and  arrive  at  the  ford  ;  it  will  only  be  after  receiving 


356  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

their  report  that  the  officer  will  write  the  word  im- 
practicable, and  it  would  be  better  still,  if  he  has  the 
time,  to  ascertain  the  fact  for  himself,  for  subordinates 
are  apt  to  be  deterred  by  small  difficulties.  From  0, 
the  detachment  returns  to  the  bridge  by  the  road.  In 
passing,  the  officer  detaches  two  men  to  go  around 
the  marsh,  cross  the  ford,  and  return  to  A.  He  then 
estimates  the  distance  to  the  foot  of  the  hill,  and  puts 
in  the  curve  on  his  plan. 

He  next  passes  around  the  little  hill,  following  out 
the  foot  of  the  slopes  and  the  paths  ;  he  ascends  the 
hill,  whence  he  discovers  plainly  the  form  of  the 
river ;  he  sketches  both  in,  and  proceeds  as  far  as  the 
farm-house,  always  measuring  the  distances.  The 
farm-house  is  marked  down,  and  he  returns  a  second 
time  to  the  bridge  by  the  path,  after  taking  note  of 
the  ferry  and  the  mill.  The  whole  force  is  now  col- 
lected between  the  bridge  and  the  hills,  where  it  will 
remain  an  hour,  while  the  commander,  accompanied 
by  the  guide  and  four  or  five  horsemen,  passes  around 
the  villages  I)  and  E  ;  the  troops  will  then  proceed  to 
A  and  wait  for  their  commander.  The  latter,  in  pass- 
ing over  this  part  of  the  ground,  marks  upon  his 
sketch  the  woods,  pond,  and  stream,  as  well  as  infor- 
mation concerning  the  roads  from  D  and  E. 

By  the  time  the  officer  reaches  A,  the  daylight  may 
be  past,  or  a  portion  of  it  still  left.  In  the  latter  case, 
he  will  let  his  troops  rest,  and,  if  he  is  certain  of  not 
meeting  the  enemy,  he  will  take  two  or  three  of  the 


TOPOGRAPHICAL    RECONNOI83ANCES.  357 

best  men  and  go  to  the  heights  on  the  right,  passing 
by  the  stone  country-house.  From  the  old  chateau, 
on  the  sugar-loaf  at  the  end  of  the  spur,  he  can  see 
distinctly  the  course  of  the  stream,  and  correct  his 
sketch,  if  necessary.  He  will  endeavor  to  represent 
this  broken  ground  as  well  as  he  can.  In  returning, 
he  will  go  down  the  little  brook,  down  the  river  to 
the  bridge,  measuring  the  length  of  the  dike.  His 
work  is  done,  and  he  should  then  return  to  his  quar- 
ters to  complete  his  sketch  and  notes. 

This  sketch  will  be  undoubtedly  insufficient,  if  an 
accurate  map  is  required,  for  it  is  not  to  be  expected 
that  a  work  so  rapidly  done  will  not  contain  con- 
siderable errors  ;  but  what  is  essential  is  shown  in  a 
clear  and  simple  manner,  and  the  general  can,  by  its 
aid,  discover  what  it  is  important  for  him  to  know. 
A  sketch,  made  with  the  pencil,  should  be  gone  over 
with  pen  and  ink. 

When  the  duty  can  be  divided  between  several  offi- 
cers, a  reconnoissance,  even  of  greater  extent,  may  be 
made  more  rapidly.  One  officer  examines  the  roads ; 
a  second  the  streams,  noting  their  breadth,  depth, 
velocity,  height  of  banks,  &c.  ;  a  third  goes  through 
woods,  examines  villages  as  to  their  defensive  proper- 
ties and  resources,  &c.  Each  officer  has  his  sheet,  on 
which  he  makes  his  sketch  and  adds  his  notes.  An 
officer  of  higher  rank  superintends  the  whole.  He 
takes  precautionary  measures  for  the  safety  of  his 
parties,  and  studies  the  general  outline  of  the  country. 


358  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY". 

Provided  with  his  glass,  lie  seeks  elevated  places, 
whence  he  can  better  see  the  ground  to  be  examined. 

However  rapidly  this  may  all  be  done,  it  is  some- 
times necessary  to  reconnoitre  much  more  so,  almost 
at  a  gallop  even.  All  that  can  then  be  done  is  to  take 
a  few  rough  notes  and  put  down  a  few  hasty  lines  ; 
the  sketch  must  then  be  made  from  memory. 

Itineraries. — Reconnoissances  are  much  simplified 
when  they  have  no  other  object  than  to  indicate  the 
features  of  a  road ;  they  are  then  termed  itineraries. 
They  are  made  in  two  ways ;  either  by  means  of  con- 
ventional signs,  or  by  notes  written  in  a  -table,  with 
columns  prepared  in  advance. 

No  march  should  be  made  without  an  officer  being 
selected  to  make  an  itinerary.  He  notes  the  special 
features  of  the  road,  what  is  remarkable  on  the  right 
and  left,  the  breadths  of  defiles,  the  declivities  of  slopes, 
the  repairs  needed,  £c.  Distances  from  point  to  point 
are  expressed  in  hours  of  march. 

Itineraries  of  the  first  kind  are  made  upon  sheets 
prepared  as  in  Figure  28.*  The  sheets  are  then  united 
to  represent  the  whole  road,  and  mounted  upon  linen 
for  preservation.  The  top  of  each  sheet  must  be 
attached  to  the  bottom  of  the  next.  The  notes  are 
commenced  at  the  bottom  of  the  sheet  and  carried  on 
to  the  top.  A  straight  line  in  the  middle  marks  the 
road ;  squares  or  circles  indicating  inhabited  places. 
Other  lines  to  the  right  and  left  represent  side  roads, 
*  See  also  Regulations  for  U.  S.  Army,  page  100 


TOPO&RArHICAL    KECONNOISSANCES.  «359 

near  which  are  written  the  names  of  the  nearest 
places.  Crooked  lines  mark  streams  crossing  the 
road,  &c.  Every  one  ma}7  adopt  such  signs  as  he 
prefers. 

If  the  sheet  is  too  small  to  receive  all  the  notes 
that  are  proper,  a  special  note-book  may  be  kept  in 
addition. 


360 


PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 
Fig.  28. 


&C. 

&C. 

Woods  at  300  yards  from 
the  road. 

gsTAVERN 

Many  scattered  houses  in 
the  neighborhood. 

Distance  from  A   to  D. 
4h.  fry.   The  road  is  good 
bef  Areen  these  points,  ex- 
ex  pt  near  the  river,  where 
are     deep     ruts,    which 
must    be    filled  for    the 
passage  of  artillery. 

.,_  -  .                -s 

!— 

Surrounded  by  old  walls  ; 
accommodates  3,000  men. 

Kiver    fordable.       Stone 
bridge  ;  admits  10  abreast. 

HIGHEST 

b 

M 
POINT 

From  the  bridge  to  the 
highest     point,     double 
teams  are  needed. 

*\. 

Q 

3 

VILLAGE^ 

)B. 

Accommodates  1,200  men. 

i^^B^ 

^•MIIJU'** 

Marshy  stream. 

The  plateau  offers  a  good 
position  for  defence.   The 
front  is  covered  by  the 
marshy  stream,  the  flanks 
rest    on   woods,   leaving 
an  interval  of  4,000  yards. 

FARMHOUSE 

1*1 
K 

Q 
^ 

">                 <S 

Koad  toY.  in  4h.  SO7. 
Practicable  for  wagons. 

0. 

"*$ 

Not  capable  of  defence. 
Accommodates  10,000 
men. 

CITY    H     Hj    A. 

General  Remarks  .       ICONVENTIONALSIGNS!    Particular  Remarks  . 

CHAPTER  Till. 

SPECIAL    MISSIONS,    AND    GIVING   BEST    TO    TROOPS. 

Art.  I. — Convoy§. 

IF  convoys  move  elsewhere  than  on  ground  con- 
trolled by  the  army,  and,  consequently,  at  a  distance 
from  the  principal  force  of  the  enemy,  they  will  cer- 
tainly be  captured,  for  there  is  no  task  more  difficult 
than  to  defend  a  convoy  of  considerable  extent  against 
a  serious  attack.  Frederick  lost  a  large  convoy  on  its 
way  to  Olmutz,  because  it  was  obliged  to  follow  roads 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy.  Neither  the  bravery 
of  the  escort  nor  the  nearness  of  the  army  could  save 
it  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Austrians,  and 
Frederick  was  obliged  to  raise  the  siege  of  Olmutz  in 
consequence  of  its  loss. 

Usually  these  convoys  are  only  exposed  to  the  at- 
tacks of  partisans  or  light  troops,  who  have  succeeded, 
on  account  of  the  smallness  of  their  forces,  in  passing 
unperceived  to  the  rear  of  the  army.  Against  such 
attacks  precautions  are  taken  in  giving  escorts  to  con- 
voys. These  escorts  are  principally  composed  of 
infantry,  because  troops  of  this  kind  can  fight  on  all 
kinds  of  ground,  and  may,  in  case  of  need,  take  posi- 
16 


362  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

tion  behind  the  wagons,  or  even  in  them,  in  order  to 
drive  off  an  enemy.  Cavalry  is  also  necessary,  both 
to  scout  the  country  to  a  great  distance  from  the  con- 
voy, and  give  prompt  notice  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy,  and  also  to  take  part  in  the  defence  against  an 
attack  of  cavalry.  The  latter,  being  able  to  move 
very  rapidly  from  one  end  to  the  other  of  the  convoy, 
would  soon  discover  some  unprotected  point,  if  the 
escort  were  composed  only  of  foot  soldiers. 

It  will  be  taken  for  granted,  therefore,  that  the  es- 
cort of  a  convoy  of  importance  ought  to  be  composed 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  the  former  being  the  more 
numerous.  They  should  march  in  the  following 
order :  A  leading  advanced  guard,  composed  of  cav- 
alry, will  precede  the  convoy  from  two  to  five  miles, 
in  order  to  examine  the  road  in  front  and  the  ground 
on  the  flanks.  But,  as  the  enemy  might  escape  the 
observation  of  the  leading  detachment,  and  place  him- 
self in  ambush  in  the  interval  between  it  and  the 
head  of  the  convoy,  a  second  detachment  is  necessary 
immediately  in  front,  from  which  scouts  will  be  sent 
out  in  advance  and  flankers  on  the  sides.  The  longer 
is  the  string  of  carriages  or  pack-animals,  the  greater  is 
the  danger  of  surprise,  and,  consequently,  the  greater 
the  necessity  for  precautions  to  avoid  it.  A  convoy 
is  exposed  to  attack  in  rear  nearly  as  much  as  in 
front ;  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  form  a  rear-guard, 
a  part  of  which  will  be  cavalry,  to  give  speedy  notice 
of  what  is  passing  in  rear.  The  troops  forming 


CONVOYS.  303 

the  mass  of  the  escort,  principally  infantry,  will  be 
divided  into  three  bodies,  one  of  which  will  inarch  at 
the  head  of  the  convoy,  accompanied  by  workmen, 
carrying  with  them  several  wagons  filled  with  tools 
of  all  kinds,  ropes,  timbers — indeed,  every  thing  neces- 
sary for  repairing  bridges  and  roads.  The  second  de- 
tachment will  be  placed  in  the  middle  of  the  column, 
and  the  third  at  the  tail. 

The  troops  should  be  by  no  means  scattered  along 
the  whole  length  of  the  convoy,  because,  in  case  of 
surprise,  every  part  would  be  equally  weak  to  resist 
attack.  There  should,  however,  be  a  few  men  de- 
tailed from  the  detachments  of  the  main  body  to 
march  along  the  sides  of  the  road,  and  compel  the 
drivers  to  keep  their  places  and  distances.  Order  on 
the  march  is  one  of  the  most  important  things.  The 
drivers  are  generally  ready  to  cut  loose  their  horses 
and  take  to  flight  at  the  first  appearance  of  danger, 
and  at  all  times  to  be  very  negligent.  They  should, 
therefore,  be  kept  in  a  rigid  state  of  discipline,  arid 
carefully  watched. 

The  head  of  the  convoy  should  move  slowly  and 
regularly,  in  order  to  avoid  breaks  in  the  column. 
The  drivers  should  be  forbidden  to  water  their  horses 
except  by  permission.  If  there  is  powder  in  the  con- 
voy, no  smoking  should  be  allowed.  If  a  wagon 
breaks  down,  its  load  should  be  speedily  divided 
among  the  others  that  can  receive  it  most  conveni- 
ently. There  should  be  a  signal  agreed  upon  for  the 


364  PKINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

halting  of  the  whole  column  when  such  an  accident 

o 

happens.  If  only  some  slight  repairs  are  necessary, 
the  convoy  moves  on,  while  the  disabled  wagon  falls 
to  one  side  and  takes  its  place  in  rear  of  the  column, 
to  return  to  its  proper  place  at  the  first  general  halt, 
unless  the  commander  decides  otherwise.  The  sol- 
diers should  never  be  permitted  to  put  their  knap- 
sacks, &c.,  in  the  wagons  ;  still  less  should  they  ride 
themselves. 

Whenever  the  road  is  wide  enough,  the  carriages 
should  be  formed  in  double  file.  The  length  of  the 
column  is  thus  diminished  one-half;  and,  if  circum- 
stances require,  the  defensive  park  may  be  rapidly 
formed,  which  is  done  by  the  carriages  wheeling  to  the 
right  and  left,  so  as  to  form  in  two  compact  lines,  with 
the  horses'  heads  towards  each  other  and  quite  near. 
In  this  way  the  horses  are  better  covered,  the  drivers 
cannot  get  off  with  them,  and  the  whole  space  oc- 
cupied is  much  less  than  when  in  column.  This  for- 
mation evidently  requires  some  time,  and  should  only 
be  adopted  when  necessity  requires. 

A  halt  of  a  few  minutes  should  be  made  every 
hour,  to  give  the  horses  time  to  breathe,  to  adjust  the 
harness,  &c.  In  the  middle  of  the  day  a  longer  halt 
is  made,  to  feed  and  water  the  animals,  but  without 
unhitching.  The  necessary  food  for  this  purpose 
should  be  carried  both  by  men  and  beasts.  The  con- 
voy usually  halts  at  night  near  a  village,  as  provi- 
sions are  to  be  found  there  for  man  and  beast,  as  well 


CONVOYS.  365 

as  shops  for  repairs  of  harness  and  wagons,  and  for 
shoeing  horses.  Unless  it  is  absolutely,  necessary  to 
do  otherwise,  the  park  should  be  formed  beyond  the 
village,  because  it  is  better  to  have  a  defile  of  that 
sort  in  rear  than  in  front,  if  it  should  during  the 
night  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

A  good  place  for  the  park  is  a  spot  enclosed  by 
walls  or  thick  hedges,  as  it  is  most  secure.  In  the 
interior  of  the  park  the  most  valuable  objects  are  put, 
such  as  despatches  or  other  valuable  papers,  money,  or 
munitions ;  a  guard  should  always  be  placed  to  pre- 
vent the  drivers  making  a  fire  near  the  wagons  con- 
taining powder.  The  horses  are  tied  up  inside  the 
enclosure,  each  team  near  its  own  wagon.  The  troops, 
except  the  guard  of  the  park,  bivouac  at  a  little  dis- 
tance, occupying  the  ground,  with  the  usual  precau- 
tions of  outposts,  &c.  No  one  should  be  permitted 
to  leave  the  park  without  the  consent  of  the  com- 
mander. Those  who  are  to  go  for  provisions  and 
forage  should  be  designated.  Neither  officer,  soldiers, 
nor  drivers  should  be  suffered  to  go  to  the  inns  and 
shops  of  the  village.  The  commander  should  take  all 
necessary  measures  for  providing  food  for  the  whole 
command,  as  well  as  straw  to  sleep  on  ;  for  this  pur- 
pose, as  well  as  to  select  a  place  for  the  park,  officers 
and  a  few  men  should  be  sent  in  advance. 

The  park  is  commonly  a  hollow  square,  but  the 
locality  will  always  determine  its  form,  which  should 
make  an  enclosure,  either  to  contain  the  horses  and 


366  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

drivers,  or  as  a  kind  of  defensive  work  in  case  of 
attack.  The  carnages  may  be  in  file  or  side  by  side, 
according  to  the  front  of  the  square  they  form  ;  the 
rule  being  that  all  the  poles  be  turned  in  the  same 
direction  and  towards  the  place  of  destination.  It  is 
proper  to  double  the  carriages  in  file,  so  that  in  case 
of  need  the  intervals  of  one  row  may  be  rapidly 
covered  by  pushing  forward  the  carriages  of  the 
other.  When  the  space  occupied  is  contracted,  and 
the  number  of  carriages  large,  they  are  placed  in 
several  lines,  with  sufficient  intervals  between  them 
to  receive  the  teams. 

When  the  convoy  sets  out  the  next  day,  each  car- 
riage retakes  its  own  place  in  the  column,  and,  to  en- 
able it  to  do  so,  each  has  its  own  number,  which  pre- 
vents all  quarrels  on  the  subject  of  precedence  among 
the  drivers.  The  officers  should  also  see  that  each 
enters  the  column  in  its  turn  and  without  delay. 
These  precautions  may  appear  very  minute,  but  they 
are  quite  necessary.  There  are  others  that  should  bo 
taken  by  the  commander  of  the  convoy  ;  for  example, 
he  should  satisfy  himself  that  all  the  carriages  and 
animals  are  in  good  order  before  setting  out.  He 
should  see  whether  the  loads  are  not  too  heavy,  and 
remedy  the  difficulty  if  they  are,  either  by  employing 
more  wagons  or  lengthening  the  teams.  He  prepares 
a  list  of  all  the  wagons,  with  their  contents  and  the 
names  of  the  drivers.  He  requires  the  officers  to  assist 
in  his  duties  of  supervision,  and  gives  them  instruc- 


CONVOYS.  367 

tions  what  they  should  do  in  different  circumstances 
that  he  may  foresee.  He  should  cause  a  defensive 
park  to  be  formed  several  times,  that  the  drivers  may 
know  how  to  perform  their  part  without  confusion. 

The  passages  of  defiles  are  dangerous  for  a  con- 
voy which  is  surrounded  by  numerous  parties  of  the 
enemy.  A  defile  should  therefore  never  be  entered 
until  the  outlet  from  it  is  secured,  and  it  should  be 
passed  with  all  practicable  speed.  In  passing  bridges, 
precautions  should  be  taken  against  attacks  on  both 
banks.  It  is  manifestly  the  duty  of  a  commander  of 
a  convoy  to  obtain  all  the  information  he  can  of  the 
route  he  is  to  follow,  and  even  to  make  a  personal 
examination  of  it  in  advance,  if  he  has  time  enough. 

o 

When  the  enemy  is  reported  in  front  by  the  leading 
detachment,  which  falls  back  rapidly  upon  the  escort, 
the  carriages  close  up  as  much  as  possible  and  halt, 
or,  better  still,  form  in  double  file,  if  the  road  is  wide 
enough.  The  advanced  guard  and  the  head  detachment 
of  the  escort  take  a  position  to  receive  the  enemy  ;  the 
centre  detachment  forms  alongside  of  the  first,  or  in 
echelon,  as  the  ground  may  permit,  and  as  one  or 
other  flank  is  more  exposed.  The  third  detachment, 
joined  by  the  rear-guard,  remains  in  reserve,  ready  to 
charge  the  enemy  when  he  has  turned  the  wing  of  the 
troops  in  front,  and  is  attempting  to  fall  upon  the 
flank  of  the  convoy,  to  cut  it  in  two,  or  throw  it  into 
confusion.  This  reserve  should  be  immediately  in 
front  of  the  carriages,  that  it  may  pass  readily  from 


308  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

right  to  left.  In  this  position  it  has  the  advantage  of 
replying  by  small  detachments  to  the  circling  move- 
ments of  the  attacking  party.  All  the  cavalry  of  the 
escort  should  be  in  the  reserve.  If  the  main  body  is 
too  near  the  head  of  the  convoy,  the  reserve  may  be 
obliged  to  take  position  somewhere  on  the  flank  ;  in 
this  case  an  opening  should  be  made  in  the  column,  to 
allow  passage  through  from  side  to  side.  It  is  very 
necessary  for  the  reserve  to  have  much  mobility,  be- 
cause it  is  called  upon  to  look  out  for  the  feints  of  the 
enemy,  and  repel  all  the  lateral  attacks,  which  the 
main  body  cannot  attend  to.  The  soldiers  placed 
along  the  convoy,  to  watch  the  drivers,  must  now  give 
special  attention  to  their  duties,  and  should  at  once 
shoot  down  any  who  attempt  to  cut  loose  their  horses 
in  order  to  escape. 

If  the  attack  is  repulsed,  the  commander  of  the  es- 
cort must  be  very  careful  how  he  indulges  in  a  pursuit, 
for  the  flight  may  be  a  feint,  to  draw  him  into  an  am- 
buscade, or  away  from  the  train,  while  another  body 
of  the  enemy  attacks  it.  His  object  is  to  arrive  safely 
at  his  destination  with  his  charge.  This,  however, 
should  not  prevent  him  from  attacking  the  enemy  if 
suitable  opportunities  offer.  If  necessity  requires,  he 
should  take  shelter  in  and  behind  the  wagons.  In  a  des- 
perate case  like  this,  a  protracted  resistance  may  be 
useless,  on  account  of  the  great  superiority  of  the  ene- 
my ;  the  commander  may  then  endeavor  to  save  a 
portion  of  the  train  by  abandoning  the  remainder,  or 


CONVOYS.  300 

else  to  destroy  the  whole  by  killing  or  maiming  the 
horses,  breaking  the  wheels,  overturning  the  wagons, 
and  even  setting  on  fire  those  easily  burned. 

The  defence  against  an  attack  from  the  rear  is  con- 
ducted on  the  same  principles:  —  the  centre  detach- 
ment is  united  to  the  rear  detachment  and  the  rear- 
guard, to  form  a  main  body  to  resist  the  enemy  ;  the 
head  detachment  falls  back  to  form  a  reserve.  The 
convoy  should  continue  its  march  while  the  troops 
fight.  The  latter  will  retire  gradually,  keeping  at  no 
great  distance  from  the  tail  of  the  column,  but  pre- 
senting a  bold  front  in  defiles,  and  wherever  the  ground 
permits.  In  the  mean  time,  the  advanced  guard  re- 
ceives information  of  the  attack,  and  joins  the  reserve. 

The  most  dangerous  attack  is  that  in  flank,  because 
the  convoy  is  more  exposed  in  that  direction.  In  this 
case,  the  three  detachments  unite  on  the  side  attacked, 
and  move  out  so  far  that  the  enemy  will  be  obliged  to 
make  a  wide  detour  in  attacking  and  expose  his  own 
flank.  The  best  arrangement  is  to  throw  the  centre 
detachment  well  out,  and  form  in  echelon  the  other 
two,  strengthened  respectively  by  the  advanced  and  rear 
guard.  The  convoy  doubles  its  files  and  moves  on, 
regulating  its  movements  by  those  of  the  troops.  If 
they  halt,  it  must  halt,  unless  the  enemy  has  only  in- 
fantry, in  which  case  the  convoy  will  take  the  trot  and 
escape.  But  the  attacking  party  usually  contains  cav- 
alry, and  the  convoy  must  regulate  its  movements  by 
those  of  the  escort.  However,  it  may  sometimes  gain 
16* 


370  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

ground  in  a  defile,  or  in  some  place  where  cavalry  is 
unable  to  act.  At  any  rate,  the  director  of  the  train 
must  obey  exactly  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the 
escort.  If  the  latter  thinks  it  necessary  to  form  a 
defensive  park,  the  former  executes  the  movement  at 
the  first  suitable  place. 

It  is  sometimes  impossible  to  adopt  the  above  dis- 
positions. There  may  not  be  men  enough  to  form 
three  detachments,  and  in  this  case  two  are  used,  one 
at  the  head  of  the  convoy,  and  the  other  at  the  tail ; 
perhaps,  even,  after  furnishing  the  advanced  and  rear 
guards,  the  main  body  may  be  too  small  for  subdivi- 
sion, and  then  it  should  all  march  together  on  the 
most  dangerous  side.  The  rule  is  never  to  scatter  the 
escort  along  the  convoy,  but  to  assemble  it  in  one  or 
more  groups  capable  of  effectual  resistance.  A  con- 
voy of  importance  should  never  be  risked  on  the  road 
without  a  previous  sweeping  of  the  country  by  mova- 
ble columns.  If  the  convoy  is  put  in  motion  immedi- 
ately after  the  return  of  the  columns,  there  are  many 
chances  in  its  favor,  and  the  escort  may  be  considera- 
bly diminished. 

It  is  evident,  from  what  precedes,  that  the  attack  of 
a  convoy  is  a  very  safe  operation,  even  for  a  body  of 
troops  inferior  to  the  escort,  for,  if  the  enemy  is  taken 
unawares,  the  convoy  may  be  destroyed,  or  a  part  of 
it  captured  ;  if  the  attack  fails,  the  party  may  retire 
safely.  It  should  be  partly  infantry  and  partly  cav- 
alry. It  is  evident  that  if,  by  hiding  behind  a  wood, 


CONVOYS.  371 

a  bill,  a  field  of  grain,  &c.,  the  bead  or  tail  of  tlie  con- 
voy can  be  surprised  and  enveloped  before  assistance 
can  arrive,  the  success  is  complete.  This  plan  should 
be  attempted  before  resorting  to  an  open  attack.  But 
it  is  not  right  to  expect  such  negligence  upon  the  part 
of  the  commander  of  the  escort ;  but,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  escort  will  be  prepared  for  the  attack.  Hence, 
his  attention  must  be  divided  by  sending  against  him 
several  small  columns  and  many  skirmishers,  who  seek 
to  get  near  the  wagons,  to  shoot  the  horses  and  obstruct 
the  road.  The  cavalry,  circling  around,  moves  rapidly 
upon  exposed  points.  If  several  carriages  are  reached, 
it  is  sufficient  to  frighten  off  the  drivers  and  cut  the 
traces,  because  in  this  way  the  rear  part  of  the  convoy 
is  brought  to  a  halt. 

If  the  time  and  place  of  the  attack  can  be  chosen, 
it  evidently  should  be  made  when  the  convoy  is  partly 
in  a  defile,  and  the  head  or  the  tail  may  be  enveloped. 
Success  is  then  certain,  the  inevitable  crowding  and 
confusion  in  the  defile  preventing  one  part  of  the 
troops  from  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  other. 
But  such  a  piece  of  good  fortune  is  rare,  and  there 
are  chances  enough  of  success  to  justify  attacking  a 
convoy  wherever  it  is  found. 

When  the  whole  or  part  of  a  convoy  has  been  seized, 
the  prize  should  be  rapidly  carried  off  to  a  secure 
place,  before  the  enemy  can  come  up  in  superior  force 
and  recapture  it.  Rather  than  permit  this,  the  carriages 
should  be  destroyed,  and  only  the  most  valuable  part 


372  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

of  their  contents  preserved  arid  carried  off  on  the  backs 
of  the  horses.  Fighting  is  to  be  avoided  ;  that  is  not 
the  object  of  the  expedition. 

Art.  II. — AmS>u§cades. 

As  war  is  now  waged,  and  with  the  great  number 
of  detachments  with  which  armies  are  surrounded  in 
the  present  day,  ambuscades  are  scarcely  possible, 
except  for  small  bodies  of  troops.  Very  broken  coun- 
try is  particularly  suited  to  them,  from  the  ease  with 
which  troops  may  be  concealed  in  it.  This  method 
of  attacking  by  surprise  can  only  succeed  when  the 
enemy  is  very  negligent  in  his  marches,  taking  none 
of  the  usual  precautions ;  for,  as  soon  as  notice  is 
given  of  an  ambuscade,  it  has  failed.  In  an  ambus- 
cade, the  effort  should  be  made  not  only  to  surprise 
the  enemy,  but  to  envelop  him  and  cut  off  his  re- 
treat ;  for  this  purpose,  the  troops  in  ambush  should 
be  divided  into  several  bodies,  in  order  to  attack  on 
all  sides  at  once. 

When  moving  to  a  position  of  ambush,  the  body 
of  troops  should  be  preceded  by  a  small  advanced 
guard  and  by  scouts,  in  the  usual  manner,  to  avoid 
falling  into  a  similar  trap  laid  by  the  enemy,  and  to 
seize  all  persons  who  might  carry  him  word  of  the 
operation.  This  is  a  rule,  in  fact,  which  should  never 
be  disregarded. 

Woods,  hills,  rocks,  tall  hedges,  &c.,  are,  it  is  true, 


AMBUSCADES.  373 

the  most  advantageous  places  for  ambuscades,  but 
there  are  others  by  no  means  useless  for  such  pur- 
poses, such  as  dikes,  fields  of  grain,  or  meadows  of  tall 
grass,  or  plains  crossed  by  gentle  undulations,  partic- 
ularly as  the  enemy  is  lulled  into  security  by  not  sus- 
pecting any  probability  of  an  attempt  at  surprise  on 
such  ground.  An  inventive  genius  can  make  the 
most  of  circumstances  of  this  kind,  when  he  sees  his 
adversary  inclined  to  negligence  and  presumption. 
In  this  way  Hannibal  deceived  Minutius.  Polybius 
says,  that  between  the  two  camps  was  a  hill  whence 
either  could  greatly  annoy  the  other.  Hannibal  de- 
termined to  seize  it  first,  but  suspecting  that  Minu- 
tius, proud  of  a  former  success,  would  not  fail  to  pre- 
sent himself,  he  had  recourse  to  a  stratagem.  Al- 
though the  plain  commanded  by  the  hill  was  gener- 
ally level  and  open,  Hannibal  had  observed  several 
undulations  and  hollows,  where  some  men  might  be 
hid.  He  accordingly  distributed  among  them,  in 
small  bodies,  500  horse  and  5,000  foot.  Minutius 
marched  up  to  defend  the  hill,  without  perceiving  the 
troops  in  ambush,  who  took  him  in  flank  and  rear ; 
he  was  completely  defeated. 

In  preparing  an  ambuscade,  those  places  are  also 
to  be  sought  where  the  enemy  cannot  deploy  easily ; 
where  he  is  obliged  to  move  in  a  long,  narrow 
column  ;  where,  on  account  of  local  difficulties,  dis- 
order may  be  expected  to  occur ;  where  the  troops  are 
separated  by  obstacles,  &c. 


374  piimciPLEs  OF  STRATEGY. 

At  what  distance  from  the  road,  followed  by  the 
enemy,  should  an  ambuscade  be  established  ?  This 
question  can  only  be  solved  by  considering  the  local- 
ity, and  the  kind  of  troops  to  be  attacked.  In  general, 
it  may  be  said,  that  if  the  place  of  concealment  is  too 
near,  the  flankers  of  the  enemy  will  discover  the  trap ; 
and  if  it  is  too  far  off,  the  enemy  will  have  time  to 
escape.  Cavalry  should  station  itself  at  a  greater 
distance  than  infantry,  because  it  can  get  over  ground 
more  rapidly,  and  the  noise  of  the  horses  cannot  be 
repressed.  For  this  reason,  and  because  cavalry  can- 
not act  in  all  kinds  of  ground,  infantry  is  better  suited 
for  ambuscades.  However,  cavalry  may  be  used  in 
small  bodies. 

The  place  of  ambush  should  be  entered  from  the 
sides  and  rear,  in  order  to  leave  no  tracks  on  the  road 
by  which  the  enemy  might  be  led  to  suspect  some- 
thing. K-ight  is  the  best  time  for  moving,  in  order 
to  arrive  before  day  at  the  place.  It  is  a  good  plan 
to  take,  at  first,  another  road,  in  order  to  mislead  the 
inhabitants  of  the  country,  who  may  be  in  the  interest 
of  the  enemy. 

A  body  of  troops  in  ambush  should  light  no  fires  ; 
each  soldier  should  remain  in  the  place  assigned  to 
him,  whether  standing,  sitting,  or  lying  ;  he  should 
not  move,  nor  hold  his  arms  in  such  a  position  as  to 
reflect  the  rays  of  the  sun.  In  the  daytime,  a  portion 
of  the  troops  may  sleep,  if  they  have  long  to  wait,  be- 
cause the  enemy  is  visible  at  a  distance,  and  there  is 


AMBUSCADES.  375 

ample  time  for  preparation  ;  but  at  night,  every  man 
must  be  on  the  alert,  to  seize  the  favorable  moment 
for  rushing  upon  the  enemy,  when  the  preconcerted 
signal  is  given. 

The  troops  being  divided,  as  has  been  stated,  into 
several  bodies,  with  special  duties  to  perform,  each 
should  be  informed  precisely  what  it  has  to  do,  in 
order  to  avoid  confusion  and  to  have  concert  in  the 
attack.  The  infantry,  placed  as  near  the  road  as 
possible,  fire  a  single  volley  and  then  rush  upon  the 
enemy,  uttering  loud  cries  at  the  same  time.  The 
cavalry,  posted  at  a  greater  distance,  make  a  circuit, 
in  order  to  close  the  way  both  in  front  and  rear.  The 
party  in  ambush  should  only  rise  up  at  a  given  signal ; 
it  should  not  stir  on  account  of  a  few  shots,  that  may 
be  accidental.  The  commander  is  the  sole  judge  of 
the  moment  for  action,  and  it  is  for  him  to  give  the 
signal.  Too  much  impatience  may  cause  the  opera- 
tion to  miscarry. 

After  an  engagement,  the  enemy  may  often  be 
drawn  into  an  ambuscade  by  a  feigned  retreat.  This 
ruse  is  well  known,  but  still  it  succeeds,  because  an 
enemy  who  believes  himself  victorious,  and  wishes  to 
profit  by  his  first  success,  does  not  always  take  all  the 
precautions  usual  in  an  ordinary  march,  and,  more- 
over, people  are  made  presumptuous  by  good  fortune. 
In  1622,  Tilly  was  pressing  Heidelberg  closely.  The 
King  of  Bohemia  and  Mansfeld  passed  the  Rhine  to  suc- 
cor that  city.  At  the  news  of  the  march  of  the  Kin? 


376  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

of  Bohemia,  Tilly  encamped  near  Wisloch,  in  a  very 
advantageous  position.  To  draw  him  from  it,  Mans- 
feld  attacked,  and  during  the  engagement  caused  his 
troops  to  fall  back,  as  if  worsted.  Tilly  pursued 
warmly,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Mingelheim,  where 
Mansfeld  had  placed  in  ambush  a  part  of  his  army, 
and  much  artillery.  The  Bavarians,  taken  unawares 
in  this  way,  were  at  once  defeated  ;  they  had  2,000 
men  killed,  and  lost  their  baggage,  cannon,  and  many 
prisoners.  Heidelberg  was  relieved. 

When  information  has  been  received  of  an  attempt 
upon  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  prepare  an  ambuscade, 
an  excellent  opportunity  is  offered  to  make  a  counter- 
plot, for  he  will  be  surprised  at  the  moment  when  he 
expected  to  cause  surprise,  his  troops  will  be  demor- 
alized, and  fear  will  give  the  finishing  stroke.  "With 
this  object,  the  counter-ambuscade  should  be  arranged 
as  near  as  possible  to  that  of  the  enemy.  Paulin,  in- 
formed by  deserters  that  Cecinna  had  prepared  an  am- 
buscade for  him,,  sent  a  portion  of  his  troops  to  station 
themselves  in  ambush  near  those  of  the  enemy,  while 
he  moved  up  as  if  he  knew  nothing  of  their  design. 
The  party  of  Cecinna  was  cut  to  pieces,  because  his 
men  lost  confidence  as  soon  as  they  saw  Paulin's 
troops  show  themselves. 

This  proves  that  even  in  arranging  an  ambuscade, 
that  is  to  say,  when  a  commander  deems  himself  suffi- 
ciently in  control  of  the  country  to  effect  a  surprise  of 
his  enemy,  it  is  necessary  to  be  on  his  guard,  to  post 


AMBUSCADES.  377 

sentinels,  and  to  examine  the  neighborhood  of  the 
position  he  is  going  to  occupy.  The  sentinels  are  not 
only  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  party  in  am- 
bush, but  also  to  give  notice  of  the  arrival  of  the 
enemy  who  is  to  be  surprised,  and  to  communicate 
any  information  that  may  be  interesting  to  the  com- 
mander. This  duty  should  be  committed  to  men  of 
intelligence  and  experience  in  war ;  it  is  well  even  to 
place  an  officer  or  non-commissioned  officer  on  the 
look  out,  with  two  or  three  men  to  transmit  his 
reports. 

If  the  patrols  or  sentinels  see  any  of  the  scouts  of 
the  enemy,  they  should  not  challenge,  but  hide,  or 
retire  without  noise ;  the  least  indiscretion  may  cause 
such  an  enterprise  to  fail.  If  the  enemy  discover  the 
ambushed  party,  all  that  remains  is  to  rush  out  and 
seize  the  most  exposed  men. 

It  is  well  to  have,  on  the  two  flanks  of  the  ambus- 
cade, small  detachments  of  cavalry  to  ride  after  peas- 
ants, who  might  see  the  trap,  and  endeavor  to  give 
notice  of  its  existence  to  the  enemy.  The  neighing 
of  the  horses  is,  however,  dangerous,  as  it  may  lead 
to  discovery. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that,  if  the  troops  are 
to  remain  a  long  time  concealed,  the  commander,  be- 
fore setting  out  upon  the  expedition,  should  see  that  a 
supply  of  provisions  is  laid  in  for  men  and  horses. 
Having  once  entered  the  place  of  concealment,  none 
should  be  permitted  to  leave  it,  even  in  disguise,  for 


378  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

fear  of  arousing  the  suspicions  of  the  inhabitants,  and 
also  those  of  the  enemy. 


Art.  III.— Advanced  Po§ts. 

When  the  circumstances  of  the  war  permit  the 
troops  to  remain  quietly  resting,  they  are  either  in  camp 
or  cantonments.  Some  remarks  were  made  in  a  pre- 
vious chapter  on  the  subject  of  cantonments.  It  is 
proposed  now  to  enter  into  more  detail,  and  to  treat 
of  castrametation,  or  the  art  of  choosing  and  laying 
out  camps.  But  first,  a  few  words  will  be  said  as  to 
advanced  posts,  applicable  alike  to  the  case  of  troops 
long  in  a  position  of  repose,  or  simply  making  a  tem- 
porary stay  at  some  place. 

The  advanced  posts  of  a  stationary  body  of  troops 
perform  the  same  duties  as  the  scouting  parties  and 
flankers  on  a  march.  Their  office  is  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  falling  upon  the  main  body  without  being 
perceived  and  the  alarm  given.  Every  body  of  troops 
which  is  established  in  camp,  bivouac,  or  cantonments, 
for  a  long  time,  or  for  a  single  day,  or  even  for  a  few 
hours,  should  be  covered  by  detachments  whose  num- 
ber and  strength  should  be  proportioned  to  the  entire 
force,  arid  the  extent  of  ground  to  be  occupied.  These 
detachments  form  the  advanced  posts.  If  they  are 
well  posted,  and  keep  a  good  look  out,  the  enemy  can- 
not present  himself  in  any  direction  without  being 


ADVANCED   POSTS.  379 

seen  at  a  considerable  distance,  and  time  is  thus  given 
for  preparations  for  defence.  If,  on  the  contrary,  they 
are  badly  placed,  are  too  much  separated,  and  perform 
their  duties  negligently,  one  of  the  detachments  may 
be  captured  without  the  knowledge  of  its  neighbors, 
and  the  danger  for  the  main  body  is  so  much  the 
greater  because  it  is  reposing  in  a  false  security.  Out- 
post service  deserves,  therefore,  the  careful  attention  of 
all  officers  connected  with  it. 

The  nature  of  the  ground  determines  the  kind  of 
troops  to  be  used  for  this  purpose.  In  an  open  coun- 
try cavalry  will  be  employed,  but  infantry  chiefly  in 
a  broken  country.  A  few  horsemen  should  always  be 
with  the  detachments,  for  duty  as  orderlies  and  mes- 
Fengers.  Mounted  soldiers  are  also  necessary  as  ve- 
dettes on  the  principal  roads,  to  give  timely  notice  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy. 

The  distance  at  which  the  advanced  posts  should  be 
placed  cannot  be  fixed  absolutely,  because  it  depends 
upon  their  number,  the  ground,  and  the  strength  of  the 
main  body.  It  is  plain  that  a  large  body  of  troops, 
requiring  some  time  to  assemble,  should  have  its  out- 
posts more  distant  than  a  small  body,  which  can  get 
under  arms  in  a  moment.  Moreover,  a  large  force 
can  safely  extend  its  line  of  outposts,  because  they 
may  be  made  stronger  and  well  supported. 

Advanced  posts  are  divided  into  outposts  and  grand 
guards.  The  first,  as  their  name  implies,  are  outside 
of  all,  the  grand  guards  serving  as  centres  and  rallying 


380  PRINCIPLES    OF   STRATEGY. 

points  for  them.  The  grand  guards  furnish  the  out- 
posts, each  sending  out  as  many  as  may  be  necessary 
for  a  good  view  of  the  surrounding  ground.  In  addi- 
tion to  these,  and  intermediate  between  them  and  the 
main  body,  small  reserves  are  placed  in  suitable  posi- 
tions; they  are  called  supports  or  pickets. 

The  grand  guards  are  placed,  as  much  as  possible, 
in  covered  positions,  such  as  low  ground,  behind  vil- 
lages or  woods,  on  the  reverse  of  a  hill,  &c.  The 
essential  thing  is  to  keep  them  out  of  sight  of  the 
enemy,  who  might  attempt  to  attack  them  suddenly 
or  capture  them.  The  outposts  are  still  more  to  the 
front,  say  about  100  paces,  observing  the  same  rule  of 
keeping  out  of  view  of  the  enemy.  These  posts, 
drawn  from  the  grand  guards,  furnish  an  extensive 
chain  of  sentinels  or  vedettes,  who  are  intended  to  see 
every  thing  that  goes  on.  Each  picket  furnishes  three 
or  four  grand  guards,  each  grand  guard  as  many  out- 
posts, and  each  outpost  several  sentinels.  The 
strength  of  the  outposts  cannot  be  always  and  every- 
where the  same,  being  dependent  on  the  number  of 
sentinels  to  be  furnished.  In  each  outpost  there 
should  be  three  times  as  many  men  as  it  furnishes 
sentinels,  besides  the  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers. 

In  a  wooded  country,  the  sentinels  occupy  the  outer 
skirts,  the  outposts  the  first  clear  places,  the  grand 
guards  those  more  to  the  rear.  The  pickets  are  placed 
behind  the  forest,  and  always  far  enough  so  that  the 


ADVANCED    POSTS.  381 

enemy  cannot  fall  upon  them  suddenly,  under  cover 
of  the  trees,  even  if  he  should  have  succeeded  in  pene- 
trating the  wood.  In  general,  woods  and  other  covers 
should  be  viewed  with  suspicion.  If  the  forest  is  too 
extensive  to  be  left  in  front,  large  open  places  should 
be  sought  out  for  the  pickets,  or  else  abatis  made  to 
cover  them.  The  grand  guards  and  outposts  should 
take  similar  precautions. 

Communication  between  the  posts  should  be  kept 
up  by  frequent  patrols,  either  to  watch  the  sentinels, 
to  discover  any  of  the  enemy  who  may  slip  past  in 
the  dark,  to  prevent  desertions,  to  seize  spies,  &c. 
The  outposts  should  never  be  separated  from  the 
grand  guards  by  obstacles  which  would  prevent  their 
prompt  assembling,  if  the  enemy  should  attack.  The 
same  rule  should  as  far  as  possible  be  observed  be- 
tween the  grand  guards  and  pickets,  but  sometimes 
cannot,  on  account  of  the  greater  distance.  In  this 
latter  case,  the  obstacle  should  be  held  by  an  inter- 
mediate post,  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  and  protect 
the  retreat  of  the  advanced  troops. 

The  pickets  may  be  composed  of  troops  of  all  arms, 
but  the  grand  guards  are  either  cavalry  or  infantry. 
If  of  infantry,  there  should  be  still  a  few  mounted 
men,  for  purposes  already  mentioned.  The  pickets,  in 
addition  to  the  outposts  and  grand  guards,  should  have 
their  own  small  posts,  or,  at  least,  their  own  sentinels. 
Generally,  too  many  precautions  cannot  be  taken  to 
guard  against  surprises.  The  officer  who  permits  him- 


S82  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

self  to  be  surprised  is  entirely  inexcusable ;  lie  should 
always  take  it  for  granted  that  the  posts  in  front  of 
him  are  negligent,  or  may  be  captured  bj  the  enemy, 
and  his  arrangements  should  be  made  accordingly. 

When  the  sentinels  give  notice  of  the  approach  of 
the  enemy  and  see  him  coming,  they  fall  back  upon 
their  respective  posts,  then  upon  the  grand  guards ; 
and  the  latter,  after  ascertaining  the  exact  state  of  af- 
fairs, and  that  a  serious  attack  is  made,  retire  towards 
the  pickets,  skirmishing  as  they  go.  The  pickets  send 
supports  to  the  grand  guards ;  receive  them  when 
they  come  in ;  fight,  if  it  is  necessary  to  hold  their 
positions  ;  or  fall  back  slowly  upon  the  main  body. 

At  night,  the  outposts  are  strengthened,  in  order  to 
increase  the  number  of  sentinels.  If  the  country  is 
wooded  and  favors  surprises,  the  sentinels  are  drawn 
in  nearer  their  outposts  at  nightfall,  in  order  to  avoid 
risk  of  being  carried  off.  By  taking  their  places  at 
the  bottom  of  the  hills,  whose  tops  they  may  have 
occupied  during  the  day,  they  have  a  better  chance 
of  seeing  an  approaching  enemy. 

When  the  same  points  are  occupied  for  several 
days,  it  is  a  good  plan  to  fortify  them,  either  by  throw- 
ing up  earthworks  or  by  using  abatis. 

No  one  should  leave  the  outposts.  Houses  should 
be  occupied  neither  by  officers  nor  men.  The  men 
should  never  take  off  their  clothes  or  accoutrements. 
Not  more  than  half  the  men  should  sit  down  or  rest 
at  the  same  time,  the  remainder  being  on  the  lookout. 


ADVANCED    POSTS.  383 

The  outposts  receive  deserters,  stop  travellers  and 
inhabitants  coming  in,  and  question  them.  Their 
reports  are  to  be  received  with  caution,  as  they  are 
often  false  and  generally  inaccurate. 

Frequent  patrols  move  about  among  the  outposts, 
called  defensive  patrols,  to  distinguish  them  from  those 
which  are  sent  to  the  exterior,  to  greater 
tances,  to  make  some  discovery.  Defei 
only  intended  to  see  that  the  sentiiij 
and  that  the  enemy  does  not  slip  inwiM^thi  between 
the  posts :  to  perform  this  duty,  a  coi 
or  four  men  are  sufficient.  When  a  noise* 
patrol  is  sent  to  discover  the  cause,  as  every  little 
thing  may  be  an  indication  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy.  A  man  is  sent  forward  to  reconnoitre,  who 
fires  his  piece  if  he  sees  the  enemy.  The  corporal 
causes  his  patrol  to  discharge  their  pieces,  and  they 
all  fall  back  towards  the  nearest  sentinel.  If  the 
ground  is  very  obstructed  or  covered,  the  men  of  the 
patrol  are  separated,  in  order  to  examine  the  ground 
more  thoroughly  ;  but  usually  they  keep  together. 
The  patrol  should  follow  the  direction  marked  out  for 
it,  be  perfectly  silent,  march  slowly,  halt  often  and 
listen,  avoid  rattling  the  arms,  must  not  smoke.  If  a 
sentinel  is  found  neglectful  of  his  duty,  the  patrol 
halts  and  a  man  is  sent  to  give  notice  at  the  outpost; 
it  will  only  move  forward  when  the  sentinel  has  been 
replaced. 

Near  dawn,  patrols  should  be  sent  out  more   fre- 


384  PRINCIPLES    OF    STEATEGY. 

quently,  because  this  is  the  time  to  expect  the  enemy. 
A  patrol  is  sometimes  replaced  by  an  intelligent 
soldier,  who  makes  the  rounds  of  the  sentinels,  to 
keep  them  on  the  alert. 

Art.  IT. — Laying   out  Camps. 

In  establishing  a  camp,  either  tents,  barracks,  or 
branches  of  trees  may  be  employed  in  giving  shelter, 
depending  upon  the  means  at  hand  and  the  duration 
of  the  encampment.  A  camp  should  always  be 
located  upon  military  considerations,  regard  being 
also  had  to  the  health  of  men  arid  animals.  It  should 
be  near  wood  and  water,  but  far  from  swamps,  which 
breed  fatal  fevers.  In  a  military  point  of  view,  a 
camp  should  overlook  the  surrounding  country,  or  at 
least  not  be  overlooked,  and  the  wings  should  be 
rested  upon  natural  obstacles.  If  a  river  flows  in 
front,  at  such  a  distance  as  to  permit  the  army  to 
be  assembled  and  manoeuvred,  so  much  the  better. 
The  rear  should  be  open,  and  present  one  or  more 
good  woods,  by  which  a  retreat  may  be  effected  if 
necessary. 

The  position  of  a  camp  seems  to  be  therefore  essen- 
tially defensive.  Hence  come  the  measures  for  its 
safety;  all  the  avenues  to  the  camp  from  the  front, 
flanks,  and  rear  should  be  held  by  detachments ;  the 
bridges  should  be  particularly  guarded  and  covered 
by  mtrenchinents,  fords  watched  and  defiles  occupied. 


LAYING    OUT    CAMPS.  385 

Besides  these  detachments,  which  may  sometimes  be 
at  a  considerable  distance,  the  camp  should  be  imme- 
diately surrounded  by  guards  occupying  lines  parallel 
to  the  front,  flanks,  and  rear,  at  a  distance  of  one  or 
two  hundred  yards.  To  avoid  surprise,  the  guards 
may  construct  small  defensive  works,  which  will 
enable  them  to  repel  a  charge  of  cavalry,  or  even  to 
resist  for  some  time  the  attack  of  superior  forces  of 
infantry.  These  works  may  be  very  rapidly  con- 
structed (See  Figure  29),  in  which  the  unit  of  measure 
is  the  yard.  If  the  exact  form  shown  cannot  be 
given,  at  any  rate  a  mound  of  earth  can  be  thrown 
up,  three  or  four  feet  high. 

The  work  may  be  in  the  form  of  a  redan  or  lunette, 
only  large  enough  to  contain  the  guard  when  under 
arms.  A  yard  along  the  parapet  is  the  allowance 
for  each  man.  The  work  is  closed  at  the  gorge 
by  a  small  trench  and  bank  of  earth.  Sometime? 
abatis  may  be  substituted  for  the  earthwork. 


f 

$.  5o 

Fig.  29. 

The  front  of  the  camp  should  be  as  great  as  that 
of  the  troops  in  line  of  battle,  not  only  for  the  whole 
mass,  but  for  each  battalion,  &c.     The  artillery  camps 
17 


386  PRINCIPLES   OF   STRATEGY. 

are  usually  in  rear  of  the  infantry.  As  far  as  possible, 
the  camp  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry  should  form  a 
single  line,  the  cavalry  being  on  the  wings.  The 
lines  of  the  carnp  of  an  army  should  be  regulated  by 
the  ground,  in  the  same  way  as  an  order  of  battle. 
When  the  army  is  formed  in  two  lines,  there  are  two 
camps,  one  before  the  other.  The  reserve  has  its 
own.  The  same  rules  are  observed  in  each  camp,  as 
if  it  were  alone. 

If  a  camp  is  to  be  occupied  a  long  time,  and  may 
be  attacked,  it  should  be  fortified.  It  is  better  to 
have  the  works  that  are  built  for  its  protection  few 
and  strong,  than  many  and  weak.  In  an  open  and 
level  country,  the  cavalry  should  camp  upon  the 
wings  of  the  infantry,  because  that  is  their  place  in 
line  of  battle ;  but  in  a  broken  country,  they  would 
form  a  second  line  behind  the  infantry  ;  they  should 
always  take  precautions  to  avoid  sudden  attack,  as 
some  time  is  required  to  saddle  the  horses,  &c.  The 
artillery  park  should  also  be  in  rear,  as  nothing  is 
more  to  be  feared  than  a  surprise  of  a  park.  When 
there  are  no  natural  obstacles  to  cover  the  flanks  of 
the  camp,  brigades  or  divisions  may  be  placed  in 
camps  on  the  flanks,  perpendicular  to  the  general  line. 
Sometimes,  when  attack  may  be  also  expected  in 
rear,  the  second  line  may  turn  its  color  fronts  to  the 
rear,  and  thus  a  large  square  or  rectangle  be  formed. 

It  is  better,  for  several  reasons,  to  put  soldiers  in 
huts  than  in  tents  :  1st,  no  transportation  is  required 


BIVOUACS.  387 

for  them;  2d,  the  huts  are  more  healthy;  3d,  the 
construction  of  the  huts  gives  occupation  to  the  sol- 
diers and  develops  their  intelligence.  The  general 
arrangement  of  a  camp  of  huts  should  be  the  same 
as  for  tents. 


Art.  V.— Bivouacg. 

When  the  troops  cannot  be  regularly  established  in 
camp,  but  still  must  be  kept  together,  they  are  placed 
m  bivouac.  In  bivouac,  as  in  camp,  each  body  of 
troops  should  be  placed  as  in  the  order  of  battle. 

A  regiment  of  cavalry  being  in  order  of  battle,  in 
rear  of  the  ground  to  be  occupied,  is  broken  by 
platoons  to  the  right.  The  horses  of  each  platoon 
are  placed  in  a  single  row,  and  fastened  to  pickets 
planted  firmly  in  the  ground  ;  near  the  enemy,  they 
remain  saddled  all  night,  with  girths  slackened.  The 
arms  are  at  first  stacked  in  rear  of  each  row  of 
horses;  the  sabres,  with  the  bridles  hung  on  them, 
are  placed  against  the  stacks.  The  forage  is  placed 
on  the  right  of  each  row  of  horses.  Two  stable- 
guards  for  each  platoon  watch  the  horses. 

A  fire  for  each  platoon  is  made  near  the  color  line, 
twenty  paces  to  the  left  of  the  row  of  horses.  A 
shelter  is  made  for  the  men  around  the  fire,  if  possi- 
ble, and  each  man  then  places  his  arras  and  bridle 
against  the  shelter.  The  fires  and  shelter  for  the 
officers  are  placed  in  rear  of  the  line  of  those  for  the 


3S8  nilNCII'LES    OF    STRATEGY. 

men.  The  interval  between  the  shelters  should  be 
such  that  the  platoons  can  take  up  a  line  of  battle 
freely  to  the  front  or  rear. 

The  interval  between  the  squadrons  must  be  with- 
out obstruction  throughout  the  whole  depth  of  the 
bivouac.  The  distance  from  the  enemy  decides  the 
manner  in  which  the  horses  are  fed  and  led  to  water. 
"When  it  is  permitted  to  unsaddle,  the  saddles  are 
placed  in  the  rear  of  the  horses. 

For  infantry,  the  h'res  are  made  in  rear  of  the 
color  line,  on  the  ground  that  would  be  occupied  by 
the  tents  in  camp.  The  companies  are  placed  around 
them,  and,  if  possible,  construct  shelters.  When 
liable  to  surprise,  the  infantry  should  stand  to  arms  at 
daybreak,  and  the  cavalry  mount,  until  the  return  of 
the  reconnoitring  parties.  If  the  arms  are  to  be 
taken  apart  to  clean,  it  must  be  done  by  detach- 
ments, successively. 

The  artillery  can  have  no  fixed  rule  for  its  bivouacs, 
being  obliged  to  suit  itself  to  localities  ;  but,  in  every 
case,  the  fires  should  not  be  near  the  park.  The  fol- 
lowing is  a  good  arrangement :  1st,  a  single  row  of 
fires  for  cannoneers  and  drivers  ;  2d,  the  horses  in 
four  ranks  ;  3d,  the  forage  ;  4th,  the  pieces,  caissons, 
and  wagons,  parked  in  rear,  in  two  ranks.  The  officers 
have  a  fire  to  the  front. 


CANTONMENTS.  389 


Art.  VI.— Cantonments 

In  order  to  put  troops  in  cantonments,  they  are 
distributed  in  the  villages  of  the  country  occupied  by 
them.  "When  an  army  is  moving,  it  must  be  can- 
toned, if  at  all,  in  the  order  in  which  it  happens  to 
be,  each  corps  using  to  the  best  advantage  the  villages, 
hamlets,  and  farm-houses  it  occupies,  all  under  the 
direction  and  superintendence  of  the  officers,  in  order 
to  avoid  fighting  among  the  men  for  the  best  quar- 
ters. 

If  the  army  is  to  remain  in  the  same  position  some 
time,  it  may  be  more  extended,  in  order  to  burden 
the  country  less  and  make  the  soldiers  more  comforta- 
ble. They  are  generally  much  crowded  in  cantoning 
on  a  march.  This  distribution  of  the  troops  among 
the  villages  and  hamlets  of  a  country  demands  much 
care  and  attention  from  the  staff  officers,  who  have 
the  duty  to  perform,  in  order  that  the  men  may  be 
securely  and  conveniently  lodged,  and  that  they  may 
be  uniformly  distributed  among  the  people  in  propor- 
tion to  their  ability  to  receive  them. 

Cantonments  should,  if  possible,  be  established 
behind  a  river,  for  the  sake  of  greater  security  against 
attack.  This  is  particularly  necessary  for  winter 
quarters,  which  are  generally  more  extended.  The 
different  corps  should  be  near  enough  for  mutual  sup- 


390  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

port.  A  place  of  assembly  should  be  designated,  in 
view  of  the  contingency  of  an  attack.  This  point 
should  not  be  too  near  the  enemy. 

The  different  arms  of  the  service  should  be  so 
cantoned  as  to  afford  mutual  support.  The  artillery 
is  placed  near  the  roads,  so  as  to  be  able  to  move 
rapidly  wherever  needed ;  it  should  be,  covered  Lj 
the  infantry.  The  cavalry  may  be  placed  wherever 
forage  and  water  are  most  convenient,  as  the  rapidity 
of  its  motions  enables  it  to  reach  the  place  of  assem- 
bly in  time  from  any  part  of  the  cantonment.  Care 
must  betaken,  however,  not  to  station  it  where  it  may 
be  easily  surprised,  as  it  is  not  so  able  to  repel  a  sud- 
den attack  as  infantry. 

In  each  partial  cantonment,  there  should  be  a  place 
for  the  troops  to  assemble  at  a  given  signal,  and  all 
the  usual  precautions  for  safety  should  be  taken. 
Each  battalion  should  have  its  place  of  assembly  in 
case  of  alarm,  each  brigade,  each  division,  each  army 
corp,  and  finally  the  whole  army.  This  final  position 
should  be  known  to  the  commanders  of  divisions  arid 
even  of  brigades,  to  provide  for  the  case  of  acciden- 
tal separation  from  the  divisions  to  which  they  belong. 

The  communication  between  the  different  places  of 
assembly  should  be  free ;  with  this  object,  bridges 
should  be  repaired,  roads  improved  and  newly 
opened,  if  necessary.  If  a  river  passes  through  the 
cantonment,  it  must  be  bridged  ;  and  if  there  are 
deep  ravines,  difficult  of  passage,  roads  must  be  made 


CANTONMENTS.  391 

across  them  for  artillery.  When  the  cantonments 
are  not  covered  by  an  nnfordable  river,  it  is  well  to 
break  up  the  roads  by  which  the  enemy  can  arrive, 
and  to  construct  abatis  and  field-works  in  the  most 
accessible  places.  A  still  better  safeguard  is  great 
vigilance  upon  the  part  of  the  advanced  posts.  Both 
means  should  be  used. 

Generals  should  never  leave  their  troops,  but  re- 
main in  their  midst,  in  the  most  convenient  place  for 
giving  their  orders.  In  1094,  Count  Tilly  was  cap- 
tured in  a  house  where  he  was  lodging,  because  a 
marsh  separated  him  from  his  troops.  Such  disgrace 
is  reserved  for  officers  who  prefer  their  comfort  to 
their  safety.  When  troops  bivouac,  the  generals 
should  bivouac  with  them  ;  their  tents,  if  they  have 
them,  should  be  kept  for  maps  and  papers  which  must 
be  used,  and  might  be  ruined  by  rain  or  dew ;  but 
they  should  sleep  out  with  the  men.  The  latter 
should  have  no  ground  for  complaining  that  they  are 
exposed  to  hardships  and  privations  which  are  not 
shared  by  their  officers.  This  is  especially  necessary 
with  volunteers  and  militia. 

The  commanding  general  fixes  the  limits  to  be  oc- 
cupied by  each  corps,  the  commanders  of  corps  dis- 
tribute their  own  divisions,  the  generals  of  divisions 
their  brigades,  &c.  To  make  these  distributions, 
maps  are  required,  and  the  more  they  are  in  detail  the 
better.  After  the  first  assignments  are  made,  it 
must  be  expected  that  many  rectifications  will  be 


392  PRINCIPLES   OF    STRATEGY. 

necessary.  "When  they  are  made,  tables  will  be  pre- 
pared, showing  in  detail  the  positions  of  the  different 
bodies  of  troops.  At  the  head-quarters  of  a  division, 
for  example,  there  will  be  a  table,  embracing  the  fol- 
lowing heads  :  Head-quarters  of  the  division  ;  Head- 
quarters of  the  brigades,  battalions,  isolated  compa- 
nies ;  Places  of  assembly  of  brigades  ;  Place  of  assem- 
bly of  the  division ;  Remarks.  So  for  other  bodies, 
whether  larger  or  smaller. 

There  is  often  no  time  for  the  preparation  of  such 
tables,  wrhere  the  distribution  of  the  troops  must  be 
made  very  rapidly,  as,  for  example,  in  cantonments  on 
a  march.  In  such  a  case,  each  brigade  quartermas- 
ter, accompanied  by  the  battalion  quartermasters  and 
an  officer  of  each  company,  should  precede  the  bri- 
gade several  hours,  to  prepare  lodgings,  the  division 
quartermaster  having  given  general  instructions  to 
the  brigade  quartermasters.  To  complete  the  subject, 
there  are  given  below  some  extracts  from  a  circular 
addressed  to  commanders  of  divisions,  in  anticipation 
of  a  grand  concentration  of  troops.  It  may  be 
modified  to  suit  varying  circumstances  : 

1st.  The  companies  of  the  same  battalion  must  be 
always  kept  together,  and,  as  far  as  practicable,  the 
battalions  and  regiments  of  the  same  brigade. 

2d.  The  soldiers  of  the  same  company  must  be 
lodged  together  by  sections,  or  at  least  by  half  sec- 
tions ;  which  will  not  prevent  putting  several  sections 
in  a  single  house,  if  it  affords  room  enough. 


CANTONMENTS.  393 

3d.  The  commander  of  a  battalion  and  his  staff 
should  be  placed  as  nearly  as  possible  in  the  centre 
of  his  battalion. 

4th.  The  company  officers  should  be  lodged  in  the 
same  house  with  their  men,  or  very  near  them. 

5th.  The  drummers  must  be  near  head-quarters. 

6th.  Near  the  rallying  place,  there  should  always 
be  the  police-guard. 

7th.  Barns  are  to  be  prepared  as  lodgings,  and  the 
first  floors  of  dwellings,  the  upper  being  left  to  the 
inhabitants,  unless  there  is  great  scarcity  of  room. 

8th.  The  company  officers  in  advance  will  mark 
with  chalk,  upon  the  doors  of  barns  and  houses,  the 
letters  of  companies,  and  the  number  of  men  to  be 
received  in  them. 

9th.  When  a  room  is  six  paces  in  width,"  soldiers 
may  be  made  to  sleep  in  two  rows ;  but  if  the  width 
is  less,  in  but  one  row.  Each  man  is  allowed  the 
breadth  of  a  pace.  Thus,  a  room  twenty  paces  long 
would  accommodate  forty  men,  if  six  paces  or  more 
in  width ;  but  only  twenty  men,  if  less  than  six  paces  in 
width. 

10th.  The  distribution  of  lodgings  should  com- 
mence on  the  right  of  the  village,  looking  towards 
the  enemy ;  that  is  to  say,  the  first  company  should 
be  placed  on  the  right,  and  so  on. 

llth.  The  same  rule  should  be  followed  if  several 
battalions  are  in  the  same  village ;  that  is,  the  first 
battalion  should  be  on  the  right. 
17* 


394  PKINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

12th.  The  non-commissioned  officers  will  see  that 
arms  and  accoutrements  are  placed  in  order  in  the 
several  rooms,  so  that  each  man  may  easily  lay  his 
hands  upon  his  own,  &c.,  &c. 

During  cantonments  of  some  duration,  efforts  are 
made  to  re-establish  that  perfect  discipline  and  order 
which  are  often  much  disturbed  by  a  long  and  painful 
campaign.  During  the  same  period,  the  cavalry  is 
remounted,  the  ranks  filled  up,  the  troops  paid, 
clothed,  shod,  and  fully  equipped  in  every  way.  In 
marches  in  their  own  country,  the  troops  live  on  what 
they  carry  with  them,  and  what  may  be  procured  for 
distribution  to  them  by  the  proper  officers.  In  an 
enemy's  country,  they  may  live  on  the  product  of 
requisitions  made  upon  the  inhabitants.  Those  requi- 
sitions should  be  regulated  in  amount  by  the  ability 
of  the  people  to  meet  them  and  by  the  wants  of  the 
troops,  both  present  and  prospective ;  for  it  is  always 
well  to  have  a  supply  of  provisions  for  several  days, 
in  order  that  the  troops  may  not  want  the  neces- 
saries of  life.  These  requisitions  are  renewed  as  the 
army  advances.  But  it  is  one  of  the  most  difficult 
things  to  prevent  the  soldiers  from  wasting  their 
rations,  when  they  have  a  supply  issued  for  several 
days  at  once. 

Depots  of  supplies  are  also  formed,  from  which  the 
troops  may  be  subsisted  during  the  operations  of  the 
campaign,  if  the  country  through  which  they  pass 
cannot  support  them.  If  extended  requisitions  upon 


CANTONMENTS.  395 

the  country  do  not  furnish  sufficient  supplies,  more 
must  be  purchased  elsewhere,  for  money  must  be 
expended  to  feed  the  men,  who  have,  at  best,  to 
undergo  many  privations  and  sufferings. 

If  the  war  is  conducted  upon  proper  principles,  the 
soldiers  should  never  be  permitted  to  seize  food  or 
clothing  for  themselves.  Every  thing  should  come  to 
them  through  authorized  officers,  otherwise  the  war 
will  soon  degenerate  into  wholesale  pillaging.  Un- 
doubtedly, the  men  must  not  be  permitted  to  starve 
nor  to  suffer  in  an  abundant  country.  The  enemy 
should  be  always  made  to  bear,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
burden  of  the  war.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  leav- 
ing out  of  consideration  the  calls  of  humanity, 
self-interest  requires  that  the  non-combatant  inhabit- 
ants of  any  country  be  treated  in  person  and  prop- 
erty with  as  much  consideration  as  possible.  By 
requiring  an  invaded  country  to  furnish  whatever  sup- 
plies it  can,  without  causing  starvation  to  innocent 
non-combatants ;  by  exhibiting  all  the  kindness  and 
humanity  possible,  consistently  with  firmness  arid 
justice,  provision  is  made  for  the  future,  and  especially 
for  the  eventuality  of  a  retrograde  movement  through 
the  same  country.  By  treating  the  inhabitants  with 
justice  and  humanity,  and  giving  them  an  equivalent 
for  their  property,  many  friends  are  gained,  or,  at  least, 
their  hostility  diminished  ;  they  will  not  fly  at  your 
approach ;  they  will  give  you  bread  for  money,  and 
give  you  shelter  in  their  habitations.  Act  otherwise ; 


396  PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

pillage,  ravage  the  country ;  force  the  timid  non-com- 
batants to  flee  for  their  lives  ;  march  with  the  sword 
in  one  hand  and  the  fire-brand  in  the  other;  surround 
yourself  with  ruins,  make  the  country  a  desert,  and  in 
a  little  while  you  may  be  yourself  reduced  to  the  direst 
extremities.  To-day  you  may  be  swimming  in  plenty, 
and  to-morrow  enduring  the  pangs  of  want.  I  repeat 
it ;  require  the  inhabitants  of  a  country  to  supply 
your  necessities,  for  this  is  the  right  of  war;  but  use 
this  right  with  wise  discretion.  In  this  light  must 
we  interpret  the  maxim  of  Cato  —  War  supports  war. 


THE   END. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PRINCIPLES   OF  STRATEGY. 

PAGE 

ART.  1.  Definitions 7 

2.  Bases  of  operations 11 

3.  Lines  of  operations 15 

4.  Strategic  points 25 

5.  Plan  of  campaign 28 

6.  Plan  of  defence 35 

7.  Strategical  operations 47 

Forward  movements. 49 

Retreats 57 

Diversions— Combined  marches — Detachments 60 

Pursuit 68 

Holding  a  conquered  country 71 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION   OF   ARMIES 

ART.  1.  Composition  of  an  army 77 

"     2.  Formations  of  troops 89 

CHAPTER  III. 

MARCHES  AND  MANfEUVRES. 

ART.  1.  Rules  to  be  observed  in  marches 99 

Scouting  parties 108 

Advanced  guard Ill 

Rear  guard 120 

Strength  of  a  column  on  the  march 121 

u     2.  Forward  movements  and  the  combats  they  lead  to 122 

Order  of  march  of  a  division 122 


398  CONTENTS. 

VAGB. 

Art.   2.  Forward  movements  and  the  combats  they  lead  to 122 

of  bridges 131 

of  woods 135 

Passage  of  rivers. 136 

Arrival  of  the  column  in  presence  of  the  enemy  . . .  138 

3.  Flank  marches 141 

4.  Marches  in  retreat 147 

Eear  guard 149 

Passing  a  bridge  in  retreat 151 

5.  The  simultaneous  movement  of  several  columns 155 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BATTLES. 

Preliminary  remarks 168 

ART.  1.  Definitions — Orders  of  battle 170 

Number  of  lines  in  order  of  battle 171 

Reserve 172 

Lines  to  be  deployed  or  in  columns 173 

Divisions  of  a  corps,  how  distributed 174 

.  Parallel  order 175 

Oblique  order 176 

Parallel  order  re-enforced    178 

Continued  order  and  order  with  intervals 179 

Checker  order 181 

Crotchet  to  the  rear 182 

Crotchet  to  the  front 183 

"     2.  Employment  of  the  different  arms 184 

"     3.  Offensive  battles 190 

The  reconnoissance 190 

Determination  of  the  point  of  attack 191 

Attack  of  heights 198 

The  enveloping  attack 199 

The  flank  attack 200 

Attack  upon  the  centre 204 

Concentration 208 

Example  of  attacking  with  a  corps  of  four  divisions.  208 

Pursuits .  217 


CONTENTS.  390 

PAGE. 

Art.  4.  Defensive  battles 220 

Positions 220 

Dispositions  for  the  defensive 225 

Squares 232 

Defensive  properties  of  ground 2,33 

Use  of  fortifications 23G 

Defensive  manoeuvres 237 

Retreat..  .  241 


CHAPTER  Y. 

DEFENCE  OF  EIVERS  AND  MOUNTAINS — COVERING  A  SIEGE. 

ART.  1.  Defence  of  rivers 248 

Bridge-heads 250 

Secondary  means 254 

Movements  of  troops 255 

"  2.  Defence  of  mountains 259 

Artificial  obstacles 201 

Positions 262 

Intrenchments 265 

Movements  of  troops 266 

Example 270 

Communications 273 

Summary 274 

"     3.  Covering  a  siege 274 

CHAPTER  YI. 

COMBATS   AND  AFFAIRS. 

ART.  1.  Combats  of  infantry  against  infantry    281 

In  a  plain 283 

Upon  heights 291 

In  woods 294 

In  inhabited  places 297 

-"     2.  Cavalry  against  cavalry 3' 

"     3.  Cavalry  against  infantry 307 

"     4.  Combats  of  artillery 312 


400  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Art.   5.  Attack  and  defence  of  a  redoubt 316 

"     6.  Attack  and  defence  of  a  strong  dwelling-house  with  out- 
buildings and  enclosures,  all  of  masonry 320 

"     7.  Attack  and  defence  of  a  village 322 

"     8.  Observations  upon  manoeuvres 327 


CHAPTER  YII. 

RECONNOISSANCES. 

AET.  1.  Armed  reconnoissances 332 

Secret         "  338 

Spies 345 

"     2.  Topographical  reconnoissances 346 

Itineraries .   358 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

SPECIAL  MISSIONS,    AND    GIVING    REST   TO    TROOPS. 

ART.  1.  Convoys 361 

"     2.  Ambuscades 372 

"     3.  Advanced  posts 378 

"     4.  Laying  out  camps 384 

"     5.  Bivouacs 3B7 

"     6.  Cantonments  . .  .389 


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Grillmore's  Limes  and  Cements. 

Fifth  Edition.    Revised  and  Enlarged.     8vo.     Cloth.     $4.00. 

PRACTICAL  TREATISE  ON  LIMES,  HYDRAULIC  CEMENTS,  AND  MOR- 
TARS. By  Q.  A.  GILLMORE,  Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  Corps  of  Engineers. 
Brevet  Major-General  U.  S.  Army. 


Glllmore's  Coignet  Betoii. 

Nine  Plates,  Views,  etc.     8vo.    Cloth.    $2.50. 

COIGXET  BETON  AXD  OTHER  ARTIFICIAL  STONE. — By  Q.  A.  GILL- 
MORE,  Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  Corps  of  Engineers,  Brevet  Major-General  U.S. 
Army. 

Grillmore  on  Roads. 

Seventy  Illustrations.    12mo.     Cloth.    $2.03. 

A  PRACTICAL  TREATISE  ox  THE  CONSTRUCTION  OF  ROADS,  STREETS, 
AND  PAVEMENTS.  By  Q.  A.  GILLMORE,  Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  Corps  of 
Engineers,  Brevet  Major-General  U.  S.  Army. 


Gillmore's  Building  Stones. 

8vo.     Cloth.    $1.50. 

REPORT    ON  STRENGTH  OF   THE  BUILDING  STONES  IN   TIII?   UNITED 
STATES,  etc. 


tiolley's  Railway  Practice. 

1  vol.  folio.     Cloth.     $12.00. 

AMERICAN  AND  EUROPEAN  RAILWAY  PRACTICE,  in  the  Economical 
Generation  of  Steam,  including  the  materials  and  construction  of 
Coal-burning  Boilers,  Combustion,  the  Variable  Blast,  Vaporization, 
Circulation,  Super-heating,  Supplying  and  Heating  Feed-water,  &c., 
and  the  adaptation  of  Wood  and  Coke-burning  Engines  to  Coal* 
burning ;  and  in  Permanent  Way,  including  Road-bed,  Sleepers, 
Rails,  Joint  Fastenings,  Street  Railways,  etc.,  etc.  By  ALEXANDER 
L.  HOLLEY,  B.P.  With  77  lithographed  plates. 


Useful  Information  for  Railway  Men. 

Pocket  form.    Morocco,  gilt.     $2.00. 

Compiled  by  W.    G.   HAMILTON,   Engineer.     Sixth  Edition,  Retted 
and  Enlarged.     570  pages. 


D.   VAN  NO  STRAND.  \\ 


Stuart's   Civil  and   Military  Engineering  of 
America. 

8vo.    Illustrated.    Clotli.    $5.00. 

THE  CIVIL  AND  MILITARY  ENGINEERS  OF  AMERICA.  By  General 
CHARLES  B.  STUART,  Author  of  "  Naval  Dry  Docks  of  the  United 
States,"  etc.,  etc.  Embellished  with  nine  finely-executed  Portraits 
on  steel  of  eminent  Engineers,  and  illustrated  by  Engravings  of  some 
of  the  most  important  and  original  works  constructed  in  America. 


Ernst's  Manual  of  Military  Engineering. 

193  Wood-cuts  and  3  Lithographed  Plates.    12mo.    Cloth.    $5.00 
A  MANUAL  OF  PRACTICAL   MILITARY   ENGINEERING.     Prepared  for 
the  use  of  the  Cadets  of  the  U.  S.  Military  Academy,  and  for  Engineer 
Troops.     By  Capt.  O.  II.  ERNST,  Corps  of  Engineers,  Instructor  in 
Practical  Military  Engineering,  U.  S.  Military  Academy. 


Simms'  Levelling. 

12mo.    Cloth.    $2.50. 

A  TREATISE  ox  THE  PRINCIPLES  AND  PRACTICE  OF  LEVELLING, 
showing  its  application,  to  purposes  of  Railway  Engineering  and  tha 
Construction  of  Roads,  etc.  By  FREDERICK  W.  SIMMS,  C.E.  From 
the  fifth  London  edition,  Revised  and  Corrected,  with  the  addition  of 
Mr.  Law's  Practical  Examples  for  Setting-out  Railway  Curves. 
Illustrated  with  three  lithographic  plates  and  numerous  wood-cuts. 


JefFers'  Nautical  Surveying. 

Illustrated  with  9  Copperplates  and  31  Wood-cut  Illustrations.    8vo.    Cloth.    $5.00. 
NAUTICAL  SURVEYING.      By  WILLIAM  1ST.  JEFFERS,  Captain  U.  S. 
Navy.  

Brunnow's  Spherical  Astronomy. 

Illustrated.    8vo.    Cloth.    $0.50. 

SPHERICAL  ASTRONOMY.    By  F.   BRUNNOW,  Ph.  Br,    Translated  by 
the  Author  from  the  second  German  edition, 

The  Plane  Table. 

8vo.     Cloth.    $2.00. 

ITS  USES  IN  TOPOGRAPHICAL    SURVEYING.     From  the  papers  of  ths 
IT.  S.  Coast  Survov. 


12  SCIENTIFIC  LOOKS  PUBLISHED  BY 


Clianvenet's  Lunar  Distances. 

8vo.    Cloth.    $2.00. 

METHOD  OF  CORRECTING  LUNAR  DISTANCES,  and  Improved 
Method  of  Finding  the  Error  and  Rate  of  a  Chronometer,  by  equal 
altitudes.  By  War.  CHAUVENET,  LL.D.,  Chancellor  of  Washington 
University  of  St.  Louis. 

Burt's  Key  to  Solar  Compass. 

Second  Edition,    rocket-book  form.    Tuck.    $2.50. 

KEY  TO  THE  SOLAR  COMPASS,  and  Surveyor's  Companion  ;  comprising 
all  the  Rules  necessary  for  use  in  the  Field  ;  also  Description  of  the 
Linear  Surveys  and  Public  Land  System  of  the  United  States,  Notes 
on  the  Barometer,  Suggestions  for  an  Outfit  for  a  Survey  of  Four 
Months,  etc.  By  W.  A.  BURT,  U.  S.  Deputy  Surveyor. 


Howard's  Earthwork  Mensuration. 

8vo.    Illustrated.     Cloth.    $1.50. 

EARTHWORK  MENSURATION  ON  THE  BASIS  OF  THE  PRISMOIDAL 
FORMULAE.  Containing  simple  and  labor-saving  method  of  obtaining 
Prismoidal  Contents  directly  from  End  Areas.  Illustrated  by 
Examples,  and  accompanied  by  Plain  Rules  for  practical  uses.  By 
CONWAY  R.  HOWARD,  Civil  Engineer,  Richmond,  Va. 


tMorris'  Easy  Kules. 

78  Illustrations.    8vo.    Cloth.    $1.50. 

EASY  RULES  FOR  THE  MEASUREMENT  OF  EARTHWORKS,  by  means  of 
the  Prismoidal  Formula.     By  ELWOOD  MORRIS,  Civil  Engineer. 


Clevenger's  Surveying. 

Illustrated  Pocket  Form.    Morocco,  gilt.    $2.50. 

A  TREATISE  ON  THE  METHOD  OF  GOVERNMENT  SURVEYING,  as 
prescribed  by  the  U.  S.  Congress  and  Commissioner  of  the  General 
Land  Office.  With  complete  Mathematical,  Astronomical,  and  Prac- 
tical Instructions  for  the  use  of  the  U.  S.  Surveyors  in  the  Field,  and 
Students  who  contemplate  engaging  in  the  business  of  Public  Land 
Surveying.  By  S.  V.  CLEVENGER,  U.  S.  Deputy  Surveyor. 


Hewson  on  Embankments. 

8vo.    Cloth.    82.00. 

PRINCIPLES  AND  PRACTICE  OF  EMBANKING  LANDS  from  River 
Floods,  as  applied  to  the  Levees  of  the  Mississippi.  By  WILLIAM 
HEWSON,  Civil  Engineer. 


D.   VAN  NOSTRAND.  1:3 

Minifie's  Mechanical  Drawing. 

Ninth  Edition.     Royal  8vo.     Cloth.    $4.00. 

A  TEXT-BOOK  OF  GEOMETRICAL  DRAWING,  for  the  use  of  Mechanics 
and  Schools.  With  illustrations  for  Drawing  Plans,  Sections,  and 
Elevations  of  Buildings  and  Machinery  ;  an  Introduction  to  Isometri- 
cal  Drawing,  and  an  Essay  on  Linear  Perspective  and  Shadows. 
AVith  over  200  diagrams  on  steel.  By  WILLIAM  MINIFIE,  Architect. 
With  an  Appendix  on  the  Theory  and  Application  of  Colors. 


Minifie's  Geometrical  Drawing. 

New  Edition.    Enlarged.    12rno.    Cloth.    $2.00. 

GEOMETRICAL  DRAWING.     Abridged  from  the  octavo  edition,  for  the 
use  of  Schools.     Illustrated  with  48  steel  plates. 


Free  Hand.  Drawing. 

Profusely  Illustrated.    18ino.    Boards.    50  cents. 

A  GUIDE  TO  ORNAMENTAL,  Figure,  and  Landscape  Drawing.     By  an 
Art  Student. 


The  Mechanic's  Friend. 

12mo.    Cloth.    300    Illustrations.    $1.50.  , 

THE  MECHANIC'S  FRIEND.  A  Collection  of  Receipts  and  Practical 
Suggestions,  relating  to  Aquaria — Bronzing — Cements — Drawing — 
Dyes — Electricity — Gilding — Glass- working — Glues — Horology — Lac- 
quers—Locomotives— Magnetism — Metal- working — Modelling — Pho- 
tography— Pyrotechny — Railways  —  Solders  —  Steam-Engine  —  Tele- 
graphy— Taxidermy — Varnishes — Waterproofing — and  Miscellaneous 
Tools,  Instruments,  Machines,  and  Processes  connected  with  the 
Chemical  and  Mechanical  Arts.  By  WILLIAM  E.  AXON,  M.R.S.L. 


Harrison's  Mechanic's  Tool-Book. 

44  Illustrations.    12mo.    Cloth.    $1.50. 

MECHANICS'  TOOL  BOOK,  with  Practical  Rules  and  Suggestions,  for  the 
use  of  Machinists,  Iron  Workers,  and  others.     By  W.  B.  HARRISON. 

Randall's  Quartz  Operator's  Hand-Book. 

12mo.    Cloth.    $2.00. 

QUARTZ    OPERATOR'S   HAND-BOOK.    By  P.  M.   RANDALL.      Ne\f 
edition.  Revised  and  Enlarged.     Fully  illustrated. 


14  SCIENTIFIC  LOOKS  PUBLISHED  LY 

Joynson  on  Machine  Grearing. 

8vo.     Cloth.    s^2.00. 

THE  MECHANIC'S  AND  STUDENT'S  GUIDE  in  the  designing  and  Con" 
structionof  General  Machine  Gearing,  as  Eccentrics,  Screws,  Toothed 
Wheels,  etc.,  and  the  Drawing  of  Rectilineal  and  Curved  Surfaces. 
Edited  by  FRANCIS  H.  JOYNSON.  With  18  folded  plates. 


Silversmith's  Hancl-Book:. 

Fourth  Edition.    Illustrated.     12nio.     Cloth.    $3.00. 

A  PRACTICAL  HAND-BOOK  FOR  MINERS,  Metallurgists,  and  Assayers. 
By  JULIUS  SILVERSMITH.     Illustrated. 


Barnes'  Submarine  Warfare. 

8vo.     Cloth.     $5.00. 

SUBMARINE  WARFARE,  DEFENSIVE  AND  OFFENSIVE.  Descriptions 
of  the  various  forms  of  Torpedoes,  Submarine  Batteries  and  Torpedo 
Boats  actually  used  in  War.  Methods  of  Ignition  by  Machinery, 
Contact  Fuzes,  and  Electricity,  and  a  full  account  of  experiments 
made  to  determine  the  Explosive  Force  of  Gunpowder  under  Water. 
Also  a  discussion  of  the  Offensive  Torpedo  system,  its  effect  upon 
Iron-clad  Ship  systems,  and  influence  upon  future  Naval  Wars.  By 
Lieut.-Com.  JOHN  S.  BARNES,  U.S.N.  With  twenty  lithographic 
plates  and  many  wood-cuts. 

Foster's  Submarine  Blasting. 

4to.     Cloth.    $3.50. 

SUBMARINE  BLASTING,  in  Boston  Harbor,  Massachusetts — Removal  of 
Tower  and  Corwin  Rocks. .  By  JOHN  G.  FOSTER,  U.  S.  Eng.  and 
Bvt.  Major-General  U.  S.  Army.  With  seven  plates. 


Mowbray's  Tri-Nitro- Glycerine. 

8vo.    Cloth.    Illustrated.    $3.00 

TRI-NITRO-GLYCERINE,  as  applied  in  the  Hoosac  Tunnel,  and  to  Sub- 
marine Blasting,  Torpedoes,  Quarrying,  etc. 


Williamson  on  the  Barometer. 

4to.     Cloth.    $15.00. 

OX  THE  USE  OF  THE  BAROMETER  ON  SURVEYS  AND  RECONNAIS- 
SANCES. Part  I. — Meteorology  in  its  Connection  with  Hypsometry. 
Part  II. — Barometric  Hypsometry.  By  R.  S.  WILLIAMSON,  Bvt. 
Lt.-Col.  U.  S.  A.,  Major  Corps  of  Engineers.  With  illustrative  tables 
and  engravings. 


D.   VAN  NOSTUAND. 


Williamson's  Meteorological  Tables. 

4to.    Flexible  Cloth.    $2.50. 

PRACTICAL  TABLES  IN  METEOROLOGY  AND  II  YPSOMETRY,  in  connection 
with  the  use  of  the  Barometer.     By  Col.  R.  S.  WILLIAMSON,  U.S.A. 


Butler's  Projectiles  and.  KifLed.  Cannon. 

4to.    30  Plates.     Cloth.    $7.50. 

PROJECTILES  AND  RIFLED  CANNON.  A  Critical  Discussion  of  the 
Principal  Systems  of  Rifling  and  Projectiles,  with  Practical  Sugges- 
tions for  their  Improvement.  By  Capt.  JOHN  S.  BUTLER,  Ordnance 
Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

Ben6t's  Chronoscope. 

Second  Edition.    Illustrated.    4to.    Cloth.    $3.00. 

ELECTRO-BALLISTIC  MACHINES,  and  the  Schultz  Chronoscope.  By 
Lt.-Col.  S.  V.  BENET,  Chief  of  Ordnance  U.  S.  A. 


Michaelis'  Chronograph.. 

4to.    Illustrated.     Cloth.    $3.00. 

THE  LE  BOULENGIC  CHRONOGRAPH.  With  three  lithographed  folding 
plates  of  illustrations.  By  Bvt.  Captain  O.  E.  MICHAELIS,  Ordnance 
Corps,  U.  S.  A. 

Nugent  on  Optics. 

12mo.    Cloth.    $1.50. 

TREATISE  ON  OPTICS  ;  or,  Light  and  Sight,  theoretically  and  practically 
treated ;  with  the  application  to  Fine  Art  and  Industrial  Pursuits. 
By  E.  NUGENT.  With  103  illustrations. 


Peirce's  Analytic  Mechanics. 

4to.     Cloth.    $10.03. 

SYSTEM  OF  ANALYTIC  MECHANICS.  By  BENJAMIN  PEIRCE,  Pro- 
fessor of  Astronomy  and  Mathematics  in  Harvard  University. 

Craig's  Decimal  System. 

Square  32mo.    Limp.    50c. 

WEIGHTS  AND  MEASURES.  An  Account  of  the  Decimal  System,  with 
Tables  of  Conversion  for  Commercial  and  Scientific  Uses.  By  B.  F. 
CRAIG,  M.D. 


16  SCIENTIFIC  BOOKS  PUBLISHED  BY 


Alexander's  Dictionary  of  Weights  and 
Measures. 

New   Edition.    8vo.    Cloth.    $3.50. 

UNIVERSAL  DICTIONARY  OF  WEIGHTS  AND  MEASURES,  Ancient  and 
Modern,  reduced  to  the  standards  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
By  J.  II.  ALEXANDER. 

Elliot's  European  Light- Houses. 

51  Engravings  and  21  Wood-cuts.    8vo.    Cloth.    $5.00. 

EUROPEAN  LIGHT-HOUSE  SYSTEMS.  Being  a  Report  of  a  Tour  of 
Inspection  made  in  1873.  By  Major  GEORGE  H.  ELLIOT,  U.  S. 
Engineers. 

Sweet's  Report  on  Coal. 

With  Maps.    8vo.    Cloth.    $3.00. 
SPECIAL  REPORT  ON  COAL.     By  S.  II .  SWEET. 


Colburn's  Gras  Works  of  London. 

12mo.    Boards.    GO  cents. 
GAS  WORKS  OF  LONDON.     By  ZKRAII  COLBURN. 

Walker's  Screw  Propulsion. 

8vo.    Cloth.    75  cents. 

NOTES  ox  SCREW  PROPULSION,  its  Rise  and  History.  By  Capt.  TV.  H 
WALKER,  U.  S.  Navy. 

Pook  on  Shipbuilding. 

8vo.    Cloth.    Illustrated.    $5.00. 

METHOD  OF  PREPARING  THE  LINES  AND  DRAUGHTING  VESSELS 
PROPELLED  BY  SAIL  OR  STEAM,  including  a  Chapter  on  Laying-off 
on  the  Mould-loft  Floor.  By  SAMUEL  M.  POOK,  Naval  Constructor. 

Saeltzer's  Acoustics. 

12mo.    Cloth.     $2.00. 

TREATISE  ON  ACOUSTICS  in  connection  with  Ventilation.  By  ALEX- 
ANDER SAELTZER. 


Pickert  and  Metcalf ' s  Art  of  Graining. 

1vol.    4to.    Tinted  Paper.    Cloth.    $10.00. 

THE  ART  OF  GRAINING,  with  description  of  Colors  and  their  Applica- 
tion. By  CHARLES  PICKERT  and  ABRAHAM  METCALF.  With  42 
tinted  plates  of  the  various  woods  used  in  interior  finishing. 


D.    VAN  NOSTHAND.  17 


Wanklyn's  Milk  Analysis. 

12mo.    Cloth.    $1.00. 

MILK  ANALYSIS.  A  Practical  Treatise  on  the  Examination  of  Milk, 
and  its  Derivatives,  Cream,  Butter,  and  Cheese.  By  J.  ALFRED 
WANKLYN,  M.R.C.S. 


Hice  &  Johnson's  Differential  Functions. 

Paper,  12    mo.    50  cents. 

ON  A  NEW  METHOD  OP  OBTAINING  THE  DIFFERENTIALS  OF  FUNC- 
TIONS, with  especial  reference  to  the  Newtonian  Conception  of  Rates 
or  Velocities.  By  J.  MIXOT  HICE,  Prof,  of  Mathematics,  U.  S.  Navy, 
and  W.  TVooLSKY  JOHNSON,  Prof,  of  Mathematics,  St.  John's 
College,  Annapolis. 


Coffin's  Navigation. 

Fifth  Edition.    12mo.    Cloth.    $3.50. 

NAVIGATION  AND  NAUTICAL  ASTRONOMY.  Prepared  for  the  use  of 
the  U.  S.  Naval  Academy.  By  J.  H.  C.  COFFIN,  Professor  of 
Astronomy,  Navigation  and  Surveying  ;  with  52  wood-cut  illustra- 
tions. 


Clark's  Theoretical  Navigation, 

8vo.    Cloth.    $3.00. 

THEORETICAL  NAVIGATION  AND  NAUTICAL  ASTRONOMY.  By  LEWIS 
CLARK,  Lieut. -Commander,  U.  S.  Navy.  Illustrated  with  41  wood- 
cuts, including  the  Vernier. 


Toner's    Dictionary    of  Elevations. 

8vo.    Paper,  $3.00    Cloth,  $3,75. 

DICTIONARY  OF  ELEVATIONS  AND  CLIMATIC  REGISTER  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES.  Containing,  in  addition  to  Elevations,  the  Latitude, 
Mean  Annual  Temperature,  and  the  total  Annual  Rain  Fall  of  many 
Localities  ;  with  a  brief  introduction  on  the  Orographic  and  Physical 
Peculiarities  of  North  America,  By  J.  M.  TONER,  M.D. 


IS  SCIENTIFIC  LOOKS  PUBLISHED  UY 


VAN    NOSTRAND'S     SCIENCE     SEKIES. 


It  is  the  intention  of  the  Publisher  of  this  Series  to  issue  them  at 
intervals  of  about  a  month.  They  will  be  put  up  in  a  uniform,  neat, 
and  attractive  form,  ISmo,  fancy  boards.  The  subjects  will  be  of  an 
eminently  scientific  character,  and  embrace  as  wide  a  range  of  topics  as 
possible,  all  of  the  highest  character. 

Price,  50  Cents  Each. 

I.  CHIMNEYS  FOR  FURNACES,  FIRE-PLACES,  AND  STEAM  BOILERS.    By 

R.  ARMSTRONG,  C.E. 

II.  STEAM  BOILER  EXPLOSIONS.    By  ZERAH  COLBURN. 

III.  PRACTICAL  DESIGNING  OF  RETAINING  WALLS.   By  ARTHUR  JACOB, 
A.B.    With  Illustrations. 

IV.  PROPORTIONS    OF    PINS    USED    IN    BRIDGES.      By    CHARLES    E. 
BENDER,  C.E.     With  Illustrations. 

V.  VENTILATION  OF  BUILDINGS.  By  W.  F.  BUTLER.  With  Illustrations. 

VI.  ON  THE  DESIGNING  AND  CONSTRUCTION  OF  STORAGE  RESERVOIRS. 
By  ARTHUR  JACOB.     With  Illustrations. 

VII.  SURCHARGED  AND   DIFFERENT   FORMS   OF   RETAINING  WALLS. 
By  JAMES  S.  TATE,  C.E. 

VIII.  A  TREATISE  ON  THE  COMPOUND  ENGINE.     By  JOHN  TURNBULL. 

With  Illustrations. 

IX.  FUEL.     By  C.WILLIAM  SIEMENS,  to  which  is  appended  the  value  of 
ARTIFICIAL  FUELS  AS  COMPARED  WITH  COAL.     By  JOHN  WORM' 

ALD,  C.E. 

X.  COMPOUND  ENGINES.     Translated  from  the  French  of  A.  MALLET. 

Illustrated. 

XL  THEORY  OF  ARCHES.    By  Prof.  W.  ALLAN,  of  the  Washington  and 
Lee  College.     Illustrated. 

XII.  A  PRACTICAL  THEORY  OF  VOUSSOIR  ARCHES.  By  WILLIAM  CAIN, 
C.E.     Illustrated. 


D.  VAN  NOSTliAND.  59 


XIII.  A  PRACTICAL   TREATISE  ox  THE  GASES  MET  WITH  IN  COAL 
MINES.     By   the   late   J.  J.  ATKINSON,  Government  Inspector  of 

Mines  for  the  County  of  Durham,  England. 

XIV.  FRICTION  OF  AIR  IN  MINES.    By  J.  J.  ATKINSON,  author  of  "  A 
Practical  Treatise  on  the  Gases  met  with  in  Coal  Mines." 

XV.  SKEW  ARCHES.      By  Prof.  E.  W.  HYDE,  C.E.    Illustrated  with 
numerous  engravings  and  three  folded  plates. 

XVI.  A  GRAPHIC  METHOD  FOR  SOLVING  CERTAIN  ALGEBRAIC  EQUA- 
TIONS.    By  Prof.  GEORGE  L.  VOSE.     With  Illustrations. 

XVII.  WATER  AND   WATER   SUPPLY.      By  Prof.  W.  H.  CORFIELD, 
M.A.,  of  the  University  College,  London. 

XVIII.  SEWERAGE    AND    SEWAGE    UTILIZATION.      By  Prof.   W.  H. 
CORFIELD,  M.A.,  of  the  University  College,  London. 

XIX.  STRENGTH  OF  BEAMS  UNDER  TRANSVERSE  LOADS.      By  Prof. 
W.  ALLAN,  author  of  "Theory  of  Arches."    With  Illustrations 

XX.  BRIDGE  AND   TUNNEL   CENTRES.       By  JOHN  B.  MCMASTERS, 
C.E.    With  Illustrations. 

XXI.  SAFETY  VALVES.    By  RICHARD  II.  BUEL,  C.E.    With  Illustra- 
tions. 

XXII.  HIGH   MASONRY    DAMS.     By    JOHN    B.  MCMASTERS,    C.E. 

With  Illustrations. 

XXIII.  THE   FATIGUE    OF    METALS    under  Repeated    Strains,    with 
various  Tables  of  Results  of  Experiments.     From  the  German  of 
Prof.  LUDWIG  SPANGENBERG.    With  a  Preface  by  S.  H.  SHREVE, 
A.M .     With  Illustrations. 

XXIV.  A  PRACTICAL  TREATISE  ON  THE  TEETH  OF  WHEELS,  with 
the  theory  of  the  use  of  Robinson's  Odontograph.   By  S.  W.  ROBIN- 
SON, Prof,  of  Mechanical  Engineering,  Illinois  Industrial  University. 

XXV.  THEORY  AND    CALCULATIONS  OF  CONTINUOUS  BRIDGES.    By 
MANSFIELD  MERRIMAN,  C.E.     With  Illustrations. 


20  D.   VAN  NO  STRAND. 

The  University   Series. 

No.  1. — ON  THE  PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  LIFE.  By  Prof.  T.  H.  HUXLEY, 
LL.D.,  F.R.S.  With  an  introduction  by  a  Professor  in  Yale  College. 
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No.  2. — THE  CORELATION  OF  VITAL  AND  PHYSICAL  FORCES.  By 
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